Siegel Lv N. Strip Tolleson LLC v. Ec 215 Las Vegas LLC
CourtNevada Supreme Court
Date FiledNovember 21, 2026
Docket90698
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
SIEGEL LV NORTH STRIP TOLLESON No. 90698
LLC, A NEVADA LIMITED LIABILITY
COMPANY; SIEGEL LV NORTH STRIP
MCDOWELL LLC, A NEVADA
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY;
SIEGEL LV NORTH STRIP
TROPICANA LLC, A NEVADA
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY; AND
SIEGEL IN NORTH STRIP SIERRA
VISTA LLC, A NEVADA LIMITED
LIABILITY COMPANY,
Appellants,
vs.
EC 215 LAS VEGAS LLC, A
DELAWARE LIMITED LIABILITY
COMPANY AND EC 3001 SOUTH LAS
VEGAS BOULEVARD LLC, A
DELAWARE LIMITED LIABILITY
COMPANY,
Respondents.
ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE
This is an appeal from a district court order granting a motion for
a preliminary injunction. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Susan
Johnson, Judge.
Appellant Siegel LV North Strip Tolleson LLC (Siegel) purchased
a vacant parking lot on the Las Vegas Strip. Siegel’s property is adjacent to
respondent EC 215 Las Vegas LLC’s property (Silver City). Silver City owns
a strip mall with retail and restaurant tenants. When Siegel purchased the
parking lot, it did so subject to a Parking Easement Agreement (PEA), which
grants Silver City and its patrons access to certain portions of Siegel’s parking
lot.
Siegel put up a chain-link fence around the lot’s perimeter and
installed gates requiring Silver City’s driving patrons to enter a QR code to
park for free (hereafter, the “Fence and Gate System”). Siegel’s Fence and Gate
System effectively cut off pedestrians’ and drivers’ ability to use its parking lot
as a shortcut to access Silver City’s property.
Silver City sued Siegel, alleging the Fence and Gate System
violated the PEA, and, as relevant here, moved for a preliminary injunction
requiring its removal. Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court
granted the preliminary injunction on July 10, 2024, pending resolution of the
litigation. The district court denied reconsideration on April 28, 2025, but
clarified that Siegel was only required to remove the portion of the Fence and
Gate System that was subject to the PEA. Siegel appeals.
“A preliminary injunction is proper where the moving party can
demonstrate that it has a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits and
that, absent a preliminary injunction, it will suffer irreparable harm for which
compensatory damages would not suffice.” Excellence Cmty. Mgmt. v. Gilmore,
131 Nev. 347, 350-51, 351 P.3d 720, 722 (2015). We review the district court’s
decision for an abuse of discretion, id., but review underlying legal issues,
including contract interpretation, de novo, Posner v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 140
Nev. 201, 202, 545 P.3d 1150, 1152 (2024); Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Neal, 119 Nev.
62, 64, 64 P.3d 472, 473 (2003).
Siegel presents two overarching arguments on appeal: (1) the
district court misinterpreted the PEA as requiring “unobstructed” access to the
portion of the lot it covers, leading the court to conclude that the Fence and
Gate System likely violates the PEA; and (2) even if the district court correctly
interpreted the PEA, the evidence does not support its finding that Silver City
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would suffer irreparable harm if the Fence and Gate System remained in place
pending resolution of the litigation.
The district court did not commit reversible error in determining that Silver
City’s claims have a likelihood of success on their merits
The district court interpreted Section 1.1(a) of the PEA as granting
Silver City’s patrons the right to unobstructed access to and through the
Exclusive Easement Parcel, including access to and from Silver City’s property
and any abutting public streets. Based on that interpretation, the court
concluded that Silver City was likely to succeed on its claim that the Fence and
Gate System violated the PEA and ordered Siegel to remove it.
Siegel argues that Section 1.1.(a) of the PEA does not grant Silver
City’s patrons an unobstructed right of access to the parking lot. Alternatively,
Siegel argues that the district court erroneously relied on Section 1.1(f) because
that section applies only after Siegel builds a parking garage on the lot.
Unobstructed access
Siegel acknowledges that the PEA gives Silver City’s patrons
access to Siegel’s parking lot but argues that it does not guarantee
unobstructed access and therefore permits the Fence and Gate System so long
as Silver City’s patrons retain some access.
Silver City responds that other PEA provisions support the district
court’s interpretation, including Section 2.3(iv), which prohibits Siegel from
taking actions that interfere with Silver City’s parking rights during
construction of the parking garage. In reply, Siegel argues that Section 2.3(iv)
does not apply until Siegel starts constructing the parking garage.
The district court’s July 10, 2024, order did not finally resolve the
parties’ competing interpretations of the PEA; it determined only that Silver
City’s interpretation was more persuasive for purposes of preliminary relief.
Although “the scope of an easement is strictly construed in favor of the
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landowner,” City of Las Vegas v. Cliff Shadows Pro. Plaza, LLC, 129 Nev. 1,
12, 293 P.3d 860, 867 (2013), Siegel has not shown that the district court erred
in preliminarily determining that the PEA precludes the challenged
obstructions.
Although Section 2.3(iv) expressly addresses interference during
construction of the parking garage, that limitation does not establish that
Siegel may obstruct access before construction begins. Additionally, Siegel’s
argument that the PEA affords Silver City some access does not establish that
the Fence and Gate System is consistent with the access rights granted under
the PEA. Accordingly, Siegel has not shown that the district court committed
reversible error in preliminarily determining that Silver City was likely to
succeed on its claims.
Applicability of Section 1.1(f)
Siegel argues that Section 1.1(f) of the PEA, which permits Silver
City to tow unauthorized vehicles at Siegel’s expense under certain
circumstances, applies only to vehicles parked in the parking garage, which
has not yet been built. Accordingly, Siegel argues that the district court
improperly relied on Section 1.1(f) in concluding that the PEA did not authorize
the Fence and Gate System. Silver City responds that Section 1.1(f)’s
introductory language ties it to other rights contained in Section 1.1, including
those that apply before construction begins.
Because the district court determined only that Silver City’s
interpretation of Section 1.1 was likely correct for purposes of preliminary
relief, we need not definitively resolve that section’s meaning. Given Section
1.1(f)’s introductory language, we are not persuaded that the district court
committed reversible error in preliminarily determining that Section 1.1(f)
might apply before construction of the parking garage. Accordingly, Siegel has
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not shown error in the district court’s evaluation of the likelihood-of-success
factor.
The district court’s irreparable-harm determinations are supported by
substantial evidence
Siegel alternatively argues that the district court abused its
discretion because substantial evidence does not support its finding that Silver
City would suffer irreparable harm. See Finkel v. Cashman Pro., Inc., 128 Nev.
68, 72-73, 270 P.3d 1259, 1262 (2012) (“A decision that lacks support in the
form of substantial evidence is arbitrary or capricious and, therefore, an abuse
of discretion.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Siegel raises three
arguments, contending that money damages would adequately compensate
Silver City, the district court overlooked less restrictive alternatives, and the
balance of harms favors Siegel.
Adequacy of money damages
Siegel argues that money damages could compensate Silver City
for any lost revenue from the Fence and Gate System. Silver City responds
that leaving the Fence and Gate System in place could jeopardize contractual
relationships with Silver City’s tenants, which include Silver City’s obligations
to provide their tenants’ customers parking access. Because such harm
extends beyond calculable lost revenue, and Siegel does not meaningfully
address Silver City’s contention in this respect, Siegel has not shown that the
district court acted arbitrarily and capriciously in finding that money damages
would be inadequate.
Alternate ways of preventing harm
Siegel argues that the district court overlooked potential
modifications to the Fence and Gate System that could have addressed Silver
City’s access concerns without its complete removal. But Silver City’s request
for injunctive relief was an all-or-nothing proposition, seeking removal of the
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Fence and Gate System, and Siegel identifies no specific alternative
modifications that the district court overlooked. Accordingly, Siegel has not
demonstrated that the district court abused its discretion in ordering the Fence
and Gate System’s removal pending resolution of the litigation. This
conclusion does not foreclose consideration of a modification arrangement in
further litigation.
Balance of harm
Siegel contends that removal of the Fence and Gate System
pending this litigation will expose its lot to the risks of crime and
homelessness, thereby resulting in harm to Siegel that outweighs Silver City’s
alleged harm from the Fence and Gate System being maintained.
We are not persuaded that the district court committed reversible
error solely on this issue. Namely, as the district court found, Siegel purchased
the lot fully aware of the concerns regarding crime and homelessness
associated with the lot. Thus, Siegel cannot rely on these perceived harms that
existed when it purchased the lot as a justification for installing the Fence and
Gate System thereafter. In sum, substantial evidence supports the district
court’s findings that Silver City would likely suffer irreparable harm if the
Fence and Gate System were to remain in place pending the litigation.
Having considered the parties’ arguments and concluded that no
relief is warranted, we
ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.
Bell, J.
Stiglich, J. Cadish, J.
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cc: Hon. Susan Johnson, District Judge
Ayala & Associates
Christiansen Trial Lawyers
Dziminski Law Group
Spencer Fane LLP/Las Vegas
Jay Young, Settlement Judge
Eighth District Court Clerk
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