Full Opinion

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA SIEGEL LV NORTH STRIP TOLLESON No. 90698 LLC, A NEVADA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY; SIEGEL LV NORTH STRIP MCDOWELL LLC, A NEVADA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY; SIEGEL LV NORTH STRIP TROPICANA LLC, A NEVADA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY; AND SIEGEL IN NORTH STRIP SIERRA VISTA LLC, A NEVADA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, Appellants, vs. EC 215 LAS VEGAS LLC, A DELAWARE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY AND EC 3001 SOUTH LAS VEGAS BOULEVARD LLC, A DELAWARE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, Respondents. ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE This is an appeal from a district court order granting a motion for a preliminary injunction. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Susan Johnson, Judge. Appellant Siegel LV North Strip Tolleson LLC (Siegel) purchased a vacant parking lot on the Las Vegas Strip. Siegel’s property is adjacent to respondent EC 215 Las Vegas LLC’s property (Silver City). Silver City owns a strip mall with retail and restaurant tenants. When Siegel purchased the parking lot, it did so subject to a Parking Easement Agreement (PEA), which grants Silver City and its patrons access to certain portions of Siegel’s parking lot. Siegel put up a chain-link fence around the lot’s perimeter and installed gates requiring Silver City’s driving patrons to enter a QR code to park for free (hereafter, the “Fence and Gate System”). Siegel’s Fence and Gate System effectively cut off pedestrians’ and drivers’ ability to use its parking lot as a shortcut to access Silver City’s property. Silver City sued Siegel, alleging the Fence and Gate System violated the PEA, and, as relevant here, moved for a preliminary injunction requiring its removal. Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court granted the preliminary injunction on July 10, 2024, pending resolution of the litigation. The district court denied reconsideration on April 28, 2025, but clarified that Siegel was only required to remove the portion of the Fence and Gate System that was subject to the PEA. Siegel appeals. “A preliminary injunction is proper where the moving party can demonstrate that it has a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits and that, absent a preliminary injunction, it will suffer irreparable harm for which compensatory damages would not suffice.” Excellence Cmty. Mgmt. v. Gilmore, 131 Nev. 347, 350-51, 351 P.3d 720, 722 (2015). We review the district court’s decision for an abuse of discretion, id., but review underlying legal issues, including contract interpretation, de novo, Posner v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 140 Nev. 201, 202, 545 P.3d 1150, 1152 (2024); Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Neal, 119 Nev. 62, 64, 64 P.3d 472, 473 (2003). Siegel presents two overarching arguments on appeal: (1) the district court misinterpreted the PEA as requiring “unobstructed” access to the portion of the lot it covers, leading the court to conclude that the Fence and Gate System likely violates the PEA; and (2) even if the district court correctly interpreted the PEA, the evidence does not support its finding that Silver City 2 would suffer irreparable harm if the Fence and Gate System remained in place pending resolution of the litigation. The district court did not commit reversible error in determining that Silver City’s claims have a likelihood of success on their merits The district court interpreted Section 1.1(a) of the PEA as granting Silver City’s patrons the right to unobstructed access to and through the Exclusive Easement Parcel, including access to and from Silver City’s property and any abutting public streets. Based on that interpretation, the court concluded that Silver City was likely to succeed on its claim that the Fence and Gate System violated the PEA and ordered Siegel to remove it. Siegel argues that Section 1.1.(a) of the PEA does not grant Silver City’s patrons an unobstructed right of access to the parking lot. Alternatively, Siegel argues that the district court erroneously relied on Section 1.1(f) because that section applies only after Siegel builds a parking garage on the lot. Unobstructed access Siegel acknowledges that the PEA gives Silver City’s patrons access to Siegel’s parking lot but argues that it does not guarantee unobstructed access and therefore permits the Fence and Gate System so long as Silver City’s patrons retain some access. Silver City responds that other PEA provisions support the district court’s interpretation, including Section 2.3(iv), which prohibits Siegel from taking actions that interfere with Silver City’s parking rights during construction of the parking garage. In reply, Siegel argues that Section 2.3(iv) does not apply until Siegel starts constructing the parking garage. The district court’s July 10, 2024, order did not finally resolve the parties’ competing interpretations of the PEA; it determined only that Silver City’s interpretation was more persuasive for purposes of preliminary relief. Although “the scope of an easement is strictly construed in favor of the 3 landowner,” City of Las Vegas v. Cliff Shadows Pro. Plaza, LLC, 129 Nev. 1, 12, 293 P.3d 860, 867 (2013), Siegel has not shown that the district court erred in preliminarily determining that the PEA precludes the challenged obstructions. Although Section 2.3(iv) expressly addresses interference during construction of the parking garage, that limitation does not establish that Siegel may obstruct access before construction begins. Additionally, Siegel’s argument that the PEA affords Silver City some access does not establish that the Fence and Gate System is consistent with the access rights granted under the PEA. Accordingly, Siegel has not shown that the district court committed reversible error in preliminarily determining that Silver City was likely to succeed on its claims. Applicability of Section 1.1(f) Siegel argues that Section 1.1(f) of the PEA, which permits Silver City to tow unauthorized vehicles at Siegel’s expense under certain circumstances, applies only to vehicles parked in the parking garage, which has not yet been built. Accordingly, Siegel argues that the district court improperly relied on Section 1.1(f) in concluding that the PEA did not authorize the Fence and Gate System. Silver City responds that Section 1.1(f)’s introductory language ties it to other rights contained in Section 1.1, including those that apply before construction begins. Because the district court determined only that Silver City’s interpretation of Section 1.1 was likely correct for purposes of preliminary relief, we need not definitively resolve that section’s meaning. Given Section 1.1(f)’s introductory language, we are not persuaded that the district court committed reversible error in preliminarily determining that Section 1.1(f) might apply before construction of the parking garage. Accordingly, Siegel has 4 not shown error in the district court’s evaluation of the likelihood-of-success factor. The district court’s irreparable-harm determinations are supported by substantial evidence Siegel alternatively argues that the district court abused its discretion because substantial evidence does not support its finding that Silver City would suffer irreparable harm. See Finkel v. Cashman Pro., Inc., 128 Nev. 68, 72-73, 270 P.3d 1259, 1262 (2012) (“A decision that lacks support in the form of substantial evidence is arbitrary or capricious and, therefore, an abuse of discretion.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Siegel raises three arguments, contending that money damages would adequately compensate Silver City, the district court overlooked less restrictive alternatives, and the balance of harms favors Siegel. Adequacy of money damages Siegel argues that money damages could compensate Silver City for any lost revenue from the Fence and Gate System. Silver City responds that leaving the Fence and Gate System in place could jeopardize contractual relationships with Silver City’s tenants, which include Silver City’s obligations to provide their tenants’ customers parking access. Because such harm extends beyond calculable lost revenue, and Siegel does not meaningfully address Silver City’s contention in this respect, Siegel has not shown that the district court acted arbitrarily and capriciously in finding that money damages would be inadequate. Alternate ways of preventing harm Siegel argues that the district court overlooked potential modifications to the Fence and Gate System that could have addressed Silver City’s access concerns without its complete removal. But Silver City’s request for injunctive relief was an all-or-nothing proposition, seeking removal of the 5 Fence and Gate System, and Siegel identifies no specific alternative modifications that the district court overlooked. Accordingly, Siegel has not demonstrated that the district court abused its discretion in ordering the Fence and Gate System’s removal pending resolution of the litigation. This conclusion does not foreclose consideration of a modification arrangement in further litigation. Balance of harm Siegel contends that removal of the Fence and Gate System pending this litigation will expose its lot to the risks of crime and homelessness, thereby resulting in harm to Siegel that outweighs Silver City’s alleged harm from the Fence and Gate System being maintained. We are not persuaded that the district court committed reversible error solely on this issue. Namely, as the district court found, Siegel purchased the lot fully aware of the concerns regarding crime and homelessness associated with the lot. Thus, Siegel cannot rely on these perceived harms that existed when it purchased the lot as a justification for installing the Fence and Gate System thereafter. In sum, substantial evidence supports the district court’s findings that Silver City would likely suffer irreparable harm if the Fence and Gate System were to remain in place pending the litigation. Having considered the parties’ arguments and concluded that no relief is warranted, we ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED. Bell, J. Stiglich, J. Cadish, J. 6 cc: Hon. Susan Johnson, District Judge Ayala & Associates Christiansen Trial Lawyers Dziminski Law Group Spencer Fane LLP/Las Vegas Jay Young, Settlement Judge Eighth District Court Clerk 7