Cy 4422y, LLC v. Magliarditi
CourtNevada Supreme Court
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
Docket88927 c/w 88271 c/w 90078 c/w 90087 c/w 87930
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
CY 4422Y, LLC, A CALIFORNIA No. 87930
LIMITED LIABILITIY COMPANY,
Appellant,
vs.
DOMINIC J. MAGLIARDITI, AN
INDIVIDUAL; NIKKI C. MAGLIARDITI,
AN INDIVIDUAL; AND ALEXANDRA T.
MAGLIARDITI, AN INDIVIDUAL,
Respondents.
______________________________________
CY 4422Y, LLC, A CALIFORNIA No. 88271
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY,
Appellant,
vs.
DOMINIC J. MAGLIARDITI, AN
INDIVIDUAL,
Respondent.
______________________________________
CY 4422Y, LLC, A CALIFORNIA No. 88927
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY,
Appellant,
vs.
NIKKI C. MAGLIARDITI, AN
INDIVIDUAL; AND ALEXANDRA T.
MAGLIARDITI, AN INDIVIDUAL,
Respondents.
______________________________________
CY 4422Y, LLC, A CALIFORNIA No. 90078
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY,
Appellant,
vs.
NIKKI C. MAGLIARDITI, AN
INDIVIDUAL; AND ALEXANDRA T.
MAGLIARDITI, AN INDIVIDUAL,
Respondents.
______________________________________
NIKKI C. MAGLIARDITI, AN No. 90087
INDIVIDUAL; AND ALEXANDRA T.
MAGLIARDITI, AN INDIVIDUAL,
Appellants,
vs.
M1 ACCELERATOR LLC, A NEVADA
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY;
BLACKBOX CAPITAL, LLC, A
NEVADA LIMITED LIABILITY
COMPANY; MAGS 20, INC., A NEVADA
CORPORATION; AND JOSEPH D.
MAGLIARDITI, TRUSTEE OF THE
JOSEPH D. MAGLIARDITI TRUST
U/T/D 7/2/2003,
Respondents.
ORDER AFFIRMING IN PART
AND VACATING IN PART (DOCKET NO. 87930);
AFFIRMING (DOCKET NO. 88271);
AFFIRMING (DOCKET NO. 90078);
AFFIRMING IN PART, VACATING IN PART,
REVERSING IN PART, AND REMANDING (DOCKET NO. 88927);
AND DISMISSING APPEAL (DOCKET NO. 90087)
These are consolidated appeals from a district court order, certified
as final under NRCP 54(b), granting summary judgment on third-party claims
in a business dispute (Docket No. 87930) and from post-judgment orders
awarding attorney fees (Docket Nos. 88271 (Dominic) and 90078 (Nikki and
Alexandra)), awarding costs (Docket Nos. 87930 (Dominic) and 88927 (Nikki
and Alexandra)), and granting a motion to alter/amend a post-judgment order
awarding attorney fees (Docket No. 90087). Eighth Judicial District Court,
Clark County; Hon. Timothy C. Williams, Judge.
These appeals arise from a dispute over an ownership interest in
appellant CY 4422Y, LLC (“CY”), the holding company of a hotel in
Sacramento, California. Respondent Dominic Magliarditi managed nonparty
2
Pacific West LLC, which owned 20.5% of CY. Dominic’s daughters,
respondents Nikki and Alexandra Magliarditi, took over management of
Pacific West in 2020, pursuant to a settlement agreement between Pacific West
and CY’s then-parent company, GHG NV, LLC. The settlement agreement
required Pacific West to indemnify and hold harmless GHG and affiliated
entities but left Pacific West’s membership interest in CY unchanged.
During the COVID-19 pandemic, CY applied for a Small Business
Administration Economic Injury Disaster Loan (“Loan”). CY failed to obtain
the Loan, allegedly because Dominic declined to personally guarantee it.1
Pursuant to Section 3.10 of CY’s amended operating agreement, CY
subsequently redeemed Pacific West’s ownership interest for $672,656. The
parties dispute whether that amount reflected the fair market value of Pacific
West’s interest, but the agreement permitted CY to redeem a member’s
interest for the lesser of its remaining invested capital or the fair market value
of its units.
Pacific West sued CY and associated parties. CY asserted
counterclaims against Pacific West and, as relevant here, a third-party
complaint against Dominic, Nikki, and Alexandra (collectively, “the
Magliarditis”), for concert of action, civil conspiracy, indemnification pursuant
to the settlement agreement, and tortious interference with contractual
relations.
Dominic moved for summary judgment on CY’s third-party claims
to which Pacific West, Nikki, and Alexandra joined. The district court granted
the motion. As to the indemnification claim, the district court concluded that
1The record shows that the Small Business Administration denied the
Loan because the IRS could not locate CY’s 2019 tax return.
3
the settlement agreement did not impose an indemnification obligation on
Dominic, Nikki, and Alexandra. The district court entered summary judgment
against CY on the remaining third-party claims because, after discovery, CY
failed to identify evidence of any actual damages resulting from the alleged
concert of action, conspiracy, or tortious interference with contractual
relations. The district court certified the summary judgment order as final
under NRCP 54(b) and CY appeals from that order in Docket No. 87930.2
The Magliarditis moved for attorney fees and costs associated with
defending against the third-party complaint. The district court granted the
motion and awarded all requested attorney fees and costs in four separate
orders—two orders in favor of Dominic for his fees and costs, and the other two
orders in favor of Nikki and Alexandra for their fees and costs. CY appeals
from the two attorney fees orders in Docket Nos. 88271 and 90078, and the two
costs orders in Docket Nos. 87930 and 88927.
Several members of CY, but not CY itself, moved to alter or amend
the order awarding attorney fees to Nikki and Alexandra, arguing that the
order included findings that the district court did not make. The district court
granted the motion in part and struck the challenged findings from the order.
The district court did not change the amount of the fee award. Nikki and
Alexandra appeal from that order in Docket No. 90087.
Summary judgment (Docket No. 87930)
CY argues that the district court erred in granting summary
judgment in favor of the Magliarditis because nominal damages suffice for the
2CY does not challenge the summary judgment in Pacific West’s favor in
these pending appeals.
4
actual-damages elements in its third-party claims for concert of action, civil
conspiracy, and tortious interference with contractual relations. We disagree.
We review a district court order granting summary judgment de
novo. Golden Gate/S.E.T. Retail of Nev. v. Mod. Welding Co. of Cal., Inc., 141
Nev., Adv. Op. 12, 565 P.3d 1, 4 (2025) (citing Wood v. Safeway, Inc., 121 Nev.
724, 729, 121 P.3d 1026, 1029 (2005)). Summary judgment is proper if the
pleadings and other evidence demonstrate that no genuine issue of material
fact exists and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law. Id. “All evidence ‘must be viewed in a light most favorable to the
nonmoving party.’” Id. (quoting Wood, 121 Nev. at 729, 121 P.3d at 1029). “The
nonmoving party must present specific facts demonstrating a genuine factual
issue.” Id.
Concert of action and civil conspiracy
“An actionable civil conspiracy is a combination of two or more
persons who, by some concerted action, intend to accomplish some unlawful
objective for the purpose of harming another which results in damage.” Cap.
Advisors, LLC v. Cai, 140 Nev., Adv. Op. 34, 548 P.3d 1202, 1211 (2024)
(quoting Collins v. Union Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 99 Nev. 284, 303, 662 P.2d
610, 622 (1983)). Concert of action is similar to civil conspiracy insofar as both
theories require an agreement between tortfeasors. GES, Inc. v. Corbitt, 117
Nev. 265, 270, 21 P.3d 11, 15 (2001). Concert of action is a theory of joint
liability that requires one tortfeasor to act in concert with another or pursuant
to a common design, much like a conspiracy. Id. at 270-71, 21 P.3d at 15.
Accordingly, we address the two claims together.
The requirement that a civil conspiracy “results in damage” means
that the plaintiff must suffer actual damages from the defendants’ wrongful
acts; nominal damages are insufficient. See Eikelberger v. Tolotti, 96 Nev. 525,
5
528 n.1, 611 P.2d 1086, 1088 n.1 (1980) (“The gist of a civil conspiracy is not
the unlawful agreement but the damage resulting from that agreement or its
execution. The cause of action is not created by the conspiracy but by the
wrongful acts done by the defendants to the injury of the plaintiff.”). Concert-
of-action liability, like civil-conspiracy liability, requires proof of actual
damages because it derives from an underlying tort that must result in injury.
GES, Inc., 117 Nev. at 269-271, 21 P.3d at 14-15; Eikelberger, 96 Nev. at 528
n.1, 611 P.3d at 1088 n.1.
Here, CY failed to identify evidence that any alleged conspiracy or
concerted action caused actual damages. Although CY asserts it suffered
economic loss from not receiving the Loan, that loss is speculative and lacks an
evidentiary basis. Further, while the record shows Pacific West received
$162.16 in credit card commissions from March 2017 through December 2020,
CY presented no evidence linking the loss of those commissions to any
concerted action or civil conspiracy. Thus, CY failed to identify evidence of
actual damages necessary to sustain either a concert of action or civil
conspiracy claim.
CY’s reliance on Iliescu v. Reg’l Transp. Comm’n, 138 Nev. 741, 522
P.3d 453 (Ct. App. 2022) does not alter this conclusion. CY cites Iliescu for the
proposition that nominal damages are available whenever a legal right is
violated. But Iliescu held only that a claim for nominal damages remained
viable alongside a claim for compensatory damages in a trespass action. Id. at
751, 522 P.3d at 461-62. Unlike civil conspiracy and concert of action, trespass
claims do not require proof of actual damages; the invasion of a property right
is sufficient. See Lied v. Clark Cnty., 94 Nev. 275, 279, 579 P.2d 171, 173-74
(1978) (“[T]o sustain a trespass action, a property right must be shown to have
been invaded”). Because CY failed to identify evidence of actual damages
6
resulting from the alleged concert of action and civil conspiracy, the
availability of nominal damages resulting from a violation of a legal right in
trespass actions is not persuasive. Thus, the district court properly granted
summary judgment on these claims.
Tortious interference with contractual relations
In an action for intentional interference with contractual relations,
a plaintiff must establish: “(1) a valid and existing contract; (2) the defendant’s
knowledge of the contract; (3) intentional acts intended or designed to disrupt
the contractual relationship; (4) actual disruption of the contract; and (5)
resulting damage.” J.J. Indus., LLC v. Bennett, 119 Nev. 269, 274, 71 P.3d
1264, 1267 (2003) (emphasis added). Thus, like concert of action and civil
conspiracy claims, tortious interference with contractual relations requires
actual damages.
As discussed above, CY failed to identify evidence of actual
damages. Further, CY failed to connect the credit card commissions to this
claim. Accordingly, CY’s claim for tortious interference with contractual
relations fails and the district court properly granted summary judgment on
this claim.3
Attorney fees
“We review the district court’s award of attorney fees and costs for
an abuse of discretion and will uphold an award supported by substantial
evidence.” Valley Health Sys., LLC v. Murray, 140 Nev. 137, 146, 544 P.3d 904,
912 (2024). However, when an award of attorney fees implicates a question of
3CY does not appeal the summary judgment on the indemnification
claim.
7
law, we review the award de novo. Davis v. Beling, 128 Nev. 301, 321, 278 P.3d
501, 515 (2012).
A court may award a prevailing party attorney fees when the
opposing party brought or maintained a complaint without reasonable ground
or to harass the prevailing party. NRS 18.010(2)(b). The court must liberally
construe the statute in favor of awarding attorney fees in all appropriate
situations. Id. “For purposes of NRS 18.010(2)(b), a claim is frivolous or
groundless if there is no credible evidence to support it.” Rodriguez v.
Primadonna Co., LLC, 125 Nev. 578, 588, 216 P.3d 793, 800 (2009).
A motion for attorney fees must be supported by documentation
concerning the amount of fees claimed. NRCP 54(d)(2)(B)(v)(b). When
analyzing a request for attorney fees for reasonableness, the district court must
consider the Brunzell factors: (1) the quality of the advocate; (2) the character
of the work needed to be done; (3) the work performed; and (4) the result. L.V.
Rev.-J. v. Clark Cnty. Coroner, 138 Nev. 813, 817, 521 P.3d 1169, 1174 (2022)
(citing Brunzell v. Golden Gate Nat’l Bank, 85 Nev. 345, 349, 455 P.2d 31, 33
(1969)).
Nikki and Alexandra’s attorney fees (Docket No. 90078)
CY challenges the district court’s award of attorney fees for Nikki
and Alexandra on three grounds, arguing that (1) its claims were not frivolous,
(2) the amount awarded was not supported by substantial evidence, and (3) the
fees were improperly apportioned. We conclude that the district court properly
found that Nikki and Alexandra were entitled to fees based on substantial
evidence and reasonably determined that apportionment was impracticable.
First, the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding CY’s
claims against Nikki and Alexandra groundless and frivolous because CY
identified no credible evidence connecting Nikki and Alexandra to the theories
8
of liability. Although CY sought $13.5 million in damages, it identified
evidence of, at most, $162.16 in lost credit card commissions, and no evidence
that Nikki or Alexandra caused that loss. Nor did CY identify evidence to
support that Nikki and Alexandra participated in the alleged concert of action,
civil conspiracy, or tortious interference with contractual relations. The
district court therefore properly determined that Nikki and Alexandra were
entitled to attorney fees under NRS 18.010(2)(b).
Second, the amount of fees was adequately supported by
substantial evidence. Under Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Haeger, a court
may “shift only those attorney’s fees incurred because of the misconduct at
issue.” 581 U.S. 101, 108 (2017). However, courts need not “become green-
eyeshade accountants.” Id. at 110 (quoting Fox v. Vice, 563 U.S. 826, 838
(2011)). Between the district court’s knowledge of the litigation and the billing
logs, the district court had sufficient evidence to award attorney fees and
therefore did not abuse its discretion in the amount of fees awarded.
Third, the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that
apportionment of fees was impracticable. When a plaintiff pursues claims
against multiple defendants based on the same factual circumstances, the
court may decline to apportion fees if the claims are so interrelated that
apportionment is impracticable. Mayfield v. Koroghli, 124 Nev. 343, 353, 184
P.3d 362, 369 (2008). However, the court must attempt to apportion fees and
make specific findings explaining as to why further apportionment is
impracticable. Id. at 353-54, 184 P.3d at 369. Here, the district court found
that the work performed by Bailey Kennedy benefited Pacific West, Nikki, and
Alexandra, rather than Nikki or Alexandra individually, and it therefore could
not apportion the fees among them. That finding supports allocating one-third
of the attorney fees to Nikki and Alexandra.
9
In sum, we affirm the district court’s determination that Nikki and
Alexandra are entitled to attorney fees under NRS 18.010(2)(b) based on the
billing logs and that apportionment was impracticable.
Dominic’s attorney fees (Docket No. 88271)
CY raises similar challenges to the order awarding attorney fees
to Dominic, arguing that its claims were not frivolous under NRS 18.010(2)(b)
and that Dominic’s heavily redacted billing records prevented the district court
from evaluating the reasonableness and necessity of the attorney fees. For the
reasons discussed above, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
finding CY’s claims against Dominic to be groundless and frivolous. We
therefore focus on the evidentiary support for the amount awarded.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by relying on
counsel’s declaration and the partially redacted billing statements. The
declaration addressed the Brunzell factors, including counsel’s qualifications,
the character of the work to be done, and the result obtained. The billing
statements provide further detail about the work performed for Dominic,
notwithstanding the redactions in the billing statements. Although the
redactions made some of the services more difficult to evaluate, they did not
prevent the district court from assessing the reasonableness of the fees. See,
e.g., Katz v. Incline Vill. Gen. Improvement Dist., 2019 WL 6247743 at *3 (Nev.
Nov. 21, 2019) (Order of Affirmance) (upholding a fee award despite redactions
that made evaluating the services more difficult). The district court also
reasonably determined that the redactions were appropriate to preserve
privileged information. Unlike with Nikki, Alexandra, and Pacific West,
Dominic’s counsel only represented Dominic in defending against CY’s third-
party claims. Accordingly, the court does not need to attempt any allocation of
the fees incurred. Because the combination of the declaration and billing
10
statements, as well as the court’s experience in presiding over the case,
provided sufficient evidence for the district court’s analysis under the Brunzell
factors, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
awarding attorney fees to Dominic. We therefore affirm that award.
Costs (Docket Nos. 87930 and 88927)
We review a district court’s decision awarding costs for an abuse of
discretion. Cadle Co. v. Woods & Erickson, LLP, 131 Nev. 114, 120, 345 P.3d
1049, 1054 (2015). To be recoverable “costs must be reasonable, necessary, and
actually incurred.” Id.; NRS 18.005. The party seeking costs must
demonstrate their necessity to the litigation and cannot rely solely on a
declaration stating that the costs were reasonable and necessary. Cadle Co.,
131 Nev. at 120-121, 345 P.3d at 1054 (citing Bobby Berosini, Ltd. v. People for
the Ethical Treatment of Animals, 114 Nev. 1348, 1352-53, 971 P.2d 383, 386
(1998)). The moving party must file a verified memorandum itemizing the
costs incurred, and the adverse party may move the court to retax them. NRS
18.110(1), (4). Applying these principles, we affirm costs supported by evidence
tying them to Dominic, Nikki, and Alexandra’s defense of CY’s third-party
claims and reverse costs for which the record lacks that support.
Nikki and Alexandra’s costs (Docket No. 88927)
Expert Costs
CY argues that the district court improperly awarded expert costs
for services related to Pacific West’s affirmative claims against CY, as opposed
to expert costs for services related to Nikki and Alexandra’s defense of CY’s
third-party complaint. We agree.
The district court awarded costs for expert reports and depositions
from Rob Bare, Ben Edwards, and Dwight Duncan. Bare opined about whether
CY’s attorney breached ethical duties in connection with CY’s repurchase of
11
Pacific West’s membership interest. Edwards addressed whether a member of
CY breached fiduciary duties owed to Pacific West or had a conflict of interest
in purchasing Pacific West’s membership interest. Duncan testified to the
value of Pacific West’s membership interest in CY. The experts’ opinions
concerned Pacific West’s affirmative claims against CY, and the record does
not establish that the experts’ services were necessary to defend against CY’s
third-party claims against Nikki and Alexandra. Accordingly, we reverse the
award of expert costs for Bare, Edwards, and Duncan.
Relatedly, CY argues that the court improperly awarded expert
fees exceeding the statutory cap without analyzing the Frazier factors. We
agree. NRS 18.005(5) permits recovery of reasonable expert fees, subject to a
$15,000 limit per expert, unless the court determines that the circumstances
warrant a larger fee. Before exceeding that limit, the court must consider the
relevant Frazier factors and explain its findings. Nevins v. Martyn, 140 Nev.,
Adv. Op. 66, 557 P.3d 965, 978-79 (2024) (citing Frazier v. Drake, 131 Nev. 632,
650-51, 357 P.3d 365, 377-78 (Ct. App. 2015)).
Here, the district court awarded $23,670 for Randall R. Smith’s
expert services without addressing the Frazier factors or explaining why the
services warranted fees that exceeded the statutory cap. We therefore vacate
this portion of the costs award and remand for the district court to consider the
Frazier factors and determine whether Smith’s services warrant exceeding the
$15,000 limit.4
4We do not need to address whether Duncan’s fees exceeded the $15,000
limit because we are reversing that award entirely. While Duncan and Smith
work for the same firm, the bills have sufficient detail to allow us to determine
how much was incurred for each.
12
Other costs
CY argues that Nikki and Alexandra failed to adequately support
several categories of costs, either because the record does not establish that the
costs were reasonable, necessary, and actually incurred or because the costs
related to Pacific West’s claims against CY rather than Nikki and Alexandra’s
defense against CY’s third-party claims. We address each of these categories
in turn.
Clerks’ fees
CY challenges the award of clerks’ fees because the supporting
documents do not establish that all the clerks’ fees were reasonable and
necessary to Nikki and Alexandra’s defense. Some of the fees, including the
filing fee for Nikki and Alexadra’s answer and counterclaims against CY, were
facially related to their defense. Thirty-eight others, including fees for Pacific
West’s motion to amend its complaint, concerned filings unrelated to Nikki and
Alexandra. Because the record does not support awarding the latter costs, we
affirm $1,781.89 in clerks’ fees and reverse the remaining $133 of the $1,914.89
award.
Document reproduction
CY also challenges the $6,074.25 award for document
reproduction. Nikki and Alexandra’s supporting documents identify the
photocopied documents as relating to the Pacific West Member Dispute but do
not establish that the copy expenses were reasonably necessary to Nikki and
Alexandra’s defense of CY’s third-party claims. Accordingly, we reverse the
award of photocopy fees.
Reporters’ fees
While the invoices establish that the reporters’ fees were incurred,
they do not establish that all transcripts were reasonably necessary to Nikki
13
and Alexandra’s defense. The deposition transcripts of Bare, Edwards, and
Duncan were for experts that we have already concluded were unrelated to
that defense. By contrast, the transcripts of depositions of Nikki, Alexandra,
and Dominic, and hearings on the motion for summary judgment were facially
relevant to Nikki and Alexandra’s defense. Because the record does not
sufficiently establish the necessity of the remaining transcripts, the district
court abused its discretion in awarding those costs. Accordingly, we affirm
$7,282.03 in reporters’ fees and reverse the remaining $43,456.03 of the
$50,738.06 award.
Postage
The supporting documents do not establish that the postage
expenses were necessary to Nikki and Alexandra’s defense, and some expenses
relate to payments for experts whose services were unrelated to that defense.
Only the $0.87 postage expense for the transcript of the hearing on Domnic’s
summary judgment motion was facially related to their defense. Therefore, we
affirm $0.87 in postage and reverse the remaining $31.53 of the $32.40 award.
Witness fees
The supporting documentation does not establish that the $66.16
in witness fees were necessary to Nikki and Alexandra’s defense. Accordingly,
we reverse the witness-fee award.
14
Travel costs
The travel expenses were incurred for a deposition of Alexandra, a
party to CY’s third-party complaint. The supporting documents establish that
expenses consisted of a Southwest flight and Lyft rides to and from the airport
at reasonable amounts. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its
discretion in awarding these costs, and we affirm the travel costs award of
$423.81.
Messenger and courier fees
Some messenger and courier expenses were unrelated to Nikki and
Alexandra’s defense. The record does not establish the relevance of retrieving
a CD from Judge Timothy C. Williams and returning it to Bailey Kennedy,
delivering an opposition to an emergency motion for an extension of time, or
delivering a status conference binder. Because the record does not establish
that these expenses were necessary to Nikki and Alexandra’s defense, we
affirm $60 in messenger and courier fees and vacate the remaining $139 of the
$199.00 award.
Legal research fees
The receipts show that the legal research concerned the Pacific
West Member Dispute and the declaration does not explain how that research
related to Nikki and Alexandra’s defense beyond generally asserting that all
costs were reasonable and necessary. Because the record does not establish
that the $8,605.41 in legal research fees was necessary to Nikki and
Alexandra’s defense, we reverse that award.
Secretary of State copy order fees
The costs memorandum identifies these fees as relating to
business entity records for Cataract Advance, LLC; Cataract Foods, LLC;
Taylex, LLC; Lextar, LLC; and Cataract Processing, LLC, but Nikki and
15
Alexandra did not explain how these records were relevant or necessary to
their defense. We therefore reverse the $282 award.
Conference call fees
Some conference calls were facially related to Nikki and
Alexandra’s defense, including calls involving Nikki and Alexandra and calls
concerning the depositions of Pacific West. Other calls involved experts
Edwards and Duncan concerning Pacific West’s affirmative claims rather than
Nikki and Alexandra’s defense. Because the latter expenses were not shown
to be necessary to the defense, we affirm $46.76 in conference call fees and
reverse the remaining $15.60 of the $62.36 award.
Parking fees
Parking fees for Nikki’s depositions and the hearings on the
motion for summary judgment were facially related to Nikki and Alexandra’s
defense. The remaining expenses concerned Pacific West’s claims against CY
or were not adequately supported. We therefore affirm $140 in parking fees
and reverse the remaining $368.68 of the $508.68 award.
Recorder’s fees
The record does not establish that the $107 in Sacramento County
recorder’s fees for withdrawing a notice of pendency of action was necessary to
Nikki and Alexandra’s defense. We therefore reverse that award of $107.
Dominic’s costs (Docket No. 87930)
CY argues that the district court abused its discretion by awarding
costs to Dominic that were unnecessary and unreasonable. We will address
each challenged category in turn.5
5We do not address the photocopy fees because CY expressly informed
the district court that it was not challenging those fees.
16
The record does not establish that the costs for discovery and
exhibit processing were necessary or reasonable to defend against CY’s third-
party claims. The declaratory statement that all costs were necessarily
incurred is insufficient to establish that these particular costs were reasonable
and necessary. Accordingly, we reverse the award of $1,139.10.
The record likewise does not establish that the filing, processor,
and courier fees were necessary to defend against CY’s third-party claims.
Nothing in the cited materials explains the purpose of these expenses or
connects them to Dominic’s defense. Therefore, we reverse the awards of
$2,427.99, $510.20, and $273.80.
In contrast, the transcription fees were for Dominic’s deposition
and are facially related to defending against CY’s third-party claims.
Accordingly, we affirm the award of $3,363.70.
The parking fee receipts identify the expenses as parking fees but
do not establish whether they were incurred for proceedings related to
Dominic’s defense of CY’s third-party claims. Accordingly, because the record
does not establish that these costs were necessary, we reverse the award of
$257.00.
Similarly, the PACER receipts do not identify the purpose of the
downloads, and the record contains no other evidence connecting them to
Dominic’s defense against CY’s third-party claims. Accordingly, we reverse the
award of $16.50.
Post-judgment interest
CY argues that the district court erred by awarding post-judgment
interest to the Magliarditis when they did not request it. We disagree.
We review whether a statute permits post-judgment interest de
novo. Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys. of Nev. v. Gitter, 133 Nev. 126, 132, 393 P.3d
17
673, 680 (2017). “Interest may be awarded where allowed by statute.” Id. NRS
17.130(2) provides for post-judgment interest on any judgment when no rate of
interest is otherwise specified. Id. at 133, 393 P.3d at 680. In Waddell v.
L.V.R.V. Inc., we held that NRS 17.130(1) permits post-judgment interest on
attorney fee awards, reasoning that such awards compensate the prevailing
party for the loss of the use of money. 122 Nev. 15, 26, 125 P.3d 1160, 1167
(2006). That reasoning applies equally to an award of attorney fees and costs
under NRS 18.010 and 18.020. Id. (holding the prevailing party may recover
post-judgment interest on an attorney fee award).
Since the district court properly awarded the Magliarditis attorney
fees and some costs as the prevailing parties, those awards were subject to post-
judgment interest under NRS 17.130(2) regardless of whether they explicitly
requested interest. The district court therefore did not err by awarding post-
judgment interest on those fees and costs.
Order granting in part motion to amend attorney fee award
Nikki and Alexandra appeal from the district court’s order
granting in part the motion to amend the order awarding Nikki and Alexandra
attorney fees. While we generally review a district court order granting a
motion to amend a judgment for abuse of discretion, AA Primo Builders, LLC
v. Washington, 126 Nev. 578, 589, 245 P.3d 1190, 1197 (2010), CY challenges
Nikki and Alexandra’s standing to bring this appeal, arguing that they are not
aggrieved by the order. Because appellate standing is a jurisdictional
prerequisite, we address that issue first. Matter of T.L., 133 Nev. 790, 791-92,
406 P.3d 494, 496 (2017).
“Only ‘[a] party who is aggrieved by an appealable judgment or
order’ has standing to appeal to this court.” Id. at 792, 406 P.3d at 496 (quoting
NRAP 3A(a)). A party is aggrieved only if the district court’s ruling adversely
18
and substantially affects a party’s personal or property rights. Id. “The
grievance must be substantial in that the district court’s decision imposes an
injustice, or illegal obligation or burden, on the party, or denies the party an
equitable or legal right.” Id. The district court’s order amending the attorney
fee award did not aggrieve Nikki and Alexandra. While the amended order
removed several factual findings concerning CY’s third-party claims, it did not
alter the attorney fee award or otherwise diminish the relief Nikki and
Alexandra obtained. Nikki and Alexandra argue that the findings could assist
them in a potential abuse-of-process action, but the possibility that an order
may affect a party’s position in future litigation does not establish a concrete
grievance under NRAP 3A. See La Tierra Homeowner Ass’n v. Bank of Am.,
N.A., 2019 WL 1422861, at *2 (Nev. Mar. 28, 2019) (Order Dismissing Appeal)
(rejecting as purely speculative an appellant’s argument that it had standing
to appeal based on an adverse finding that could render it vulnerable to future
adverse rulings); Capanna v. Orth, 134 Nev. 888, 897, 432 P.3d 726, 735 (2018)
(explaining that a party who obtained the relief it sought was not aggrieved by
a ruling that did not diminish its recovery). Because Nikki and Alexandra
identify no concrete adverse effect on their personal or property rights, they
are not aggrieved by the amended order and thus lack standing to appeal.
Based on the foregoing, in Docket No. 87930, we affirm the district
court’s summary judgment in favor of the Magliarditis and affirm in part and
reverse in part the award of costs to Dominic; in Docket No. 88271, we affirm
the award of attorney fees to Dominic; in Docket No. 90078, we affirm the
district court’s award of attorney fees to Nikki and Alexandra; in Docket No.
88927, we affirm in part, vacate in part, and reverse in part the award of costs
to Nikki and Alexandra, and remand for further proceedings consistent with
this order; in Docket No. 90087, we dismiss the appeal for lack of standing; and
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we affirm the awards of post-judgment interest on the attorney fees and costs
awarded to the Magliarditis, to the extent those awards are affirmed.
It is so ORDERED.
Herndon, C.J.
Pickering, J. Parraguirre, J.
Bell, J. Stiglich, J.
Cadish, J. Lee, J.
cc: Hon. Timothy C. Williams, District Judge
Stephen E. Haberfeld, Settlement Judge
Bailey Kennedy
Champion Lovelock Law
McNutt Law Firm, P.C.
Reid Rubinstein & Bogatz
Pisanelli Bice PLLC
Eighth District Court Clerk
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