Park 'N Go v. Airport Authority
CourtNebraska Supreme Court
Date FiledJuly 17, 2026
DocketS-25-409
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
07/17/2026 08:14 AM CDT
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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
321 Nebraska Reports
PARK ‘N GO v. AIRPORT AUTHORITY
Cite as 321 Neb. 798
Park ‘N Go of Nebraska, LLC, appellee, v. Airport
Authority of the City of Omaha, appellant.
___ N.W.3d ___
Filed July 17, 2026. No. S-25-409.
1. Declaratory Judgments. An action for declaratory judgment is sui
generis; whether such action is to be treated as one at law or one in
equity is to be determined by the nature of the dispute.
2. Injunction: Equity. An action for injunction sounds in equity.
3. Equity: Appeal and Error. On appeal from an equity action, an appel-
late court tries factual questions de novo on the record and, as to ques-
tions of both fact and law, is obligated to reach a conclusion independent
of the conclusion reached by the trial court.
4. Judgments: Statutes: Appeal and Error. When an appeal calls for
statutory interpretation or presents questions of law, an appellate court
must reach an independent, correct conclusion irrespective of the deter-
mination made by the court below.
5. Taxes: Words and Phrases. A tax is an enforced contribution of money
or other property, assessed in accordance with some reasonable rule or
apportionment by authority of a sovereign state on persons or property
within its jurisdiction for the purpose of defraying the public expenses.
Appeal from the District Court for Douglas County: Tressa
M. Alioth, Judge. Reversed and remanded with directions.
Patrick D. Pepper, J. Scott Paul, and Alexander K. Shaner,
of McGrath North Mullin & Kratz, P.C., L.L.O., for appellant.
Matthew B. Reilly and Thomas J. Culhane, of Erickson |
Sederstrom, P.C., L.L.O., for appellee.
Funke, C.J., Cassel, Stacy, Papik, Freudenberg, and
Bergevin, JJ.
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PARK ‘N GO v. AIRPORT AUTHORITY
Cite as 321 Neb. 798
Funke, C.J.
INTRODUCTION
Airport Authority of the City of Omaha (Airport Authority)
appeals the order of the district court for Douglas County
declaring a charge imposed by Airport Authority to be an imper-
missible tax in violation of the Nebraska Constitution. Airport
Authority asserted that the charge was a user fee imposed
under its statutory authority. In this action for declaratory and
injunctive relief, Park ‘N Go of Nebraska, LLC (Park ‘N Go),
challenged the charge as an unconstitutional tax. The district
court permanently restrained Airport Authority from collecting
the charge from Park ‘N Go and ordered Airport Authority to
remit to Park ‘N Go all charges that it had collected.
We determine that the charge imposed by Airport Authority
was not an unconstitutional tax. We therefore reverse the order
of the district court and remand the cause with directions to
dismiss Park ‘N Go’s complaint.
BACKGROUND
Airport Authority is a political subdivision of the State of
Nebraska charged with operating, managing, and overseeing
Eppley Airfield in Omaha, Nebraska. Airport Authority derives
its authority from, and is governed by, the Cities Airport
Authorities Act. 1
Park ‘N Go is a limited liability company with its principal
place of business in Omaha. Park ‘N Go operates a surface
parking lot located on private property off the premises of
Eppley Airfield. Park ‘N Go charges customers daily or hourly
rates depending on the length of time a customer parks in the
lot. Park ‘N Go offers a shuttle service to transport custom-
ers to and from Eppley Airfield. Park ‘N Go does not charge
an additional fee for the transportation service, and a cus-
tomer’s charge for parking is the same whether the customer
uses the transportation service or not. Airport Authority grants
Park ‘N Go and other transportation providers access to use
1
See Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 3-501 to 3-514 (Reissue 2022).
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PARK ‘N GO v. AIRPORT AUTHORITY
Cite as 321 Neb. 798
dedicated passenger pickup and dropoff lanes (Commercial
Vehicle Lanes) located on Eppley Airfield’s property.
Resolution Adopted
On June 15, 2021, the board of directors of Airport Authority
enacted a resolution (Resolution) that imposed a charge, begin-
ning August 1, 2021, upon off-airport parking companies for a
continued right of access to use the Commercial Vehicle Lanes
at Eppley Airfield. The charge was imposed as a monthly col-
lection initially calculated as 10 percent of an off-airport park-
ing company’s gross receipts, with the potential for Airport
Authority to adjust the fee amount on an annual basis. In the
Resolution, which defined Eppley Airfield and its facilities as
“Airport,” the term “Gross Receipts” was generally defined
as “all monies or other compensation received by a Parking
Company from the conduct of its vehicle parking, vehicle
storage business and/or shuttle services to Airport parking
passengers or Airport tenant parking employees, which shall
be separately accounted for by a Parking Company.” The
Resolution specifically excluded certain receipts, including
“[r]evenues received for providing independent transportation
services exclusively for non-Airport parking activity,” from
the definition of “Gross Receipts.”
The Resolution stated that pursuant to regulations promul-
gated by the Federal Aviation Administration, Airport
Authority was required to “‘maintain a fee and rental structure
for the facility and services at the [Airport,] which will make
the [Airport] as self-sustaining as possible.’” The Resolution
also stated that Airport Authority “incurs operating, admin-
istration, and other necessary expenses related to the Airport
roadways and the Commercial Vehicle Lanes” and that it was
assessing and charging the off-airport parking company a user
fee “in an effort to support portions of the operating, admin-
istration, and other necessary expenses related to the Airport
and [to] comply with the above referenced [Federal Aviation
Administration] regulation.”
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PARK ‘N GO v. AIRPORT AUTHORITY
Cite as 321 Neb. 798
Although the Resolution did not cite the specific statutory
authority for the imposition of the off-airport parking company
user fee, in the present litigation, Airport Authority asserts that
its power to impose the charge derives from § 3-504(11). That
statute authorizes Airport Authority to “charge fees, rentals,
and other charges for the use of projects under the jurisdiction
of such authority” and requires that “all fees, rentals, charges,
and other revenue derived from any project shall be applied to
the payment of operating, administration, and other necessary
expenses of the authority properly chargeable to such project.” 2
For purposes of the Cities Airport Authorities Act, including
§ 3-504(11), § 3-501(7) defines “[p]roject” as
any airport operated by the authority, including all real
and personal property, structures, machinery, equipment,
and appurtenances or facilities which are part of such
airport or used or useful in connection therewith either
as ground facilities for the convenience of handling avia-
tion equipment, passengers, and freight or as part of avi-
ation operation, air navigation, and air safety operation.
Action Filed in District Court
On July 22, 2021, Park ‘N Go filed a complaint in the dis-
trict court in which it sought declaratory and injunctive relief
against Airport Authority regarding the charge imposed under
the Resolution. The complaint named individual members of
Airport Authority’s board and Airport Authority’s police chief
as defendants in their official capacities. The court later dis-
missed a claim of unfair trade practices that had been included
in the complaint, and it eventually dismissed all the individual
defendants, leaving Airport Authority as the sole defendant.
In the operative amended complaint, in support of its claim
for declaratory relief, Park ‘N Go alleged that although the
Resolution purported to charge a user fee, the charge was
instead a tax that Airport Authority did not have constitutional
2
§ 3-504(11).
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PARK ‘N GO v. AIRPORT AUTHORITY
Cite as 321 Neb. 798
authority to impose. Park ‘N Go cited Neb. Const. art. VIII, § 1,
which provides, in part: “The necessary revenue of the state
and its governmental subdivisions shall be raised by taxation in
such manner as the Legislature may direct.” Park ‘N Go sought
a judgment declaring that Airport Authority had imposed a tax
in violation of the Nebraska Constitution.
In support of its claim for injunctive relief, Park ‘N Go
alleged that when Airport Authority enacted the Resolution,
it had acted outside its authority and imposed a tax under
the pretext of a purported user fee. Park ‘N Go alleged the
10-percent “tax” was “inherently unreasonable, excessive, and
untethered from the services sold, furnished, or supplied by”
Airport Authority. Park ‘N Go further alleged that its property
and other legal rights were affected by the Resolution and that
it had no adequate remedy at law to restrain Airport Authority
from exceeding its authority by enacting the Resolution
and imposing the charge therein. Park ‘N Go sought orders
enjoining Airport Authority from, among other things, put-
ting the Resolution into effect and attempting to collect from
Park ‘N Go the charges described in the Resolution.
Trial
The matter went to a bench trial in February 2025 on
Park ‘N Go’s claims for declaratory and injunctive relief. At
the beginning of the trial, the district court received without
objection various exhibits, including the parties’ joint statement
of stipulated facts. Other exhibits were received in connection
with witness testimony.
Witnesses called by Park ‘N Go included three Airport
Authority employees—the chief financial officer, the proj-
ect manager, and the chief commercial officer—who had
been involved in developing the Resolution and who gener-
ally testified regarding considerations that went into Airport
Authority’s decision to implement the charge set forth in
the Resolution and to use a percentage of gross receipts as the
measure of the charge. Park ‘N Go also called as a witness its
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PARK ‘N GO v. AIRPORT AUTHORITY
Cite as 321 Neb. 798
vice president of development, who generally testified regard-
ing Park ‘N Go’s operations. In its case, Airport Authority
called as a witness its chief commercial officer to provide
additional testimony regarding the imposition of the charge
under the Resolution, as well as Airport Authority’s revenues
and expenses and its obligations under federal grants.
District Court Decision
After trial, the district court entered its order ruling on
Park ‘N Go’s complaint. The court accepted the parties’ stipu-
lation of facts and incorporated those facts into its order. The
parties stipulated, among other things, that Airport Authority
was “a non-taxing authority under Nebraska law,” and the
court found that “Airport Authority is not granted taxing
authority under Nebraska law.” The parties also stipulated
that one of the reasons Airport Authority chose to implement
a user fee based on gross receipts was because its research
showed that other airports imposed similar charges on gross
receipts and because Airport Authority used gross receipts
as a routine method for calculating user fees for other com-
mercial users of Eppley Airfield. The court made additional
findings of fact, including a finding that evidence presented
at trial showed that “the amount of the charge was not
based upon any estimate of Park ‘N Go’s, or other similarly
situated off-airport parking companies, actual usage of the
Commercial Vehicle Lanes.”
The district court turned to analyzing the question it stated
was presented to it: “whether the charge imposed by the
‘Off-Airport Parking User Fee’ is a fee or an impermissible
tax.” In setting forth legal standards, the court stated that
Airport Authority requested that the court apply a presump-
tion of validity to the Resolution, but the court declined to
apply such a presumption. The court stated that to determine
whether the Resolution imposes a fee or a tax, it would need
to employ “some sort of legal test,” but that no Nebraska
precedent had adopted a clear test for distinguishing between
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PARK ‘N GO v. AIRPORT AUTHORITY
Cite as 321 Neb. 798
a fee and a tax. The court rejected Airport Authority’s urg-
ing that it decide the issue based solely on the language of
§ 3-504(11), granting airport authorities the power to charge
“fees, rentals, and other charges for the use of projects.” The
court acknowledged that Airport Authority had been “granted
the authority to charge fees in relation to use of Eppley
Airfield.” But the court stated that the issue in this case
was not whether Airport Authority had “authority to gener-
ally apply fees to third party companies that utilize Eppley
Airfield” and that instead, the issue was “whether this so-
called fee is actually a tax.” The court stated that labeling the
charge as a “‘fee’” under § 3-504(11) was “of no consequence
in deciding whether [the charge] is a fee or a tax.”
The district court chose to employ a test urged by Park ‘N Go
and derived from a treatise. 3 The court set forth the test as fol-
lows: “‘The test to determine whether a charge is a fee rather
than a tax is whether the charge (1) applies to the direct benefi-
ciary of a particular service, (2) is allocated directly to defray-
ing the costs of providing the service, and (3) is reasonably
proportionate to the benefit received.’”
Regarding the first factor, the district court found the evi-
dence showed that Park ‘N Go directly benefits from using
the Commercial Vehicle Lanes in its business offering parking
to people arriving and departing from Eppley Airfield. But
the court determined that because Park ‘N Go could allocate
the charge to its customers, the customers were “indirect ben-
eficiaries” of Park ‘N Go’s use of the Commercial Vehicle
Lanes. The court stated that the charge was “not a fee to be
applied solely to the direct beneficiary” and that instead, “the
charge more closely resembles a sales tax,” the legal inci-
dence of which falls upon the purchaser.
Regarding the second factor, the court found the evidence
showed that “the charge imposed by the Resolution is not
correlated with the off-airport companies’ actual use of the
3
See 71 Am. Jur. 2d State and Local Taxation § 13 (2023).
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PARK ‘N GO v. AIRPORT AUTHORITY
Cite as 321 Neb. 798
Commercial Vehicle lanes nor is it associated with the costs
incurred from that usage.” The court found it “deeply con-
cerning” that Airport Authority “made no effort to estimate
the costs it incurs from the use of its Commercial Vehicle
Lanes” and instead set the charge based on an analysis of what
other airports were charging similar companies. The court
stated that Airport Authority used gross receipts to calculate
the charge because it was the method Airport Authority used
to charge other commercial users of Eppley Airfield, but the
court noted that “these other commercial users typically con-
tinuously occupy airport property” for uses such as concession
stands located inside the airport. The court further stated that
funds collected under the Resolution were “not earmarked for
directly defraying the costs of the Commercial Vehicle Lanes
usage” and instead went into “a general revenue account” that
could be used to help pay the “high costs associated with vari-
ous renovations and improvement projects” at Eppley Airfield.
The court concluded that the charge under the Resolution was
“used to raise revenue to benefit the . . . entirety of Eppley
Airfield” and that therefore, the charge failed the second prong
of the test because it was not allocated directly to defraying
the costs of providing the Commercial Vehicle Lanes.
Regarding the third factor, the court found that the charge
under the Resolution “is not reasonably proportionate to the
benefit that off-airport parking companies like [Park ‘N Go]
receive.” The court stated that Airport Authority was unable
“to quantify the costs associated with the benefit of using
Eppley’s designated Commercial Vehicle Lanes” and that
instead, Airport Authority witnesses testified “off-airport park-
ing companies owe their entire existence to the presence of
Eppley Airfield.” The court found this testimony “alarming
. . . in that it may permit the Airport Authority to charge off-
airport parking companies without limits.” The court stated
that it could not “deny the existence of a benefit to off-airport
parking companies in their use of the designated lanes,” but
it could not find that a 10-percent charge on gross receipts
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PARK ‘N GO v. AIRPORT AUTHORITY
Cite as 321 Neb. 798
was reasonably proportionate to such benefit “without any
evidence of the costs associated with permitting this benefit
to” Park ‘N Go. The court also noted evidence that other
users of the Commercial Vehicle Lanes were permitted to
pay a specific amount each time one of the user’s vehicles
entered the Commercial Vehicle Lanes, while yet other users
were charged no fee at all. The court found no evidence to
show why Airport Authority “would treat so differently users
that receive an identical benefit” or any reason for charg-
ing off-airport parking companies “based on something other
than actual usage.” The court found that Park ‘N Go’s gross
receipts, which were based on the number of days a vehicle
was in its lot, had no relationship to the number of times
Park ‘N Go’s shuttle used the Commercial Vehicle Lanes.
For that reason, the court found that the charge imposed by
Airport Authority under the Resolution was not reasonably
proportionate to the benefit Park ‘N Go received from being
allowed to use the Commercial Vehicle Lanes.
Based on its application of the test, the district court found
that the “Airport Authority’s Resolution imposes an imper-
missible tax upon Park ‘N Go in violation of the Nebraska
Constitution.” The court therefore declared that (1) “the
Resolution is unlawful under the Nebraska Constitution, it is
invalid, and it is void ab initio,” and (2) “the Resolution is not
enforceable.” The court ordered that “Airport Authority is
permanently restrained from enforcing the Resolution against
Park ‘N Go or hereafter collecting any further sums under the
Resolution from Park ‘N Go,” and it ordered Airport Authority
to “remit to Park ‘N Go all sums collected from Park ‘N Go
since the passage of the Resolution, together with prejudg-
ment interest.” The court ordered Airport Authority to pay
Park ‘N Go’s taxable costs.
Airport Authority moved to alter or amend the judgment
or for a new trial. The district court sustained the motion to
alter or amend to the extent that it (1) ordered the individ-
ual defendants dismissed from the action and (2) found that
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PARK ‘N GO v. AIRPORT AUTHORITY
Cite as 321 Neb. 798
Park ‘N Go was not entitled to prejudgment interest. But the
court overruled the motion to alter or amend as to all other
grounds asserted by Airport Authority, and it overruled the
motion for a new trial.
Airport Authority appeals the district court’s order.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Airport Authority assigns that the district court erred in (1)
finding that the charge under the Resolution was an uncon-
stitutional tax and not a permissible fee, (2) adopting the
three-part test to determine whether a purported user fee is
an unconstitutional tax, (3) failing to provide the Resolution
a presumption of validity, (4) shifting the burden of proof to
Airport Authority, (5) failing to enter judgment in favor of
Airport Authority when Park ‘N Go failed to meet its burden
to prove the user fee was a tax, and (6) granting permanent
injunctive relief to Park ‘N Go.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1-4] Park ‘N Go sought both declaratory and injunctive
relief. An action for declaratory judgment is sui generis;
whether such action is to be treated as one at law or one
in equity is to be determined by the nature of the dispute. 4
An action for injunction sounds in equity. 5 On appeal from
an equity action, an appellate court tries factual questions
de novo on the record and, as to questions of both fact and
law, is obligated to reach a conclusion independent of the
conclusion reached by the trial court. 6 When an appeal calls
for statutory interpretation or presents questions of law, an
appellate court must reach an independent, correct conclusion
irrespective of the determination made by the court below. 7
4
PSK v. Legacy Outdoor Advertising, 318 Neb. 1, 13 N.W.3d 81 (2024).
5
Charter West Bank v. Riddle, 314 Neb. 263, 989 N.W.2d 428 (2023).
6
Id.
7
Flinn v. Strode, 320 Neb. 813, 30 N.W.3d 661 (2026).
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PARK ‘N GO v. AIRPORT AUTHORITY
Cite as 321 Neb. 798
ANALYSIS
Before addressing the issues Airport Authority raises on
appeal, we find it helpful to clarify the challenge raised by
Park ‘N Go and decided by the district court. The challenge
Park ‘N Go set forth in the operative complaint was that
the charge imposed by the Resolution was a tax that Airport
Authority did not have authority to impose under the Nebraska
Constitution. Park ‘N Go sought a declaration to that effect
and injunctive relief based on that declaration. We do not read
the complaint as setting forth a separate claim that even if
the charge is a user fee, it did not comply with any statutory
requirement that a user fee must be imposed in a reasonable
and uniform manner.
The district court likewise viewed Park ‘N Go’s complaint as
limited to the contention that the charge under the Resolution
was an unconstitutional tax. The court stated in its order that
the question presented to it was “whether the charge imposed
by the ‘Off-Airport Parking User Fee’ is a fee or an imper-
missible tax.” The court acknowledged Airport Authority’s
power under § 3-504(11) to charge fees to companies using the
airport, but the court stated that the issue presented to it was
“whether this so-called fee is actually a tax.” The court ulti-
mately found that the “Resolution imposes an impermissible
tax” and declared that the Resolution was “unlawful under the
Nebraska Constitution.”
In arguing that the charge in this case is not a tax, Airport
Authority relies in part on City of Ord v. Biemond, 8 in which
this court stated that a “use charge or rental fee” imposed by a
municipality under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 3-215(5) (Reissue 1962)
for the use of airport property under the municipality’s con-
trol was “not a tax.” However, whether the charge imposed
by the municipality was a tax, rather than a fee, was not at
issue in City of Ord v. Biemond. Instead, the issues on appeal
in that case involved whether the charge met the requirements
8
City of Ord v. Biemond, 175 Neb. 333, 338, 122 N.W.2d 6, 10 (1963).
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of § 3-215(5) and whether the charge violated the Nebraska
Constitution on equal protection grounds. In City of Ord v.
Biemond, the companies being charged for use of the munici-
pality’s airport contended, in part, that the user charge vio-
lated § 3-215(5), which required charges to be reasonable and
uniform for the same class of service.
We do not read Park ‘N Go’s complaint to allege a similar
claim to that in City of Ord v. Biemond. Park ‘N Go did not
allege that a charge imposed under § 3-504(11) is subject
to the same or a similar statutory requirement to be reason-
able and uniform for the same class of service as is a charge
imposed under § 3-215(5). Consequently, the district court
did not determine whether a statutory requirement of reason-
ableness and uniformity applies to a charge imposed under
§ 3-504(11), nor did it determine whether the charge imposed
by the Resolution violated such a statutory requirement.
Instead, Park ‘N Go alleged, and the district court found, that
the charge was an unconstitutional tax, rather than a user fee.
To the extent Park ‘N Go alleged the charge was unreason-
able and the district court considered whether the charge was
unreasonable, it was in the context of determining whether the
charge was a tax. In our review, we consider reasonableness in
the same context.
Park ‘N Go urges that if we determine the charge is not a
tax, we should affirm the district court’s order on the alterna-
tive basis that even if the charge is not a tax, it was outside
Airport Authority’s power under § 3-504(11) because it was
unreasonable and not uniformly applied to other types of
users. This argument is like the issue presented in City of Ord
v. Biemond. But because that question was not presented by
Park ‘N Go’s complaint and not decided by the district court,
we make no determination whether the same or a similar
statutory requirement applies to a charge imposed pursuant to
§ 3-504(11) or whether the charge in this case violated any
such statutory requirement.
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PARK ‘N GO v. AIRPORT AUTHORITY
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With this understanding of Park ‘N Go’s complaint and the
district court’s order, the main issue in this appeal is whether
the charge imposed by the Resolution was a tax. We first
address Airport Authority’s contention that the court erred
when it adopted the three-part test it used to determine that
issue. We then consider, based on what we determine to be the
proper analysis, whether the charge imposed by the Resolution
was a tax that Airport Authority lacked the power to impose.
After determining that the charge was not a tax, we consider
our resolution of this appeal based on that determination.
Test Used by District Court
Airport Authority assigns that the district court erred in
adopting a three-part test to determine whether a purported
user fee is instead an unconstitutional tax. While it was not
error for the court to consider factors set forth in the test when
analyzing the issues in this case, we decline to adopt the test,
or any other specific test, as the controlling test to distinguish
a tax from a fee in all circumstances.
The factors of the three-part test considered by the district
court were derived from a Nevada case in which the court
stated that if the three “criteria fit the charge, it is a fee.” 9
But this test was among various considerations discussed in
a treatise, including another “three-part test that looks to (1)
what entity imposes the charge, (2) what population is subject
to the charge, and (3) what purposes are served by the use of
the monies obtained by the charge.” 10 The treatise begins its
discussion by stating that “[t]here is no bright line test for
distinguishing a tax from a fee; rather, how such exactions
9
Clean Water Coalition v. The M Resort, LLC, 127 Nev. 301, 315, 255
P.3d 247, 257 (2011) (citing State v. Medeiros, 89 Haw. 361, 973 P.2d 736
(1999)).
10
71 Am. Jur. 2d, supra note 3, § 13 at 321-22 (citing Valero Terrestrial
Corp. v. Caffrey, 205 F.3d 130 (4th Cir. 2000)).
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should be classified depends upon their purpose.” 11 Another
treatise, in a section distinguishing taxes and fees, states that
“[i]t is not possible to come up with a single test that will
correctly distinguish a tax from a fee in all situations as what
is a tax for one inquiry is not necessarily a tax under other
circumstances” and that instead, “determining whether an
assessment is a fee or tax must be done on a case-by-case
basis dependent upon the facts and circumstances surrounding
each assessment.” 12
We agree that no single test can or should be mandated for
distinguishing whether a charge is a fee or a tax in all cases
in which the issue may arise. Instead, as we describe further
below, the facts and circumstances surrounding the imposition
of the charge should be considered with an understanding of
the general purposes of fees and taxes and how similar charges
imposed under similar circumstances have been character-
ized. We therefore proceed to review the district court’s find-
ing in this case by considering the charge imposed under the
Resolution in this manner.
Whether Charge Is Tax, Rather Than Fee
Airport Authority assigns that the district court erred in
finding that the charge under the Resolution was an unconstitu-
tional tax and not a permissible fee. We conclude that the court
erred when it found that the charge was a tax.
[5] We do not appear to have specifically addressed how
to distinguish between a tax and a user fee, but we have con-
sidered whether a charge imposed under another label was an
unconstitutional tax. In Schumacher v. Johanns, 13 we consid-
ered a challenge by subscribers of telecommunication services
who relied in part on Neb. Const. art. VIII, § 1, to contend
11
71 Am. Jur. 2d, supra note 3, § 13 at 320 (citing Utah Sage, Inc. v.
Pleasant Grove City, 525 P.3d 1269 (Utah 2023)).
12
84 C.J.S. Taxation § 4 at 51 (2022) (citing State, ex rel., v. Withrow, 62
Ohio St. 3d 111, 579 N.E.2d 705 (1991)).
13
Schumacher v. Johanns, 272 Neb. 346, 722 N.W.2d 37 (2006).
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that a surcharge imposed by the Nebraska Public Service
Commission was an unconstitutional tax. We cited authority
defining a tax as “‘“[a]n enforced contribution of money or
other property, assessed in accordance with some reasonable
rule or apportionment by authority of a sovereign state on
persons or property within its jurisdiction for the purpose of
defraying the public expense”’” and stating that one of the
“‘essential characteristics of a tax [was] that it is not a volun-
tary payment but an enforced contribution.’” 14 Although we
recognized this definition of “tax,” we stated that “[t]he term
really gains meaning only from the factual and legal context in
which the issue comes before the court.” 15
In Schumacher v. Johanns, in determining that the surcharge
was a fee and not a tax, we emphasized the primary purpose
of the surcharge was not to generate revenue for governmen-
tal purposes, but, rather, “to regulate the telecommunications
industry through a rebalancing and restructuring of rates.” 16
Other courts have similarly emphasized the primary purpose
of a charge when distinguishing between taxes and fees. 17
14
Id. at 359, 722 N.W.2d at 48 (citing Nebraska P.P. Dist. v. Hershey School
Dist., 207 Neb. 412, 299 N.W.2d 514 (1980)).
15
Schumacher v. Johanns, supra note 13, 272 Neb. at 359, 722 N.W.2d at
48.
16
Id. at 363, 722 N.W.2d at 50.
17
See, T-Mobile South, LLC v. Bonet, 85 So. 3d 963, 982-83 (Ala. 2011)
(“‘“[a] tax is generally a revenue raising measure, imposed by a legislative
body, that allocates revenue to a general fund, and is spent for the benefit of
the entire community[, and that a] user fee, by contrast, is a payment given
in return for a government provided benefit and is tied in some fashion to
the payor’s use of the service”’”); Barber v. Ritter, 196 P.3d 238, 248, 249
(Colo. 2008) (“[t]o determine whether a government mandated financial
imposition is a ‘fee’ or a ‘tax,’ the dispositive criteria is the primary or
dominant purpose of such imposition at the time the enactment calling for
its collection is passed”; if “a primary purpose for the charge is to raise
revenues for general governmental spending, then it is a tax,” but if “the
primary purpose for the charge is to finance a particular service utilized by
those who must pay the charge, then the charge is a ‘fee’”).
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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
321 Nebraska Reports
PARK ‘N GO v. AIRPORT AUTHORITY
Cite as 321 Neb. 798
When considering whether the charge here was a tax, we
find it helpful to consider decisions from other jurisdictions
addressing similar circumstances when determining whether
the charge imposed under the Resolution was a tax, as
Park ‘N Go contends, or a user fee, as Airport Authority con-
tends. The decisions set forth below involve charges imposed
on commercial entities using and benefiting from the air-
port facilities.
In Ace Rent-A-Car v. Airport Authority, 18 the court considered
whether a fee imposed by an airport authority on off-airport car
rental companies was an unauthorized tax on income, rather
than a user fee. The airport authority possessed no taxing
authority but was authorized by statute to collect charges from
all users of its facilities and services. Pursuant to the statute,
the airport authority assessed off-airport car rental companies
a fee of 7 percent of sales for rental of cars to customers
originating from the airport. The fee was imposed on the com-
panies for the privilege of using airport roadways to operate
their shuttle services. Distinguishing taxes and user fees, the
court stated:
A tax is compulsory and not optional; it entitles the
taxpayer to receive nothing in return, other than the rights
of government which are enjoyed by all citizens. . . . On
the other hand, a user fee is optional and represents a
specific charge for the use of publicly-owned or publicly-
provided facilities or services. 19
Comparing these descriptions to the charge at issue, the
court reasoned that a company “must pay a fee to [the airport
authority] only if it uses and benefits from the airport facili-
ties which the fee supports.” 20 The court rejected an argument
that the fee was a tax because it was based on revenue, and
the court stated that “[t]o the contrary, the fee charged to
18
Ace Rent-A-Car v. Airport Authority, 612 N.E.2d 1104 (Ind. App. 1993).
19
Id. at 1108 (citation omitted).
20
Id.
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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
321 Nebraska Reports
PARK ‘N GO v. AIRPORT AUTHORITY
Cite as 321 Neb. 798
[a company] represents a percentage of the revenues the com-
pany receives from renting automobiles to customers it picks
up at the airport.” 21 The court concluded that “[b]ecause the
fee is based on furnishing [the rental car company] a specific
benefit it is thus not a tax but an authorized user fee.” 22
In Jacksonville Port Auth. v. Alamo, 23 the court similarly
concluded that a charge imposed on an off-airport rental and
parking company was “not a tax but an authorized user fee.”
The fee was a charge of 6 percent of gross receipts, and the
court used reasoning like that in Ace Rent-A-Car v. Airport
Authority regarding the respective purposes of taxes and user
fees. The court stated that “in assessing and collecting the
user fee, the [airport authority was] acting in a proprietary
capacity requiring those who benefit from its airports to pay
their fair share of costs incurred in providing the benefits,”
and that the company “pays the fee only if it uses and ben-
efits from the facilities the fee supports.” 24 The court also
stated that “the fee is for [the company’s] use of all of the
[airport’s] facilities which benefit [the company] by generat-
ing its business”; that “[i]f [the company] wished to avoid the
fee, it could obtain its customers from another source”; and
that the “charge is tied exclusively to [the company’s] use of
the airport facilities to conduct its business.” 25
In Westrac, Inc. v. Walker Field, 26 the court determined that
a fee in the amount of 10 percent of gross revenues imposed
on a car rental company was not an illegal tax. The court
distinguished taxes and user fees, stating that “[r]ates charged
for use of a public facility owned by a municipal corporation
ordinarily are not considered taxes because their purpose is
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Jacksonville Port Auth. v. Alamo, 600 So. 2d 1159, 1165 (Fla. App. 1992).
24
Id. at 1164.
25
Id. at 1162.
26
Westrac, Inc. v. Walker Field, 812 P.2d 714 (Colo. App. 1991).
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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
321 Nebraska Reports
PARK ‘N GO v. AIRPORT AUTHORITY
Cite as 321 Neb. 798
to defray the expense of operating and improving the facil-
ity and because they are imposed only upon those using the
service provided” and that “[t]axes, on the other hand, are
not based on the amount of use, and the proceeds are used to
defray general municipal expenses.” 27
The district court in the case before us focused much of its
analysis on whether the charge imposed under the Resolution
was reasonably proportionate to the benefit the companie