PriorityOne Bank and Harvey Lott v. JSC-Americanzil Construction, LLC, Jose L. Silva and Nancy Silva
CourtMississippi Supreme Court
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
Docket2025-IA-00399-SCT
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2025-IA-00399-SCT
PRIORITYONE BANK AND HARVEY LOTT
v.
JSC-AMERICANZIL CONSTRUCTION, LLC,
JOSE L. SILVA AND NANCY SILVA
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 03/21/2025
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. STANLEY ALEX SOREY
TRIAL COURT ATTORNEYS: JOHN M. DEAKLE
RICHARD JOSEPH LAJAUNIE
TANGI CARTER
RUSSELL LAMAR JOHNSON
RONALD VERDELL JOHNSON, IV
AUDRY REGNAL BLACKLEDGE
ANTHONY SAKALARIOS
RICHARD D. UNDERWOOD
PHILLIP BUFFINGTON
TIMOTHY JAMES ANZENBERGER
KYE CNEE’ HANDY
COREY DANIEL GIBSON
NOAH LEE SANFORD
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: COVINGTON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: PHILLIP BUFFINGTON
RICHARD D. UNDERWOOD
TIMOTHY JAMES ANZENBERGER
KYE CNEE’ HANDY
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: THOMAS LEWIS TULLOS, II
ANTHONY SAKALARIOS
NATURE OF THE CASE: CONTRACT
DISPOSITION: REVERSED, RENDERED, AND
REMANDED - 11/19/2026
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
BEFORE COLEMAN, P.J., SULLIVAN AND WILSON, JJ.
COLEMAN, PRESIDING JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:
¶1. In a separate case, Harvey Lott, an employee of PriorityOne Bank, engaged in
personal and professional business with JSC-Americanzil Construction, LLC. Lott hired JSC
to construct his home and convinced JSC to obtain a construction loan for the project.
Dissatisfied with the construction, Lott filed suit against JSC, and JSC counterclaimed
against Lott. The parties executed a settlement disposing of all claims.
¶2. In the instant matter, Jason Ray Temple and his wife hired JSC and obtained a
construction loan from PriorityOne Bank. After the settlement between JSC and Lott, JSC
filed a cross-complaint against PriorityOne Bank and Lott. The circuit court denied
PriorityOne Bank’s motion to dismiss or, alternatively, for summary judgment as to the cross-
complaint. PriorityOne Bank appeals and argues that the settlement agreement bars the
claims filed against them in the cross-complaint. We agree, and accordingly, we reverse the
trial court’s denial of the motion to dismiss the cross-complaint or, alternatively, for summary
judgment as to the cross-complaint and render summary judgment in favor of PriorityOne
Bank. We remand the case to the circuit court for further proceedings.
FACTS
Lott Lawsuit
¶3. In the separate matter, i.e., the Lott lawsuit, Harvey Lott and his wife entered into a
contract on May 15, 2019, with JSC-Americanzil Construction, LLC, Jose Lazaro Silva, and
Nancy Silva, i.e., the contractors, to construct their home. A dispute arose regarding the
quality of construction, the time of performance, and the amount owed, so the Lotts filed suit
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against the contractors for breach of contract, breach of warranty, and negligent construction
of the home in January 2020.
¶4. In their answer, the contractors brought a counterclaim against the Lotts. The
counterclaim raised a variety of contract-related claims including fraud, detrimental reliance,
unjust enrichment, breach of contract, and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. The contractors claims centered around the contention that Lott wrongfully
pressured the contractors to take out a home equity line of credit from PriorityOne Bank, the
bank that employed Lott as a loan officer, so that the contractors could purchase materials
for and continue work on the Lott home. The pertinent paragraph from the counterclaim
reads as follows:
Harvey advised Lazaro that [Lazaro] needed a Line of Credit for JSC from the
bank where Harvey worked, PriorityOne Bank, and that said Line of Credit
would enable him to pay for and continue purchasing the materials, and make
the other necessary expenditures to keep working on the home of the Lotts.
Harvey advised Lazaro that he had prepared the paperwork for said Line of
Credit and that Lazaro needed to come sign it. Based on the advice and
assurance of Harvey, Lazaro entered into the Line of Credit for JSC, and
became indebted for materials and other expenditures on said Line of Credit
for the upgrades and changes that the Lotts kept insisting be made to the plan.
Additionally, the counterclaim alleged that “JSC has been in a professional relationship with
Harvey and his employer, PriorityOne Bank. Through the years, JSC has sent customers to
Harvey, and Harvey has referred construction work to JSC.”
¶5. On February 23, 2021, Lott and the contractors entered into a settlement agreement
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and executed a release disposing of the Lott lawsuit. It provides as follows:
FULL AND FINAL RELEASE AND SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
For and in consideration of the mutual promises herein, we, Harvey Lott and
Nicole Lott, Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants in Covington County Circuit Cause
No. 2020-016C-1, and JSC-Americanzil Construction, LLC, Jose Lazaro Silva
a/k/a Jose Lazaro Da Silva, Nancy Silva a/k/a Nancy Da Silva,
Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs in the same suit, do hereby release, acquit, and
forever discharge all opposing part(ies) and their officers, directors, employers,
owners, heirs, successors, and/or assigns from any liability now accrued or
hereafter to accrue on account of any and all claims or causes of action which
we now or may hereafter have damages or loss of any kind or nature
whatsoever, now known or unknown or that may hereafter develop, by any or
all of us sustained or received, as a result of a certain contract and/or
agreement(s) between the parties to construct—and the said construction
itself—of a residential building/home located adjacent to Highway 49 and
Cascio Road in Covington County, Mississippi, and any financing therefor.
Further, we release acquit, and forever discharge PriorityOne Bank,
PriorityOne Capital Corporation, and their successors and/or assigns from any
and all liability, if any, now accrued or hereafter to accrue, regarding any
loan(s) and/or financing in connection with the aforementioned subject
construction and home, said release including but not limited to lender
liability, fraud, misrepresentation, breach of implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing, and all other claims.
The release(s) between the parties shall include, but be not limited to, claims
based in equity or law, including for specific performance, breach of contract,
fraud, fraudulent inducement, negligence, professional negligence, lender
liability, misrepresentation, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, loss of use, and all other damages.
The aforementioned parties sign as their own free act, without influence in
making this settlement by any representation of the party or parties released not
included in this instrument. All agreements between the parties are made a
part of this release. This instrument shall not be valid and final unless and
until executed by all parties and properly acknowledged.
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Temple Lawsuit
¶6. In September 2017, Jason Ray Temple and his wife also hired the contractors for the
purpose of constructing their home. The Temples obtained a construction loan from
PriorityOne Bank through Harvey Lott, a loan officer and soon-to-be president of the
Covington branch. In July 2018, the contractors tendered the project as complete, but shortly
thereafter, the Temples detected numerous construction-related problems with the house. In
July 2020, after the commencement of the Lott lawsuit but prior to its settlement, Temple
sued the contractors and PriorityOne Mortgage Corporation for negligence and breach of
contract. The initial complaint named only the contractors and PriorityOne Mortgage
Corporation as defendants. Subsequently, on May 3, 2024, Temple amended the complaint
to name Harvey Lott and PriorityOne Bank as defendants, to broaden existing claims, and
to assert additional causes of action.
¶7. On January 14, 2021, while both lawsuits were pending, the contractors’ attorney
emailed PriorityOne Bank’s general counsel in an attempt “to avoid getting the bank
involved in litigation between the president of the Collins branch, Harvey Lott, and my
clients.” Four days later, Lott’s attorney emailed the contractors’ attorney and proposed
settling the Lott lawsuit. The contractors’ attorney’s reply indicated a potential willingness
to settle but raised concerns regarding “that $75,000.00 loan that my people claim Harvey
talked them into taking out to buy materials.” Lott’s attorney informed the contractors’
attorney that “[he does not] believe Harvey has any authority to cancel or alter their debts.”
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¶8. Between January 20 and January 28, 2021, the attorneys for Lott and the contractors
exchanged several emails related to the proposed settlement. On January 26, 2021, Lott’s
attorney clarified his client’s position with the following email:
You may let the Silvas know so that it’s not a surprise — a release from our
end would require the Silvas releasing Harvey and also his employer for all
claims involving the home and financing for it. I’m not sure there’s any theory
of liability on the bank’s part anyway, but that would have to be included.
¶9. In his response, the contractors’ attorney acknowledged that “[The contractors] are
hot about the $75,000.00 note on their home that, according to them, Harvey talked them into
to get material for his house. They are jumping to sue [PriorityOne Bank], and think if we
dismiss Harvey it will hamper that suit.” The contractors and the Lotts executed the release
nearly one month later.
¶10. On April 5, 2023, more than two years after settling the Lott lawsuit, the contractors
moved to amend their answer in the Temple lawsuit for the purpose of asserting a cross-
complaint against codefendant PriorityOne Bank. Circuit Court Judge Matthew Sullivan
granted permission to amend, and the contractors filed the cross-complaint on May 31, 2023.
PriorityOne Bank moved to dismiss the cross-complaint or, alternatively, for summary
judgment. On October 18, 2023, Judge Sullivan granted the motion to dismiss, finding that
“Construction Defendants released the causes of action in the Cross-Complaint against the
Bank.”
¶11. On December 19, 2024, the Temples moved to recuse Judge Sullivan because he
previously had obtained a construction loan from PriorityOne Bank. The contractors joined
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in the Temples’ motion to recuse and moved to reinstate the cross-complaint. Judge Sullivan
found the Temples’ motion contained erroneous claims and asserted his ability to act fairly
and impartially, yet, nonetheless, he recused and transferred the matter to Judge Stanley
Sorey.
¶12. On February 6, 2025, Judge Sorey reinstated the contractors’ cross-complaint, and
PriorityOne Bank promptly filed an additional motion to dismiss the cross-complaint or,
alternatively, for summary judgment. On March 21, 2025, Judge Sorey denied the motion
and ordered PriorityOne Bank to answer the cross-complaint within thirty days. PriorityOne
Bank complied and filed their answer on April 28, 2025. On April 11, 2025, PriorityOne
Bank was granted permission to bring the instant interlocutory appeal of the circuit court’s
March 21, 2025, order denying PriorityOne Bank’s motion to dismiss or, alternatively, for
summary judgment as to the cross-complaint.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶13. “A settlement is a contract.” Hastings v. Guillot, 825 So. 2d 20, 23 (¶ 12) (Miss.
2002) (citing McManus v. Howard, 569 So. 2d 1213, 1215 (Miss. 1990)). “This Court has
stated that questions concerning the construction and interpretation of contracts are questions
of law.” Royer Homes of Miss., Inc. v. Chandeleur Homes, Inc., 857 So. 2d 748, 751 (¶
4) (Miss. 2003) (citing Warwick v. Gautier Util. Dist., 738 So. 2d 212, 214 (Miss. 1999);
Miss. State Highway Comm’n v. Patterson Enters. Ltd., 627 So. 2d 261, 263 (Miss. 1993)).
“We review questions of law de novo.” Id. (citing Warwick, 738 So. 2d at 214; Patterson
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Enters., 627 So. 2d at 263). Additionally, the Court reviews a trial court’s decision to grant
or deny summary judgment de novo. Monsanto Co. v. Hall, 912 So. 2d 134, 136 (¶ 5) (Miss.
2005).
ANALYSIS
I. Under the plain language of the settlement agreement, the
contractors released PriorityOne and Lott from the claims raised
in the cross-complaint.
¶14. Neither party denies the existence of a valid, properly executed contractual agreement
that disposed of the Lott lawsuit. However, the parties disagree as to whether the release
extended to claims raised in the contractors’ cross-complaint filed in the Temple lawsuit.
Thus, before determining if the release extends to the claims in the Temple lawsuit, the Court
must address any potential ambiguity in the release.
A. The release is not ambiguous.
¶15. “This Court applies contract law principles to settlement agreements.” Union Carbide
Corp. v. Nix, 142 So. 3d 374, 392 (¶ 44) (Miss. 2014) (citing Chantey Music Publ’g, Inc.
v. Malaco, Inc., 915 So. 2d 1052, 1056 (Miss. 2005)). “Thus, when examining a settlement
agreement, the Court must first examine the four corners of the document.” Id. (citing
Rotenberry v. Hooker, 864 So. 2d 266, 270 (Miss. 2003)). “[W]hen interpreting a contract,
the court’s concern is not nearly so much with what the parties may have intended but with
what they said, since the words employed are by far the best resource for ascertaining the
intent and assigning meaning with fairness and accuracy.” HeartSouth, PLLC v. Boyd, 865
8
So. 2d 1095, 1105 (¶ 27) (Miss. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Warwick,
738 So. 2d at 214). “Contracts must be interpreted by objective, not subjective standards,
therefore ‘[c]ourts must ascertain the meaning of the language actually used, and not some
possible but unexpressed intent of the parties.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting IP
Timberlands Operating Co. v. Denmiss Corp., 726 So. 2d 96, 105 (Miss. 1998)). “The
parties[’] disagreement over the meaning of a word or provision, alone, does not render an
instrument ambiguous.” Id. (citing IP Timberlands, 726 So. 2d at 105).
¶16. In accordance with Nix, the Court must first examine the four corners of the release,
which read as follows:
For and in consideration of the mutual promises herein, we, . . . do hereby
release, acquit, and forever discharge all opposing part(ies) and their
officers, directors, employers, owners, heirs, successors, and/or assigns from
any liability now accrued or hereafter to accrue on account of any and all
claims or causes of action[,] . . . as a result of a certain contract and/or
agreement(s) between the parties to construct—and the said construction
itself—of a residential building/home located adjacent to Highway 49 and
Cascio Road in Covington County, Mississippi, and any financing therefor.
Further, we release acquit, and forever discharge PriorityOne Bank,
PriorityOne Capital Corporation, and their successors and/or assigns from
any and all liability, if any, now accrued or hereafter to accrue, regarding any
loan(s) and/or financing in connection with the aforementioned subject
construction and home, said release including but not limited to lender
liability, fraud, misrepresentation, breach of implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing, and all other claims.
(Emphasis added.)
¶17. PriorityOne contends that the release unambiguously and completely extinguished the
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claims, while the contractors argue that the release agreement’s scope was strictly limited to
resolving the Lott lawsuit and matters pertaining to the construction of the Lott residence.
A plain reading of the agreement indicates that the contractors intended to release
PriorityOne and the Lotts from all claims relating to the construction of the Lott home and
any financing or loans in connection with the construction of the Lott home. Rather than
containing ambiguous language, the release presents clear, specific terms that allow the Court
to ascertain the parties’ intent. The Court finds the contractors’ argument is without merit.
B. PriorityOne may enforce the release.
¶18. The contractors argue PriorityOne’s status as a nonsignatory precludes their ability to
enforce the release. Prior to addressing whether PriorityOne’s ability to enforce the release,
the Court must address nonsignatories.
i. Nonsignatory versus Third-Party Beneficiary
¶19. When addressing third-party beneficiaries and nonsignatories in their briefs, both
parties use the terms interchangeably. By equating nonsignatory status with third-party
beneficiary status, each party misconstrues precedent, which in turn causes great confusion
of a simple issue.
¶20. The Court mentions nonsignatories and their respective rights in numerous cases, yet
few cases, if any, clearly define or interpret the term nonsignatory. While the meaning of the
term appears self-evident, distinguishing the terms may alleviate any confusion.
¶21. “A person or entity that signs a document, personally or through an agent, and thereby
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becomes a party to an agreement.” Signatory, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024).
Thus, a nonsignatory is a person or entity that does not sign a document, personally or
through an agent, and thereby does not become a party to the agreement. Accordingly, a
distinction exists between a nonsignatory and a third-party beneficiary. Third-party
beneficiary status encompasses a contract-based, meaningful relationship, whereas
nonsignatory simply describes a person or entity who did not sign the agreement.
ii. PriorityOne may enforce the release as a third-party beneficiary.
¶22. The contractors claim that PriorityOne’s failure to participate in the negotiations,
provide consideration, and sign the Lott settlement demonstrates a lack of intent by the
contracting parties—the Lotts and the contractors—to extend the protection of the release
to PriorityOne.
¶23. “A third person may enforce a promise made for his benefit even though he is a
stranger to the contract or to the consideration.” Cope v. Thrasher Constr., Inc., 231 So. 3d
989, 993 (¶ 7) (Miss. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Miss. High Sch.
Activities Ass’n v. Farris, 501 So. 2d 393, 395-96 (Miss. 1987)). “To enforce the promise,
the third-party’s beneficiary status ‘must spring from the terms of the contract itself.’” Id.
(quoting Burns v. Wash. Sav., 251 Miss. 789, 796, 171 So. 2d 322, 325 (1965)). The Court
applies the following analysis to determine third-party beneficiary status:
(1) When the terms of the contract are expressly broad enough to include the
third party either by name as one of a specified class, and (2) the said third
party was evidently within the intent of the terms so used, the said third party
will be within its benefits, if (3) the promisee had, in fact, a substantial and
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articulate interest in the welfare of the said third party in respect to the subject
of the contract.
Id. (quoting Simmons Hous., Inc. v. Shelton ex rel. Shelton, 36 So. 3d 1283, 1286 (¶ 10)
(Miss. 2010)).
¶24. Thus, the Court must determine whether PriorityOne qualifies to receive third-party
beneficiary status. The terms of the release expressly name PriorityOne, which satisfies the
first element. PriorityOne correctly notes that neither party may dispute the point. However,
the contractors vigorously contest the second element. The contractors contend that the
release fails to exhibit a clear manifestation of intent to extend the benefits of the agreement
to PriorityOne. The Court held that “in a release contract a party releases only those parties
whom he intends to release.” Smith v. Falke, 474 So. 2d 1044, 1047 (Miss. 1985). Again,
“when examining a settlement, the Court must first examine the four corners of the
document.” Nix, 142 So. 3d at 392 (¶ 44) (citing Rotenberry, 864 So. 2d at 270).
¶25. The release specifically identifies PriorityOne, and, as determined previously, the
terms and conditions clearly and unambiguously display the parties’ intent to release
PriorityOne from all claims related to the financing and construction of the Lott residence.
We find that the plain language of the Agreement exhibits the contractors’ intent to release
PriorityOne.
¶26. Finally, PriorityOne qualifies as an intended third-party beneficiary “if . . . the
promisee had, in fact, a substantial and articulate interest in the welfare of the said third party
in respect to the subject of the contract.” Shelton, 36 So. 3d at 1286 (quoting Yazoo & Miss.
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Valley R.R. Co. v. Sideboard, 161 Miss. 4, 133 So. 669, 671 (1931)). Lott, the promissee
in the release, possessed a substantial and articulable interest in the welfare of PriorityOne,
his employer. He sought the release of his employer from liability of claims that allegedly
arose from his conduct and, thus, satisfies the third element.
¶27. Furthermore, the Shelton Court held that “[a] third-party beneficiary also must benefit
directly from the contract” and that “[a] mere incidental or consequential benefit is
insufficient.” Shelton, 36 So. 3d at 1286 (¶ 11) (citing Adams v. Greenpoint Credit, LLC,
943 So. 2d 703, 708-09 (Miss. 2006)).
¶28. Since we established that PriorityOne receives third-party beneficiary status, we must
now determine whether PriorityOne directly benefitted from the release. Here, the release
extinguished liability from potential litigation, which clearly classifies as beneficial.
Therefore, we find that PriorityOne qualifies as a third-party beneficiary and may enforce the
release.
C. The release extends to claims brought forth in the cross-complaint.
¶29. After determining that the release was unambiguous and enforceable, the Court must
determine whether the release shields PriorityOne from the claims raised in the Temple
cross-complaint. The contractors argue that the release tethers itself to the specific Lott
construction project, while the Temple cross-complaint arises from several ongoing projects,
which they classify as “umbrella issues.” PriorityOne contends that the contractors’ cross-
complaint constitutes a second attempt to litigate claims previously disposed of by the release
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when settling the Lott lawsuit. Ascertaining the answer requires reviewing the foundation
of the contractors’ counterclaim filed in the Lott lawsuit.
¶30. After the Lotts sued the contractors for negligent construction in the Lott lawsuit, the
contractors filed a counterclaim. In the counterclaim, the contractors alleged that Harvey
Lott wrongfully induced them to take out a loan from PriorityOne Bank for the purpose of
funding the construction of the home. The causes of action raised in the counterclaim
centered on financial damage caused by Lott’s nonpayment of materials purchased with the
loan.
¶31. Next, the Court must review the core of the claims raised in the cross-complaint of the
current suit and compare them to the claims raised in the Lott lawsuit. In the factual section
of their cross-complaint, the contractors mention an arrangement with Lott in which the two
parties exchanged referrals. The contractors allege that Lott acted in the course and scope
of his employment when he performed inspections of homes built by the contractors and
approved their construction loans. The contractors allege that several omissions and errors
resulted in three lawsuits involving homebuilders who hired the contractors and obtained
construction loans from PriorityOne. While the contractors name three different cases in
support of their position, they limit their specific factual allegations to facts involving the
construction of the Lott home.
¶32. Although the contractors characterize the issues underlying the cross-complaint as
broader than and distinct from the ones raised in the counterclaim, the factual allegations in
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the cross-complaint pertain only to issues previously addressed in the counterclaim of the
Lott lawsuit and settled in the release.
¶33. “The law favors settlement of disputes by agreement of the parties and, ordinarily, will
enforce the agreement which the parties have made, absent any fraud, mistake, or
overreaching.” Welsh v. Mounger, 883 So. 2d 46, 48 (¶ 7) (Miss. 2004) (citing Hastings,
825 So. 2d at 24). Reviewing a trial court’s grant or denial of summary judgment “requires
examination of all evidentiary matters in the record, including admissions in pleadings,
answers to interrogatories, depositions, affidavits and exhibits.” City of Jackson v. Maxie
ex rel. M.Y., 412 So. 3d 1156, 1159 (¶ 11) (Miss. 2025) (citing Turner v. Johnson, 498 So.
2d 389, 391 (Miss. 1986)). “[T]he moving party bears the burden of demonstrating that no
genuine issue of material fact exists.” Maxie, 412 So. 3d at 1159 (¶ 12) (alteration in
original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Anderson v. Wiggins, 331 So. 3d 1, 4
(Miss. 2020)). To prevent summary judgment, “the non-moving party must establish that a
genuine issue of material fact [exists] within the means allowable under [Rule 56 of the
Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure].” Id. (second alteration in original) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Gorman-Rupp Co. v. Hall, 908 So. 2d 749, 754 (Miss. 2005)).
¶34. After reviewing the record, the Court holds that the contractors, the nonmoving party,
failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact. The cross-complaint raises allegations
that pertain to issues previously addressed in the counterclaim of the Lott lawsuit that
subsequently settled. Therefore, no genuine issue of material fact exists, and PriorityOne is
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entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
CONCLUSION
¶35. The Court reverses the trial court’s denial of the motion to dismiss the cross-complaint
or, alternatively, for summary judgment as to the cross-complaint and renders summary
judgment in favor of PriorityOne Bank. The case is remanded for further proceedings.
¶36. REVERSED, RENDERED, AND REMANDED.
RANDOLPH, C.J., KING, P.J., ISHEE, GRIFFIS, SULLIVAN, BRANNING
WILSON AND TOLLISON, JJ., CONCUR.
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