Fidelity Bank Versus Stuart G. Coleman and Jerry Lathan
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
Docket26-C-548
JudgeFrank A. Brindisi
StatusUnknown
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Full Opinion
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal
State of Louisiana
No. 26-C-548
FIDELITY BANK
versus
STUART G. COLEMAN AND JERRY LATHAN
IN RE STUART G. COLEMAN
APPLYING FOR SUPERVISORY WRIT FROM THE TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COURT, PARISH OF JEFFERSON, STATE OF LOUISIANA, DIRECTED TO THE HONORABLE
FRANK BRINDISI, DIVISION "E", No. 876-033
November 18, 2026
Panel composed of Judges Susan M. Chehardy,
John J. Molaison, Jr., and Scott U. Schlegel
WRIT DENIED
Relator, Stuart G. Coleman, seeks review of the trial court’s October 14,
2026 judgment denying his declinatory exception of improper venue and his
alternative motion to transfer. For the following reasons, we deny the writ
application.
Procedural History
On May 20, 2026, Fidelity Bank sued relator and Jerry Lathan in the 24th
Judicial District Court. Fidelity alleges that relator and Lathan are solidarily liable
under their guaranties of a loan to Carillon Oaks Lincoln, LLC, an Alabama
limited liability company. The petition grounded venue solely in La. C.C.P. art.
42, alleging that relator is domiciled in Jefferson Parish. On May 27, 2026,
Fidelity amended its petition to correct Lathan’s surname and repeated the same
venue allegation. Lathan answered and filed a reconventional demand without
excepting to venue.
Relator filed a declinatory exception of improper venue and, alternatively, a
motion to transfer the action to Orleans Parish. In opposition, Fidelity relied on
La. C.C.P. art. 77.
The trial court heard the exception on September 29, 2026. Relator testified,
and the court admitted Fidelity Exhibits 1 through 7 without objection but
excluded Fidelity’s proposed Exhibit 8, an affidavit. The court denied the
exception at the close of the hearing and signed a written judgment on October 14,
2026.
The clerk mailed notice of judgment on October 15, 2026, and relator filed
his notice of intent the same day. The trial court set a return date of November 13,
2026, and stayed proceedings on the merits pending this Court’s disposition.
Relator timely filed this application on November 13, 2026.
Assignment of Error
Relator assigns a single error:
The district court erred in denying Mr. Coleman’s exception of
improper venue by treating the Conlin Street address’s use for
receiving mail and suitability for service as substitutes for the
supervision required by La. C.C.P. art. 77. Neither establishes that an
office at that address had supervision over the loan and guaranty at
issue. To the extent the district court implicitly found that such
supervision existed, that finding is manifestly erroneous because it
lacks a reasonable factual basis and is clearly wrong in light of the
record as a whole.
Relator asks this Court to reverse the judgment, sustain the exception, and
remand with instructions to transfer the action to the Civil District Court for the
Parish of Orleans. Alternatively, he asks this Court to vacate the judgment and
remand the matter for the trial court to apply Article 77’s supervision requirement.
Standard of Review
Venue is a question of law, which this Court reviews de novo. Seghers v.
LaPlace Equip. Co., 13-350 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/12/14), 136 So.3d 64, 69. On the
trial of a declinatory exception, a party may introduce evidence to support or
controvert the objection when its grounds do not appear from the petition, the
citation, or the return. La. C.C.P. art. 930. When the court admits evidence at that
hearing, it must decide the exception on the evidence presented rather than on the
allegations of the petition. Galata Chemicals, LLC v. Chromalox, Inc., 25-18 (La.
App. 5 Cir. 7/2/25), 421 So.3d 971, 976, writ denied, 25-983 (La. 11/25/25), 421
So.3d 533.
Where a party introduces evidence at the hearing, “a manifest-error/clearly-
wrong standard accompanies the appellate court’s de novo review of the legal
question of venue as to any underlying factual findings.” FBP Covington, LLC v.
Fat Boy’s Pizza Franchise, LLC, No. 26-C-446, 2026 WL 3082800, at *2 (La.
App. 5 Cir. Oct. 15, 2026). An appellate court may reverse a factual finding only
if it finds that no reasonable factual basis exists for the finding and that the record
establishes the finding is clearly wrong. Stobart v. State, Through Dep’t of Transp.
& Dev., 617 So.2d 880, 882 (La. 1993). Relator does not dispute this framework.
Relator contends, however, that the trial court’s oral remark reflects a legal
error that interdicted the fact-finding process and therefore requires de novo
review. He relies on Evans v. Lungrin, 97-0541 (La. 2/6/98), 708 So.2d 731, 735,
in which the supreme court held that when one or more legal errors interdict the
fact-finding process, the manifest-error standard no longer applies and, if the
record is otherwise complete, the appellate court should conduct its own de novo
review.
The asserted error appears only in the trial court’s oral reasons. At the close
of the hearing, the court stated its belief that the testimony and documents showed
that the Conlin Street address “was the proper place for him to be served.”
Appellate courts review judgments, not reasons for judgment, and a trial court’s
oral or written reasons form no part of the judgment. Hosp. Serv. Dist. No. 1 of
Par. of St. James v. Hosp. Serv. Dist. No. 3 of Par. of Lafourche, 25-202 (La. App.
5 Cir. 11/26/25), 427 So.3d 297, 303, writs denied, 25-1634 (La. 3/25/26), 428
So.3d 268; 25-1636 (La. 3/25/26), 428 So.3d 269. The supreme court has applied
the same rule in declining to base the standard of review on a trial court’s reasons
rather than on its judgment. Wooley v. Lucksinger, 09-0571 (La. 4/1/11), 61 So.3d
507, 572.
The trial court denied the exception after considering relator’s testimony, the
exhibits admitted into evidence, and the parties’ briefing and argument. At the
hearing, both parties identified supervision as the only disputed element of Article
77. The judgment therefore rests on an implicit finding that the Conlin Street
office had supervision over the matter sued upon. Relator acknowledges that, if
the judgment is so read, the finding must be assessed under the manifest-error
standard, and that the brevity of the oral reasons alone does not warrant de novo
factfinding. Accordingly, we review that finding for manifest error.
Burden of Proof
This Court has held that when the grounds for an objection of improper
venue do not appear on the face of the petition, the defendant bears the burden of
offering evidence in support of his position. Seghers, 136 So.3d at 69; Galata
Chemicals, 421 So.3d at 976. Other courts have stated that the party invoking a
supplementary venue article must establish that it applies. See Johnson v.
Acadiana Ry. Co., 96-263 (La. App. 3 Cir. 4/16/97), 693 So.2d 226, 230.
Relator suggests that Fidelity bore the burden because it first raised Article
77 in its opposition. We need not resolve that question. Fidelity introduced
documentary evidence and elicited relator’s admissions on cross-examination, and
that evidence furnishes a reasonable factual basis for the finding under either
allocation.
The Evidence
Article 77 provides:
An action against a person having a business office or
establishment in a parish other than that where he may be sued under
Article 42 only, on a matter over which this office or establishment
had supervision, may be brought in the parish where this office or
establishment is located.
Relator conceded at the hearing, and concedes in his application, that the first
requirement of Article 77 is satisfied: he has a business office or establishment at
4425 Conlin Street in Jefferson Parish. He also concedes that Article 77 does not
require exclusive supervision, personal ownership of an office, or a particular form
of proof. The only question is whether the record furnishes a reasonable basis for
the finding that the Conlin Street office supervised the loan and guaranty.
Relator was the only witness, and he offered no exhibits.1 On direct
examination, he testified that his home is on General Haig Street in New Orleans,
where he lived when suit was filed. He pays property taxes in Orleans Parish and
ordinarily works from a home office there. He described the Conlin Street address,
his brother’s dermatology clinic, as a mail-drop arrangement at which clinic staff
receive his mail. He stated that he performs no work there and has not maintained
an office there for about seven years. He testified that he negotiated the loan and
the later agreements in Orleans Parish or at his attorney’s downtown office, that he
reviewed communications and made decisions in New Orleans, and that he signed
the documents at his home office or at his attorney’s office. He also testified that
1
Relator’s affidavit was attached to his exception but was never offered into evidence. “Evidence not properly and
officially offered and introduced cannot be considered, even if it is physically placed in the record.” Denoux v.
Vessel Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 07-2143 (La. 5/21/08), 983 So.2d 84, 88. Accordingly, we do not consider the affidavit,
although it appears in the writ application. See State v. Nguyen, 25-312 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/12/25), 427 So.3d 267,
282, writ denied, 25-1475 (La. 5/12/26), 430 So.3d 1087, petition for cert. filed (U.S. July 6, 2026) (No. 26-19).
neither his brother nor the clinic staff had any role in the loan, and that neither he
nor the Conlin Street address supervised or administered the loan in Jefferson
Parish.
On cross-examination, relator acknowledged that the Conlin Street address
appears in his guarantor signature block and in the notice provision of the 2022
Loan Agreement. He acknowledged that the 2025 Loan Forbearance and
Modification Agreement and its First Amendment identify him in their opening
recitals as “a resident of the State of Louisiana … having an address of 4425
Conlin Street, Metairie” and list that address for notices. He admitted that he
signed the forbearance agreement under oath while represented by counsel. Asked
whether he ever used his home address in the loan transaction, he answered, “For
notices, no.” Asked whether he used it for anything, he answered that his home
was where he did his business daily.
Relator further acknowledged that he used his SGC Group email for this
loan transaction. On September 9, 2026, twenty days before the hearing, he wrote
to Fidelity requesting the loan’s 2025 principal and interest activity and its year-
end statement, and he signed that email “SGC Group, L.L.C. 4425 Conlin St
Metairie, LA 70006.” He agreed that SGC Group, the management company he
owns, is domiciled at 4425 Conlin Street, and that he is its registered agent and
manager at that address. His Louisiana State Bar Association listing likewise gives
Conlin Street as his address, although the listing notes that the parish shown is
based on the member’s mailing address. The Secretary of State’s record for
Carillon Oaks Lincoln Master Tenant, LLC shows that entity’s domicile at Conlin
Street, with Lathan & Coleman LLC as its manager at the same address. Relator
testified, however, that the Master Tenant was not involved in this loan.
Fidelity called no witnesses. The trial court excluded the proposed affidavit
of Fidelity’s executive vice president on relator’s hearsay objection.
Law and Analysis
Article 77 requires more than an office in the parish. “The office or
establishment providing supervision over the matter in dispute must be located in
that parish.” Johnson, 693 So.2d at 230. Where the record is silent on the
essential element of supervision, Article 77 does not apply. Surridge v. Benanti,
261 La. 282, 259 So.2d 324, 328 (1972). Whether the office had supervision over
the matter is a question of fact. See Recile v. Weigel, 188 So.2d 636, 638 (La. App.
4 Cir. 1966).
Louisiana courts have found Article 77 supervision on comparable evidence.
In Analab, Inc. v. Bank of South, 271 So.2d 73, 75 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1972), the court
held that an action against a defendant domiciled in Orleans Parish “was on a
matter over which his office in Jefferson Parish had supervision.” The defendant
there identified himself through his position at that office, received the other party
there, handed over a business card bearing the bank’s identity, and had the invoice
directed there.
In Hyatt v. Petrolite Corp., 95-0767 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/19/96), 668 So.2d
432, 434, the record included business cards and a state filing bearing the office
address, and the court concluded that the office “supervised plaintiff and his
activities.” In Byles Welding & Tractor Co. v. Butts Sales & Service, Inc., 578
So.2d 246, 250 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1991), the court held venue proper because “the
office which supervised that business was located in Sabine Parish.”
Supervision need not be exclusive. In Hamilton Medical Group v. Ochsner
Health Plan, 550 So.2d 290, 293-94 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1989), the court upheld
Article 77 venue in Lafayette Parish even though the financial accounting and all
rate decisions took place in New Orleans. The local office qualified because it was
“established to administer or supervise the activities of the Hamilton Medical
Group under the contract.” Id. at 294.
Here, relator presented the Conlin Street office as his address for this loan in
three ways: in the sworn recitals of the forbearance instruments, in the notice
provisions of each admitted instrument, and in his own loan-administration
correspondence as recently as twenty days before the hearing. The management
company, through whose email account he conducted that correspondence, is
registered at the same office. From that evidence, the trial court could reasonably
infer that the Jefferson Parish office had supervision over the loan and guaranty.
That inference is consistent with Analab, in which the office’s identity was used in
dealing with the counterparty on the transaction itself. 271 So.2d at 75.
The trial court was also entitled to weigh relator’s explanations against the
documents. Relator described the address as a mail-drop arrangement. He
characterized the sworn recitals, including one that is not a notice provision, as
being “[f]or notices.” He disclaimed the forbearance recital on the ground that
Fidelity drafted it, although he admitted that he signed the instrument under oath
with the assistance of counsel and never sought a correction. Moreover, his
testimony that he performs no work at Conlin Street is difficult to reconcile with
his concession that he maintains a business office or establishment there.
Where testimony conflicts, “reasonable evaluations of credibility and
reasonable inferences of fact should not be disturbed upon review[.]” Rosell v.
ESCO, 549 So.2d 840, 844 (La. 1989); see also Stobart, 617 So.2d at 882. Relator
himself acknowledges that the documents support Fidelity’s position that Conlin
Street served an ongoing business purpose and that the trial court could weigh
them against his testimony. When the evidence supports two permissible views, the
factfinder’s choice between them cannot be manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong.
Rosell, 549 So.2d at 844; Stobart, 617 So.2d at 883.
Nor does relator benefit from the rule that an appellate court may find
manifest error where “documents or objective evidence so contradict the witness’s
story” that a reasonable factfinder would not credit it. Rosell, 549 So.2d at 844-45.
Here, the documents support the finding; they contradict relator’s testimony, not
the other way around.
Relator relies on Anglade v. Hemenway Furniture Co., 151 So.2d 164 (La.
App. 4 Cir. 1963), and Recile for the distinction between a contractual or mailing
address and actual supervision of the transaction. He also cites Jordan v. Central
Louisiana Electric Co., 95-1270 (La. 6/23/95), 656 So.2d 988, 989 (per curiam),
for the proposition that courts do not strictly construe the supplementary venue
articles because they are “part and parcel of the general venue rule set forth in
Article 42.” Anglade and Recile, however, are distinguishable on their facts. In
Anglade, the parties confected the lease at issue in Shreveport, and the defendant
paid rent, taxes, and insurance from Shreveport, and managed the property from
there; the defendant’s New Orleans stores were unrelated to it. 151 So.2d at 165-
66. In Recile, the defendants did not maintain the office, paid no rent, and had
visited it only once or twice. The contract address there was inserted “for the
convenience of Rodstrom, their legal advisor in this instance, and not because it
represented the business office of these defendants.” 188 So.2d at 638-39.
Here, by contrast, relator concedes that the Conlin Street office is his
business office or establishment. He personally and repeatedly adopted its address
under oath in the forbearance instruments, and he used its identity to administer the
loan.
Conclusion
We review the trial court’s judgment, not its oral reasons. The trial court
rendered that judgment on the testimony and evidence admitted at a contradictory
hearing. Relator concedes that he maintains a business office in Jefferson Parish.
He repeatedly designated that office’s address in the loan agreement and under
oath and with counsel in the forbearance instruments, and he used that office’s
identity to conduct the loan’s affairs. The record therefore provides a reasonable
factual basis for the trial court’s implicit finding that the Jefferson Parish office had
supervision over the matter sued upon within the meaning of La. C.C.P. art. 77 and
that finding is not clearly wrong.
Because venue is proper in Jefferson Parish under Article 77, we do not
reach relator’s request for transfer to Orleans Parish under La. C.C.P. arts. 121 and
932(B), or his alternative request for vacatur and remand. Relator does not
separately assign error to the denial of his alternative motion to transfer on grounds
of forum non conveniens.
Gretna, Louisiana, this 18th day of November, 2026.
JJM
SMC
SUS
SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CURTIS B. PURSELL
CHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT
SUSAN S. BUCHHOLZ
FREDERICKA H. WICKER
CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
JUDE G. GRAVOIS
MARC E. JOHNSON
STEPHEN J. WINDHORST LINDA M. TRAN
JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR.
FIRST DEPUTY CLERK
SCOTT U. SCHLEGEL
TIMOTHY S. MARCEL FIFTH CIRCUIT
MELISSA C. LEDET
JUDGES 101 DERBIGNY STREET (70053)
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL STAFF
POST OFFICE BOX 489
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www.fifthcircuit.org
NOTICE OF DISPOSITION CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THE DISPOSITION IN THE FOREGOING MATTER HAS BEEN
TRANSMITTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNIFORM RULES - COURT OF APPEAL, RULE 4-6 THIS
DAY 11/18/2026 TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, THE TRIAL COURT CLERK OF COURT, AND AT LEAST ONE OF
THE COUNSEL OF RECORD FOR EACH PARTY, AND TO EACH PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL, AS LISTED BELOW:
26-C-548
E-NOTIFIED
24th Judicial District Court (Clerk)
Honorable Frank A. Brindisi (DISTRICT JUDGE)
Gabrielle L. Ferrara (Relator) Laura F. Ashley (Relator)
Wade P. Webster (Respondent)
Peter J. Rotolo, III (Respondent)
Amy L. McIntire (Respondent)
MAILED
E. Howell Crosby (Respondent) Michael J. Thompson, Jr. (Respondent)
Attorney at Law Attorney at Law
1100 Poydras Street Thompson Law Office, PLLC
Suite 2300 Post Office Box 280
New Orleans, LA 70163 Gulfport, MS 39501