Full Opinion

SECOND DIVISION DOYLE, P. J., DAVIS and WHITAKER, JJ. NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be received no later than 4:30 pm on the 10th day after the decision was issued to be deemed timely filed. https://www.gaappeals.gov/rules November 2, 2026 In the Court of Appeals of Georgia A26A1626. NORHAVEN PARTNERS, LLC et al. v. BARTOW COUNTY et al. DOYLE, Presiding Judge. Norhaven Partners, LLC, and Peeples Owner LLC (collectively, “Norhaven”) filed a petition for review of the Bartow County Commissioner’s grant of a conditional use permit (“CUP”) to Justin Rice and Rice Commercial Investments, Inc., (collectively, “Rice”) to build a waste processing facility next to a proposed residential development. The trial court initially disposed of several arguments raised in the petition but remanded for the commissioner to make further findings of fact and conclusions of law as to the remaining arguments. On remand, the commissioner made factual findings and legal conclusions as directed, and after a hearing, the trial court rejected Norhaven’s remaining arguments. Norhaven appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by (1) reviewing only the written transcript of the public hearing before the commissioner; (2) remanding the case to the commissioner to make factual findings where the record was amenable to only one interpretation; and (3) denying the petition after the commissioner ignored the trial court’s instructions on remand. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. Our review of a quasi-judicial decision of an agency of a local government by way of a petition for review requires us to determine that the findings of fact are supported by any evidence and to examine the soundness of the conclusions of law that are based upon the findings of fact. ... [W]hen we review a superior court’s order in a[ quasi-judicial] proceeding, our duty is not to review whether the record supports the superior court’s decision but whether the record supports the final decision of the [quasi-judicial] agency. ... [W]e review legal conclusions de novo. Beacon Media, LLC v. City of Atlanta, 379 Ga. App. 477, 478 (929 SE2d 40) (2026) (cleaned up). So viewed, the record reflects that in January 2023, Bartow County approved conceptual site plans submitted by Norhaven to develop a 97-unit townhome community on residentially zoned property. By October 2023, the development plans for this townhome community, known as the Overlook on Pettit, had been fully 2 approved by the county, which approved Norhaven’s application for a land use disturbance permit for the development. Adjacent to, and east of, the site of Norhaven’s planned residential development is property zoned heavy industrial owned by Rice. Rice had been using the property for a mulch materials processing, wood shredding, and rock crushing operation prior to its July 2, 2024 application for a CUP to expand the use of the property to include a recovered materials processing and solid waste handling facility for construction and demolition materials. At the time of Rice’s CUP application, no construction had begun on Norhaven’s residential development, but based on an overlay of Rice’s proposed site plan and Norhaven’s development plans, 46 of the 97 proposed townhomes would be within 1,000 feet of the proposed waste handling area. Relevant to this appeal, Section 9.5.6 of the Bartow County Zoning Ordinance provides that “[n]o waste handling area (as measured from the chain link fence boundary) may be located within one thousand (1,000) feet of any residential dwelling (so used at the time of the application).” Section 3.1 of the zoning ordinance provides that “[t]he word ‘used’ or ‘occupied’ as applied to any land or building shall be construed to include the words ‘intended, arranged[,] or designed to be used or occupied.’” Section 3.2 of the ordinance defines “dwelling” as “[a] building or other 3 structure designed, arranged, or used for temporary or permanent living quarters for one or more persons.” This Section further defines “structure” as “[a]nything constructed or erected, the use of which requires location on the ground, or attachment to something having location on the ground.” In August 2024, a public hearing on Rice’s CUP application was held before the Bartow County Planning Commission, which voted to recommend approval of the CUP with certain conditions, such as construction of a berm along the boundary of the property bordering residential properties and a prohibition on the incineration of waste. Rice’s CUP application then came before the Bartow County Commissioner for a public hearing on September 4, 2024. Representatives of Norhaven, as well as members of the public, appeared at the hearing and voiced their opposition to the CUP. In particular, representatives of Norhaven argued that based on Rice’s proposed site plan, approval of the CUP would result in a violation of Section 9.5.6 of the Bartow County Zoning Ordinance because Rice’s waste processing facility would be within 1,000 feet of 46 of the townhomes planned for construction as part of Norhaven’s residential development. At the conclusion of the hearing, the commissioner approved Rice’s CUP application, subject to the conditions recommended by the planning commission, as well as the additional condition per the 4 zoning ordinance that a “1,000-foot separation distance from residential homes from the proposed solid waste handling facilities shall be in place and shall be maintained.” On October 3, 2024, Norhaven filed a petition for review of the commissioner’s approval of the CUP, naming Rice and Bartow County as a respondents. Relevant to this appeal, the petition alleged that the approval of Rice’s CUP application violated Section 9.5.6 of the Bartow County Zoning Ordinance in that the proposed waste processing facility would be within 1,000 feet of residential dwellings and that the approval was therefore void. The trial court convened a hearing on the petition on July 9, 2025. At the hearing, counsel for Norhaven argued that a dwelling need not be constructed in order to trigger application of Section 9.5.6 of the zoning ordinance; it merely had to be “intended, arranged, or designed to be used” pursuant to Section 3.1 of the ordinance. Counsel for Rice countered that Section 9.5.6 of the ordinance required a 1,000-foot separation distance only as measured from residential dwellings constructed at the time the CUP application was submitted, citing Section 3.2 of the ordinance, which defines “dwelling” as a “building or other structure designed, arranged, or used for temporary or permanent living quarters for one or more persons.” On September 3, 2025, the trial court entered an order on Norhaven’s petition 5 for review. Relevant to this appeal, the trial court interpreted OCGA § 5-3-5(a)(1) to confine the scope of its review to the transcript of the hearing before the commissioner, to the exclusion of any issue not specifically raised at this hearing. The trial court also remanded the case to the commissioner for determination of “whether any portion of a waste handling area, as measured from the chain link fence boundary, is located within one thousand (1,000) feet of any residential dwelling (intended, arranged, or designed to be used).” On remand, the commissioner made a written finding of fact that Rice’s proposed “waste handling area, as measured from the chain link fence boundary, was located at least 1,000 feet from any residential dwelling being used at the time of the [a]pplication.” In support of this finding, the commissioner cited testimony from the September 4, 2024 hearing that Norhaven had completed some site work but had not yet started construction of any townhomes pursuant to its residential development plan. Following entry of the commissioner’s written findings, the case was transmitted back to the trial court, which convened a second hearing on Norhavan’s petition for review on December 17, 2025. There, counsel for Norhaven challenged the commissioner’s finding that Rice’s proposed waste handling facility would be at 6 least 1,000 feet from any residential dwelling on the grounds (1) that it was not supported by any evidence, and (2) that it ignored the trial court’s remand instructions by failing to consider Section 9.5.6 of the zoning ordinance in conjunction with Section 3.1 of the ordinance, under which Norhaven’s proposed residential building sites should be considered buildings that were “intended, arranged, or designed to be used” as residential dwellings. On January 5, 2026, the trial court entered a final order denying the petition and affirming the commissioner’s approval of Rice’s CUP application. In its order, the trial court ruled that the commissioner had complied with the trial court’s instructions on remand to make written findings of fact. Additionally, the trial court ruled that the commissioner was required to consider Section 3.1 of the zoning ordinance and “any other applicable code when determining whether a waste handling facility is within 1,000 feet of a residential dwelling.” Although the trial court’s order does not explicitly deny Norhaven’s argument that the approval of Rice’s CUP application was void for violating Sections 9.5.6 and 3.1 of the zoning ordinance, subsequent correspondence among the trial court and parties clarifies that it was the trial court’s intention to do so. Norhaven filed an application for discretionary appeal, which this Court granted, and this appeal followed. 7 1. Norhaven contends that the trial court erred by construing OCGA § 5-3- 5(a)(1) to confine the scope of its review to the written transcript of the public hearing before the commissioner. This contention is without merit. OCGA § 5-3-5(a)(1) provides that in reviewing the decision of a lower judicatory, “a reviewing court shall ... [r]eview only matters raised in the record of the proceedings in the lower judicatory.” When interpreting statutory language, Georgia courts are to “presume that the General Assembly meant what it said and said what it meant.” Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170, 172(1)(a) (751 SE2d 337) (2013) (quotation marks omitted). In so doing, we “must afford the statutory text its plain and ordinary meaning, ... view the statutory text in the context in which it appear, and ... read the statutory text in its most natural and reasonable way.” Chestnut Ridge, LLC v. Hall County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 323 Ga. 150, 155(1) (924 SE2d 331) (2025) (quotation marks omitted). “[I]f the statutory text is clear and unambiguous, we attribute to the statute its plaining meaning, and our search for statutory meaning is at and end.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). Here, the phrase “matters raised in the record of the proceeding in the lower judicatory” plainly refers to all materials submitted to or considered by the lower judicatory during the course of the relevant proceeding. To the extent that the trial 8 court interpreted OCGA § 5-3-5(a)(1) to confine the scope of its review to the transcript of the hearing before the commissioner, to the exclusion of issues not specifically raised at this hearing, such as Section 3.1 or other applicable provisions of the zoning ordinance, Rice’s CUP application, or other materials submitted to or considered by the commissioner but not directly addressed at the hearing, the trial court erred. But a successful enumeration of error requires a showing of both error and harm. See Alligood v. Piedmont Med. Care Corp., Inc., 369 Ga. App. 171, 172(1) (892 SE2d 790) (2023) (“An appellant must show harm as well as error to prevail on appeal; error to be reversible must be harmful.”) (quotation marks omitted). Here, although the trial court purported to limit its review to the transcript of the hearing before the commissioner, it clearly considered the application of Section 3.1 of the zoning ordinance, as evidenced in its instruction to the commissioner on remand to consider this Section in its determination of “whether any portion of a waste handling area, as measured from the chain link fence boundary, is located within one thousand (1,000) feet of any residential dwelling (intended, arranged, or designed to be used)” and in its ruling in the final order that the commissioner was required to consider the language of this Section “or any other applicable code” in making this determination. 9 To the extent that the trial court was required, but failed, to explicitly consider the effect of other applicable sections of the zoning ordinance not specifically raised at the hearing before the commissioner, Norhaven cannot show harm because consideration of other applicable sections of the ordinance leads to the same conclusion that the trial court reached — that Rice’s proposed waste processing facility did not violate Section 9.5.6 of the zoning ordinance because it was not within 1,000 feet of any residential dwelling. Section 3.2 of the ordinance defines “dwelling” as “[a] building or other structure designed, arranged, or used for temporary or permanent living quarters for one or more persons.” This Section further defines “structure” as “[a]nything constructed or erected, the use of which requires location on the ground, or attachment to something having location on the ground.” Thus, a proper reading of Section 9.5.6 in conjunction with Sections 3.1 and 3.2 mandates the conclusion that the term “residential dwelling” includes only buildings, structures, or other constructed edifices intended, arranged, or designed to be used as living quarters and, contrary to Norhaven’s argument, does not encompass undeveloped residential properties that may be intended, arranged, or designed to be the sites of residential dwellings but on which no such buildings or structures are erected at the time of the application. Because the trial court’s order is consistent with this reading, 10 this enumeration of error presents no basis for reversal. 2. Norhaven also contends that the trial court erred by remanding the case to the commissioner to make factual findings as to Rice’s compliance with Section 9.5.6 of the zoning ordinance because the record is amenable to only one interpretation. We disagree. OCGA § 5-3-18(1)(1)(C) provides that in rendering a final decision as to a petition for review, one of the trial court’s options for disposing of the petition is “[r]emanding [the] petition for review back to the lower judicatory with instructions[.]” Here, the trial court did just that, and rightly so. In passing on a petition for review, a trial court is required to “[a]ccept the findings of fact and credibility of the lower judicatory unless they are clearly erroneous[,]” see OCGA § 5-3-5(a)(2), and, more broadly, to “[d]etermine whether the final judgment was sustained by sufficient evidence.” OCGA § 5-3-5(a)(4). The trial court was faced with a challenge to the commissioner’s determination that Rice’s CUP application violated Section 9.5.6 of the zoning ordinance. The commissioner initially determined that the CUP did not violate this Section but failed to make explicit factual findings in support of this determination. The trial court properly remanded the case to the commissioner to do so under OCGA §§ 5-3-5(a)(1) 11 and (a)(4). On remand, the commissioner cited testimony indicating that at the time of Rice’s CUP application, no residential dwellings or other structures had been constructed on Norhaven’s residential properties. Our independent review confirms this finding to be undisputed and supported by the record. Because sufficient evidence supported the commissioner’s determination that Rice’s CUP application was not in violation of Section 9.5.6 of the zoning ordinance, the trial court did not err in accepting this finding of fact pursuant to OCGA § 5-3-5(a)(2). 3. Finally, Norhaven contends that the trial court erred by denying its petition for review because the commissioner ignored the trial court’s instructions on remand. We disagree. The trial court instructed the commissioner on remand to determine “whether any portion of a waste handling area, as measured from the chain link fence boundary, is located within one thousand (1,000) feet of any residential dwelling (intended, arranged, or designed to be used).” On remand, the commissioner did precisely as instructed, finding that “the waste handling area, as measured from the chain link fence boundary, was located at least 1,000 feet from any residential dwelling being used at the time of the [a]pplication.” As discussed in Division 2, the commissioner cited sufficient evidence to support this determination in the form of testimony at the 12 hearing, including that of Norhaven’s own representative, that no residential dwellings had been constructed on any of Norhaven’s properties at the time of Rice’s CUP application. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by finding that the commissioner had complied with its instructions on remand. In light of our holdings herein, it is not necessary to address Rice’s motion to dismiss this appeal based on alleged changes to the Bartow County Zoning Ordinance, which is hereby denied as moot. Judgment affirmed. Davis, J., concurs. Whitaker, J., concurs in judgment only. 13