Kalshiex LLC v. John Martin
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
Docket25-1892
StatusPublished
📰 News Coverage: Read the LAWS.com news report on this case
Full Opinion
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PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 25-1892
KALSHIEX LLC,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v.
JOHN A. MARTIN, in his official capacity as Secretary of the Maryland Lottery
and Gaming Control Commission and Director of the Maryland Lottery and Gaming
Control Agency; MARYLAND LOTTERY AND GAMING CONTROL
AGENCY; MICHAEL EATON, in his official capacity as Managing Director of
Gaming for the Maryland Lottery and Gaming Control Agency; EVERETT D.
BROWNING, SR., in his official capacity as Chair of the Maryland Lottery and
Gaming Control Commission; E. RANDOLPH MARRINER, in his official
capacity as Vice Chair of the Maryland Lottery and Gaming Control Commission;
ADE ADEBISI, in his official capacity as Commissioner of the Maryland Lottery
and Gaming Control Commission; DIANE CROGHAN, in her official capacity as
Commissioner of the Maryland Lottery and Gaming Control Commission;
GEORGE L. DOETSCH, JR., in his official capacity as Commissioner of the
Maryland Lottery and Gaming Control Commission; HAROLD E. HODGES, in his
official capacity as Commissioner of the Maryland Lottery and Gaming Control
Commission; JAMES J. STAKEM, in his official capacity as Commissioner of the
Maryland Lottery and Gaming Control Commission; MARYLAND LOTTERY
AND GAMING CONTROL COMMISSION; ANTHONY G. BROWN, in his
official capacity as Attorney General for the State of Maryland,
Defendants – Appellees,
--------------------------------------
PARADIGM OPERATIONS LP; UNDERDOG SPORTS HOLDING, INC.
Amici Supporting Appellant,
and
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STOP PREDATORY GAMBLING; TEXANS AGAINST GAMBLING, d/b/a
Texans Who Care; THE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN PHYSICIANS &
SURGEONS; TODD PHILLIPS; BETTER MARKETS, INC.; NEVADA, OHIO,
36 OTHER STATES, AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA; AMERICAN
GAMING ASSOCIATION; INDIAN GAMING ASSOCIATION; NATIONAL
CONGRESS OF AMERICAN INDIANS; CALIFORNIA NATIONS INDIAN
GAMING ASSOCIATION; ARIZONA INDIAN GAMING ASSOCIATION;
MINNESOTA INDIAN GAMING ASSOCIATION; OKLAHOMA INDIAN
GAMING ASSOCIATION; WASHINGTON INDIAN GAMING
ASSOCIATION; UNITED SOUTH AND EASTERN TRIBES SOVEREIGNTY
PROTECTION FUND; SAN MANUEL GAMING AND HOSPITALITY
AUTHORITY; TRIBAL ALLIANCE OF SOVEREIGN INDIAN NATIONS; 30
FEDERALLY RECOGNIZED TRIBES,
Amici Supporting Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.
Adam B. Abelson, District Judge. (1:25-cv-01283-ABA)
Argued: May 7, 2026 Decided: November 18, 2026
Before GREGORY, THACKER, and BENJAMIN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by published per curiam opinion, in which Judge Gregory and Judge Thacker
joined.
Judge Gregory wrote a concurring opinion. Judge Thacker wrote a concurring opinion.
Judge Benjamin wrote a dissenting opinion.
ARGUED: William E. Havemann, MILBANK LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellant.
Max F. Brauer, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MARYLAND, Baltimore,
Maryland, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Davis Campbell, New York, New York,
Neal Kumar Katyal, Joshua B. Sterling, Samantha K. Ilagan, MILBANK LLP,
Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Anthony G. Brown, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MARYLAND, Baltimore, Maryland; Erik Delfosse, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, MARYLAND LOTTERY AND GAMING CONTROL
AGENCY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees. Tyler R. Green, Conor D. Woodfin,
CONSOVOY MCCARTHY PLLC, Salt Lake City, Utah, for Amicus Paradigm
Operations LP. David Gringer, New York, New York, Adela Lilollari, Boston,
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Massachusetts, Kelly P. Dunbar, Donna M. Farag, Olu O. Oisaghie, WILMER CUTLER
PICKERING HALE AND DORR LLP, Washington, D.C., for Amicus Underdog Sports
Holding Inc. Andrew L. Schlafly, Far Hills, New Jersey, for Amici Stop Predatory
Gambling, Texans Against Gambling, and the Association of American Physicians and
Surgeons. Todd Phillips, Atlanta, Georgia, for Amicus Todd Phillips. Dennis M. Kelleher,
Stephen W. Hall, BETTER MARKETS, INC., Washington, D.C.; Jim Davy, ALL RISE
TRIAL & APPELLATE, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for Amicus Better Markets, Inc.
Aaron D. Ford, Attorney General, Heidi Parry Stein, Solicitor General, Jessica E. Whelan,
Chief Deputy Solicitor General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
NEVADA, Las Vegas, Nevada, for Amicus State of Nevada. Dave Yost, Attorney
General, Mathura J. Sridharan, Solicitor General, Zachery P. Keller, Deputy Solicitor
General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF OHIO, Columbus, Ohio, for
Amicus State of Ohio. Steve Marshall, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF ALABAMA, Montgomery, Alabama, for Amicus State of Alabama.
Stephen J. Cox, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
ALASKA, Anchorage, Alaska, for Amicus State of Alaska. Kristin K. Mayes, Attorney
General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ARIZONA, Phoenix, Arizona,
for Amicus State of Arizona. Tim Griffin, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ARKANSAS, Little Rock, Arkansas, for Amicus State of
Arkansas. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
CALIFORNIA, Sacramento, California, for Amicus State of California. Philip J. Weiser,
Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF COLORADO, Denver,
Colorado, for Amicus State of Colorado. William Tong, Attorney General, OFFICE OF
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CONNECTICUT, Hartford, Connecticut, for Amicus
State of Connecticut. Kathleen Jennings, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF DELAWARE, Wilmington, Delaware, for Amicus State of
Delaware. Brian L. Schwalb, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Washington, D.C., for Amicus District
of Columbia. Anne E. Lopez, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF HAWAI’I, Honolulu, Hawai’i, for Amicus State of Hawai’i.
Raúl Labrador, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
IDAHO, Boise, Idaho, for Amicus State of Idaho. Kwame Raoul, Attorney General,
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ILLINOIS, Chicago, Illinois, for Amicus
State of Illinois. Theodore E. Rokita, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF INDIANA, Indianapolis, Indiana, for Amicus State of Indiana.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF IOWA,
Des Moines, Iowa, for Amicus State of Iowa. Kris Kobach, Attorney General, OFFICE
OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF KANSAS, Topeka, Kansas, for Amicus State of
Kansas. Liz Murrill, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
LOUISIANA, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, for Amicus State of Louisiana. Aaron M. Frey,
Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MAINE, Augusta,
Maine, for Amicus State of Maine. Andrea Joy Campbell, Attorney General, OFFICE OF
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MASSACHUSETTS, Boston, Massachusetts, for
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Amicus Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Dana Nessel, Attorney General, OFFICE OF
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MICHIGAN, Lansing, Michigan, for Amicus State of
Michigan. Keith Ellison, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
OF MINNESOTA, St. Paul, Minnesota, for Amicus State of Minnesota. Lynn Fitch,
Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MISSISSIPPI, Jackson,
Mississippi, for Amicus State of Mississippi. Michael T. Hilgers, Attorney General,
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEBRASKA, Lincoln, Nebraska, for
Amicus State of Nebraska. Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY, Trenton, New Jersey, for Amicus State of
New Jersey. Raúl Torrez, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
OF NEW MEXICO, Santa Fe, New Mexico, for Amicus State of New Mexico.
Letitia James, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW
YORK, New York, New York, for Amicus State of New York. Jeff Jackson, Attorney
General, NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Amicus State of North Carolina. Gentner Drummond, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF OKLAHOMA, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Amicus State
of Oklahoma. Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
OF OREGON, Salem, Oregon, for Amicus State of Oregon. David W. Sunday, Jr., Attorney
General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF PENNSYLVANIA, Harrisburg,
Pennsylvania, for Amicus Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Peter F. Neronha, Attorney
General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF RHODE ISLAND, Providence,
Rhode Island, for Amicus State of Rhode Island. Alan Wilson, Attorney General, OFFICE
OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF SOUTH CAROLINA, Columbia, South Carolina,
for Amicus State of South Carolina. Marty Jackley, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF SOUTH DAKOTA, Pierre, South Dakota, for Amicus State
of South Dakota. Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF TENNESSEE, Nashville, Tennessee, for Amicus State of Tennessee.
Derek E. Brown, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
UTAH, Salt Lake City, Utah, for Amicus State of Utah. Charity R. Clark, Attorney
General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VERMONT, Montpelier,
Vermont, for Amicus State of Vermont. Nicholas W. Brown, Attorney General, OFFICE
OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON, Olympia, Washington, for
Amicus State of Washington. Josh Kaul, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WISCONSIN, Madison, Wisconsin, for Amicus State of
Wisconsin. Bruce Bennett, Benjamin Sovocool, New York, New York, Kevin F. King,
Matthew J. Glover, Scott Garfing, Hassan Ahmad, Eli Nachmany, COVINGTON &
BURLING LLP, Washington, D.C., for Amicus American Gaming Association.
Joseph H. Webster, Elizabeth Bower, Jens W. Camp, HOBBS, STRAUS, DEAN &
WALKER LLP, Washington, D.C.; Bryan Newland, POWERS, PYLES, SUTTER &
VERVILLE PC, Washington, D.C., for Tribal Amici. Scott Crowell, CROWELL LAW
OFFICE, TRIBAL ADVOCACY GROUP PLLC, Sedona, Arizona, for Amici Rincon
Band of Luiseño Indians, Santa Ynez Band of Chumash Mission Indians, and the Spokane
Tribe of the Spokane Reservation. Michael Hoenig, YUHAAVIATAM OF SAN
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MANUEL NATION, Washington, D.C., for Amici Yuhaaviatam of San Manuel Nation
and San Manuel Gaming and Hospitality Authority.
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PER CURIAM:
The judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
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GREGORY, Circuit Judge, concurring:
KalshiEX, LLC (“Kalshi”) brings this appeal, which presents a narrow question of
federal preemption. The Commodity Exchange Act (“CEA” or “the Act”) grants the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) exclusive jurisdiction over
transactions involving swaps traded or executed on a designated contract market (“DCM”).
7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)(A). But Congress also enacted a separate provision elsewhere in the
same Act providing separate treatment for certain event contracts specifically involving
gaming, among other things, and providing that certain such contracts may not be listed or
traded on a DCM. Id. § 7a-2(c)(5)(C)(i)–(iii). The question here is whether, when read
together, those provisions clearly establish that the CFTC’s authority over the sports event
contracts at issue excludes Maryland’s traditionally recognized authority to enforce its
gaming laws.
I do not decide whether Kalshi’s sports event contracts are “swaps” within the
meaning of the CEA. That is because, even assuming they are, neither the Act nor the
CFTC’s implementation of it clearly establish that such contracts are entitled to trade on a
DCM free from state gaming laws. Whether the contracts are swaps bears on the scope of
the CFTC’s regulatory authority; it does not alone answer whether that authority is
exclusive to the CFTC and displaces Maryland’s concurrent authority to regulate gambling.
Rather than providing a settled answer, the statutory and regulatory framework leaves
unresolved the relationship between the CEA’s grant of exclusive jurisdiction and
Congress’s treatment of gaming contracts.
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Because the regulation of gambling has long been a matter of traditional state police
power, I would not infer that Congress displaced Maryland’s concurrent authority absent a
clear expression of its intent to do so. Nor has Kalshi shown that complying with both the
CEA and the Maryland law at issue would be impossible or stand as an obstacle to
Congress’s objective to create a centralized federal regulatory framework for trading
derivative contracts. I therefore conclude that Kalshi has not demonstrated that the CEA
preempts Maryland’s sports wagering laws and concur in the judgment affirming the
district court.
I.
A.
Kalshi operates a federally regulated trading exchange known as a designated
contract market, or DCM, which is overseen by the CFTC. Through its platform, users
trade standardized financial contracts tied to future events, including the outcome of
sporting events. Unlike a traditional sportsbook, such as FanDuel or DraftKings, where
the house takes the other side of every bet, Kalshi never becomes the customer’s opponent.
If a customer bets on the Lakers to beat the Celtics through FanDuel, FanDuel is the other
party to that wager. On Kalshi’s exchange, by contrast, the customer trades directly with
another user who takes the opposite view, and prices are determined by supply and demand
based on what participants believe is likely to happen—much like prices are determined
on a traditional stock exchange. Even so, Kalshi advertises itself as “the first app for legal
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sports betting in all 50 states” and “the first nationwide legal sports betting platform.”
(emphasis added).
Maryland law generally prohibits sports wagering unless the operator is licensed by
the state. The Maryland Lottery and Gaming Control Commission and the Maryland
Lottery and Gaming Control Agency (collectively referred to herein as the “Maryland
gaming authorities”) are the state agencies responsible for administering and enforcing
those laws. Because Kalshi was engaged in sports wagering as defined in Md. Code Ann.,
State Gov’t §§ 9-1E-01(j), 9-1E-01(e), the Maryland gaming authorities concluded that
Kalshi was required to obtain a “sports wagering license[]” and comply with all laws
applicable to licensed operators to conduct that aspect of its business in Maryland. See id.
§ 9-1E-03. The applicable requirements consist of data security obligations and advertising
restrictions, including prohibitions on deceptive advertising and advertising directed at
individuals prohibited from participating in sports wagering and other at-risk individuals.
Id.
On April 7, 2025, the Maryland gaming authorities sent Kalshi a cease-and-desist
letter, asserting that Kalshi was unlawfully offering “wagering on sporting events” by
making its sports event contracts available to Marylanders without the state license
required to operate. The letter ordered Kalshi to stop making its sports wagering contracts
available within fifteen days.
B.
On April 21, 2025, after receiving the Maryland gaming authorities’ cease-and-
desist letter, Kalshi filed this action against the Maryland Attorney General, the Maryland
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Lottery and Gaming Control Agency, the Maryland Lottery and Gaming Control
Commission, and various Maryland gaming officials in their official capacities. Kalshi
sought declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that the CEA preempts Maryland’s sports-
wagering laws as applied to trading activity conducted on its federally regulated exchange.
Kalshi simultaneously moved for a preliminary injunction barring Maryland from
enforcing its sports wagering laws against Kalshi’s sports event contracts.
To win a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must establish four factors: (1) that they
are likely to succeed on the merits; (2) that they are likely to suffer irreparable harm absent
relief; (3) that the balance of equities favors them; and (4) that an injunction is in the public
interest. Frazier v. Prince George’s Cnty., 86 F.4th 537, 543 (4th Cir. 2023) (citing Winter
v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)). In arguing that its claim is likely to
succeed on its merits, Kalshi primarily contended that its gaming contracts are swaps traded
on a federally designated contract market, so they fall within the CEA’s exclusive
jurisdiction. See 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)(A).
While Kalshi’s motion was pending, two other federal district courts entered
preliminary injunctions preventing the states of Nevada and New Jersey from enforcing
state gambling laws against Kalshi, although the district court in Nevada later changed its
position. See KalshiEX LLC v. Hendrick (Hendrick I), No. 2:25-cv-00575, 2025 WL
1073495 (D. Nev. Apr. 9, 2025) (enjoining the Nevada Gaming Commission and the
Nevada Gaming Control Board from pursuing penalties against Kalshi for “offering event-
based contracts” in violation of Nevada law), injunction later dissolved by, KalshiEX LLC
v. Hendrick (Hendrick II), 817 F. Supp. 3d 1014 (D. Nev. 2025) (see n. 1 below); KalshiEX
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LLC v. Flaherty, No. 25-cv-02152-ESK-MJS, 2025 WL 1218313 (D.N.J. Apr. 28, 2025),
aff’d, 172 F.4th 220 (3d Cir. 2026) (enjoining New Jersey Division of Gaming Enforcement
from pursuing penalties against Kalshi for “listing unauthorized sports wagers” in violation
of New Jersey state law).
Those courts concluded that the CEA’s grant of “exclusive jurisdiction” to the CFTC
likely preempted state regulation of trading activity conducted on federally regulated
exchanges. Hendrick I, 2025 WL 1073495, at *7 (finding preemption because “[s]ection
2’s plain and unambiguous language” “reflects congressional intent to occupy the field of
regulating CFTC-designated exchanges and the transactions conducted on those
exchanges”); Flaherty, 2025 WL 1218313, at *6 (same).
The federal district court in Maryland reached a different conclusion here and denied
Kalshi’s motion on August 1, 2025. 1 KalshiEX LLC v. Martin, 793 F. Supp. 3d 667, 675–
76 (D. Md. 2025). The court “assume[d] without deciding” that Kalshi’s sports event
contracts qualified as swaps under the CEA. Id. at 675. The court nevertheless concluded
that Kalshi failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits because Congress
had not “clearly and manifestly intended to strip states of their authority to regulate
gambling.” Id. at 676. Although the district court acknowledged that Congress intended
some degree of field preemption when it granted the CFTC exclusive jurisdiction over
1
Following this decision of the Maryland district court, the Nevada district court
reversed its earlier ruling and dissolved the preliminary injunction in light of both Martin
discussed here and its intervening decision in N. Am. Derivatives Exch., Inc. v. Nevada ex
rel. Nevada Gaming Control Bd., 815 F. Supp. 3d 1169 (D. Nev. 2025), which concluded
that sports event contracts of the type at issue are not swaps subject to the CEA. Hendrick
II, 817 F. Supp. 3d 1014, 1022 (D. Nev. 2025).
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trading on DCMs generally, the court concluded that the CEA did not clearly establish that
Congress intended to occupy the field of gambling regulation specifically, thus leaving
“room for supplementary state legislation” where Congress expressly relies on and
incorporates state laws. Id. at 679–80 (quoting Kansas v. Garcia, 589 U.S. 191, 208
(2020)). So, according to the district court of Maryland, when “Congress expressly
authorized the [CFTC] to prohibit particular categories of transactions as contrary to the
public interest based on the fact that the conduct at issue would violate state law,” this
signaled shared jurisdiction between the state and the CFTC over gambling that happens
on a DCM. Id. at 680 (emphasis in original).
The district court further determined Maryland’s sports wagering laws did not
conflict with the federal regulatory framework because Kalshi could comply with state law
through state licensure requirements, which bear no burden on Kalshi’s ability to comply
with the CEA. Id. at 685–86. Having concluded Kalshi failed to establish a likelihood of
success on the merits, the court declined to address the remaining preliminary injunction
factors. Id. at 686–87.
Since Kalshi first filed suit in Maryland, several courts have addressed the question
presented in this appeal in cases involving Kalshi or similarly situated prediction markets,
but they have reached no consensus. KalshiEX, LLC v. Hendrick, 817 F. Supp. 3d 1014
(D. Nev. 2025) (finding no preemption because court determined Kalshi’s sporting event
contracts are not swaps, and, even if they are swaps, the CEA “does not state that the CFTC
has exclusive jurisdiction over” commodities it excludes from trading); KalshiEX, LLC v.
Schuler, No. 2:25-CV-1165, 2026 WL 657004 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 9, 2026) (finding no
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preemption because court determined Kalshi’s sporting event contracts are not swaps and
Congress’s intent to displace state authority is unclear); Kalshiex LLC v. Williams, No. 25
Civ. 8846 (AT), 2026 WL 2017466 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2026) (finding no preemption
because of ambiguity in statutory reading); QCX LLC v. Nessel, No. 1:26-CV-710, 2026
WL 1895958 (W.D. Mich. June 17, 2026) (holding that, because of ambiguity in statutory
reading, there is no preemption in a suit brought by another prediction market alleging
imminent enforcement after the action against Kalshi); KalshiEX LLC v. Cox, No. 2:26-cv-
00151-RJS-CMR (D. Utah Aug. 8, 2026) (finding no preemption according to 7 U.S.C.
§ 16(e)(2)).
But see KalshiEX LLC v. Flaherty, No. 25-cv-02152-ESK-MJS, 2025 WL 1218313
(D.N.J. Apr. 28, 2025), aff’d, 172 F.4th 220 (3d Cir. 2026) (finding preemption because the
court held Kalshi’s sporting event contracts are swaps over which the CEA has exclusive
jurisdiction); KalshiEX LLC v. Johnson, No. CV-26-01715-PHX-MTL, 2026 WL 1223373
(D. Ariz. May 5, 2026) (same); Kalshiex LLC v. Orgel, No. 3:26-CV-00034, 2026 WL
474869 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 19, 2026) (holding that Tennessee’s intrastate wagering
requirement conflicted with the CEA and declining to address field preemption); United
States v. Minnesota, No. 26-CV-2661 (KMM/DTS), 2026 WL 2150211 (D. Minn. July 27,
2026) (finding preemption because it “appears to be the case” that sporting event contracts
traded on Kalshi’s exchange are swaps).
Other federal courts of appeals likewise have reached no consensus. Kalshiex LLC
v. Schuler, No. 26-3196, 2026 WL 1295806 (6th Cir. Apr. 24, 2026) (finding no preemption
because Kalshi’s sporting event contracts are not swaps and “Kalshi fail[ed] to establish
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that Congress intended the CEA to preempt state laws on sports gambling”); KalshiEX LLC
v. Flaherty, 172 F.4th 220 (3d Cir. 2026) (finding preemption because “Kalshi’s sports-
related event contracts are swaps traded on a CFTC-licensed DCM, so the CFTC has
exclusive jurisdiction”); KalshiEx LLC v. Assad, 190 F.4th 1098 (9th Cir. 2026) (finding
no preemption because “sports event contracts are likely not swaps under the CEA”).
Kalshi timely appealed. On appeal, it raises the same preemption arguments as it
raised below.
II.
Long before Congress enacted the Commodities Exchange Act (“CEA”), the
Constitution established a system of government that divided authority between the
national government and the states. The Framers rejected a national government of
unlimited power in favor of a federal system that preserved the sovereignty of the states
while entrusting the federal government with powers of national concern. That division of
authority safeguards individual liberty, promotes political accountability, and allows the
states to govern matters traditionally committed to their care. The Federalist No. 39, at
245 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (describing the states’ “residuary and
inviolable sovereignty” as ascribed by the Constitution).
But “[w]ith dual sovereignty . . . ‘follows the possibility that laws can be in conflict
or at cross-purposes.’” GenBioPro, Inc. v. Raynes, 144 F.4th 258, 270 (4th Cir. 2025)
(quoting Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 398–99 (2012)). The Framers anticipated
that possibility. Their solution was the Supremacy Clause, which provides that federal law
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“shall be the supreme Law of the Land.” U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. Thus, when Congress
acts within its constitutional authority, federal law prevails over conflicting state law.
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991).
Those seemingly conflicting principles give rise to the doctrine of federal
preemption. Whatever form a preemption claim takes, “[p]re-emption fundamentally is a
question of congressional intent.” English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990). This
is because, while Congress unquestionably possesses the authority to displace state law,
courts presume that Congress “does not cavalierly pre-empt” the exercise of states’
traditional police powers because “the States are independent sovereigns in our federal
system.” Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996). Accordingly, I “start with the
assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by [a]
Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.” Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (emphasis added).
That presumption carries particular force here. No one disputes that regulating
gambling has long fallen within the states’ traditional police powers. And doctrine says
that the power to override the states’ historic authority “is an extraordinary power in a
federalist system,” so courts expect Congress to make its intention clear. Gregory, 501
U.S. at 460. Thus, courts do not use statutory uncertainty to redraw the federal-state
balance themselves. Rather, “[i]n areas of traditional state regulation, we assume that a
federal statute has not supplanted state law unless Congress has made such an intention
‘clear and manifest.’” Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005) (quoting
N.Y. State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 655
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(1995)). Accordingly, where a federal statute reasonably admits competing interpretations
regarding its preemptive scope, courts “have a duty to accept the reading that disfavors pre-
emption.” Id.; see also GenBioPro, 144 F.4th at 270 (quoting Spector v. Norwegian Cruise
Line Ltd., 545 U.S. 119, 139 (2005) (plurality opinion)) (explaining that lawmakers do not
usually “intrude on sensitive domains” through language that does not clearly convey that
result (emphasis added)); cf. Ala. Ass’n of Realtors v. HHS, 594 U.S. 758, 764 (2021) (“We
expect Congress to speak clearly when authorizing an agency to exercise powers of vast
economic and political significance.” (internal quotation omitted)).
With those principles in mind, I turn to Kalshi’s two preemption theories. First,
Kalshi argues that Congress occupied the field by granting the CFTC exclusive jurisdiction
over the sports event contracts at issue, thereby leaving no room for concurrent state
regulation. Second, Kalshi contends that, even if Maryland retains some regulatory
authority, its gaming laws conflict with the CEA because they stand as an obstacle to the
federal scheme Congress established. I disagree with both arguments and address each
separately.
A.
I first consider Kalshi’s argument that the CEA occupies the field. Field preemption
arises when “Congress has legislated so comprehensively that it has left no room for
supplementary state legislation.” R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Durham Cnty., 479 U.S.
130, 140 (1986); see also Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. at 401. The question is
therefore not whether Congress regulates these contracts through the CEA. Rather, the
question is whether Congress clearly intended the CEA to vest the CFTC with exclusive
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regulatory authority over gaming contracts, thereby withdrawing Maryland’s historic
authority to regulate gambling in this area.
Kalshi principally relies on the CEA’s exclusive-jurisdiction provision, which grants
the CFTC “exclusive jurisdiction” over certain “transactions involving swaps.” 7 U.S.C.
§ 2(a)(1)(A). Read in isolation, that language appears to support Kalshi’s position. But
statutes are not read one provision at a time. We must interpret the exclusive-jurisdiction
provision in conjunction with the remainder of the statutory scheme, including § 7a-
2(c)(5)(C)(i), known as the “Special Rule,” which appears within the same statute and
governs event contracts involving gaming. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000) (“A court must therefore interpret the statute as a
symmetrical and coherent regulatory scheme . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
As I explain below, the clarity necessary to displace Maryland’s traditional police
powers disappears when those provisions are read together.
i.
I begin with the text Congress enacted. Subject to some exceptions, the CEA grants
the CFTC “exclusive jurisdiction” over “transactions involving swaps or contracts of sale
of a commodity for future delivery . . . traded or executed on a contract market” designated
under the Act. 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)(A). Kalshi contends that its sports event contracts are
swaps traded on a federally regulated designated contract market (“DCM”) and therefore
fall within the CFTC’s exclusive jurisdiction beyond the reach of Maryland’s gaming laws.
Reading the provision alone, that argument makes sense if we agree that those gaming
contracts are swaps.
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Whether sports event contracts of this kind qualify as “swaps” under the CEA,
however, has divided courts considering the question and presents difficult and technical
questions of statutory interpretation. I need not enter that debate here because the
preemption question can be resolved without deciding it. 2 Even assuming Kalshi’s
contracts are swaps, that establishes only that they fall within the CEA’s regulatory
framework. It does not answer the question here, which is whether the CEA clearly grants
the CFTC exclusive authority over those contracts to the exclusion of Maryland’s
traditional authority to regulate gambling. Put differently, whether the contracts are swaps
bears on the CFTC’s authority to regulate them at all; by contrast, the field preemption
question here is whether that authority wholly excludes concurrent and supplemental state
regulation of contracts involving gaming specifically. Kalshi’s position would effectively
answer that question based on the form the wagering takes: because the wagers are
packaged as derivative contracts traded on a DCM, Kalshi contends that they fall
2
My colleague argues that the preemption question must turn on whether the sports-
related contracts are held to be swaps. Dissent at 57–58. In the dissent’s view, if the sports-
related contracts are swaps, then the CFTC is conferred exclusive jurisdiction, and field
preemption necessarily applies. Id. But the critical question is whether that exclusive
jurisdiction language over the field of DCM trading creates an inference that Congress “left
no room for supplementary state regulation.” Hillsborough Cnty., Fla. v. Automated Med.
Lab’ys, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985); See Flaherty, 172 F.4th at 236 (Roth, J., dissenting)
(explaining that the federal occupation of a subfield of futures trading does not overcome
the presumption against preemption of states’ historic police powers over gambling). The
dissent’s view would allow Kalshi, or any person or entity for that matter, to circumvent
state gambling laws by repackaging ordinary gambling as futures trading on a DCM. As
discussed further below, the statutory context of the CEA does not evince a “clear and
manifest” intention to preempt traditional state authority and permit this loophole. See
Rice, 331 U.S. at 230.
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exclusively within the federal sphere and beyond the reach of traditional state gaming
regulation.
But the CEA itself makes that inference difficult to sustain. Congress did not treat
the gaming subject as irrelevant merely because it takes the form of a derivative contract.
To the contrary, Congress enacted the Special Rule specifically addressing event contracts
involving gaming and other sensitive subjects. Under that Rule, the CFTC “may
determine” that an event contract is “contrary to the public interest” if it involves, among
other things, gaming. Id. § 7a-2(c)(5)(C)(i). If the CFTC makes that determination, “[n]o
agreement, contract, or transaction” so determined “may be listed or made available for
clearing or trading on or through a registered entity.” Id. § 7a-2(c)(5)(C)(ii). Congress
further authorized the CFTC to determine the continuing eligibility of clearing
organizations to clear such contracts. Id. §§ 2(a)(1)(A), 7a-2(c)(5)(C)(iii).
Read together, as we must, these provisions reveal why the swap question does not
resolve the preemption question. Congress did not treat every derivative contract traded
on a DCM alike. It granted the CFTC exclusive jurisdiction over transactions “traded or
executed” on DCMs while separately recognizing that cert