Full Opinion

USCA4 Appeal: 25-1892 Doc: 135 Filed: 11/18/2026 Pg: 1 of 59 PUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 25-1892 KALSHIEX LLC, Plaintiffs - Appellants, v. JOHN A. MARTIN, in his official capacity as Secretary of the Maryland Lottery and Gaming Control Commission and Director of the Maryland Lottery and Gaming Control Agency; MARYLAND LOTTERY AND GAMING CONTROL AGENCY; MICHAEL EATON, in his official capacity as Managing Director of Gaming for the Maryland Lottery and Gaming Control Agency; EVERETT D. BROWNING, SR., in his official capacity as Chair of the Maryland Lottery and Gaming Control Commission; E. RANDOLPH MARRINER, in his official capacity as Vice Chair of the Maryland Lottery and Gaming Control Commission; ADE ADEBISI, in his official capacity as Commissioner of the Maryland Lottery and Gaming Control Commission; DIANE CROGHAN, in her official capacity as Commissioner of the Maryland Lottery and Gaming Control Commission; GEORGE L. DOETSCH, JR., in his official capacity as Commissioner of the Maryland Lottery and Gaming Control Commission; HAROLD E. HODGES, in his official capacity as Commissioner of the Maryland Lottery and Gaming Control Commission; JAMES J. STAKEM, in his official capacity as Commissioner of the Maryland Lottery and Gaming Control Commission; MARYLAND LOTTERY AND GAMING CONTROL COMMISSION; ANTHONY G. BROWN, in his official capacity as Attorney General for the State of Maryland, Defendants – Appellees, -------------------------------------- PARADIGM OPERATIONS LP; UNDERDOG SPORTS HOLDING, INC. Amici Supporting Appellant, and USCA4 Appeal: 25-1892 Doc: 135 Filed: 11/18/2026 Pg: 2 of 59 STOP PREDATORY GAMBLING; TEXANS AGAINST GAMBLING, d/b/a Texans Who Care; THE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN PHYSICIANS & SURGEONS; TODD PHILLIPS; BETTER MARKETS, INC.; NEVADA, OHIO, 36 OTHER STATES, AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA; AMERICAN GAMING ASSOCIATION; INDIAN GAMING ASSOCIATION; NATIONAL CONGRESS OF AMERICAN INDIANS; CALIFORNIA NATIONS INDIAN GAMING ASSOCIATION; ARIZONA INDIAN GAMING ASSOCIATION; MINNESOTA INDIAN GAMING ASSOCIATION; OKLAHOMA INDIAN GAMING ASSOCIATION; WASHINGTON INDIAN GAMING ASSOCIATION; UNITED SOUTH AND EASTERN TRIBES SOVEREIGNTY PROTECTION FUND; SAN MANUEL GAMING AND HOSPITALITY AUTHORITY; TRIBAL ALLIANCE OF SOVEREIGN INDIAN NATIONS; 30 FEDERALLY RECOGNIZED TRIBES, Amici Supporting Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. Adam B. Abelson, District Judge. (1:25-cv-01283-ABA) Argued: May 7, 2026 Decided: November 18, 2026 Before GREGORY, THACKER, and BENJAMIN, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by published per curiam opinion, in which Judge Gregory and Judge Thacker joined. Judge Gregory wrote a concurring opinion. Judge Thacker wrote a concurring opinion. Judge Benjamin wrote a dissenting opinion. ARGUED: William E. Havemann, MILBANK LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Max F. Brauer, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MARYLAND, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Davis Campbell, New York, New York, Neal Kumar Katyal, Joshua B. Sterling, Samantha K. Ilagan, MILBANK LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Anthony G. Brown, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MARYLAND, Baltimore, Maryland; Erik Delfosse, Senior Assistant Attorney General, MARYLAND LOTTERY AND GAMING CONTROL AGENCY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees. Tyler R. Green, Conor D. Woodfin, CONSOVOY MCCARTHY PLLC, Salt Lake City, Utah, for Amicus Paradigm Operations LP. David Gringer, New York, New York, Adela Lilollari, Boston, 2 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1892 Doc: 135 Filed: 11/18/2026 Pg: 3 of 59 Massachusetts, Kelly P. Dunbar, Donna M. Farag, Olu O. Oisaghie, WILMER CUTLER PICKERING HALE AND DORR LLP, Washington, D.C., for Amicus Underdog Sports Holding Inc. Andrew L. Schlafly, Far Hills, New Jersey, for Amici Stop Predatory Gambling, Texans Against Gambling, and the Association of American Physicians and Surgeons. Todd Phillips, Atlanta, Georgia, for Amicus Todd Phillips. Dennis M. Kelleher, Stephen W. Hall, BETTER MARKETS, INC., Washington, D.C.; Jim Davy, ALL RISE TRIAL & APPELLATE, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for Amicus Better Markets, Inc. Aaron D. Ford, Attorney General, Heidi Parry Stein, Solicitor General, Jessica E. Whelan, Chief Deputy Solicitor General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEVADA, Las Vegas, Nevada, for Amicus State of Nevada. Dave Yost, Attorney General, Mathura J. Sridharan, Solicitor General, Zachery P. Keller, Deputy Solicitor General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF OHIO, Columbus, Ohio, for Amicus State of Ohio. Steve Marshall, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ALABAMA, Montgomery, Alabama, for Amicus State of Alabama. Stephen J. Cox, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ALASKA, Anchorage, Alaska, for Amicus State of Alaska. Kristin K. Mayes, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ARIZONA, Phoenix, Arizona, for Amicus State of Arizona. Tim Griffin, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ARKANSAS, Little Rock, Arkansas, for Amicus State of Arkansas. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CALIFORNIA, Sacramento, California, for Amicus State of California. Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF COLORADO, Denver, Colorado, for Amicus State of Colorado. William Tong, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CONNECTICUT, Hartford, Connecticut, for Amicus State of Connecticut. Kathleen Jennings, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF DELAWARE, Wilmington, Delaware, for Amicus State of Delaware. Brian L. Schwalb, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Washington, D.C., for Amicus District of Columbia. Anne E. Lopez, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF HAWAI’I, Honolulu, Hawai’i, for Amicus State of Hawai’i. Raúl Labrador, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF IDAHO, Boise, Idaho, for Amicus State of Idaho. Kwame Raoul, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ILLINOIS, Chicago, Illinois, for Amicus State of Illinois. Theodore E. Rokita, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF INDIANA, Indianapolis, Indiana, for Amicus State of Indiana. Brenna Bird, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF IOWA, Des Moines, Iowa, for Amicus State of Iowa. Kris Kobach, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF KANSAS, Topeka, Kansas, for Amicus State of Kansas. Liz Murrill, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF LOUISIANA, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, for Amicus State of Louisiana. Aaron M. Frey, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MAINE, Augusta, Maine, for Amicus State of Maine. Andrea Joy Campbell, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MASSACHUSETTS, Boston, Massachusetts, for 3 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1892 Doc: 135 Filed: 11/18/2026 Pg: 4 of 59 Amicus Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Dana Nessel, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MICHIGAN, Lansing, Michigan, for Amicus State of Michigan. Keith Ellison, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MINNESOTA, St. Paul, Minnesota, for Amicus State of Minnesota. Lynn Fitch, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MISSISSIPPI, Jackson, Mississippi, for Amicus State of Mississippi. Michael T. Hilgers, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEBRASKA, Lincoln, Nebraska, for Amicus State of Nebraska. Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY, Trenton, New Jersey, for Amicus State of New Jersey. Raúl Torrez, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW MEXICO, Santa Fe, New Mexico, for Amicus State of New Mexico. Letitia James, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW YORK, New York, New York, for Amicus State of New York. Jeff Jackson, Attorney General, NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Amicus State of North Carolina. Gentner Drummond, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF OKLAHOMA, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Amicus State of Oklahoma. Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF OREGON, Salem, Oregon, for Amicus State of Oregon. David W. Sunday, Jr., Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF PENNSYLVANIA, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, for Amicus Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Peter F. Neronha, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF RHODE ISLAND, Providence, Rhode Island, for Amicus State of Rhode Island. Alan Wilson, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF SOUTH CAROLINA, Columbia, South Carolina, for Amicus State of South Carolina. Marty Jackley, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF SOUTH DAKOTA, Pierre, South Dakota, for Amicus State of South Dakota. Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TENNESSEE, Nashville, Tennessee, for Amicus State of Tennessee. Derek E. Brown, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF UTAH, Salt Lake City, Utah, for Amicus State of Utah. Charity R. Clark, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VERMONT, Montpelier, Vermont, for Amicus State of Vermont. Nicholas W. Brown, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON, Olympia, Washington, for Amicus State of Washington. Josh Kaul, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WISCONSIN, Madison, Wisconsin, for Amicus State of Wisconsin. Bruce Bennett, Benjamin Sovocool, New York, New York, Kevin F. King, Matthew J. Glover, Scott Garfing, Hassan Ahmad, Eli Nachmany, COVINGTON & BURLING LLP, Washington, D.C., for Amicus American Gaming Association. Joseph H. Webster, Elizabeth Bower, Jens W. Camp, HOBBS, STRAUS, DEAN & WALKER LLP, Washington, D.C.; Bryan Newland, POWERS, PYLES, SUTTER & VERVILLE PC, Washington, D.C., for Tribal Amici. Scott Crowell, CROWELL LAW OFFICE, TRIBAL ADVOCACY GROUP PLLC, Sedona, Arizona, for Amici Rincon Band of Luiseño Indians, Santa Ynez Band of Chumash Mission Indians, and the Spokane Tribe of the Spokane Reservation. Michael Hoenig, YUHAAVIATAM OF SAN 4 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1892 Doc: 135 Filed: 11/18/2026 Pg: 5 of 59 MANUEL NATION, Washington, D.C., for Amici Yuhaaviatam of San Manuel Nation and San Manuel Gaming and Hospitality Authority. 5 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1892 Doc: 135 Filed: 11/18/2026 Pg: 6 of 59 PER CURIAM: The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 6 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1892 Doc: 135 Filed: 11/18/2026 Pg: 7 of 59 GREGORY, Circuit Judge, concurring: KalshiEX, LLC (“Kalshi”) brings this appeal, which presents a narrow question of federal preemption. The Commodity Exchange Act (“CEA” or “the Act”) grants the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) exclusive jurisdiction over transactions involving swaps traded or executed on a designated contract market (“DCM”). 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)(A). But Congress also enacted a separate provision elsewhere in the same Act providing separate treatment for certain event contracts specifically involving gaming, among other things, and providing that certain such contracts may not be listed or traded on a DCM. Id. § 7a-2(c)(5)(C)(i)–(iii). The question here is whether, when read together, those provisions clearly establish that the CFTC’s authority over the sports event contracts at issue excludes Maryland’s traditionally recognized authority to enforce its gaming laws. I do not decide whether Kalshi’s sports event contracts are “swaps” within the meaning of the CEA. That is because, even assuming they are, neither the Act nor the CFTC’s implementation of it clearly establish that such contracts are entitled to trade on a DCM free from state gaming laws. Whether the contracts are swaps bears on the scope of the CFTC’s regulatory authority; it does not alone answer whether that authority is exclusive to the CFTC and displaces Maryland’s concurrent authority to regulate gambling. Rather than providing a settled answer, the statutory and regulatory framework leaves unresolved the relationship between the CEA’s grant of exclusive jurisdiction and Congress’s treatment of gaming contracts. 7 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1892 Doc: 135 Filed: 11/18/2026 Pg: 8 of 59 Because the regulation of gambling has long been a matter of traditional state police power, I would not infer that Congress displaced Maryland’s concurrent authority absent a clear expression of its intent to do so. Nor has Kalshi shown that complying with both the CEA and the Maryland law at issue would be impossible or stand as an obstacle to Congress’s objective to create a centralized federal regulatory framework for trading derivative contracts. I therefore conclude that Kalshi has not demonstrated that the CEA preempts Maryland’s sports wagering laws and concur in the judgment affirming the district court. I. A. Kalshi operates a federally regulated trading exchange known as a designated contract market, or DCM, which is overseen by the CFTC. Through its platform, users trade standardized financial contracts tied to future events, including the outcome of sporting events. Unlike a traditional sportsbook, such as FanDuel or DraftKings, where the house takes the other side of every bet, Kalshi never becomes the customer’s opponent. If a customer bets on the Lakers to beat the Celtics through FanDuel, FanDuel is the other party to that wager. On Kalshi’s exchange, by contrast, the customer trades directly with another user who takes the opposite view, and prices are determined by supply and demand based on what participants believe is likely to happen—much like prices are determined on a traditional stock exchange. Even so, Kalshi advertises itself as “the first app for legal 8 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1892 Doc: 135 Filed: 11/18/2026 Pg: 9 of 59 sports betting in all 50 states” and “the first nationwide legal sports betting platform.” (emphasis added). Maryland law generally prohibits sports wagering unless the operator is licensed by the state. The Maryland Lottery and Gaming Control Commission and the Maryland Lottery and Gaming Control Agency (collectively referred to herein as the “Maryland gaming authorities”) are the state agencies responsible for administering and enforcing those laws. Because Kalshi was engaged in sports wagering as defined in Md. Code Ann., State Gov’t §§ 9-1E-01(j), 9-1E-01(e), the Maryland gaming authorities concluded that Kalshi was required to obtain a “sports wagering license[]” and comply with all laws applicable to licensed operators to conduct that aspect of its business in Maryland. See id. § 9-1E-03. The applicable requirements consist of data security obligations and advertising restrictions, including prohibitions on deceptive advertising and advertising directed at individuals prohibited from participating in sports wagering and other at-risk individuals. Id. On April 7, 2025, the Maryland gaming authorities sent Kalshi a cease-and-desist letter, asserting that Kalshi was unlawfully offering “wagering on sporting events” by making its sports event contracts available to Marylanders without the state license required to operate. The letter ordered Kalshi to stop making its sports wagering contracts available within fifteen days. B. On April 21, 2025, after receiving the Maryland gaming authorities’ cease-and- desist letter, Kalshi filed this action against the Maryland Attorney General, the Maryland 9 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1892 Doc: 135 Filed: 11/18/2026 Pg: 10 of 59 Lottery and Gaming Control Agency, the Maryland Lottery and Gaming Control Commission, and various Maryland gaming officials in their official capacities. Kalshi sought declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that the CEA preempts Maryland’s sports- wagering laws as applied to trading activity conducted on its federally regulated exchange. Kalshi simultaneously moved for a preliminary injunction barring Maryland from enforcing its sports wagering laws against Kalshi’s sports event contracts. To win a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must establish four factors: (1) that they are likely to succeed on the merits; (2) that they are likely to suffer irreparable harm absent relief; (3) that the balance of equities favors them; and (4) that an injunction is in the public interest. Frazier v. Prince George’s Cnty., 86 F.4th 537, 543 (4th Cir. 2023) (citing Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)). In arguing that its claim is likely to succeed on its merits, Kalshi primarily contended that its gaming contracts are swaps traded on a federally designated contract market, so they fall within the CEA’s exclusive jurisdiction. See 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)(A). While Kalshi’s motion was pending, two other federal district courts entered preliminary injunctions preventing the states of Nevada and New Jersey from enforcing state gambling laws against Kalshi, although the district court in Nevada later changed its position. See KalshiEX LLC v. Hendrick (Hendrick I), No. 2:25-cv-00575, 2025 WL 1073495 (D. Nev. Apr. 9, 2025) (enjoining the Nevada Gaming Commission and the Nevada Gaming Control Board from pursuing penalties against Kalshi for “offering event- based contracts” in violation of Nevada law), injunction later dissolved by, KalshiEX LLC v. Hendrick (Hendrick II), 817 F. Supp. 3d 1014 (D. Nev. 2025) (see n. 1 below); KalshiEX 10 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1892 Doc: 135 Filed: 11/18/2026 Pg: 11 of 59 LLC v. Flaherty, No. 25-cv-02152-ESK-MJS, 2025 WL 1218313 (D.N.J. Apr. 28, 2025), aff’d, 172 F.4th 220 (3d Cir. 2026) (enjoining New Jersey Division of Gaming Enforcement from pursuing penalties against Kalshi for “listing unauthorized sports wagers” in violation of New Jersey state law). Those courts concluded that the CEA’s grant of “exclusive jurisdiction” to the CFTC likely preempted state regulation of trading activity conducted on federally regulated exchanges. Hendrick I, 2025 WL 1073495, at *7 (finding preemption because “[s]ection 2’s plain and unambiguous language” “reflects congressional intent to occupy the field of regulating CFTC-designated exchanges and the transactions conducted on those exchanges”); Flaherty, 2025 WL 1218313, at *6 (same). The federal district court in Maryland reached a different conclusion here and denied Kalshi’s motion on August 1, 2025. 1 KalshiEX LLC v. Martin, 793 F. Supp. 3d 667, 675– 76 (D. Md. 2025). The court “assume[d] without deciding” that Kalshi’s sports event contracts qualified as swaps under the CEA. Id. at 675. The court nevertheless concluded that Kalshi failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits because Congress had not “clearly and manifestly intended to strip states of their authority to regulate gambling.” Id. at 676. Although the district court acknowledged that Congress intended some degree of field preemption when it granted the CFTC exclusive jurisdiction over 1 Following this decision of the Maryland district court, the Nevada district court reversed its earlier ruling and dissolved the preliminary injunction in light of both Martin discussed here and its intervening decision in N. Am. Derivatives Exch., Inc. v. Nevada ex rel. Nevada Gaming Control Bd., 815 F. Supp. 3d 1169 (D. Nev. 2025), which concluded that sports event contracts of the type at issue are not swaps subject to the CEA. Hendrick II, 817 F. Supp. 3d 1014, 1022 (D. Nev. 2025). 11 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1892 Doc: 135 Filed: 11/18/2026 Pg: 12 of 59 trading on DCMs generally, the court concluded that the CEA did not clearly establish that Congress intended to occupy the field of gambling regulation specifically, thus leaving “room for supplementary state legislation” where Congress expressly relies on and incorporates state laws. Id. at 679–80 (quoting Kansas v. Garcia, 589 U.S. 191, 208 (2020)). So, according to the district court of Maryland, when “Congress expressly authorized the [CFTC] to prohibit particular categories of transactions as contrary to the public interest based on the fact that the conduct at issue would violate state law,” this signaled shared jurisdiction between the state and the CFTC over gambling that happens on a DCM. Id. at 680 (emphasis in original). The district court further determined Maryland’s sports wagering laws did not conflict with the federal regulatory framework because Kalshi could comply with state law through state licensure requirements, which bear no burden on Kalshi’s ability to comply with the CEA. Id. at 685–86. Having concluded Kalshi failed to establish a likelihood of success on the merits, the court declined to address the remaining preliminary injunction factors. Id. at 686–87. Since Kalshi first filed suit in Maryland, several courts have addressed the question presented in this appeal in cases involving Kalshi or similarly situated prediction markets, but they have reached no consensus. KalshiEX, LLC v. Hendrick, 817 F. Supp. 3d 1014 (D. Nev. 2025) (finding no preemption because court determined Kalshi’s sporting event contracts are not swaps, and, even if they are swaps, the CEA “does not state that the CFTC has exclusive jurisdiction over” commodities it excludes from trading); KalshiEX, LLC v. Schuler, No. 2:25-CV-1165, 2026 WL 657004 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 9, 2026) (finding no 12 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1892 Doc: 135 Filed: 11/18/2026 Pg: 13 of 59 preemption because court determined Kalshi’s sporting event contracts are not swaps and Congress’s intent to displace state authority is unclear); Kalshiex LLC v. Williams, No. 25 Civ. 8846 (AT), 2026 WL 2017466 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2026) (finding no preemption because of ambiguity in statutory reading); QCX LLC v. Nessel, No. 1:26-CV-710, 2026 WL 1895958 (W.D. Mich. June 17, 2026) (holding that, because of ambiguity in statutory reading, there is no preemption in a suit brought by another prediction market alleging imminent enforcement after the action against Kalshi); KalshiEX LLC v. Cox, No. 2:26-cv- 00151-RJS-CMR (D. Utah Aug. 8, 2026) (finding no preemption according to 7 U.S.C. § 16(e)(2)). But see KalshiEX LLC v. Flaherty, No. 25-cv-02152-ESK-MJS, 2025 WL 1218313 (D.N.J. Apr. 28, 2025), aff’d, 172 F.4th 220 (3d Cir. 2026) (finding preemption because the court held Kalshi’s sporting event contracts are swaps over which the CEA has exclusive jurisdiction); KalshiEX LLC v. Johnson, No. CV-26-01715-PHX-MTL, 2026 WL 1223373 (D. Ariz. May 5, 2026) (same); Kalshiex LLC v. Orgel, No. 3:26-CV-00034, 2026 WL 474869 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 19, 2026) (holding that Tennessee’s intrastate wagering requirement conflicted with the CEA and declining to address field preemption); United States v. Minnesota, No. 26-CV-2661 (KMM/DTS), 2026 WL 2150211 (D. Minn. July 27, 2026) (finding preemption because it “appears to be the case” that sporting event contracts traded on Kalshi’s exchange are swaps). Other federal courts of appeals likewise have reached no consensus. Kalshiex LLC v. Schuler, No. 26-3196, 2026 WL 1295806 (6th Cir. Apr. 24, 2026) (finding no preemption because Kalshi’s sporting event contracts are not swaps and “Kalshi fail[ed] to establish 13 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1892 Doc: 135 Filed: 11/18/2026 Pg: 14 of 59 that Congress intended the CEA to preempt state laws on sports gambling”); KalshiEX LLC v. Flaherty, 172 F.4th 220 (3d Cir. 2026) (finding preemption because “Kalshi’s sports- related event contracts are swaps traded on a CFTC-licensed DCM, so the CFTC has exclusive jurisdiction”); KalshiEx LLC v. Assad, 190 F.4th 1098 (9th Cir. 2026) (finding no preemption because “sports event contracts are likely not swaps under the CEA”). Kalshi timely appealed. On appeal, it raises the same preemption arguments as it raised below. II. Long before Congress enacted the Commodities Exchange Act (“CEA”), the Constitution established a system of government that divided authority between the national government and the states. The Framers rejected a national government of unlimited power in favor of a federal system that preserved the sovereignty of the states while entrusting the federal government with powers of national concern. That division of authority safeguards individual liberty, promotes political accountability, and allows the states to govern matters traditionally committed to their care. The Federalist No. 39, at 245 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (describing the states’ “residuary and inviolable sovereignty” as ascribed by the Constitution). But “[w]ith dual sovereignty . . . ‘follows the possibility that laws can be in conflict or at cross-purposes.’” GenBioPro, Inc. v. Raynes, 144 F.4th 258, 270 (4th Cir. 2025) (quoting Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 398–99 (2012)). The Framers anticipated that possibility. Their solution was the Supremacy Clause, which provides that federal law 14 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1892 Doc: 135 Filed: 11/18/2026 Pg: 15 of 59 “shall be the supreme Law of the Land.” U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. Thus, when Congress acts within its constitutional authority, federal law prevails over conflicting state law. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991). Those seemingly conflicting principles give rise to the doctrine of federal preemption. Whatever form a preemption claim takes, “[p]re-emption fundamentally is a question of congressional intent.” English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990). This is because, while Congress unquestionably possesses the authority to displace state law, courts presume that Congress “does not cavalierly pre-empt” the exercise of states’ traditional police powers because “the States are independent sovereigns in our federal system.” Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996). Accordingly, I “start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by [a] Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.” Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (emphasis added). That presumption carries particular force here. No one disputes that regulating gambling has long fallen within the states’ traditional police powers. And doctrine says that the power to override the states’ historic authority “is an extraordinary power in a federalist system,” so courts expect Congress to make its intention clear. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 460. Thus, courts do not use statutory uncertainty to redraw the federal-state balance themselves. Rather, “[i]n areas of traditional state regulation, we assume that a federal statute has not supplanted state law unless Congress has made such an intention ‘clear and manifest.’” Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005) (quoting N.Y. State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 655 15 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1892 Doc: 135 Filed: 11/18/2026 Pg: 16 of 59 (1995)). Accordingly, where a federal statute reasonably admits competing interpretations regarding its preemptive scope, courts “have a duty to accept the reading that disfavors pre- emption.” Id.; see also GenBioPro, 144 F.4th at 270 (quoting Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 545 U.S. 119, 139 (2005) (plurality opinion)) (explaining that lawmakers do not usually “intrude on sensitive domains” through language that does not clearly convey that result (emphasis added)); cf. Ala. Ass’n of Realtors v. HHS, 594 U.S. 758, 764 (2021) (“We expect Congress to speak clearly when authorizing an agency to exercise powers of vast economic and political significance.” (internal quotation omitted)). With those principles in mind, I turn to Kalshi’s two preemption theories. First, Kalshi argues that Congress occupied the field by granting the CFTC exclusive jurisdiction over the sports event contracts at issue, thereby leaving no room for concurrent state regulation. Second, Kalshi contends that, even if Maryland retains some regulatory authority, its gaming laws conflict with the CEA because they stand as an obstacle to the federal scheme Congress established. I disagree with both arguments and address each separately. A. I first consider Kalshi’s argument that the CEA occupies the field. Field preemption arises when “Congress has legislated so comprehensively that it has left no room for supplementary state legislation.” R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Durham Cnty., 479 U.S. 130, 140 (1986); see also Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. at 401. The question is therefore not whether Congress regulates these contracts through the CEA. Rather, the question is whether Congress clearly intended the CEA to vest the CFTC with exclusive 16 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1892 Doc: 135 Filed: 11/18/2026 Pg: 17 of 59 regulatory authority over gaming contracts, thereby withdrawing Maryland’s historic authority to regulate gambling in this area. Kalshi principally relies on the CEA’s exclusive-jurisdiction provision, which grants the CFTC “exclusive jurisdiction” over certain “transactions involving swaps.” 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)(A). Read in isolation, that language appears to support Kalshi’s position. But statutes are not read one provision at a time. We must interpret the exclusive-jurisdiction provision in conjunction with the remainder of the statutory scheme, including § 7a- 2(c)(5)(C)(i), known as the “Special Rule,” which appears within the same statute and governs event contracts involving gaming. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000) (“A court must therefore interpret the statute as a symmetrical and coherent regulatory scheme . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)). As I explain below, the clarity necessary to displace Maryland’s traditional police powers disappears when those provisions are read together. i. I begin with the text Congress enacted. Subject to some exceptions, the CEA grants the CFTC “exclusive jurisdiction” over “transactions involving swaps or contracts of sale of a commodity for future delivery . . . traded or executed on a contract market” designated under the Act. 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)(A). Kalshi contends that its sports event contracts are swaps traded on a federally regulated designated contract market (“DCM”) and therefore fall within the CFTC’s exclusive jurisdiction beyond the reach of Maryland’s gaming laws. Reading the provision alone, that argument makes sense if we agree that those gaming contracts are swaps. 17 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1892 Doc: 135 Filed: 11/18/2026 Pg: 18 of 59 Whether sports event contracts of this kind qualify as “swaps” under the CEA, however, has divided courts considering the question and presents difficult and technical questions of statutory interpretation. I need not enter that debate here because the preemption question can be resolved without deciding it. 2 Even assuming Kalshi’s contracts are swaps, that establishes only that they fall within the CEA’s regulatory framework. It does not answer the question here, which is whether the CEA clearly grants the CFTC exclusive authority over those contracts to the exclusion of Maryland’s traditional authority to regulate gambling. Put differently, whether the contracts are swaps bears on the CFTC’s authority to regulate them at all; by contrast, the field preemption question here is whether that authority wholly excludes concurrent and supplemental state regulation of contracts involving gaming specifically. Kalshi’s position would effectively answer that question based on the form the wagering takes: because the wagers are packaged as derivative contracts traded on a DCM, Kalshi contends that they fall 2 My colleague argues that the preemption question must turn on whether the sports- related contracts are held to be swaps. Dissent at 57–58. In the dissent’s view, if the sports- related contracts are swaps, then the CFTC is conferred exclusive jurisdiction, and field preemption necessarily applies. Id. But the critical question is whether that exclusive jurisdiction language over the field of DCM trading creates an inference that Congress “left no room for supplementary state regulation.” Hillsborough Cnty., Fla. v. Automated Med. Lab’ys, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985); See Flaherty, 172 F.4th at 236 (Roth, J., dissenting) (explaining that the federal occupation of a subfield of futures trading does not overcome the presumption against preemption of states’ historic police powers over gambling). The dissent’s view would allow Kalshi, or any person or entity for that matter, to circumvent state gambling laws by repackaging ordinary gambling as futures trading on a DCM. As discussed further below, the statutory context of the CEA does not evince a “clear and manifest” intention to preempt traditional state authority and permit this loophole. See Rice, 331 U.S. at 230. 18 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1892 Doc: 135 Filed: 11/18/2026 Pg: 19 of 59 exclusively within the federal sphere and beyond the reach of traditional state gaming regulation. But the CEA itself makes that inference difficult to sustain. Congress did not treat the gaming subject as irrelevant merely because it takes the form of a derivative contract. To the contrary, Congress enacted the Special Rule specifically addressing event contracts involving gaming and other sensitive subjects. Under that Rule, the CFTC “may determine” that an event contract is “contrary to the public interest” if it involves, among other things, gaming. Id. § 7a-2(c)(5)(C)(i). If the CFTC makes that determination, “[n]o agreement, contract, or transaction” so determined “may be listed or made available for clearing or trading on or through a registered entity.” Id. § 7a-2(c)(5)(C)(ii). Congress further authorized the CFTC to determine the continuing eligibility of clearing organizations to clear such contracts. Id. §§ 2(a)(1)(A), 7a-2(c)(5)(C)(iii). Read together, as we must, these provisions reveal why the swap question does not resolve the preemption question. Congress did not treat every derivative contract traded on a DCM alike. It granted the CFTC exclusive jurisdiction over transactions “traded or executed” on DCMs while separately recognizing that cert