Full Opinion

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA FOURTH DISTRICT ART CONNECTIONS USA, LLC, Appellant, v. BURGESS MODERN + CONTEMPORARY LLC, Appellee. No. 4D2025-3662 [August 19, 2026] Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County; Nickolaus Hunter Davis, Judge; L.T. Case No. 062024CA015910AXXXCE. Ejola Christlieb Cook and Matthew Lipari of Kelley Kronenberg, Fort Lauderdale, for appellant. Paul O. Lopez, Corey D. Cohen, and Jennifer A. Bautista of Tripp Scott, P.A., Fort Lauderdale for appellee. COATES, JR., HOWARD K., Associate Judge. Art Connections USA, LLC (“Appellant” or “Art Connections”) appeals from the circuit court’s order granting defendant’s amended motion for reconsideration and final summary judgment rendered in favor of Appellee Burgess Modern + Contemporary LLC (“Appellee” or “Burgess Modern”). We affirm the trial court on all issues. Facts Art Connections was a wholesale and retail art company owned by Ofer Sadik that employed Adi Notes (“Notes”) as Art Connection’s salesperson for over fifteen years. He worked with his brother, Eran Notes (“Eran”), and the two were primarily responsible for art sales. Notes previously worked with Lisa Burgess (“Burgess”), a broker for Burgess Modern. As was customary in their business relationship, Notes reached out to Burgess because Art Connections had a client interested in purchasing a Marc Chagall original piece. The two usually communicated via text or phone. Notes contacted Burgess, explaining that his client wanted to purchase the painting “La Peintre a la palette et sa muse dans le ciel de Saint Paul” (“La Palette”) for €350,000. Burgess responded to Notes via text, “[j]ust heard from him. The seller is sticking at €400,000 firm. He doesn’t want to sell for less. That’s the net price to him excluding commission. I’m working on finding another piece.” Burgess offered other paintings to purchase, texting, “I have two other ones I found that we will be able to make more dollars on. I’ll send you pictures and info. Hold on showing until I get actual asking prices.” Thereafter, Burgess messaged Art Connections with pictures of two pieces of art for consideration. The first was Marc Chagall’s “Les Cirque” and the second was Marc Chagall’s “La famille au village.” Art Connections did not respond to Burgess’s message. Notes informed Burgess by phone that Notes’ client was interested in the “first painting.” On the same day, Burgess contacted her European intermediary to ask if Marc Chagall’s “Les Cirque” could be purchased for €350,000. Soon after, the intermediary informed Burgess that the seller had agreed. Burgess contacted Notes to make him aware that she had spoken to the “seller of the Chagall circus piece,” informing him that “[i]t was no easy feat, but I finally got him to agree to hour [sic] client’s offer of €350,000.” Notes responded “it’s good news” and he would “text my customer today.” The next day, Burgess informed Notes she was in contact with the committee that inspected and checked Chagall paintings for authenticity. Notes did not indicate the painting that Burgess had named was the wrong painting. Burgess sent Art Connections an invoice, which was also emailed to Notes. The invoice indicated that the sale was for “Les Cirque.” Notes did not personally see the invoice. However, Notes ensured the transfer of the €350,000 to Burgess. After the invoice had been submitted to Art Connections and Burgess had received payment, Burgess texted Notes inquiring if his client wanted the painting framed or unframed. Upon receiving the text message, Notes realized that the painting was not the one that his client wanted. Notes immediately called Burgess to tell her it was a “big, big, big problem” and asked for her assistance. Burgess told Notes the transaction had already been completed, but she would attempt to undo it. Burges held subsequent phone calls with 2 Eran. In a text chain that included Notes and Burgess, Eran wrote to the group regarding the events, “this way we can all be on the same page.” Eran explained, “[t]here is a mistake with the Chagal (sic) painting[,] there was a confusion between you and Adi about the painting[,] and the one that we paid for it’s not the one we wanted to get.” He said, “[t]hank God, we catch it now before the painting shipped.” When the parties could not reach a resolution, Art Connections sued Burgess and Burgess Modern for various claims. After litigation ensued, negligent misrepresentation remained as the sole claim. Burgess moved for summary judgment on the basis that Art Connections could not identify a misrepresentation of material fact, because the record showed that Burgess had provided Art Connections with the correct invoice, photographs, and documentation relating to “Les Cirque.” Moreover, Burgess asserted Art Connections could not identify any circumstance in which Burgess mistakenly believed the painting she sold was “La Pallete.” At the hearing, Burgess argued no material facts were disputed. Art Connections maintained a fundamental material dispute existed as to whether Burgess had the authority to make an offer on “Les Cirque,” and argued that the parties had dealt in pictures and not the titles of the works; that was the “cadence of how business work[ed].” For its part, Burgess argued that Art Connections could not identify any misrepresentations, noting that Burgess’s failure to send a picture was not a misrepresentation of a material fact. The circuit court denied Burgess’s summary judgment motion, stating the decision was “a very close call,” and noting “there may be just enough to allow the case to proceed with an eye on plaintiff’s arguments that the context of this transaction being the trade usage of the people in the business of art transactions.” Burgess moved for reconsideration and final summary judgment, again stressing that Art Connections had not shown Burgess had made a false statement. On rehearing, the trial court granted Burgess’s motion for reconsideration and final summary judgment, concluding Art Connections had failed to demonstrate Burgess “made a misrepresentation of material fact that the defendant believed to be true but which was in fact false.” The trial court further explained, “Burgess Modern provided Plaintiff with an invoice and numerous text messages identifying, by title, Les Cirque— 3 the name of the artwork ultimately delivered.” The trial court then vacated its October 17, 2025, amended order on the Defendant’s motion for summary judgment and entered final judgment for Burgess. This appeal followed. Standard of Review “A trial court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment is subject to a de novo standard of review.” Olsen v. First Team Ford, Ltd., 359 So. 3d 873, 876 (Fla. 5th DCA 2023) (citing Baxter v. Northrup, 128 So. 3d 908, 910 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013)). “To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, a movant must show that (1) ‘there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact’ and (2) ‘the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Id. (quoting Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(a)); Williams v. Weaver, 381 So. 3d 1260, 1264 (Fla. 5th DCA 2024) (quoting Welch v. CHLN, Inc., 357 So. 3d 1277, 1278 (Fla. 5th DCA 2023)). In amending Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510, “the Florida Supreme Court sought to align Florida’s summary judgment rule with the federal summary judgment standard.” Olsen, 359 So. 3d at 877 (citing In re: Amends. to Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510, 317 So. 3d 72, 74 (Fla. 2021)). The Florida Supreme Court directed that “‘those applying new rule 1.510 must recognize the fundamental similarity between the summary judgment standard and the directed verdict standard.’” Id. “Both standards focus on ‘whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury.’” Id. “And under both standards, ‘the substantive evidentiary burden of proof that the respective parties must meet at trial is the only touchstone that accurately measures whether a genuine issue of material fact exists to be tried.’” Id. “Those applying the new rule 1.510 must recognize that the correct test for the existence of a genuine factual dispute is whether ‘the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’” Id. Thus, “in Florida it will no longer be plausible to maintain that ‘the existence of any competent evidence creating an issue of fact, however credible or incredible, substantial or trivial, stops the inquiry and precludes summary judgment, so long as the ‘slightest doubt’ is raised.’” Id. Analysis Discovery Issue 4 Art Connections argues the trial court erred in granting summary judgment while discovery was ongoing. Art Connections did not preserve this issue for appellate review. To preserve an issue for appellate review, the specific legal objection must be raised below. Lacey v. State, 831 So. 2d 1267, 1268 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002). An issue raised for the first time in a motion for rehearing or reconsideration is not preserved. See, e.g., Kovic v. Kovic, 336 So. 3d 22, 25 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022); Trinchitella v. D.R.F., Inc., 584 So. 2d 35, 35 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991) (“We cannot consider the issues raised for the first time in a motion for rehearing in the trial court.”). Summary Judgment Issues Art Connections argues that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because genuine issues of material fact remained. According to Art Connections, the record contains evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude the parties’ negotiations concerned the artwork “La Palette” and that Burgess, as a broker, acted without authority when she had negotiated for and invoiced the artwork “Les Cirque.” In response, Burgess argues Art Connections identified nothing in the record showing Burgess had made an actionable misstatement—whether express or by omission—about the sold painting. Burgess maintains that it had repeatedly identified the work as Marc Chagall’s “Les Cirque,” including providing Art Connections with a detailed invoice naming and describing “Les Cirque” and instructing Art Connections to confirm authenticity before paying. We agree with Burgess’s response. Florida adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552 (1977) as the framework for negligent misrepresentation claims. Gilchrist Timber Co. v. ITT Rayonier, Inc., 696 So. 2d 334, 339 (Fla. 1997). To make a claim for negligent misrepresentation of fact, the plaintiff must show that: (1) the defendant made a misrepresentation of material fact that he believed to be true but which was in fact false; (2) the defendant was negligent in making the statement because he should have known the representation was false; (3) the defendant intended to induce the plaintiff to rely . . . on the misrepresentation; and (4) injury resulted to the plaintiff acting in justifiable reliance upon the misrepresentation. Howard v. Murray, 184 So. 3d 1155, 1168 n.23 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (citation modified). 5 Burgess argues that prongs one and four are unmet, rendering summary judgment appropriate. That is, Art Connections did not introduce facts showing (1) a material fact had been misrepresented or (2) Art Connections had justifiably relied on the misrepresentation. We agree on both points. First, as Burgess maintains, Art Connections has not identified a misrepresentation of fact. In a negligent misrepresentation claim, the statement in question must be material. “Under Florida law, a fact is material if it made a difference in plaintiffs’ decision to enter the contract.” Gilchrist Timber Co. v. ITT Rayonier, Inc., 127 F.3d 1390, 1394 (11th Cir. 1997); see also Ribak v. Centex Real Estate Corp., 702 So. 2d 1316, 1317 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (“[A] fact is material if, but for the misrepresentation, the aggrieved party would not have entered into the contract.”). A misrepresentation of fact can be made in a myriad of ways. A party can expressly misrepresent a material fact. A party can also misrepresent a fact by conveying incorrect third-party information. See Gilchrist Timber Co., 127 F.3d at 1395 (noting that “Florida case law supports plaintiffs’ position that defendant made a representation about zoning by passing on the appraisal”). Here, Art Connections maintains the alleged misrepresentation was Burgess’s lack of authority to purchase “Les Cirque,” when Art Connections had only intended to give authority for the purchase of “La Palette.” Even taking Art Connections’ allegations as true, the correspondence between Burgess and Notes does not reveal any statements representing that the painting being negotiated was anything other than what it was—i.e., “Les Cirque.” See Garcia v. Diaz, 752 Fed.15 Appx. 927, 931 (11th Cir. 2018) (affirming dismissal where the plaintiff failed to plead that any misrepresentation occurred). While Art Connections apparently assumed “Les Cirque” referred to “La Palette,” Burgess made no statements to that effect. Cf. Nymbus, Inc. v. Chrome Fed. Credit Union, No. 18-CV-25081, 2021 WL 8894461, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 11, 2021) (dismissing negligent misrepresentation claim because “neither the[] statements nor any reasonable inference therefrom demonstrate[d] that [defendant] informed [plaintiff] that SmartCore was fully functional or completed” and also noting that Nymbus’ beliefs were not evidence that the defendant made an affirmative misrepresentation). Second, even if a material fact was negligently misrepresented, the record does not show that Art Connections justifiably relied on any such misrepresentation. A person receiving an alleged erroneous representation cannot “hide behind the unintentional negligence of the misrepresenter when the recipient is likewise negligent in failing to 6 discover the error.” Butler v. Yusem, 44 So. 3d 102, 105 (Fla. 2010); see also Gilchrist Timber Co., 127 F.3d at 1398 (citing Gilchrist Timber Co., 696 So. 2d at 339, favorably and reversing and remanding on the issue of comparative negligence). Art Connections argues that the court must consider how the parties communicated with pictures to appreciate Burgess’s misrepresentation. But Art Connections’ arguments notwithstanding, the record does not show that Burgess had misrepresented the painting. While Florida law holds that a “recipient of information does not have to investigate every piece of information furnished,” the recipient “is responsible for investigating that information which a reasonable person in the position of the recipient would be expected to investigate.” Gilchrist Timber Co., 696 So. 2d at 339; Specialty Marine & Indus. Supplies, Inc. v. Venus, 66 So. 3d 306, 311 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (citation modified). Art Connections unjustifiably minimizes the significance of the invoice that Burgess had sent to Art Connections. The invoice identifies the full name and description of the purchased painting, listing “Les Cirque,” not the painting that Art Connections had initially requested, “La Peintre a la palette et sa muse dans le ciel de Saint Paul.” As such, Art Connections cannot establish reasonable reliance, because the invoice that it had received reflected the sale was for a painting with a different name from the one requested. See Navigators Ins. Co. v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 477 Fed. Appx. 596, 597 (11th Cir. 2012) (noting that “once Powerboat Magazine received the certificate of insurance, which clearly indicated that Powerboat Magazine and Bob Teague had not been made additional insureds, Powerboat Magazine could not have reasonably relied upon the alleged representations of Collier in his discussions with Mornes or Pyburn”); see also Tevini v. Roscioli Yacht Sales, Inc., 597 So. 2d 913, 914 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992) (“In the face of paragraph 5 of the purchase contract, no reliance of the buyers on statements of title by the broker could possibly be justifiable.”). In sum, the record shows Burgess did not negligently misrepresent a material fact, as Burgess consistently referred to the painting as “Les Cirque.” Further, Art Connections did not reasonably rely on any alleged misrepresentation, because Burgess sent Art Connections an invoice clearly identifying the painting. Therefore, the trial court properly concluded that no genuine issues of material fact existed to prevent the entry of final summary judgment for Burgess. Affirmed. 7 SHEPHERD and LOTT, JJ., concur. * * * Not final until disposition of timely-filed motion for rehearing. 8