Full Opinion

SIXTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL STATE OF FLORIDA _____________________________ Case No. 6D2024-0034 Lower Tribunal No. 2021-CA-004752-O _____________________________ 1ST ORIENTAL MARKET, LLC, Appellant, v. ENSON MARKET, INC. and XINSEN NI, Appellees. _____________________________ Appeal from the Circuit Court for Orange County. Vincent S. Chiu, Judge. September 25, 2026 PRATT, J. Appellant 1st Oriental Market, LLC, appeals from the trial court’s order granting Appellee Xinsen Ni’s motion for partial summary judgment as to count one of the four-count amended complaint brought by Appellee Ni and Appellee Enson Market, Inc., against Appellant (“partial summary judgment order”), as well as the trial court’s order denying Appellant’s motion for reconsideration of the partial summary judgment order (“motion for reconsideration order”). For the reasons explained below, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. See Riggins v. Clifford R. Rhoades, P.A., 373 So. 3d 655, 660 n.4 (Fla. 6th DCA 2023) (“We have an independent obligation to examine our jurisdiction in every case.”). A few dates are relevant to this appeal. The partial summary judgment order was rendered on July 6, 2023. Appellant filed its motion for reconsideration thereof on July 20, 2023. Appellant filed its initial notice of appeal on December 29, 2023. The motion for reconsideration order was rendered on September 18, 2024. Appellant filed its first and second amended notices of appeal on January 25, 2024, and October 2, 2024. The partial summary judgment order is not reviewable as an appealable final judgment under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.110 because it does not “put[] an end to judicial labor, with only execution and enforcement of the judgment remaining.” Timmons v. Lake City Golf, LLC, 293 So. 3d 596, 599 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020); see, e.g., S.L.T. Warehouse Co. v. Webb, 304 So. 2d 97, 99 (Fla. 1974) (“Generally, the test employed by the appellate court to determine finality of an order, judgment or decree is whether the order in question constitutes an end to the judicial labor in the cause, and nothing further remains to be done by the court to effectuate a termination of the cause as between the parties directly affected.”); Bowers v. Orange Cnty., 365 So. 3d 481, 483 (Fla. 6th DCA 2023) (“[A]n appealable final judgment is one ‘which ends the litigation between the parties and disposes of 2 all issues involved such that no further action by the court will be necessary.’” (quoting Caufield v. Cantele, 837 So. 2d 371, 375 (Fla. 2002))). The partial summary judgment order is not reviewable as an appealable partial final judgment under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.110(k) because it neither “disposes of [the] entire case as to any party” nor “disposes of a separate and distinct cause of action that is not interdependent with other pleaded claims.” Fla. R. App. P. 9.110(k); see, e.g., Libman v. Fla. Wellness & Rehab. Ctr., Inc., 260 So. 3d 515, 518 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018) (“It is well-established that ‘[p]iecemeal appeals will not be permitted where claims are interrelated and involve the same transaction and the same parties remain in the suit.’” (quoting S.L.T. Warehouse, 304 So. 2d at 99)); Jensen v. Whetstine, 985 So. 2d 1218, 1220 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (“An order is not an appealable partial final order where there is a factual overlap between the pending claims and the claims resolved by the order. . . . The order on appeal is not a partial final judgment appealable pursuant to Rule 9.110(k) because there is a factual overlap between the claim resolved by the order and a pending claim.” (citations omitted)). However, the partial summary judgment order is reviewable as an appealable nonfinal order under two of the limited bases enumerated in Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3). See Fla. R. App. P. 9.130(a)(3)(B) (“Appeals to the district courts of appeal of nonfinal orders are limited to those that . . . grant, 3 continue, modify, deny, or dissolve injunctions, or refuse to modify or dissolve injunctions . . . .”); Fla. R. App. P. 9.130(a)(3)(C)(ii) (“Appeals to the district courts of appeal of nonfinal orders are limited to those that . . . determine . . . the right to immediate possession of property . . . .”). But Appellant did not timely appeal from the appealable nonfinal order—i.e., the partial summary judgment order—within thirty days of rendition of the partial summary judgment order as required by rule 9.130(b). See Fla. R. App. P. 9.130(b) (“Jurisdiction of the court under subdivisions (a)(3)-(a)(5) of this rule is invoked by filing a notice with the clerk of the lower tribunal within 30 days of rendition of the order to be reviewed.”); see also Fla. R. App. P. 9.020(h) (“An order is rendered when a signed, written order is filed with the clerk of the lower tribunal.”). Although Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration 1 within fifteen days of the date of filing of the partial summary judgment order, Appellant’s motion for reconsideration did not toll rendition of the appealable nonfinal order and the motion for reconsideration order is not in itself an appealable order. See, e.g., Dorsey v. Hearns, 433 So. 3d 481, 483 (Fla. 6th DCA 2026) (“This court . . . does not have jurisdiction to review any 1 Although titled a motion for rehearing, the motion was in actuality a motion for reconsideration because it was directed to a nonfinal order rather than a final judgment. See Seigler v. Bell, 148 So. 3d 473, 478-79 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014) (“Motions for rehearing and motions for reconsideration are two distinct motions and, though they are often confused, they do not overlap. . . . Nomenclature [of a mislabeled motion for rehearing or motion for reconsideration] does not control . . . .” (citations omitted)). 4 order denying a motion for rehearing [or reconsideration] of a nonfinal order.” (citation omitted)); Avael Law Firm, PLLC v. Sechrist, 347 So. 3d 424, 426-27 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022) (“Motions for reconsideration apply to nonfinal, interlocutory orders, and are based on a trial court’s inherent authority to reconsider and, if deemed appropriate, alter or retract any of its nonfinal rulings prior to entry of the final judgment or order terminating an action. Importantly, a motion for reconsideration does not toll the time for filing an appeal from a non-final order reviewable pursuant to the provisions of Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130. Moreover, an order that simply denies a motion for reconsideration of an underlying non-final order is not in itself an appealable order.” (citations, internal quotation marks, ellipses, footnote, and emphasis omitted)); Lovelace v. Lovelace, 124 So. 3d 447, 447 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (“The law in Florida is well settled that a motion for rehearing or reconsideration does not toll the time for filing an appeal from a non-final order reviewable pursuant to the provisions of Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130.” (citations omitted)). See generally Philip J. Padovano, 2 Fla. Prac., Appellate Practice § 2:4 (2026 ed.) (“A motion can suspend rendition of an order only if the motion is authorized under the rules governing the proceeding in which the order was entered. For example, a motion for rehearing does not suspend rendition of a 5 nonfinal order because rehearing is not authorized as to nonfinal orders.” (footnotes omitted)). 2 Consequently, because the initial notice of appeal of the partial summary judgment order was untimely filed beyond thirty days from rendition of the partial summary judgment order, and because the motion for reconsideration order is not in itself an appealable order, we lack jurisdiction to consider the merits of this appeal. See, e.g., Dorsey, 433 So. 3d at 482-83 (“Appellant challenges a number of orders entered by the trial court in this . . . case, but we do not have jurisdiction to review any of them. . . . [T]his appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.”); Doukas v. Doukas, 335 So. 3d 218, 219-20 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022) (“The trial court denied [reconsideration], and the [appellant] appealed within 30 days after denial of 2 Had the partial summary judgment order been a partial final judgment under rule 9.110(k), the motion for reconsideration would have in actuality been a motion for rehearing and said motion would have tolled the time for filing the initial notice of appeal because said motion was filed within fifteen days of the date of filing of the partial summary judgment order. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.020(h)(1) (“The following motions, if authorized and timely filed, toll rendition unless another applicable rule of procedure specifically provides to the contrary . . . motion for rehearing . . . .”); Fla. R. App. P. 9.110(b) (“Jurisdiction of the court under this rule must be invoked by filing a notice with the clerk of the lower tribunal within 30 days of rendition of the order to be reviewed . . . .”); Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.530(b) (“A motion . . . for rehearing must be served not later than 15 days after . . . the date of filing of the judgment in a non-jury action. . . .”). See generally Fla. R. App. P. 9.020(h)(2) (discussing the effect of motions tolling rendition). But because the partial summary judgment order was an appealable nonfinal order under rule 9.130 rather than a partial final judgment under rule 9.110(k), the motion for reconsideration did not toll the time for filing the initial notice of appeal. 6 [reconsideration], but by then—without tolling—far more than 30 days had passed after rendition of the original appealable non-final order. We therefore lack jurisdiction over the untimely portion of the [appellant’s] appeal, and must dismiss it.”). 3 DISMISSED. NARDELLA and MIZE, JJ., concur. Mark S. Reisinger, of Reisinger Law, PLLC, Winter Park, for Appellant. Michael J. Pugh, of Pugh Law Office P.A., Orlando, for Appellees. NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF TIMELY FILED Dismissal of this appeal is without prejudice to Appellant exercising any 3 right it may have to seek review of the partial summary judgment order or the motion for reconsideration order at the appropriate juncture by means of a timely notice of appeal of, as applicable, an appealable partial final judgment or an appealable final judgment. See generally, e.g., Dorsey, 433 So. 3d at 483 (“A timely notice of appeal of an appealable [final judgment] gives us jurisdiction to review earlier interlocutory orders.” (citation and emphasis omitted)); Fla. R. App. P. 9.110(h) (“Except as provided in [rule 9.110(k), which governs review of partial final judgments,], the court may review any ruling or matter occurring before filing of the notice.”); Fla. R. App. P. 9.110(k) (“The scope of review of a partial final judgment may include any ruling or matter occurring before filing of the notice of appeal so long as such ruling or matter is directly related to an aspect of the partial final judgment under review.”); Fla. R. App. P. 9.130(h) (“[Rule 9.130, which governs review of nonfinal orders,] will not preclude initial review of a nonfinal order on appeal from the final order in the cause.”). 7