Greenspire Global, Inc. and Steven M. Knauss v. Sarasota Green Group, LLC
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
Date FiledJune 23, 2023
Docket2D2022-2653
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA
SECOND DISTRICT
GREENSPIRE GLOBAL, INC., and STEVEN M. KNAUSS,
Appellants,
v.
SARASOTA GREEN GROUP, LLC,
Appellee.
No. 2D22-2653
June 23, 2023
Appeal pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 9.130 from the Circuit Court for Manatee
County; Edward Nicholas, Judge.
James L. Essenson, Barbara J. Welch, and Matthew J. Kelly of Essenson
Law Firm, Sarasota, for Appellants.
Hunter G. Norton of Shumaker, Loop & Kendrick, LLP, Sarasota, for
Appellee.
NORTHCUTT, Judge.
Greenspire Global, Inc., and its president, Steven M. Knauss
(collectively, Greenspire), appeal a nonfinal order permitting Sarasota
Green Group, LLC (SGG), to amend its complaint to seek punitive
damages. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.130(a)(3)(G) (authorizing appeal of
nonfinal orders that grant or deny motions for leave to amend to assert
punitive damage claims). We reverse because SGG failed to submit or
proffer evidence to support the amendment.
Greenspire licensed its bactericide and fungicide compound known
as "Procidic 2" to SGG, a distributor of "green" agricultural products.
SGG later sued Greenspire and Knauss for alleged fraudulent
inducement, negligent misrepresentation, fraud, violation of the Florida
Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (FDUTPA), and unjust
enrichment.
In due course, SGG sought leave to amend its complaint to add
demands for punitive damages in the fraud counts, contending that
"[t]he conduct causing damages to the Plaintiff was intentional and/or so
reckless and wanton in care that it constituted a conscious disregard or
indifference to the rights of the Plaintiff." After a hearing, the circuit
court granted SGG's motion. We review the ruling de novo. See Est. of
Blakely ex rel. Wilson v. Stetson Univ., Inc., 355 So. 3d 476, 481 (Fla. 5th
DCA 2022).
In Florida, punitive damages are authorized and governed by
statute. See ยง 768.72, Fla. Stat. (2022). "A defendant may be held liable
for punitive damages only if the trier of fact, based on clear and
convincing evidence, finds that the defendant was personally guilty of
intentional misconduct or gross negligence." ยง 768.72(2). As defined in
the statute:
(a) "Intentional misconduct" means that the defendant
had actual knowledge of the wrongfulness of the conduct and
the high probability that injury or damage to the claimant
would result and, despite that knowledge, intentionally
pursued that course of conduct, resulting in injury or
damage.
(b) "Gross negligence" means that the defendant's
conduct was so reckless or wanting in care that it constituted
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a conscious disregard or indifference to the life, safety, or
rights of persons exposed to such conduct.
ยง 768.72(2)(a), (b).
Before a punitive damages claim may proceed, there must be "a
reasonable showing by evidence in the record or proffered by the
claimant which would provide a reasonable basis for recovery of such
damages." ยง 768.72(1). Accordingly, when seeking leave to plead its
punitive damage claims, SGG was obliged to produce evidence that
Greenspire's conduct, knowledge, and intent reached the level of
"intentional misconduct" or "gross negligence." See ยง 768.72(2)(a), (b).
For this purpose, SGG relied solely on the unverified allegations
within and attachments to its complaint, augmented by an affidavit from
its managing member, Bruce Cassidy. SGG maintained that those
documents showed that Greenspire intentionally made false and
misleading statements regarding Procidic 2, intentionally failed to
disclose an out-of-state regulatory action regarding the product, and
knowingly misrepresented that SGG would grant Greenspire an exclusive
license. But those filings were inadequate to justify SGG's punitive
damages claims for several reasons.
First, SGG's unverified complaint was not evidence. See Harrold v.
Schluep, 264 So. 2d 431, 435 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972) ("Pleadings are not
admissible in evidence to prove or disprove a fact in issue."). As such, it
could not support the circuit court's determination that SGG made an
evidentiary showing sufficient to substantiate its punitive damages
claims. Similarly, the circuit court could not rely on the unauthenticated
attachments to the unverified complaint because they, too, lacked any
evidentiary weight on their own. See Eco-Tradition, LLC v. Pennzoil-
Quaker State Co., 137 So. 3d 495, 496 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (holding that
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unauthenticated attachments to an unverified complaint have no
evidentiary value).
Second, SGG's attempt to imbue the complaint and exhibits with
evidentiary import by submitting Cassidy's affidavit was ineffective. The
affidavit represented that Cassidy had read SGG's second amended
complaint and that "[t]he statements made therein are correct to the best
of my personal knowledge, information, and belief." (Emphasis added.)
A "verification which is improperly based on information and belief is
insufficient to entitle the verifying party to relief because the verification
is qualified in nature." Ballinger v. Bay Gulf Credit Union, 51 So. 3d 528,
529-30 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (declining to give weight to other words like
"knowledge" within the verification when the verification was already
qualified by the inclusion of the word "belief"). Thus, insofar as Cassidy's
affidavit simply reflected that he believed the unverified accusations in
the complaint, it failed to lend evidentiary support to SGG's proposed
punitive damage claims.
Finally, Cassidy's affidavit asserted that Greenspire intentionally
misrepresented or withheld material information in direct
communications with him. These allegations were fatally flawed because
Cassidy failed to disclose how he could have personal knowledge of
Greenspire's intent. See W. Edge II v. Kunderas, 910 So. 2d 953, 954-55
(Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (holding that an averment in an affidavit from an
affiant who "could not have had personal knowledge of what [another
organization] knew or did not know" was insufficient as a matter of law).
Cassidy's mere belief that Greenspire intentionally misrepresented the
attributes of Procidic 2 and otherwise behaved fraudulently was not
evidence that they did so. See id. (citing Fla. Dep't of Fin. Servs. v.
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Associated Indus. Ins. Co., 868 So. 2d 600, 602 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004)
(holding that opinions are not statements based on personal knowledge)).
Because there was no showing by evidence in the record or
proffered by SGG to support claims for punitive damages in this case, we
reverse the order permitting it to add such claims to its pleadings. Our
holding is without prejudice to SGG's filing a new motion to amend with
proper evidentiary support.
Reversed and remanded.
CASANUEVA, J., and CASE, JAMES R., ASSOCIATE SENIOR JUDGE,
Concur.
Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.
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