Casey Henry v. Aim Industries, L L C
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
Date FiledDecember 16, 2022
Docket2D22-0330
StatusPublished
๐ฐ News Coverage: Read the LAWS.com news report on this case
Full Opinion
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA
SECOND DISTRICT
CASEY HENRY,
Petitioner,
v.
AIM INDUSTRIES, LLC,
and AMY ABDNOUR,
Respondents.
No. 2D22-330
December 16, 2022
Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Circuit Court for Hillsborough
County; Darren D. Farfante, Judge.
Jonathan W. Newlon of Newlon Law Office, P.A., Dade City, for Petitioner.
J. Scott Taylor, Riverview, for Respondents.
CASANUEVA, Judge.
Casey Henry petitions for a writ of certiorari requesting that this
court quash the circuit court's order discharging her notices of lis
pendens. Because there is an inadequate appellate record, this court is
unable to determine whether the circuit court's actions departed from
the essential requirements of law. Therefore, we must deny the petition.
I. Background
In April 2021, Ms. Henry, as a member of AIM Industries, LLC
(AIM), filed an amended petition for dissolution and sale of assets of AIM
and a request for judicial declaration of her rights and interest in AIM.
The petition alleged that the main asset owned by AIM was the property
located at 5005 Performance Park Boulevard, Tampa, Florida. Prior to
filing her amended petition, Ms. Henry submitted a notice of lis pendens
on the same property, which was recorded in duplicate. AIM later filed a
motion to discharge the notices of lis pendens pursuant to section
48.23(3), Florida Statutes (2021).
The circuit court conducted a hearing on the motion to discharge
and granted the same. During this hearing, however, Ms. Henry alleges
that the circuit court did not take any evidence regarding the motion to
discharge before entering the order in favor of AIM. Ms. Henry argues
that by failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing prior to discharging the
notices of lis pendens, the circuit court departed from the essential
requirements of law.
II. Analysis
"To obtain certiorari relief, [Ms. Henry] must demonstrate that the
trial court's interlocutory order departs from the essential requirements
of the law, and causes irreparable harm that cannot be corrected on
direct appeal." Fla. W. Realty Partners, LLC v. MDG Lake Trafford, LLC,
975 So. 2d 479, 480 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007). The second and third prongsโ
establishing a harm which cannot be corrected on a direct appealโare
jurisdictional and must be considered first. Tetrault v. Calkins, 79 So. 3d
213, 215 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012).
As described by the Florida Supreme Court, one purpose of a notice
of lis pendens is to alert all others that title to the property is involved in
2
litigation and that "future purchasers or encumbrancers of that property"
are at risk of being bound by an adverse judgment. Chiusolo v.
Kennedy, 614 So. 2d 491, 492 (Fla. 1993). Here, if Ms. Henry's notices
of lis pendens remain discharged, it will affect her ability to protect
herself "from intervening liens that could impair any property rights
claimed." Fla. W. Realty Partners, 975 So. 2d at 480 (quoting
Chiusolo, 614 So. 2d at 492). Thus, the order discharging the notices of
lis pendens subjects Ms. Henry to an irreparable harm that cannot be
remedied on direct appeal.
In determining the essential requirements of law for discharging a
notice of lis pendens, we first look to section 48.23. Section 48.23(3)
provides that unless the pending pleading demonstrates that an action is
based on a duly recorded instrument or a lien pursuant to chapter 713,
the court has the power to discharge a notice of lis pendens as the court
would grant and dissolve injunctions. See Carollo v. Henderson, 290 So.
3d 1088, 1090 (Fla. 5th DCA 2020). When an action is not founded on a
duly recorded instrument or a chapter 713 lien, but alleges a nexus
between the real property and the claims set forth, an evidentiary
hearing is required on a motion to discharge a lis pendens. Id. There is
no dispute that Ms. Henry's action is not founded on a duly recorded
instrument or a chapter 713 lien.
"[T]he supreme court held that a lis pendens could not be dissolved
if, 'in the evidentiary hearing on request for discharge, the proponent [of
the lis pendens] can establish a fair nexus between the apparent legal or
equitable ownership of the property and the dispute embodied in the
lawsuit.' " Fla. W. Realty Partners, 975 So. 2d at 480 (quoting Chiusolo,
614 So. 2d at 492). Discharging a notice of lis pendens without affording
the proponent notice and an opportunity to be heard is a departure from
3
the essential requirements of law. Hallmark Builders, Inc. v. Hickory
Lakes of Brandon, Inc., 458 So. 2d 45, 46โ47 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984).
Here, Ms. Henry asserts that based on her amended petition, she
was entitled to an evidentiary hearing to establish a fair nexus and that
the hearing conducted by the circuit court did not provide an opportunity
to present evidence. AIM agrees that Ms. Henry was entitled to a hearing
wherein she was afforded the opportunity to present evidence but asserts
that Ms. Henry's entitlement to due process was accomplished by the
hearing on January 2022.1 It further asserts that without the transcript
of the hearing on the motion to discharge, the presumption of
correctness afforded to the circuit court remains intact.
At the outset, we acknowledge that there are certain factors within
the record which suggest that the court did not take any evidence during
the hearing. First, the order discharging the lis pendens contains no
written finding on whether a fair nexus existed2 and states that in
drawing its conclusion, the court considered the appropriate pleadings
and argument of counsel but failed to mention any evidence. Second,
the hearing was not scheduled as an evidentiary hearing and was set for
fifteen minutes.
1 We take a moment to emphasize that for this court to obtain a
complete and accurate factual background, we rely on the record
provided and the duty of candor owed to the court by counsel for each
party. See R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4โ3.3(a)(1).
2 While there is "no strict requirement that trial courts make
written findings of fact," we note that there are "some instances, most
often when findings are required by legislative mandate, [that] the lack of
. . . findings could result in a remand for such findings." Naples Ests.
Ltd. P'ship v. Glasby, 331 So. 3d 863, 866 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021).
4
We also acknowledge that this court has previously ruled that
circumstances exist in which a lack of a transcript would not be
dispositive. In Tampa Medical Associates, Inc. v. Estate of Torres, 903 So.
2d 259, 260 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005), the petitioner sought certiorari review of
the trial court's order requiring it to deliver certain incident reports to
counsel for the Estate. The issue pertinent to our case was whether the
trial court departed from the essential requirements of law in
determining that the Estate made a sufficient showing of need and
inability to obtain equivalent information without undue hardship. Id. at
262. The trial court order stated that the Estate "made a specific
showing of need and inability to obtain equivalent information, without
undue hardship," but made no factual findings on how it made a
showing. Id. at 263. The Estate argued that "without a transcript of the
telephonic hearing, this court must assume that it made the showing
necessary to entitle it to obtain the disputed documents." Id. Applying
D'Amato v. D'Amato, 848 So. 2d 462 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003), this court held
that the lack of a transcript was not dispositive "because it appear[ed] to
be undisputed that no evidence or testimony was presented at the
telephonic hearing." Id. Therefore, having the transcript in that instance
would not provide any additional information on the issue before the
court.
In the instant case, Ms. Henry alleges that the circuit court heard
counsel's argument during the hearing but did not permit the admission
of any evidence in support of the allegations in her petition. Unlike
Estate of Torres, the transcript is necessary for our review of the issue
alleged, particularly when AIM asserts that Ms. Henry's entitlement to
5
due process was accomplished by the hearing.3 Stated plainly, for the
circuit court to receive evidence, counsel must have indicated a desire to
present evidence. If counsel was thereafter not permitted to do so, it was
error. Since we have no transcript of the hearing and Ms. Henry did not
attempt to provide a statement of proceedings, see Fla. R. App. P.
9.200(b)(5), it is unclear whether the circuit court committed that error.
We are bound by the presumption of correctness afforded to the
circuit court and the burden is on Ms. Henry to show a departure from
the essential requirements of law. See United States Auto. Ass'n v. Bay
Area Inj. Rehab Specialists Holdings, Inc., 311 So. 3d 172, 176 (Fla. 2d
DCA 2020) (stating that it is the obligation of the appellant or petitioner
to demonstrate error on the part of the trial court, which "necessarily
includes the burden of making, preserving, and presenting an adequate
record for appellate review").
Petition denied.
ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM and ATKINSON, JJ., Concur.
Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.
3 Under due process, "the right to be heard at an evidentiary
hearing includes more than simply being allowed to be present and to
speak. Instead, the right to be heard includes the right to 'introduce
evidence at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.' " Baron v.
Baron, 941 So. 2d 1233, 1236 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (quoting Brinkley v.
County of Flagler, 769 So. 2d 468, 472 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)).
6