Cecilia S. Pino v. Hudson Excess Insurance Company
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
Date FiledJuly 30, 2026
Docket3D2025-0065
StatusPublished
📰 News Coverage: Read the LAWS.com news report on this case
Full Opinion
Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed July 30, 2026.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
________________
No. 3D25-0065
Lower Tribunal No. 24-2540-CA-01
________________
Cecilia S. Pino, et al.,
Appellants,
vs.
Hudson Excess Insurance Company, et al.,
Appellees.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Vivianne del
Rio, Judge.
Ver Ploeg & Marino, P.A., and Robert P. Major and Benjamin C.
Hassebrock and Derrick S. Natal (Orlando), for appellants.
Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP and Sarah Hafeez and Carol M. Rooney
(Ft. Lauderdale); Insurance Advisors and Consultants LLC and Ronald L.
Kammer; De Novo and Kathryn L. Ender, for appellees.
Before SCALES C.J., and LINDSEY and GORDO, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Affirmed. See Glenn v. Roberts, 95 So. 3d 271, 272 (Fla. 3d DCA
2012) (“A motion for judgment on the pleadings may be granted only if the
moving party is clearly entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”);
Fontainebleau Florida Hotel LLC v. Westchester Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 408
So. 3d 862, 864 (Fla. 3d DCA 2025) (“[I]n construing insurance policies,
courts should read each policy as a whole, endeavoring to give every
provision its full meaning…. Where the policy language is plain and
unambiguous, no special rule of construction or interpretation applies, and
the court should give the plain language in the contract the meaning it clearly
expresses.”); Aiello v. ASI Preferred Corp., 315 So. 3d 713, 719 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2021) (“[T]he Watercraft Exclusion and severability clause at issue in
this case use the term ‘an insured’ rather than ‘the insured.’ Courts have
repeatedly recognized that ‘an insured’ and ‘the insured’ are distinct and
have separate meanings; ‘an’ means ‘any’ and ‘the’ means a specific
insured.” (emphasis in original)); Acceleration Nat. Serv. Corp. v. Brickell Fin.
Servs. Motor Club, Inc., 541 So. 2d 738, 739 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) (holding
that in a contract “‘any’ is often synonymous with ‘either,’ ‘every,’ or ‘all’” and
“‘any’ is defined as ‘[o]ne or another without restriction or exception’” (internal
citations omitted)).
2