Tenaris Bay City, Inc. v. United States

Case: 25-1382 Document: 72 Page: 1 Filed: 09/18/2026 United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ______________________ TENARIS BAY CITY, INC., MAVERICK TUBE CORPORATION, IPSCO TUBULARS INC., TENARIS GLOBAL SERVICES (U.S.A.) CORP., SIDERCA S.A.I.C., Plaintiffs-Appellants v. UNITED STATES, UNITED STATES STEEL CORPORATION, BORUSAN MANNESMANN PIPE U.S. INC., PTC LIBERTY TUBULARS LLC, UNITED STEEL, PAPER AND FORESTRY, RUBBER, MANUFACTURING, ENERGY, ALLIED INDUSTRIAL AND SERVICE WORKERS INTERNATIONAL UNION, AFL-CIO, CLC, WELDED TUBE, Defendants-Appellees ______________________ 2025-1382 ______________________ Appeal from the United States Court of International Trade in No. 1:22-cv-00343-CRK, Judge Claire R. Kelly. ______________________ Decided: September 18, 2026 ______________________ FRANK JOHN SCHWEITZER, White & Case LLP, Wash- ington, DC, argued for plaintiffs-appellants. Also repre- sented by MATTHEW WOLF SOLOMON, GREGORY J. SPAK, Case: 25-1382 Document: 72 Page: 2 Filed: 09/18/2026 2 TENARIS BAY CITY, INC. v. US KRISTINA ZISSIS. MARGARET J. JANTZEN, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Wash- ington, DC, argued for defendant-appellee United States. Also represented by CLAUDIA BURKE, PATRICIA M. MCCARTHY, BRETT A. SHUMATE; IAN ANDREW MCINERNEY, United States Department of Commerce, Washington, DC. CHRISTOPHER TODD CLOUTIER, Schagrin Associates, Washington, DC, argued for defendants-appellees United States Steel Corporation, Borusan Mannesmann Pipe U.S. Inc., PTC Liberty Tubulars LLC, United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Indus- trial and Service Workers International Union, AFL-CIO, CLC, and Welded Tube USA Inc. Defendants-appellees Bo- rusan Mannesmann Pipe U.S. Inc., PTC Liberty Tubulars LLC, United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufac- turing, Energy, Allied Industrial and Service Workers In- ternational Union, AFL-CIO, CLC, and Welded Tube USA Inc. also represented by NICHOLAS J. BIRCH, SAAD YOUNUS CHALCHAL, ELIZABETH DRAKE, WILLIAM ALFRED FENNELL, JEFFREY DAVID GERRISH, LUKE A. MEISNER, NICHOLAS C. PHILLIPS, ROGER BRIAN SCHAGRIN. THOMAS M. BELINE, Cassidy Levy Kent (USA) LLP, Washington, DC, for defendant-appellee United States Steel Corporation. Also represented by MYLES SAMUEL GETLAN, JAMES EDWARD RANSDELL, IV. ______________________ Case: 25-1382 Document: 72 Page: 3 Filed: 09/18/2026 TENARIS BAY CITY, INC. v. US 3 Before LOURIE and PROST, Circuit Judges, and SUBRAMANIAN, District Judge. 1 SUBRAMANIAN, District Judge. In 2021, a coalition of domestic producers filed a peti- tion urging the United States Department of Commerce (“Commerce”) to investigate whether steel pipes imported from Argentina were being “dumped” in the United States, i.e., sold at less than fair value. The ensuing investigation vindicated the petition, and Commerce imposed antidump- ing duties on the Argentine imports. This case isn’t about that ultimate determination, but instead concerns a threshold question: whether the petition that kicked off the investigation was filed “by or on behalf of the industry.” 19 U.S.C. § 1671a(c)(1)(A)(ii). Because substantial evidence supports Commerce’s determination that it was, we affirm. BACKGROUND Oil country tubular goods (“OCTG”) are steel pipes used in oil and gas wells. On October 6, 2021, a group of four domestic OCTG producers and a union filed a petition alleging that OCTG were being imported from various countries, including Argentina, and sold in the United States for less than fair value. Their petition was brought under the antidumping provisions of the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673–1673h, which establish a process for Commerce to investigate allegations that foreign goods are being dumped in the United States. After receiving such a petition, Commerce must deter- mine whether “the petition has been filed by or on behalf of the industry.” Id. § 1673a(c)(1)(A)(ii). A petition is filed “by or on behalf of the industry” if the “domestic producers or 1 Honorable Arun Subramanian, District Judge, United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation. Case: 25-1382 Document: 72 Page: 4 Filed: 09/18/2026 4 TENARIS BAY CITY, INC. v. US workers who support the petition account for” (1) “at least 25 percent of the total production of the domestic like prod- uct” and (2) “more than 50 percent of the production of [those] expressing support for or opposition to the petition.” Id. § 1673a(c)(4)(A). In both calculations, the production at- tributable to supporters forms the numerator. What changes is the denominator—total domestic production for the 25% test, and the production of those expressing a po- sition on the petition for the 50% test. Commerce must make the industry support determination quickly, gener- ally within 20 days. Id. § 1673a(c)(1)(A). Petitioners provided calculations indicating that their petition satisfied both the 25% and 50% thresholds. The numbers they used were from 2020, the most recent calen- dar year. For the numerator, petitioners provided their own production data, as well as data from several other do- mestic producers who wrote letters in support of the peti- tion. Then, because information on total domestic OCTG production was not yet available for 2020, petitioners esti- mated industry-wide production based on domestic ship- ment numbers, adjusted using a historical ratio of production to shipments. They used that estimate of indus- try-wide production as the denominator for the 25% calcu- lation, and for the 50% calculation, they used that number as a starting point, and then subtracted the production of two companies who stated that they took no position on the petition. Commerce got right to work. The day after receiving the petition, the agency issued a questionnaire to petition- ers asking for more detail about how they determined the universe of domestic OCTG producers. After petitioners provided the requested information, Commerce followed up with another questionnaire on October 19, asking about the production facilities served by the petitioner labor un- ion. Petitioners provided this information as well. Case: 25-1382 Document: 72 Page: 5 Filed: 09/18/2026 TENARIS BAY CITY, INC. v. US 5 Not everyone supported the petition, though. Notably, Tenaris Bay City, Inc., which claims to be the largest do- mestic producer of OCTG, opposed the petition. It turns out that even though Tenaris is a major domestic producer of OCTG, it also imports OCTG and is related to foreign pro- ducers who would be harmed by tariffs. The statute pro- vides that interested parties “may submit comments or information on the issue of industry support” before Com- merce determines whether to initiate an investigation. 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(c)(4)(E). So Tenaris availed itself of that op- portunity and filed comments on October 8, 15, 20, and 22 challenging petitioners’ industry support calculations. Tenaris made several different arguments, including that 2020 was an anomalous year and that shipment data was an unreliable proxy to determine domestic production. Tenaris also observed that “[t]he relationship of pipe for- mation and pipe finishing has implications for any assess- ment of a domestic OCTG industry.” J.A. 1712. Tenaris did not, however, point to any other source of industry-wide production data that would be more accurate than petitioners’ source. Tenaris requested that Commerce either dismiss the petition or exercise its statutory author- ity to poll the industry to determine whether there was suf- ficient support. See 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(c)(4)(D)(i). Commerce declined. Relying on the information pro- vided by petitioners and its statutory authority, Commerce determined that even if all non-petitioning and non-neu- tral domestic OCTG producers opposed the petition, the statutory thresholds for industry support were met. Com- merce rejected Tenaris’s arguments to the contrary, saying that its concerns were unsubstantiated and it had not of- fered any alternative production data. On October 26, 2021, just before the 20-day deadline expired, Commerce initiated the requested antidumping investigation. See Oil Country Tubular Goods from Argentina, Mexico, and the Case: 25-1382 Document: 72 Page: 6 Filed: 09/18/2026 6 TENARIS BAY CITY, INC. v. US Russian Federation: Initiation of Less-Than-Fair-Value In- vestigations, 86 Fed. Reg. 60,205 (Nov. 1, 2021) (initiation notice). That investigation ultimately resulted in a finding of sales made at less-than-fair value and the imposition of an- tidumping duties on OCTG imports from Argentina. See Oil Country Tubular Goods from Argentina, Mexico, and the Russian Federation: Antidumping Duty Orders and Amended Final Affirmative Antidumping Duty Determina- tion for the Russian Federation, 87 Fed. Reg. 70,785 (Nov. 21, 2022). On December 16, 2022, Tenaris filed an appeal in the United States Court of International Trade (“CIT”), argu- ing that Commerce never should have initiated the inves- tigation in the first place because the petition was not filed on behalf of the domestic industry. The CIT rejected most of Tenaris’s arguments, but it agreed with Tenaris that there was a potential issue regarding “double counting.” See Tenaris Bay City, Inc. v. United States, 693 F. Supp. 3d 1314, 1326–28 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2024) (“Tenaris I”). As Tenaris pointed out, there was evidence in the record that “certain domestic companies both produce and finish OCTG.” Id. at 1326. It was thus possible that there was “pipe that was counted for the purposes of industry support when it was produced and again when it was finished.” Id. at 1327. The CIT noted that “Commerce may have reasons to reject this inference,” but “it must acknowledge considera- tion of such evidence and explain why it nonetheless rejects the inference.” Id. So the CIT “remand[ed] determination on the double counting issue to Commerce for further ex- planation or reconsideration.” Id. at 1328. On remand, Commerce maintained its position that the petition had sufficient industry support and the investiga- tion was properly initiated. Commerce found that there Case: 25-1382 Document: 72 Page: 7 Filed: 09/18/2026 TENARIS BAY CITY, INC. v. US 7 was “no evidence to suggest that, to the extent the compa- nies also engage in processing, 2 any of the U.S. producers who provided actual production data on the record literally counted each ton of pipe they produced twice—once upon the pipe formation and again upon heat treatment, thread- ing, etc.” J.A. 33. The agency also specifically addressed the two compa- nies Tenaris had flagged as potential cause for concern, Bo- rusan U.S. and PTC Liberty. Commerce concluded that the record did not show that PTC Liberty was solely a pipe fin- isher (which might imply that it was counting pipes al- ready counted by another domestic producer that manufactured them). Rather, PTC Liberty was “first and foremost” a producer of OCTG, which also had finishing ca- pabilities. J.A. 35–36. And Borusan’s processing facility finished pipes imported from overseas rather than ones manufactured by another U.S. producer. Commerce there- fore determined that “concerns about ‘double counting’” were “misplaced.” J.A. 32. On December 2, 2024, the CIT sustained Commerce’s remand results, finding that Commerce’s industry support calculations were reasonable and supported by substantial evidence. See Tenaris Bay City, Inc. v. United States, 745 F. Supp. 3d 1336, 1345 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2024) (“Tenaris II”). The CIT also rejected two new arguments Tenaris ad- vanced: that Commerce may have (1) undercounted total production in the denominator by failing to include proces- sors, and (2) overcounted production in the numerator by including threading, a form of processing that does not 2 In this context, “processing” and “finishing” are used interchangeably. Case: 25-1382 Document: 72 Page: 8 Filed: 09/18/2026 8 TENARIS BAY CITY, INC. v. US count as OCTG production. 3 The CIT concluded that Tenaris had failed to raise these arguments during the 20- day pre-initiation period, so they were unexhausted. Id. at 1342–43. While Tenaris had made vague reference to the “implications” of including both producers and processors in the industry support calculations, it could not use that as a hook “to fashion more specific arguments about poten- tial undercounting or distinctions between processing that involves heat treatment as opposed to threading opera- tions.” Id. The CIT also rejected Tenaris’s contention that Com- merce had not complied with its remand order. The court had not asked Commerce to “assess the accuracy and com- pleteness of the data more generally.” Id. at 1344. It had merely “ordered Commerce to ‘reconsider or further ex- plain’ its determination that the record accurately reflected industry support, including whether finishing operations were counted twice”—and Commerce had done so. Id. at 1345 (quoting Tenaris I, 693 F. Supp. 3d at 1320). Tenaris now appeals to this court, asking us to over- turn Commerce’s industry support calculation. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5) (granting this court exclusive jurisdic- tion over appeals from final decisions of the CIT). I We review the CIT’s decision de novo, “stepping into its shoes and applying the same standard of review.” JTEKT Corp. v. United States, 642 F.3d 1378, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Under that standard, our review of Commerce’s in- dustry support finding is deferential. We only overturn the 3 Technically, the 25% and 50% calculations use dif- ferent denominators. But both are based on petitioners’ es- timate of industry-wide production, so Tenaris’s arguments—which are focused on that estimate—apply equally to both. Case: 25-1382 Document: 72 Page: 9 Filed: 09/18/2026 TENARIS BAY CITY, INC. v. US 9 agency’s determination if it is “unsupported by substantial evidence on the record, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i). Substantial evidence means “more than a mere scintilla” and “such relevant ev- idence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Suramerica de Aleaciones Lamina- das, C.A. v. United States, 44 F.3d 978, 985 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). Even if we “would have reached a different con- clusion based on the same record,” Cleo Inc. v. United States, 501 F.3d 1291, 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2007), we must up- hold Commerce’s determination if it is “reasonable and supported by the record as a whole,” Altx, Inc. v. United States, 370 F.3d 1108, 1121 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (quotation omitted). Applying that deferential standard of review, we af- firm. As Commerce explained, Tenaris identified places where double counting was possible, but it did not identify any actual evidence of double counting. And Commerce was under no obligation to hunt for evidence dispelling Tenaris’s theoretical concerns. As for Tenaris’s arguments about potential undercounting and overcounting, we agree with the CIT that those arguments are unexhausted and decline to consider them. A We start with double counting. Everyone agrees that the domestic OCTG industry properly includes both manu- facturing and finishing operations. So if a pipe is manufac- tured by a domestic producer, it should be counted. And if a pipe is finished by a domestic producer, it should be counted too. But a single pipe should not be counted twice. There are two ways that could happen: (1) if a pipe was manufactured by one domestic producer but finished by an- other domestic producer (and counted by both), or (2) if a single domestic producer manufactured and then finished a pipe and counted it twice. Notably, double counting only Case: 25-1382 Document: 72 Page: 10 Filed: 09/18/2026 10 TENARIS BAY CITY, INC. v. US helps Tenaris if it happens in the numerator, i.e., if it at- tributes too much production to the petition’s supporters. That would mean that Commerce’s calculation overstated support for the petition. Whereas if the double counting were in the denominator, that would mean domestic sup- port was understated. And if double counting turned out to be equally a problem in the numerator and denominator, any double counting would cancel out. 4 The problem for Tenaris is that there is no evidence in the record indicating that either form of double counting actually happened—not in the numerator, not in the de- nominator, not anywhere. The evidence prompting the CIT’s initial remand was website information from two pe- titioners—PTC Liberty and Borusan—indicating that both had processing capabilities. See Tenaris I, 693 F. Supp. 3d at 1326. But as Commerce explained on remand, nothing in the record suggested that either company double counted its production. If anything, Commerce’s further ex- amination of those companies indicated that double count- ing was unlikely, because PTC Liberty was primarily a producer of OCTG with some finishing capabilities and Bo- rusan’s processing facility finished pipes imported from overseas rather than ones manufactured by another U.S. producer. 4 Commerce itself made this point, albeit somewhat clumsily. It reasoned that processing counted in both the numerator and denominator would “effectively cancel[],” and illustrated the point by removing the same additive term from both sides of the fraction. J.A. 34 n.57. That al- gebra is not literally correct: adding the same amount to the numerator and denominator does not necessarily leave a ratio unchanged. But Commerce’s underlying point was sound. If double counting inflated the numerator and de- nominator proportionally (e.g., increasing both by 50%), the industry support percentage would be unaffected. Case: 25-1382 Document: 72 Page: 11 Filed: 09/18/2026 TENARIS BAY CITY, INC. v. US 11 Tenaris contends that Commerce “erroneously consid- ered the double-counting issue to be limited to two petition- ing companies.” Opening Br. 16. But that misrepresents Commerce’s analysis. The agency started by explaining that it found “no evidence” that “any of the U.S. producers who provided actual production data on the record literally counted each ton of pipe they produced twice.” J.A. 33 (em- phasis added). So there was “no record evidence” of any double counting in the numerator. J.A. 34. It was only after Commerce conducted its general survey of the record that it went on to discuss the two specific companies whose web- sites had prompted the remand. Now on appeal, Tenaris identifies no evidence in the record that Commerce missed that would indicate double counting. Because Tenaris has no record evidence of double counting, much of its argument boils down to its contention that the onus was on Commerce to “ensure” there was “no” double counting, after Tenaris raised it as a possibility. Opening Br. 44. Tenaris bases this argument on the statu- tory provision requiring Commerce to “examin[e] . . . the accuracy and adequacy of the evidence provided in the pe- tition.” 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(c)(1)(A)(i). But Tenaris misreads the statute. The full text of 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(c)(1)(A), with the portion Tenaris relies on in bold, is: Except as provided in subparagraph (B), within 20 days after the date on which a petition is filed un- der subsection (b), the administering authority shall— (i) after examining, on the basis of sources readily available to the administering au- thority, the accuracy and adequacy of the evidence provided in the petition, determine whether the petition alleges the elements necessary for the imposition of a duty under section 1673 of this title and Case: 25-1382 Document: 72 Page: 12 Filed: 09/18/2026 12 TENARIS BAY CITY, INC. v. US contains information reasonably available to the petitioner supporting the allega- tions, and (ii) determine if the petition has been filed by or on behalf of the industry. Id. (emphases added). So the part Tenaris relies on is in subdivision (i), which relates to the other determination Commerce must make during the 20-day pre-initiation period—not subdivision (ii), which provides for the industry support determination. If Congress had wanted the “accuracy and adequacy” pro- vision to apply to both determinations, it could have easily accomplished that by putting it before the subdivisions, or by including it in both. Instead, Congress included that re- quirement in subdivision (i) but not subdivision (ii), a clear sign that it was meant to apply only to the first determina- tion. See Chafin v. Off. of Pers. Mgmt., 177 F.4th 1183, 1186 (Fed. Cir. 2026) (“It is a fundamental canon of statutory construction that ‘where Congress includes particular lan- guage in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Con- gress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate in- clusion or exclusion.’” (quoting Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983))). This is not to say Commerce may accept industry sup- port evidence at face value. Commerce’s determination still must be supported by substantial evidence, meaning the agency must “examine the record and articulate a satisfac- tory explanation for its action.” Yangzhou Bestpak Gifts & Crafts Co. v. United States, 716 F.3d 1370, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). Commerce must also take account of evidence that “fairly detracts” from its conclusion. CS Wind Vietnam Co. v. United States, 832 F.3d 1367, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Gerald Metals, Inc. v. United States, 132 F.3d 716, 720 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). That is precisely why the CIT remanded when Commerce initially failed to Case: 25-1382 Document: 72 Page: 13 Filed: 09/18/2026 TENARIS BAY CITY, INC. v. US 13 address record evidence suggesting that some OCTG may have been double counted. Tenaris I, 693 F. Supp. 3d at 1326–28. But we agree with the CIT that Commerce satisfied its obligations here. During the initial 20-day period, the agency sent petitioners multiple questionnaires, probing various aspects of petitioners’ industry support calculation and underlying data. This back and forth prompted peti- tioners to revise their calculations in certain respects, and Commerce ended up performing its own calculations that differed further from the calculations submitted by peti- tioners. Then on remand, Commerce specifically reconsid- ered the record evidence bearing on double counting and explained why it did not support Tenaris’s inference. What Commerce did not do was go out and affirma- tively find evidence to supplement the record and disprove double counting (or the other hypothetical issues Tenaris raised). But “the burden of creating an adequate record lies with interested parties and not with Commerce.” QVD Food Co. v. United States, 658 F.3d 1318, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citation modified). Tenaris itself had every oppor- tunity to submit evidence corroborating its concerns or pro- posing alternative sources of data, but it did not do so. See Qingdao Sea-Line Trading Co. v. United States, 766 F.3d 1378, 1386 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“Once Commerce selected [an] index as the best available adjustment method, [the object- ing party] had the duty to submit verifiable evidence show- ing that the use of the index was not the best available method . . . .”). As the CIT explained in a prior antidump- ing case, Commerce “has no independent duty to make a diligent inquiry into any and all information highlighted by interested parties.” Coal. of Am. Flange Producers v. United States, 448 F. Supp. 3d 1340, 1357 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2020). Case: 25-1382 Document: 72 Page: 14 Filed: 09/18/2026 14 TENARIS BAY CITY, INC. v. US These principles have particular force in the pre-initi- ation context, where the statute requires Commerce to re- solve industry support quickly and decisively. See 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(c)(1) (setting a presumptive 20-day dead- line that can be extended to “a maximum of 40 days” “in exceptional circumstances”); id. § 1673a(c)(4)(E) (“After the administering authority makes a determination with re- spect to initiating an investigation, the determination re- garding industry support shall not be reconsidered.”). Commerce has enough on its plate during that 20-day pe- riod without also having to seek out evidence to rebut un- substantiated concerns like the double counting Tenaris theorizes here. In a different case, the concerns raised by Tenaris might have required Commerce to do more—follow up with petitioners about their data, revise the calculation, etc. But here, the record did not bear those concerns out. After reex- amining the evidence, Commerce found no indication that double counting had occurred. It was not required to rein- vent the wheel to disprove a possibility that the record did not substantiate. B What about Tenaris’s other concerns, regarding under- counting and overcounting? The CIT found that those arguments were unex- hausted, reasoning that Tenaris could not “rely on the word ‘implications’ to fashion more specific arguments about po- tential undercounting or [overcounting].” Tenaris II, 745 F. Supp. 3d at 1342–43. Tenaris had raised general objections to “the completeness of the Industry Source data,” but it had not raised these specific concerns within the 20-day comment period, so the arguments were “not exhausted, and therefore not reviewable by this Court.” Id. As Tenaris points out, exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a jurisdictional requirement in this context. Case: 25-1382 Document: 72 Page: 15 Filed: 09/18/2026 TENARIS BAY CITY, INC. v. US 15 The CIT’s statutory exhaustion provision provides that the court “shall, where appropriate, require the exhaustion of administrative remedies.” 28 U.S.C. § 2637(d). So the “ap- plication of exhaustion principles in trade cases is subject to the discretion of the judge of the [CIT].” Agro Dutch In- dus. Ltd. v. United States, 508 F.3d 1024, 1029 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (internal quotation omitted). But “section 2637(d) ‘in- dicates a congressional intent that, absent a strong con- trary reason, the [trade] court should insist that parties exhaust their remedies before the pertinent administrative agencies.’” Itochu Bldg. Prods. v. United States, 733 F.3d 1140, 1145 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (alteration in original) (citing Corus Staal BV v. United States, 502 F.3d 1370, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). And because it is a discretionary decision, we “review the CIT’s failure to exhaust determination for an abuse of discretion.” Apex Frozen Foods Priv. Ltd. v. United States, 862 F.3d 1322, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2017). We find no abuse of discretion in the CIT’s finding that Tenaris failed to exhaust its administrative remedies here. To start, the application of exhaustion principles makes good sense in the pre-initiation context. As noted above, the statute generally gives Commerce only 20 days to make its industry support determination, 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(c)(1)(A), and after it makes its decision, “the deter- mination regarding industry support shall not be reconsid- ered,” id. § 1673a(c)(4)(E). A vague reference to the “implications” of including both producers and processors in the industry support calculation does not give Commerce enough notice to fairly expect it to address more specific objections like the ones Tenaris raises now, especially on such a compressed timetable. See Tenaris II, 745 F. Supp. 3d at 1342–43; Itochu Bldg. Prods., 733 F.3d at 1145 (ex- plaining that exhaustion gives the agency a “full oppor- tunity to correct errors and thereby narrow or even eliminate disputes needing judicial resolution”). Case: 25-1382 Document: 72 Page: 16 Filed: 09/18/2026 16 TENARIS BAY CITY, INC. v. US Take Tenaris’s undercounting argument. The theory is that because the data Commerce used to calculate total in- dustry production in the denominator was not “disaggre- gated” into manufacturing versus finishing, it might not have properly accounted for both. Opening Br. 27–28. Tenaris speculates, for example, that the denominator might not account for U.S. processor shipments, meaning that the industry support calculation overstates support for the petition. Tenaris similarly speculates that the ratio Commerce used to adjust the denominator might not ac- count for finishing operations. None of these arguments can be found anywhere in Tenaris’s initial submissions. While Tenaris did make gen- eral objections to the reliability of the sources Commerce used to calculate the denominator, 5 it did not argue that the source was flawed because it failed to include processor shipments. In fact, at the time, Tenaris’s concern ran in the opposite direction: it argued that processing activity might be improperly included in the calculation and asked Com- merce to exclude OCTG that petitioners “merely finish[ed] rather than produce[d].” J.A. 1450–51. 5 To the extent Tenaris reraises its general objection to the reliability of the sources Commerce used to calculate the denominator, we disagree. Petitioners submitted infor- mation from a well-known industry report that “maintains the largest market intelligence database on steel pipe and tube in the world and is the premier resource for pipe and tube statistics.” J.A. 1093. Commerce also reasonably de- termined that shipment data is an acceptable proxy for pro- duction in this case. Petitioners supported that approach with their own production-and-shipment data, and Com- merce adjusted the shipment figures using historical pro- duction-to-shipment ratios drawn from ITC data. These aspects of Commerce’s determination are supported by substantial evidence. Case: 25-1382 Document: 72 Page: 17 Filed: 09/18/2026 TENARIS BAY CITY, INC. v. US 17 The same goes for Tenaris’s overcounting argument, which focuses on the numerator. Tenaris points out that certain processing operations—such as threading alone— do not qualify as “production” of OCTG. If supporters of the petition counted those operations as production, that would inflate the numerator and overstate support for the peti- tion. This argument, though, has even less basis in Tenaris’s original submissions. During the pre-initiation period, Tenaris never argued that threading, as opposed to heat treatment or other processing, had been improperly counted as production. That distinction appeared only later on remand. For these reasons, the CIT did not abuse its discretion in determining that Tenaris failed to exhaust these more specific arguments and we decline to consider them. II Tenaris also argues that Commerce failed to comply with the CIT’s remand order by only addressing double counting. In its view, because the remand order directed Commerce to further explain or reconsider its “determina- tion that the data relied upon accurately reflected industry support, including whether finishing operations were counted twice,” Tenaris I, 693 F. Supp. 3d at 1328 (empha- sis added), double counting was just one issue Commerce should have reconsidered on remand, not the only issue. Tenaris has an uphill battle here, because a court’s in- terpretation of its own order “is entitled to deference unless the interpretation is unreasonable or is otherwise an abuse of discretion.” Amado v. Microsoft Corp., 517 F.3d 1353, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). And in Tenaris II, the CIT rejected Tenaris’s interpretation of its prior order, finding that Commerce had complied with the remand. 745 F. Supp. 3d at 1345. Case: 25-1382 Document: 72 Page: 18 Filed: 09/18/2026 18 TENARIS BAY CITY, INC. v. US Tenaris’s argument also requires ignoring the rest of the remand order. Besides double counting, the CIT’s opin- ion rejects Tenaris’s arguments. The court said that re- mand was necessary “[b]ecause Commerce did not adequately address Plaintiffs’ concerns and record evi- dence that finishing operations were not counted twice.” Tenaris I, 693 F. Supp. 3d at 1326. It then identified the particular information that troubled it—evidence that “cer- tain domestic companies both produce and finish OCTG,” creating an inference that “some domestic pipe may have been double counted”—and directed Commerce to address that inference. Id. at 1326–27. And immediately before its conclusion, the CIT again stated that Commerce had failed to address “the possibility of double counting” and “[a]ccordingly” remanded “determination on the double counting issue to Commerce for further explanation or re- consideration.” Id. at 1328. Because the CIT’s interpretation of its order is reason- able and not an abuse of discretion, we reject Tenaris’s ar- gument that Commerce failed to comply with the remand order. * * * For these reasons, the CIT’s decision in Tenaris II is AFFIRMED