CHP III, L.P. v. Benjamin F. Cravatt
CourtSupreme Court of Delaware
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
Docket70, 2026
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
CHP III, L.P., §
§ No. 70, 2026
Plaintiff-Below, §
Appellant, §
§ Court Below: Court of Chancery
v. § of the State of Delaware
§
BENJAMIN F. CRAVATT, § C.A. No. 2024-0867
THOMAS WOIWODE, §
CHRISTOPHER G. PARKER, §
BELHARRA THERAPEUTICS, §
INC., VERSANT VENTURE §
MANAGEMENT, LLC, §
INCEPTION THERAPEUTICS, §
INC., §
§
Defendants-Below, §
Appellees. §
Submitted: September 23, 2026
Decided: November 19, 2026
Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; TRAYNOR, LEGROW, GRIFFITHS, and ZURN,
Justices, constituting the Court En Banc.
ORDER
After consideration of the parties’ briefs, oral arguments, and the record on
appeal, it appears to the Court that: 1
1. In 2014, Benjamin Cravatt founded Vividion Therapeutics, Inc.
(“Vividion”) along with two colleagues at the Scripps Research Institute (“Scripps”)
1
Citations in the form “A—” refer to the Appendix to Appellant’s Opening Brief.
and the managing member of CHP III, L.P. (“Cardinal”), an investor in Vividion. 2 In
2016, Vividion agreed to fund Cravatt’s research at Scripps in exchange for an option
to exclusively license his discoveries (the “License Agreement”). 3 The License
Agreement required Vividion to use commercially reasonable efforts to meet
developmental milestones and to make milestone and royalty payments to Scripps.4
Among the intellectual property that Vividion licensed from Scripps was U.S. Patent
Application 16/478,444, entitled “Photoreactive Ligands and Uses Thereof” (the
“‘444 Application”). 5
2. On June 1, 2021, Bayer Corporation offered to acquire all Vividion’s
equity for $2 billion.6 During negotiations, Bayer conducted full, unrestricted due
diligence into Vividion and all its intellectual property rights, including the Scripps
licenses. 7 Vividion did not conduct independent market checks on the value of its
intellectual property or negotiate Bayer’s offer, following its financial advisor’s
2
A56 ¶¶ 24–26.
3
A58 ¶ 30.
4
A589–91.
5
A61 ¶ 40; A63 ¶¶ 42–43; A615; A626.
6
A47 ¶ 2; A68 ¶ 54.
7
See A51 ¶ 12; A68 ¶ 54.
2
advice. 8 The parties negotiated and signed a merger agreement on July 9 at that $2
billion price.9
3. To minimize royalty and milestone payments Bayer would owe Scripps
under the License Agreement, the merger agreement required Vividion to use
“commercially reasonable efforts to amend” the License Agreement with Scripps,
specifically to relinquish its rights to immaterial intellectual property. 10 Bayer and
Vividion agreed Vividion would retain its material intellectual property.11 Regardless
of whether and to what extent Vividion released intellectual property, the merger
consideration would stay the same.12 Before the merger closed, Vividion and Scripps
agreed Vividion would release the license to the ‘444 Application.13
8
A75 ¶ 68 (“Centerview [Partners LLC], which did not itself conduct any independent
analysis of the released rights, feared that information about Bayer’s offer would leak and
affect the IPO’s timing if the Bayer transaction fell through.”).
9
A69 ¶ 55.
10
A173 § 5.20; A187–202.
11
See A160 § 5.1; A161 § 5.1(j). In Section 5.1(j) of the merger agreement Vividion
covenanted that it would not “amend in any material respect,” or “knowingly waive, release
or assign any material right of the Company under . . . any material IP Agreements,” other
than “as set forth in Section 5.1 of the [disclosure schedule].” A160 § 5.1; A161 § 5.1(j).
12
The merger agreement did not contain a provision providing for an increase in merger
consideration if Vividion failed to release intellectual property rights.
13
A73–74 ¶¶ 64–66; A616–24.
3
4. The merger closed on August 19, 2021.14 Scripps then licensed the ‘444
Application to Cravatt’s own startup, Belharra Therapeutics, Inc. (“Belharra”). 15
Cravatt had formed Belharra shortly before Bayer had made its offer but had not told
anyone at Vividion. 16 In January 2023, Belharra emerged with “a novel-
photoaffinity-based chemoproteomics platform capable of identifying non-covalent,
small molecule drug candidates for any protein” consistent with the ‘444 Application,
and received $130 million in financing.17
5. On August 19, 2024, Cardinal sued to recover the value of the ‘444
Application directly. 18 It contends Cravatt manipulated the merger process by
concealing the value of the ‘444 Application, which deprived Vividion’s stockholders
of increased merger consideration.19 Its operative complaint asserts four causes of
action: (1) breach of fiduciary duty; (2) aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty;
(3) fraud; and (4) unjust enrichment. 20 The defendants moved to dismiss, asserting
14
A50–51 ¶ 11.
15
A84 ¶ 87.
16
A67 ¶¶ 48–50; A82 ¶ 83; see A75–78 ¶¶ 70–73; A81 ¶ 81.
17
A66–67 ¶¶ 50–51; A81–82 ¶ 82.
18
See A1.
19
See generally A46–95.
20
A85–94.
4
that the claims are derivative and Cardinal’s standing to bring them was extinguished
by the merger and that the complaint fails to state a claim.21
6. The Court of Chancery granted the motion, dismissing the appellant’s
claims as derivative. 22 The trial court found the “crux of Plaintiff’s claim” constituted
misrepresentations “during negotiations with Scripps concerning material and
immaterial IP,” which “occurred after the parties signed the merger agreement.”23
The trial court concluded that conduct after the merger agreement was signed could
not “affect[] the merger consideration in any way.”24 Then the trial court evaluated
that narrow claim under Primedia, reasoned the claim failed Primedia’s materiality
prong, and concluded Cardinal failed to plead a direct claim. 25
21
See generally A207–76.
22
CHP III, L.P. v. Cravatt, 2026 WL 112789, at *4–7 (Del. Ch. Jan. 15, 2026).
23
Id. at *5–6.
24
Id. at *5.
25
Id. (applying Primedia, Inc. S’holder Litig., 67 A.3d 455 (Del. Ch. 2013)). The trial
court wrote:
That test asks:
First, has the plaintiff pled an underlying derivative claim that has
survived a motion to dismiss or otherwise could state a claim on which
relief could be granted?
Second, is the value of the derivative claim material in the context of
the merger?
Third, does the complaint support a pleading-stage inference that the
acquirer would not assert the underlying derivative claim and did not
provide value for it?
5
7. Cardinal appeals the trial court’s order of dismissal on two grounds.
First, it asserts the trial court failed to credit the complaint’s allegations and therefore
mischaracterized the “crux” of the claim as occurring after the merger. Second, it
argues that its claim as pled is direct under Parnes v. Bally Entertainment. 26
8. This Court reviews a decision to grant a motion to dismiss de novo.27
When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must “accept all well-pleaded
factual allegations in the [c]omplaint as true . . ., draw all reasonable inferences in
favor of the plaintiff, and deny the motion unless the plaintiff could not recover under
any reasonably conceivable set of circumstances susceptible of proof.” 28 But the court
See Goldstein [v. Denner], 2022 WL 1797224, at *10 [(Del. Ch. June 2,
2022)] (summarizing the Primedia factors as endorsed by the high court in
Morris v. Spectra Energy P’rs (DE) GP, LP, 426 A.3d 121, 129 (Del. 2021)).
Plaintiff must meet all elements of the test. Plaintiff cannot meet the second
element because Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that the derivative claim was
material in the context of the merger.
Id.
26
722 A.2d 1243 (Del. 1999).
27
City of Fort Myers Gen. Emps. Pension Fund v. Haley, 235 A.3d 702, 716 (Del. 2020);
Morrison v. Berry, 191 A.3d 268, 282 (Del. 2018); Cent. Mortg. Co. v. Morgan Stanley
Mortg. Capital Hldgs. LLC, 27 A.3d 531, 535 (Del. 2011); Allen v. Encore Energy P’rs,
L.P., 72 A.3d 93, 100 (Del. 2013).
28
Cent. Mortg., 27 A.3d at 536.
6
need not “accept conclusory allegations unsupported by specific facts or . . . draw
unreasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party.” 29
9. We read the complaint to allege misconduct during merger negotiations,
in addition to after the merger agreement was signed. First, Cardinal alleges that
Cravatt “knowingly misrepresented the value and utility of Vividion’s intellectual
property to Vividion’s other directors” before the parties signed the merger
agreement. 30 Second, Cardinal alleges that Cravatt concealed the existence of
Belharra throughout merger negotiations. 31 Third, Cardinal alleges that during
negotiations Cravatt approved two representations in the merger agreement that he
knew were false.32
29
Price v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 26 A.3d 162, 166 (Del. 2011), overruled on
other grounds by Ramsey v. Georgia S. Univ. Advanced Dev. Ctr., 189 A.3d 1255, 1277
(Del. 2018) (citing Clinton v. Enter. Rent-A-Car Co., 977 A.2d 892, 895 (Del. 2009)).
30
A90 ¶ 107; accord A48 ¶ 6; A82 ¶ 83. The amended complaint alleges that Vividion
and Bayer “consult[ed] with Cravatt about Vividion’s intellectual property . . . throughout
the merger negotiations” and that Cravatt used those consultations to “shape both sides’
thinking about the value and utility” of the ‘444 Application. A71 ¶ 61. Cardinal then
explained that Cravatt’s “lies . . . about the materiality of the ‘444 application and related
intellectual property occurred during negotiations over Vividion’s representations and
culminated in the amended license agreement entered on July 13, 2021.” A81 ¶ 81; accord
A92–93 ¶ 111.
31
The amended complaint alleges that the “concealment of Belharra continued throughout
the parties’ negotiations from June 23, 2021, until July 9, 2021.” A81 ¶ 81; accord A77 ¶
72 (alleging that “Cravatt and Woiwode did not disclose Belharra to Vividion’s directors
before the Bayer transaction closed (or otherwise)”); A91 ¶ 109.
32
A79–80 ¶¶ 76–78; A81 ¶ 81 (Cravatt’s and Woiwode’s “false approval of Vividion’s
representations in the Merger Agreement occurred during the [merger] negotiations and
was complete on July 9, 2021, when Cravatt and Woiwode . . . approved the Merger
Agreement”).
7
10. We next assess whether those allegations state a direct claim. We apply
Parnes, not Primedia. While both Parnes and Primedia address direct harms that can
arise within the merger context, they address different harms.33 Under Parnes, “a
target stockholder retains direct standing after a merger has closed to challenge the
fairness or validity of the merger itself.” 34 Primedia applies specifically when a
stockholder claims she was not fairly compensated in a merger for the value of an
underlying derivative claim. 35 Cardinal challenges the undervaluation of the ‘444
Application and its release to Scripps on the basis that it diverted merger consideration
from stockholders, addressable under Parnes. 36 Cardinal does not assert stockholders
were not paid for a derivative claim under Primedia.
33
In assessing whether the plaintiff has pled a direct harm, this Court must examine the
“body of the complaint and consider[] the nature of the wrong alleged and the relief
requested.” Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 845 A.2d 1031, 1036 (quoting
Agostino v. Hicks, 2004 WL 443987, at *7 (Del. Ch. Mar. 11, 2004)); id. at 1033, 1035
(asking “(1) who suffered the alleged harm (the corporation or the suing stockholders,
individually); and (2) who would receive the benefit of any recovery or other remedy (the
corporation or the stockholders, individually)”); see also Brookfield Asset Mgmt., Inc. v.
Rosson, 261 A.3d 1251, 1263 (Del. 2021).
34
Blue v. Fireman, 2022 WL 593899, at *11 (Del. Ch. Feb. 28, 2022).
35
Morris v. Spectra Energy P’rs (DE) GP, LP, 246 A.3d 121, 128 (Del. 2021) (“[U]nder
Primedia’s three-part test, which applies to claims alleging an unfair merger because the
price does not reflect the value of derivative claims, the plaintiff must allege a viable
derivative claim assessed by a motion to dismiss standard.”).
36
A82 ¶ 83 (“Cravatt’s and Woiwode’s lies thus fundamentally altered the merger
negotiations and depressed the final merger consideration received by Vividion’s
stockholders.”); A82–83 ¶ 84 (“Cravatt’s and Woiwode’s misconduct took the ‘444
application and related intellectual property ‘off the table’ in the merger transaction . . . .
[I]n doing so, they deprived Vividion’s other stockholders of greater merger
consideration.”).
8
11. Under Parnes, “[t]he Court must distinguish between direct challenges
to a merger’s fairness and derivative challenges to wrongs merely associated with the
merger.” 37 “[T]o be direct, the side transaction must divert merger consideration from
stockholders, rather than from the acquirer; the diversion must be ‘improper,’ that is,
the product of misconduct by the defendants; and the diversion must materially affect
the merger’s process or price, calling the merger’s fairness or validity into question.”38
12. We conclude Cardinal failed to state a direct claim under Parnes. The
amended complaint fails to plead that the undervaluation and loss of the ‘444
Application depressed the merger price. Rather, Cardinal’s allegations and the merger
agreement make clear that the merger consideration would stay the same regardless
of what intellectual property might be released. During negotiations, Bayer conducted
full due diligence into Vividion’s intellectual property, including the ‘444
Application. Vividion did not negotiate the merger price from Bayer’s offer,
following its financial advisor’s advice. And the merger agreement only required
Vividion to “use commercially reasonable efforts” to renegotiate the Scripps license.39
Bayer would pay Vividion the same price for its remaining intellectual property rights
regardless of what was, or was not, released. Thus, Cardinal failed to plead a direct
37
Blue, 2022 WL 593899, at *11.
38
Id.
39
A173 § 5.20; A187–202.
9
harm under Parnes. Its breach of fiduciary duty and aiding-and-abetting claims are
derivative, and Cardinal lost standing to bring them after the merger closed.
Cardinal’s claim for unjust enrichment also fails. 40
13. We also conclude Cardinal does not allege that Cravatt fraudulently
misrepresented the value of the ‘444 Application during negotiations. To state a claim
for fraud, Cardinal must plead facts alleging the following elements:
(1) a false representation, usually one of fact, made by the defendant;
(2) the defendant’s knowledge or belief that the representation was
false, or was made with reckless indifference to the truth; (3) an intent
to induce the plaintiff to act or to refrain from acting; (4) the plaintiff’s
action or inaction taken in justifiable reliance upon the representation;
and (5) damage to the plaintiff as a result of such reliance. 41
Court of Chancery Rule 9(b) imposes a heightened standard for pleading aspects of a
fraud claim.42 It requires that “[i]n alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with
particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake. Malice, intent,
knowledge and other conditions of a person’s mind may be alleged generally.”43
40
Cardinal’s unjust enrichment claim is entirely premised on the alleged misconduct
underlying its breach of fiduciary duty claim. A94 ¶ 116–17 (“But for Cravatt’s and
Woiwode’s breaches of fiduciary duty, Vividion’s other stockholders, including Plaintiff,
would have received additional merger consideration from Bayer. . . . Defendants deprived
Plaintiff of that value by misappropriating it for themselves.”). Because Cardinal alleges
no additional facts demonstrating an independent direct harm, the unjust enrichment claim
is likewise derivative and must be dismissed.
41
In re P3 Health Grp. Hldgs., 2022 WL 15035833, at *3 (Del. Ch. Oct. 26, 2022).
42
See Ct. Ch. R. 9(b).
43
Id.
10
14. Cardinal alleges that Cravatt misrepresented that the ‘444 Application
was “immaterial and worthless” to Vividion’s board during merger negotiations. 44 It
speculates that Bayer might have paid more to acquire Vividion if it had known the
“true value” of the ‘444 Application or that Belharra existed.45 But Cardinal did not
allege details of these misrepresentations or reliance upon them. Nor did Cardinal
allege that Cravatt impeded Bayer’s due diligence or otherwise prevented it from
assessing the value of the ‘444 Application at all or in a way that resulted in a lower
merger price. Thus, Cardinal failed to plead a claim for fraud.
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Court of
Chancery is AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Morgan T. Zurn
Justice
44
A82 ¶ 83.
45
A81–82 ¶ 82.
11