Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE PPG INDUSTRIES, INC., Plaintiff, v. C.A. No. 2024-0648-NAC WESTLAKE CORPORATION, AXIALL CORPORATION, WESTLAKE US 2 LLC (f/k/a EAGLE US 2 LLC), and EAGLE SPINCO INC., Defendants. POST-TRIAL MEMORANDUM OPINION Date Submitted: August 4, 2026 Date Decided: November 18, 2026 David A. Dorey, Gregory P. Ranzini, BLANK ROME LLP, Wilmington, Delaware; Andrew Fletcher, Jason Snyderman, John A. Gibbons, BLANK ROME LLP, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Counsel for Plaintiff and Counterclaim Defendant PPG Industries, Inc. Jennifer C. Wasson, Tyler E. Cragg, POTTER ANDERSON & CORROON LLP, Wilmington, Delaware; William R. H. Merrill, Ryan V. Caughey, Ace M. Factor, Alexxa Leon, SUSMAN GODFREY LLP, Houston, Texas; David B. Goodwin, Christine S. Haskett, COVINGTON & BURLING LLP, San Francisco, California; Counsel for Defendants and Counterclaim Plaintiffs Westlake Corporation, Axiall Corporation, Westlake US 2 LLC (f/k/a Eagle US 2 LLC), and Eagle Spinco Inc. COOK, V.C. In 1998, cargo ship DG Harmony caught fire off the coast of Brazil. After attempting to fight the flames, the crew abandoned ship, and the fire destroyed the vessel and most of its cargo. A flurry of lawsuits followed. In a consolidated action, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York found that calcium hypochlorite manufactured by PPG Industries, Inc. caused the fire. PPG settled the claims for $81.5 million, with insurance contributing $56.5 million after PPG satisfied a $25 million self-insured retention amount. In 2006, Di Gregório Navegação Ltda. (“Di Gregorio”)—a Brazilian cargo transportation company that sub-chartered the DG Harmony—filed a lawsuit against PPG in Brazil. Despite being named in the consolidated New York action, Di Gregorio never appeared. In 2009, the New York court entered an order of default judgment against Di Gregorio, specifically enjoining the Brazil lawsuit. Notwithstanding the New York court’s order, the Di Gregorio litigation in Brazil continued, and, in 2010, the Brazil court found PPG liable against Di Gregorio. In 2013, PPG spun off its commodity chemicals business through a transaction involving Georgia Gulf Corporation, later renamed Axiall Corporation. The transaction was governed by a series of agreements, including a Separation Agreement and a Contribution Agreement. Those agreements addressed the transfer of assets and assumption of liabilities, the parties’ indemnification rights and obligations, and their rights and responsibilities concerning insurance. As relevant here, the Separation Agreement allocated responsibility for the Di Gregorio litigation to entities in the spun-off business. And PPG retained the insurance policies potentially covering the Di Gregorio litigation. For years after the transaction, the spun-off entities defended the Di Gregorio litigation and communicated with PPG’s insurers, including submitting invoices for defense costs. In 2023 and 2024, the Di Gregorio litigation was coming to a head. A decision on damages was imminent, and everyone started taking positions. Despite years of communication—including about strategy and settlement—the insurers refused to engage with the spun-off entities without an assignment from PPG, and they denied coverage for the Di Gregorio litigation. PPG refused to assign any rights to the insurance until any judgment in the Di Gregorio litigation was satisfied. The spun-off entities demanded an assignment before they would pay anything in the Di Gregorio litigation. In May 2024, the Brazil court entered a substantial damages award against PPG. The next month, PPG filed this action asking the Court to order the spun-off entities and their subsequent acquirer (collectively, Defendants here) to substitute PPG out of the Di Gregorio litigation and post a bond or satisfy the judgment. Defendants countered, asking the Court to order PPG to assign insurance rights to them. This decision denies PPG’s requests for specific performance and grants Defendants’ in part. Even assuming PPG has proven a breach of contract, it has not shown, by clear and convincing evidence, that specific performance is appropriate. PPG waited to request substitution for 11 years after the spinoff, and it would violate 2 principles of comity for this Court to order Defendants to take any action in the Di Gregorio litigation when that litigation was specifically enjoined by the New York court’s 2009 order. Defendants are entitled to an assignment of insurance proceeds, but, under the Separation Agreement’s terms, only for the costs of defending PPG in the Di Gregorio litigation that they have already incurred and paid. The parties agree that the spun-off entities are ultimately responsible for any enforceable judgment and related losses. And Defendants continue to defend the Di Gregorio litigation and have committed to hold PPG harmless against any attempts to enforce the Di Gregorio judgment. The parties also agree that the spun-off entities are entitled to an assignment of insurance proceeds at some point. Boiled down, the parties tussle over the logistics of their contractual obligations, with the crux of the dispute concerning sequencing and timing. Like colleagues arriving at the entrance to the office, PPG and Defendants are dancing over who goes first and who will hold the door. In the end, they’ll both make it inside. I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND The following facts were stipulated to by the parties or proven by a preponderance of the evidence at trial. 1 1 See Dkt. 147, Pre-Trial Stipulation and Order (”PTO”). The trial record includes live testimony from two fact witnesses and four experts, 234 joint exhibits, and three deposition transcripts. Trial testimony is cited as “TT [Page]:[Lines] (Name).” See Dkts. 179–80. Exhibits are cited by the numbers provided on the parties’ joint exhibit list as “JX ,” unless otherwise defined. See Dkt. 170. Pincites refer to pagination stamped with the parties’ joint exhibit numbers. Deposition transcripts are cited as “[Name] Dep. [Page]:[Lines].” 3 A. The Parties Plaintiff PPG Industries, Inc. is an industrial conglomerate based in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Through a Separation Agreement dated July 18, 2012, 2 PPG agreed to spin off its commodity chemicals business in a transaction (the “Spinoff”) with Georgia Gulf Corporation, which was subsequently renamed Axiall Corporation. Defendant Eagle Spinco Inc. was PPG’s counterparty to the Separation Agreement and is a wholly owned subsidiary of Axiall. 3 Defendant Eagle US 2 LLC (now Westlake US 2 LLC) is a subsidiary of Eagle Spinco. 4 Eagle US 2 was a party to the Contribution Agreement dated January 22, 2013, with PPG as its counterparty. 5 The purpose of the Contribution Agreement was “solely to effect the transfer of” assets and liabilities contemplated by the Separation Agreement. 6 Defendant Axiall Corporation is Eagle Spinco’s parent company. Axiall acquired Eagle Spinco in 2013. This decision refers to Axiall, Eagle US 2, and Eagle Spinco as the “Spinco Group.” 2 JX 23. 3 PTO ¶ 2. 4 Id. ¶ 3. 5 JX 41. 6 Id. § 1.2. 4 Defendant Westlake Corporation is Axiall’s, Eagle Spinco’s, and Eagle US 2’s ultimate parent company. 7 Westlake acquired Axiall in 2016. 8 Westlake is not a party to the Separation or Contribution Agreements. This decision refers to Westlake and the Spinco Group as “Defendants.” 9 B. The DG Harmony Fire and Ensuing Litigation In November 1998, an explosion occurred aboard the container ship DG Harmony off the coast of Brazil. 10 The explosion caused a total loss of the ship and its cargo. Among DG Harmony’s cargo was PPG-manufactured calcium hypochlorite. 11 Following the DG Harmony fire, numerous parties sued PPG, alleging that its calcium hypochlorite caused the explosion and subsequent fire. The claims were consolidated in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. In 2009, the court entered a judgment, finding PPG liable for the 7 PTO ¶ 5. 8 JX 92; JX 98. 9 As explained below, however, the Court concludes that Westlake is not a proper defendant in this action. 10 PTO ¶ 15. 11 Id. ¶ 16. 5 explosion and the resulting fire. 12 PPG eventually settled the lawsuits for approximately $81.5 million. 13 C. The Di Gregorio Litigation On January 11, 2006, Di Gregório Navegação Ltda (“Di Gregorio”)—a Brazilian cargo transportation company that sub-chartered the DG Harmony—filed a lawsuit against PPG in the 13th Civil and Work Accident Court of the District of Manaus, State of Amazonas, Brazil (the “Di Gregorio Litigation”). 14 PPG hired the Brazilian law firm Mattos Filho, Veiga Filho, Marrey Jr. e Quiroga Advogados (“Mattos Filho”) as defense counsel in the Di Gregorio Litigation. 15 Di Gregorio was a named party in the consolidated New York litigation but did not appear. 16 In June 2006, PPG filed a lawsuit against Di Gregorio in the Southern District of New York, seeking to enjoin the Di Gregorio Litigation. 17 On October 28, 2009, the New York court entered a default judgment in PPG’s favor, declaring that PPG was not liable to Di Gregorio and enjoining Di Gregorio from pursuing any 12 PTO ¶¶ 17–18. For a comprehensive recitation of these facts, see In re M/V DG Harmony, 394 F. Supp. 2d 649 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), opinion clarified, 2007 WL 895251 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2007), and aff’d in part, vacated in part, rev’d in part, 533 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2008). 13 TT 162:2–10 (Bloch). 14 PTO ¶¶ 19, 21. 15 Id. ¶ 22; JX 10. 16 PTO ¶ 20. 17 JX 11. 6 claims against PPG for losses arising from the DG Harmony fire (the “SDNY Order”). 18 The SDNY Order expressly enjoined the Di Gregorio Litigation. 19 Notwithstanding the SDNY Order, the Brazil court allowed the Di Gregorio Litigation to proceed and, in January 2010, entered judgment against PPG in the liability phase of the litigation. 20 PPG appealed the liability finding but was unsuccessful. 21 At the time of the DG Harmony fire, PPG maintained an insurance tower worth $350 million, subject to a $25 million self-insured retention. 22 PPG notified its insurers about the DG Harmony fire and submitted insurance claims for liabilities arising from it, including the Di Gregorio Litigation. 23 Before the Separation Agreement was executed in 2012, PPG had received about $56.5 million in reimbursement from its insurance for DG Harmony-related losses. 24 Just under $300 18 JX 12. 19 Id. 20 PTO ¶ 24. 21 Id. ¶¶ 25–28. 22 JX 1–9; JX 147; TT 135:12-18, 161:6-22 (Bloch). 23 TT 131:1–10 (Bloch). 24 Id. 162:2–10 (Bloch); see also JX 13; JX 14; JX 73. 7 million of insurance remains available under PPG’s applicable insurance policy. And the Di Gregorio Litigation is the only remaining open claim under that policy. 25 D. The Spinoff In 2012, while the Di Gregorio Litigation was proceeding, PPG agreed to spin off and sell its chlor-alkali, derivatives, and other commodity chemicals business to Georgia Gulf (now Axiall) through a series of agreements, including, as relevant here, the Separation Agreement and the Contribution Agreement. Through the Separation Agreement, PPG agreed to transfer certain assets to Eagle Spinco, and Eagle Spinco agreed to assume certain liabilities, with the remaining assets and liabilities to be retained by PPG. 26 The Contribution Agreement effectuated the transfer of the assets and liabilities to Eagle US 2 (an Eagle Spinco subsidiary) in accordance with the terms of the Separation Agreement. 27 Among the liabilities Eagle US 2 assumed under the Separation Agreement was the Di Gregorio Litigation (the “Di Gregorio Liability”). 28 According to the 25 TT162:17–24 (Bloch); id. 383:4–7 (Posner); id. 539:3–15 (Baker); McClain Dep. 162:17–165:9. 26 See JX 23 at 6. 27 JX 41 § 1.2. 28 See JX 23 §§ 2.5(a)(i), (ix), (xi). The Di Gregorio Litigation is also included in the list of transferred “Spinco Assets.” JX 23 § 2.4(a)(xiii) (“all rights to causes of Action, lawsuits, judgments, claims and demands that are, in each case, related primarily to the Eagle Business, including those listed or described on Schedule 2.4(a)(xiii)[.]”); JX 24.12 (listing the Di Gregorio Litigation in the schedule of open matters); see also Dkt. 184, Defendants Post- Trial Opening Brief (“Defs. PTOB”) at 56 (“Defendants have admitted, during discovery and 8 insurance experts who testified at trial, the industry norm is that the rights to insurance policies follow the liabilities they cover. 29 The Separation Agreement departed from this norm. Instead of following the Di Gregorio Liability, the insurance policy covering the Di Gregorio Liability remained with PPG as an excluded asset under the Separation Agreement. 30 Although PPG retained its rights to insurance policies, the parties negotiated a carve-out that imposed on PPG the obligation to pursue coverage under relevant policies using commercially reasonable efforts. 31 The parties also separately addressed the interplay between indemnification and insurance, providing that the potential availability of insurance not permit delay of indemnification. 32 Further to this concept, the parties agreed that an indemnifying party would be entitled to an assignment of PPG’s claim for insurance proceeds upon payment of indemnification and expressed an overarching intent that no provision of the Separation Agreement result in a “windfall” for insurers or relieve insurers of the obligation to provide coverage. 33 then at trial, that Eagle US 2 assumed the Di Gregorio liability, subject to the terms and conditions of the Separation Agreement.”). 29 TT 378:12–19, 379:12–17 (Posner); id. 563:10–17 (Baker). 30 JX 23 § 2.4(b)(iv). 31 Id. § 6.11(a); accord id. § 5.4(b). 32 Id. § 5.4(b). 33 Id. 9 On December 14, 2012, in anticipation of the Spinoff, PPG’s in-house counsel informed PPG’s insurers that the Di Gregorio Litigation “will become the responsibility of [Eagle Spinco]” and explained that PPG “envision[s] that the carriers will continue to reimburse or pay directly defense and indemnity costs in the open matters.” 34 The Spinoff closed on January 28, 2013. 35 Diana Reed—the in-house attorney who had been overseeing the Di Gregorio Litigation at PPG—moved to Axiall and continued to manage the defense of the Di Gregorio Litigation. 36 PPG did not ask Axiall to substitute itself or one of its subsidiaries as the named defendant in the Di Gregorio Litigation. In August 2016, Westlake acquired Axiall and its subsidiaries through a reverse triangular merger. 37 Reed moved to Westlake and continued managing the defense of the Di Gregorio Litigation. 38 Mattos Filho continued to represent PPG in Brazil at Westlake’s direction. 39 PPG still did not request substitution of Westlake or one of its subsidiaries as the named defendant in the Di Gregorio Litigation. 34 JX 37. 35 PTO ¶ 6. 36 TT 242:22–243:16; 248:4–21 (Kroger). 37 PTO ¶ 13; JX 92; JX 97. 38 TT 242:22–243:16; 248:4–21 (Kroger). 39 Id. 316:13–16 (Kroger). 10 E. Westlake and Mattos Filho Discuss Potential Substitution of PPG as the Defendant in the Di Gregorio Litigation On April 20, 2021, Mattos Filho emailed Richard Kroger, assistant general counsel at Westlake, seeking clarification about “the nature of the succession, from PPG, to Axiall and [then] to Westlake.” 40 “More specifically,” Mattos Filho asked “whether it is correct that the proceedings should continue to be conducted in the name of PPG?” 41 The answer to this question was “of particular relevance [to Mattos Filho] in the event that an award of damages is made in favor of Di Gregorio, as PPG would be the company obliged to satisfy that award[.]” 42 Mattos Filho also noted that “any assets [PPG] has in Brazil” could be at risk and flagged that “PPG has a Brazilian subsidiary, PPG Industrial do Brasil Ltda.” 43 The next day, Eva Gregory of Westlake responded to Mattos Filho, explaining the 2013 Spinoff and Westlake’s acquisition of Axiall in 2016. Gregory confirmed that “liability for the claims asserted against PPG [in the Di Gregorio Litigation] rests with Axiall/Westlake.” 44 While leaving the ultimate decision on substitution to Kroger, Gregory stated that “[w]e [Westlake] still have active lawsuits in the name 40 JX 124. 41 Id. (emphasis removed). 42 Id. As explained below, the level of risk to PPG’s Brazilian subsidiary is speculative 43 Id. and was not established by the evidence and testimony presented at trial. 44 Id. 11 of PPG[,] and we are keeping them in the name of PPG until they are resolved.” 45 Kroger followed up: Eva is correct in her explanation. I think the lawsuit should continue in PPG’s name. Even though Westlake is the ultimate successor in interest to the liability, it seems to me that PPG is still the correct entity to be party to the proceeding. They were the responsible party then, and this suit (along with many others we have) are continuing in their name, even though Westlake is overseeing the action and is responsible for resolving at the end of the day. 46 Mattos Filho responded: “[i]n light of these [explanations], we agree that the proceedings should continue in the name of PPG (and, indeed, that will save unnecessary disruption in the proceedings).” 47 Neither Westlake nor Mattos Filho consulted PPG about potential substitution. F. The Insurers Refuse to Consider Westlake’s Submissions Absent an Assignment From its acquisition of Axiall in 2016, Westlake regularly communicated with PPG’s insurers about the Di Gregorio Litigation. 48 Kroger testified that the insurers were “heavily involved” in the Di Gregorio Litigation, including strategy discussions and settlement negotiations. 49 And Westlake had been sending the insurers invoices 45 Id. 46 Id. 47 Id. 48 TT 244:1–23, 246:5–23 (Kroger). 49 Id. 244: 1–23 (Kroger); JX 70; JX 99–102; JX 109; JX 110. 12 for defense costs in the Di Gregorio Litigation. 50 At the time of trial in this action, Defendants had incurred over $2 million in attorneys’ fees in the Di Gregorio Litigation following the Spinoff. 51 On January 12, 2023, the insurers sent Westlake a letter, asserting they would not consider Westlake’s submissions of invoices in part because PPG—not Westlake— was the named insured under the policy. 52 The insurers indicated that “if Westlake shall present an assignment of PPG’s rights to the recovery of damages under the policy to Insurers for their consent, . . . Insurers would duly consider the request and would not unreasonably withhold consent.” 53 Westlake forwarded the insurers’ letter to PPG and asked “whether PPG would be agreeable to assigning its pertinent policy rights to Westlake, so that Westlake could pursue its claims related to the Di Gregorio matter directly with the insurers[.]” 54 In response, PPG stated that “no insurance rights [] transferred to Spinco” under the Separation Agreement. 55 PPG indicated its willingness “to assign 50 TT 246:24–247:13 (Kroger); JX 104–106; JX 113; JX 118; JX 121; JX 126; JX 132. 51 TT 251:17–252:4 (Kroger). 52 JX 130. The insurers also took the position that there was no payment obligation under the policy until a settlement or final judgment was paid. Both the insurance experts who testified at trial disagreed with this position and opined that defense costs are typically reimbursed as they are incurred. TT 383:8–384:3 (Posner); id. 539:8–11 (Baker). 53 JX 130. 54 JX 133. 55 JX 135. 13 narrowly tailored rights under the triggered policy” on the condition that “Westlake agree[] to reimburse PPG its proportionate share of the” $25 million self-insured retention it had previously paid in connection with the other DG Harmony-related claims by paying PPG 30 percent of any insurance proceeds recovered by Westlake. 56 On December 8, 2023, Kroger emailed Evan Bloch, PPG’s assistant general counsel, asking for “a few minutes” to discuss “new developments with respect to our 1998 ship fire, Harmony, and the Di Gregorio lawsuit in Brazil.” 57 Kroger explained that “[t]hings have not gotten better on that front[,] and the insurance issues are more critical than ever given recent developments.” 58 Kroger and Bloch had a call the following Monday, December 11. And on December 13, Bloch emailed Kroger regarding “the various outstanding matters between our companies, including the Di Gregorio/Harmony matter.” 59 Bloch indicated that “PPG [was] willing to include Westlake’s request for an assignment of insurance rights as part of a comprehensive settlement dialogue to resolve all outstanding issues between our companies.” 60 Bloch proposed a two-step process, including discussion about “a proposed 56 JX 145. The parties dispute whether these discussions can be relied on as evidence of liability. The Court is not relying on this correspondence and only includes it here to give context to the parties’ insurance dispute. 57 JX 137. 58 Id. 59 JX 139. 60 Id. 14 assignment of insurance rights specific to the Di Gregorio/Harmony claim that would be acceptable/consented to by the insurers.” 61 Discussions between the two companies were apparently unsuccessful. On January 22, 2024, Westlake’s outside counsel sent a letter to PPG, claiming that PPG was in breach of the Separation Agreement and demanding that PPG “seek as much coverage as possible in connection with the Di Gregorio litigation and any judgment that may be entered or assign its rights to proceeds from the 1998-1999 policy year to Westlake.” 62 The letter explained that the Brazil court “could issue a final judgment” on damages of up to $2.6 billion “against PPG,” that “PPG will have to post a bond” if a stay is not granted, that “Westlake is not a party to the litigation,” and that “[i]t is in our mutual interest to pursue the maximum insurance coverage available.” 63 In an email the next day, Bloch told Kroger “[t]his letter was not well received at PPG” and asserted that “PPG has fully complied with its obligations under the Separation Agreement[.]” 64 On January 31, 2024, Westlake sent another letter to PPG, “request[ing] that PPG work with Eagle Spinco to pursue insurance coverage for the Di Gregorio 61 Id. 62 JX 145. 63 Id. 64 JX 146. 15 matter.” 65 Westlake asked PPG to “assign to Eagle Spinco (in a manner that is satisfactory to the insurers) all rights to make claims for and to receive insurance proceeds in connection with the Di Gregorio matter.” 66 “Alternatively,” Westlake asked PPG to “confirm that PPG will pursue insurance coverage for any adverse judgment and for the cost of an appeal bond, if necessary[.]” 67 G. PPG Demands Substitution in the Di Gregorio Litigation On March 12, 2024, PPG sent a notice to Westlake, demanding that “Westlake take immediate steps to substitute itself for PPG” in the Di Gregorio Litigation. 68 Westlake “disagree[d] with PPG’s substitution request, largely because substitution is infeasible and impractical at this juncture.” 69 Westlake said it was “not refusing to ‘endeavor to substitute’ in for PPG,” but would only do so if PPG would “cooperat[e] with Westlake in pursuing claims against the insurers and assign[] PPG’s policy rights to Westlake[.]” 70 65 JX 149. 66 Id. 67 Id. 68 JX 152. 69 JX 153. 70 Id. 16 H. The Brazil Court Issues Its Damages Decision in the Di Gregorio Litigation The first phase of the Di Gregorio Litigation—referred to as the “liability phase”—ended with the June 15, 2019, final and non-appealable certification holding PPG liable. 71 The Di Gregorio Litigation then entered the second—or “liquidation”— phase in 2020, to determine the amount of damages. 72 Both parties, along with court- appointed experts, submitted accounting reports to the Brazil court, and final argument on damages was held in January 2024. 73 On May 21, 2024, the Brazil court issued its damages decision, concluding that Di Gregorio was entitled to damages of $90,423,764, plus an additional $93,283,196 in monetary corrections and interest. 74 The Brazil court also ordered PPG to pay Di Gregorio’s legal fees of 20 percent of the damages and a 1 percent procedural fine. Both PPG and Di Gregorio filed subsequent appeals. 75 The day after the Brazil court issued its damages decision, Mattos Filho told Westlake’s attorneys at Susman Godfrey LLP that “the amount of the award is surprising to say the least.” 76 Mattos Filho also explained that “the time period for 71 TT 400:13 – 401:2 (Carmona); id. 479:1–12 (Sica). 72 PTO ¶ 24; TT 401:3–9 (Carmona); id. 479:17–480:12 (Sica). 73 PTO ¶¶ 29–35. 74 Id. ¶ 36. 75 Id. ¶¶ 38–43. 76 JX 162. 17 making payment has not yet begun to run[,] and there are a number of different options available to PPG at this stage in terms of next steps, which we are also considering.” 77 The following week, Westlake emailed PPG about the damages decision, providing its estimated total damages amount of $703.85 million. 78 Westlake explained it “believe[d] the decision to be flawed” and laid out next steps, including “preparing an appeal” and requesting “a suspension of the effect of the Decision (i.e., so that no order can be made against PPG to effect payment of the award) until there has been a final and binding decision.” 79 Before payment of the judgment is required, the Brazil court’s accounting clerk must calculate interest and monetary corrections to the damages award. 80 Following this process—including any challenges to the calculations—the Brazil court will issue an order to pay at Di Gregorio’s request. 81 Once an order to pay issues, the judgment must be paid within 15 days. Otherwise, the Brazil court will tack on a penalty amount of 10 percent of the judgment plus additional legal fees of 10 percent. 82 At trial, PPG’s Brazilian law expert, Professor Carmona, testified that this process 77 Id. 78 JX 163. 79 Id. 80 PTO ¶ 44. 81 Id. ¶¶ 45–47. 82 Id. ¶ 11. 18 should take “a matter of days,” that he was unsure why it had not happened yet, and that the delay is “unusual.” 83 Professor Carmona also testified that neither posting a bond nor depositing the full judgment amount into the Brazilian court registry would stay enforcement under Brazil’s procedural rules. 84 But for Di Gregorio to enforce an order to pay against PPG’s Brazilian subsidiary would require a request to pierce PPG’s corporate veil. Such a request would stay enforcement proceedings in Brazil and proceed as a separate action, subject to all available challenges and appeals. 85 I. This Litigation On June 18, 2024, PPG filed this action against Defendants. 86 Two days later, PPG filed a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (the “TRO”), asking the Court to (1) require Defendants to substitute into the Di Gregorio Litigation and remove PPG entirely; (2) failing substitution, enter an order preventing Westlake from abandoning defense in the Di Gregorio Litigation; and (3) compel Westlake to “post any bond, amount in escrow, and/or Court fees necessary to secure the $706+ million award.” 87 83 TT 406:1–16, 408:13–18 (Carmona). As of the date of this decision, no order to pay has issued in the Di Gregorio Litigation. 84 Id. 455:9–15; 461:5–8 (Carmona). 85 Id. 469:5–16, 495:14–496:12 (Sica). 86 Dkt. 1. 87 Dkt. 9. 19 Following a telephonic hearing, the Court denied PPG’s request for a TRO and ordered the parties to file a stipulation agreeing that Defendants would continue to defend and pay all necessary defense fees in the Di Gregorio Litigation, and provide notice to PPG’s counsel of any material developments. 88 The Court held a two-day trial on May 6 and 7, 2025, and heard post-trial argument on July 25, 2025. On December 18, 2025, the Court held a telephonic status conference and requested supplemental briefing. 89 Following the parties’ submission of supplemental briefs, the Court heard argument on August 4, 2026, and took the matter under advisement. 90 II. LEGAL ANALYSIS Both sides seek declaratory judgments and specific performance based on provisions of the Separation Agreement. The parties’ requests for relief thus present questions of contract interpretation. “Under Delaware law, the role of a court when interpreting a contract is ‘to effectuate the parties’ intent.’” 91 In doing so, the Court “must give effect to all terms of the instrument, must read the instrument as a whole, and, if possible, reconcile all 88 See Dkt. 29. 89 Dkts. 200, 201. 90 Dkts. 212, 214. 91 Meteora Cap. P’rs, LP v. Roadzen Inc., 2026 WL 2530118, at *20 (Del. Ch. Aug. 27, 2026) (quoting Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Am. Legacy Found., 903 A.2d 728, 739 (Del. 2006)). 20 the provisions of the instrument.” 92 “Unless there is ambiguity, Delaware courts interpret contract terms according to their plain, ordinary meaning.” 93 “Contract language is not ambiguous merely because the parties dispute what it means.” 94 “To be ambiguous, a disputed contract term must be fairly or reasonably susceptible to more than one meaning.” “Delaware courts will not destroy or twist language under the guise of construing it.” 95 “If a writing is plain and clear on its face, i.e., its language conveys an unmistakable meaning, the writing itself is the sole source for gaining an understanding of intent.” 96 A. PPG’s Requests for Declaratory Judgment “Parties to a contract may seek a declaratory judgment to determine ‘any question of construction or validity’ and may seek a declaration of ‘rights, status or other legal relations thereunder.’” 97 “Declaratory relief is in the discretion of the Court and not available as a matter of right.” 98 “The court may not exercise that 92 Lorillard, 903 A.2d at 739. 93 Alta Berkeley VI C.V. v. Omneon, Inc., 41 A.3d 381, 385 (Del. 2012) (citations omitted). 94 Id. 95 Id. 96 Rhone-Poulenc Basic Chem. Co. v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 616 A.2d 1192, 1195 (Del. 1992). 97 Those Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London v. Nat’l Installment Ins. Servs., Inc., 2007 WL 4554453, at *6 (Del. Ch. Dec. 21, 2007) (quoting 10 Del. C. § 6502). 98 Id. (citing 10 Del. C. § 6506). 21 discretion, however, unless the action presents an ‘actual controversy.’” 99 The party seeking a declaratory judgment bears the burden of proof. 100 PPG seeks declaratory judgment as to three issues. First, PPG seeks a declaration that Eagle US 2 assumed the Di Gregorio Liability. 101 Defendants do not dispute this. 102 Accordingly, there does not appear to be a justiciable controversy as to this issue warranting a declaratory judgment. 103 99 XL Specialty Ins. Co. v. WMI Liquidating Tr., 93 A.3d 1208, 1216 (Del. 2014). 100 State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. v. Spine Care Del., LLC, 238 A.3d 850, 860 n.55 (Del. 2020) (“We observe that there is some debate on the burden of proof in declaratory judgment actions. . . . The Rhone-Poulenc court concluded that, ‘[t]he better view is that a plaintiff in a declaratory judgment action should always have the burden going forward.’ . . . We agree that this is the better view.”); see also San Antonio Fire & Police Pension Fund v. Amylin Pharm., Inc., 983 A.2d 304, 316 n.38 (Del. Ch. 2009) (“Because Amylin seeks a declaratory judgment as to its right to approve, it bears the burden of proof here.”), aff’d 981 A.2d 1173 (Del. 2009); Hexion Specialty Chemicals, Inc. v. Huntsman Corp., 965 A.2d 715, 739 (Del. Ch. 2008) (“[I]n determining the allocation of the burden of proof in suits for declaratory judgment, ‘the better view is that a plaintiff in a declaratory judgment action should always have the burden of going forward.’”) (quoting Lloyd’s London, 2007 WL 4554453, at *6). 101 Dkt. 183, PPG’s Post-Trial Opening Brief (“Pl. PTOB”) at 57. 102 Dkt. 188, Defendants’ Post-Trial Answering Brief (“Defs. PTAB”) at 31 (“The first declaration that PPG seeks—that Eagle US 2 ‘assumed liability for the Di Gregorio action,’ PPG Br. 57—is undisputed.”). 103 The Court is relying on Defendants’ representation in concluding there is no justiciable controversy. Defendants are thus judicially estopped from taking a contrary position in the future. See Hermelin v. K-V Pharm. Co., 2011 WL 6225377, at *1 (Del. Ch. Dec. 13, 2011) (finding request for declaratory judgment moot based on representations that defendant had paid indemnification and would not seek to claw back the amounts paid, and concluding that “[h]aving waived its right to contest indemnification . . . , and having specifically waived the right to claw back amounts paid, the Defendant and its assigns are barred from further actions inconsistent with such waiver. Moreover, I have relied specifically on the Defendant’s waivers in reaching my decision here, and thus the Defendant and its assigns are judicially estopped from litigating the issue in this or any court in a manner inconsistent with its representations here”). 22 Second, PPG seeks a declaration that Eagle US 2 is responsible for all liabilities and defense costs associated with the Di Gregorio Litigation. 104 This also appears to be undisputed. Indeed, Defendants seek their own declaration that they “must indemnify and hold PPG harmless, which will protect PPG in the event of a Di Gregorio-related Loss[.]” 105 To the extent this request for declaratory judgment includes PPG’s request for damages in the amount of its attorneys’ fees incurred in this action and the Di Gregorio Litigation, that is addressed separately below. Finally, PPG seeks a declaration that “in the event Eagle US 2 cannot satisfy any provision of the [Di Gregorio] judgment, for whatever reason, the provisions of the judgment shall apply equally to Westlake, Axiall, and [Eagle] Spinco.” 106 This is addressed in the section below regarding Defendants’ competing request for a declaration that “Westlake is not a proper defendant in this action.” 107 B. PPG’s Requests for Specific Performance PPG seeks an award of specific performance ordering Defendants to: • “take all necessary steps to substitute Westlake into the Di Gregorio action, remove PPG as the nominal defendant or obligor, and instruct the Mattos Filho law firm to terminate or withdraw its Power of Attorney with PPG; or, if the Court in the Di Gregorio Action does not permit substitution, Westlake must join in the Di Gregorio Action as an additional defendant;” 104 Pl. PTOB at 57. 105 Defs. PTOB at 2. 106 Pl. PTOB at 57. 107 Defs. PTOB at 2. 23 • “defend the Di Gregorio Action without interruption (including but not limited to, posting any bond and court costs required to preserve all rights of appeal and prevent any efforts to enforce the judgment against PPG’s or its affiliates’ interests); and” • “[t]ake all steps necessary to protect PPG and its affiliates from any enforcement action or other harm arising out of the Di Gregorio Action, including, if necessary, satisfying the judgment issued in the Di Gregorio Action.” 108 There appears to be no dispute that Defendants have been defending the Di Gregorio Litigation. And Defendants have repeatedly committed—under oath at trial and in documents filed with the Court—to continue defending the Di Gregorio Litigation, including defending PPG against any attempts at enforcing any order to pay. 109 Defendants have likewise conceded that, having assumed the Di Gregorio Liability, Eagle US 2 will ultimately be the party responsible for any final, non- appealable judgment in the Di Gregorio Litigation and any losses that arise from any such judgment. 110 The Court expressly relies on these representations in concluding there is no live controversy on these issues. Defendants are thus judicially estopped from taking a contrary position later. 111 108 Pl. PTOB at 57–58. 109 TT240:19–242:3, 327:22–328:8, 345:22–346:1 (Kroger); Defs. Supp. Br. at 5–6 (“Westlake has confirmed—in briefing, to the Court, and in sworn testimony—that it will hold PPG harmless, consistent with Article V.”) (collecting citations). 110 See, e.g., Defs. PTAB at 6 (“Defendants have consistently acknowledged their obligations.”) (collecting citations); id. at 7 (“PPG was protected because, as Kroger explained, Defendants held ultimate responsibility.”). 111 See Motors Liquidation Co. DIP Lenders Tr. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 191 A.3d 1109 (Del. 2018) (TABLE) (affirming trial court’s application of judicial estoppel to bar arguments contrary to representations made in prior litigation). 24 Thus, PPG’s live requests for specific performance boil down to (1) an order requiring substitution or addition in the Di Gregorio Litigation and (2) an order requiring Defendants to post a bond or to satisfy any judgment that issues in that action before the conclusion of all appeals and without regard to th