LG Electronics Inc. v. Invention Investment Fund I, L.P.
CourtSuperior Court of Delaware
Date FiledNovember 16, 2026
DocketN22C-11-145 SKR
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
LG ELECTRONICS INC.,
Plaintiff,
V. C.A. No. N22C-11-145 SKR CCLD
INVENTION INVESTMENT FUND
I, L.P., INVENTION INVESTMENT
FUND I, LLC, INTELLECTUAL
VENTURES I LLC, and
INTELLECTUAL VENTURES II
LLC,
Nee ee “Se Se
Defendants.
Submitted: October 21, 2026
Decided: November 16, 2026
MEMORANDUM OPINION ADDRESSING ISSUES ON REMAND
Jeremy D, Anderson, Esq., BAKER & HOSTETLER LLP, Wilmington, DE, Michael J.
McKeon, Esq., Christian A. Chu, Esq., R. Andrew Schwentker, Esq., FISH &
RICHARDSON P.C., Washington, D.C., Oliver Richards, Esq., FISH & RICHARDSON
P.C., San Diego, CA, Bailey K. Benedict, Esq., FISH & RICHARDSON P.C., Houston,
TX. Attorneys for Plaintiff.
Brian E. Farnan, Esq., Michael J. Farnan, Esq., FARNAN LLP, Wilmington, DE,
Jonathan K. Waldrop, Esq., Marcus A. Barber, Esq., John Downing, Esq., Heather
Kim, Esq., ThucMinh Nguyen, Esq., KASOwITz LLP, San Francisco, CA, Jeceaca
An, Esq., Paula Y. Ajumobi, Esq., KASOWITZ BENSON TORRES LLP, New York, NY,
Paul G. Williams, Esq., KASOWITZ BENSON TORRES LLP, Atlanta, GA. Attorneys for
Defendants.
RENNIE, J.
I. INTRODUCTION
Following a week-long jury trial that concluded with a verdict in Plaintiff’s
favor, the Court issued four opinions addressing various post-trial issues.'! Both sides
appealed, and the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed-in-part, reversed-in-part, and
remanded to address additional issues.?, On remand, this Court is instructed to: (1)
enter judgment in Plaintiff’s favor in the amount of $12,800,000°; (2) award
prejudgment interest upon consideration of when such interest began to accrue,
along with any other factual issue bearing on the award‘; and (3) reconsider
Plaintiff’s motion for costs consistent with the Supreme Court’s opinion.°
After full briefing, the Court heard oral argument on October 21, 2026.° This
Opinion resolves those remaining issues.
' LG Elees. Inc. v. Invention Inv. Fund I, L.P., 2025 WL 1545445 (Del. Super. May 15, 2025), aff’d
in part, rev'd in part and remanded, 362 A.3d 1266 (Del. 2026); LG Elecs. Inc. v. Invention Inv.
Fund I, L.P., 2025 WL 1545444 (Del. Super. May 15, 2025), aff’d in part, rev’d in part and
remanded, 362 A.3d 1266 (Del. 2026); LG Elecs. Inc. v. Invention Inv. Fund I, L.P., 2025 WL
1545442 (Del. Super. May 15, 2025), aff’d, 362 A.3d 1266 (Del. 2026); LG Elecs. Inc. v. Invention
Inv, Fund I, L.P., 2025 WL 1531375 (Del. Super. May 15, 2025), aff’d, 362 A.3d 1266 (Del. 2026).
2 LG Elecs. Inc. v. Invention Inv. Fund I, L.P., 362 A.3d 1266 (Del. 2026).
3 Td. at 1288.
4 Td. & n.93,
5 Td. at 1289.
° See Plaintiffs Opening Brief on Remand (D.I. 494, hereinafter “Pl.’s Opening Br.”); Defendants’
Opposition to Plaintiff's Opening Brief on Remand (D.I. 496, hereinafter “Opp’n.”); Plaintiff’s
Reply Brief on Demand (D.I. 498, hereinafter “Reply”).
2
II. ANALYSIS
A. DAMAGES
Following its review of this Court’s damages cap, the Delaware Supreme
Court directed that $12,800,000 be entered as the proper judgment for Plaintiff.’
Neither side raised this issue in briefing or oral argument. Accordingly, the Court’s
final order shall be amended to reflect this amount.
B. INTEREST
With respect to prejudgment interest, the Delaware Supreme Court remanded
with instructions to enter an award of prejudgment interest in Plaintiff's favor.’
Noting that the parties had not briefed the precise accrual date, the Supreme Court
permitted this Court to consider that specific factual issue “along with any other
factual issue that bears on an award of prejudgment interest.”
i. Prejudgment Interest
The parties agree that prejudgment interest began to accrue on October 19,
2021-the date of breach. However, they disagree over the applicable interest rate.
Plaintiff argues that the proper rate is 8.85%, while Defendants urge this Court to
adopt a 5.25% rate in accordance with 6 Del. C. § 2301.
1 Id. at 1288.
8 Id.
* Id. at n.93.
'0 Opp’n at 6; Reply at 1.
~
Plaintiff advances four arguments in support of its proposed rate. First, it
contends that this issue was waived when Defendants failed to challenge Plaintiff’s
proposed 8.85% rate in post-trial briefing or on appeal.'! Plaintiff points to what it
characterizes as judicial recognition of waiver in two footnotes found in this Court’s
Opinion on Plaintiff’s Post-Trial Motion for Costs and Fees.!*
Relying on these footnotes and Defendants’ failure to challenge on appeal,
Plaintiff’s second argument invokes the “law-of-the-case” doctrine. Plaintiff
asserts that because a court’s earlier legal ruling controls all later stages of the
proceeding and this Court’s adoption of the 8.85% interest rate went unchallenged,
it became the law of the case. As such, Plaintiff maintains that this rate controls
through appeal and on remand.
Third, arguing that the Supreme Court only reopened factual issues on
remand, Plaintiff stresses that this Court lacks authority to disturb a matter of law
namely, the applicable legal rate of interest."
'l Reply at 2-3.
12 Td. at 3; see LG Elecs., 2025 WL 1545444, at *3 n.27 (“In its reply brief, LG notes that IV does
not dispute ‘LG’s alternative simple interest calculation at an average 8.85% rate.’ Accordingly,
if LG is entitled to interest, but the Court rejects LG’s other arguments, it will award simple interest
at 8.85%.”); id. at *5 n. 45 (“The Court awards interest at 8.85%, because that is the uncontested
legal rate.”).
'3 Reply at 4-5.
14 Td. at 34.
Finally, Plaintiff reaches the merits of the applicable interest rate and stresses
that “Delaware courts have not adopted [a] categorical rule that prejudgment interest
must remain frozen at the breach-date rate.”!> In its briefing, Plaintiff relied on a
single Delaware Superior Court case, McGlothlin v. Petrunich Oral & Maxillofacial
Surgery, to support this proposition.!®
At oral argument, Plaintiff reinforced its
position by citing to Montgomery Cellular Holding Co., Inc. v. Dobler, 880 A.2d
206 (Del. 2005) and Schneider Nat'l Carriers, Inc. yv. Kuntz, both of which Plaintiff
contends support the premise that a court of law is able to apply a fluctuating interest
rate under § 2301(a).!’ When pressed on the statutory limits of §2301(a), Plaintiff
distinguished between compound interest and fluctuating interest; maintaining that
the former is a matter of equity while the latter is permitted by the plain language of
the statute.'* Consequently, Plaintiff argues that a court of law is not chained to the
'S Td. at 6.
'6 Id.; see 2023 WL 5747520, at *9 (Del. Super. Sept. 6, 2023).
'7 880 A.2d 206 (Del. 2005); 2022 WL 1222738 (Del. Super. Apr. 25, 2022).
'8 In this Opinion, the Court does not distinguish between the terms “fluctuating,” “averaged,”
“variable,” and “floating” insofar as they modify the concept of interest. While these terms have
technical meanings in the field of finance, the Court uses them interchangeably to designate a
calculation method that accounts for interest rates varying over time. Compound interest, on the
other hand, involves applying interest to previously accrued interest in addition to the principal
amount. This is contrasted with simple interest, which applies interest only to the principal
amount. For reasons explained herein, the distinction between fluctuating interest and compound
interest is immaterial to the Court’s statutory analysis under §2301.
5
fixed legal rate at the time of accrual but may apply an “averaged” rate that accounts
for the fluctuations occurring throughout the prejudgment interest period.!”
Defendants maintain the exact opposite. While they contest any waiver or
“law-of-the-case” foreclosure, Defendants’ main argument is substantive, namely,
that Delaware law dictates application of a legal rate that is fixed at the accrual date.7°
On their reading, neither Plaintiff nor a court of law can impose a rate that reflects
anything other than the simple legal rate fixed at the time of breach.”! For that
reason, Defendants propose that the proper prejudgment interest rate is 5.25%, which
reflects the legal rate at the time of breach.”
The Court agrees with Defendants. Whether this Court has the authority to
award an averaged interest rate is a question of jurisdictional limits. The Superior
Court may only grant the forms of relief that are within its power, and “any relief
granted without such power constitutes an impermissible constitutional
overreach.””’ As a court of law, the Superior Court’s jurisdiction is circumscribed
'9 Notably, this “averaging” or “fluctuating” method forms the basis for Plaintiff’s proposed
interest rate. See D.I. 426, Ex. 10, at § 5 (affidavit of Plaintiff's expert in support of Plaintiff’s
request for prejudgment and postjudgment interest).
20 Opp’n at 3-6.
21 Td. at 56.
22 Td. at 7.
23 Janco FS 2, LLC v. ISS Facility Servs., Inc., 364 A.3d 751 (Del. Super. June 11, 2026), as
corrected (Aug. 24, 2026).
within explicit constitutional and statutory grants of power.* This jurisdiction
stands in stark contrast to the equitable jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery and
represents the well-established divide between law and equity embodied in the
Delaware judiciary.”
Here, the specific power at issue is the power to award prejudgment interest.
The statutory source of this authority is 6 Del. C. § 2301 which provides, in relevant
part, that “[w]here there is no expressed contract rate, the legal rate of interest shall
be 5% over the Federal Reserve discount rate including any surcharge as of the time
from which interest is due.” While it is true that prejudgment interest is awarded
at compound and fluctuating rates in Delaware, it does not follow that this power is
equally available to both courts of law and courts of equity. This is because the
Court of Chancery derives certain powers from its specific constitutional grant of
equitable jurisdiction.’
In Janco FS 2, LLC v. ISS Facility Servs., Inc., this Court recognized that the
Court of Chancery derives its power to award both compound and floating interest
4 See 10 Del. C. § 541 (“The Superior Court shall have such jurisdiction as the Constitution and
laws of this State confer upon it.”).
2° See generally Janco, 364 A.3d at 776-80 (explaining the differing sources of authority between
the Superior Court and the Court of Chancery).
26 6 Del. C. § 2301(a) (emphasis added).
27 See 10 Del. C. § 341.
entirely from its equitable nature.”* The Court concurs with this reasoning. Because
the Court of Chancery is not bound by the statutory command of § 2301, it may
award whatever interest rate that equity demands.” The Superior Court, on the other
hand, derives this power exclusively from § 2301 and remains tethered to its
language.*’ Consequently, this Court, as a court of law, has no discretion to impose
an extra-statutory rate.
At oral argument, Plaintiff argued that the requested fluctuating rate is
permitted by the statute. Specifically, Plaintiff contended that the phrase “as of the
time from which interest is due” can be read to include an averaged rate because, at
all times during the prejudgment period, interest is due. Thus, in Plaintiff’s view, a
rate that reflects an average of this period is faithful to the text. The Court cannot
adopt this construction. The statute affords no such discretion but, rather, reflects a
legislative command that courts award prejudgment interest based on the legal rate
“as of the time from which” it is due which, under the present circumstances, means
as of the time of breach.
28 Janco, 364 A.3d at 776-78.
?? See Summa Corp. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 540 A.2d 403, 409 (Del. 1988) (recognizing that
a court of equity has broad discretion in fixing the prejudgment interest rate to be applied); see
also Brandin v. Gottlieb, 2000 WL 1005954, at *29 (Del. Ch. July 13, 2000) (explaining that the
Court of Chancery’s power to award compound interest is founded in its equitable power and not
6 Del. C. § 2301).
30 Janco, 364 A.3d at 778 (“The only other logical source of authority for the Superior Court to
award compound and floating interest would be through statutory law. The only statute relevant to
this discussion is 6 Del. C. § 2301”).
Further, the Court is unpersuaded that Plaintiff's cited Superior Court
decisions compel a different result. McGlothlin’s award of floating prejudgment
interest was entirely grounded in concerns of fairness without addressing the
jurisdictional limits of a court of law.*! However, freestanding equitable
considerations cannot expand the bounds of a court of law’s discretion where
precluded by the clear language of § 2301. Schneider, an action transferred from the
Court of Chancery to the Superior Court and presided over by a Vice Chancellor
sitting by designation, relied entirely on Court of Chancery authority to award
fluctuating prejudgment interest.** Because neither decision squarely addressed the
statutory constraints governing this Court of law, the Court declines to follow them
here.
Equally unavailing is Plaintiff’s reliance on Montgomery to support its
construction of § 2301. In that case, the plaintiff appealed the Court of Chancery’s
adoption of the fixed legal rate under § 2301 arguing that the Court of Chancery
erred by not, sua sponte, adopting a variable rate to reflect material rate fluctuations
over the relevant period.** The Delaware Supreme Court ultimately rejected this
argument noting that the Court of Chancery retains broad discretion to determine the
31 McGlothlin, 2023 WL 5747520, at *9; see Janco, 2026 WL 1694748, 364 A.3d at 780 n.217
(expressing similar concerns with McGlothlin).
32 Schneider Nat'l Carriers, 2022 WL 1222738, at *32.
33 Montgomery Cellular Holding Co., 880 A.2d at 226.
9
appropriate interest rate and may award a different rate than the one articulated by §
2301(a).*4: The Court does not read the Court of Chancery’s application of § 2301 in
that case as supporting Plaintiff’s view that § 2301 grants courts of law the broad
statutory authority to vary the legal interest rate. As Montgomery makes clear, the
statutory legal rate fixed at the time of accrual is the “benchmark” from which the
Court of Chancery has the discretion to depart.*° As already explained, this Court
lacks such equitable discretion.
Finally, Plaintiff cannot avail itself of the protections of waiver or the “law-
of-the-case” doctrine. These doctrines cannot cure a jurisdictional defect. Although
Defendants did not contest this issue in post-trial briefing and the Court previously
noted that omission, a party can never waive subject matter jurisdiction.*° Further,
subject matter jurisdiction may be raised sua sponte at any stage of the proceedings
whenever it appears to the Court that a defect is present.*’ Defendants raise the issue
in their remand briefing and, upon consideration and for the reasons already stated,
4 Td, at 225-26.
35 Td. at 226 (citations omitted).
36 See DBMP LLC v. Delaware Claims Processing Facility, LLC, 349 A.3d 663, 678 (Del. Ch.
2025) (explaining that subject matter jurisdiction over the remedy sought can never be created by
waiver or agreement of the parties).
37 See Gunn v. McKenna, 116 A.3d 419, 420-21 (Del. 2015) (emphasizing that both the Supreme
Court of the United States and the Delaware Supreme Court have recognized that a court’s lack of
subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time on motion of the court).
10
the Court agrees that it lacks the authority to award anything other than the fixed
legal rate at the time of breach as prescribed by statute.
For these same reasons, this ruling remains consistent with the Supreme
Court’s mandate on remand. Although the Court agrees with Plaintiff that the legal
rate is a question of law and that the mandate directed this Court to address factual
issues bearing on prejudgment interest, a court retains the inherent authority to bring
a prior order into compliance with statutory requirements.
The Court finds that the proposed 8.85% rate, as an averaging of the Federal
Reserve discount rate over the prejudgment period, represents a remedy exceeding
§ 2301’s statutory authority. Lacking the equitable jurisdiction to vary from this
statutory command, the Court will award prejudgment interest at 5.25%-the legal
rate at the time of breach.
ii. Postjudgment Interest
Because the Court’s power to award both prejudgment and postjudgment
interest derives from the same statutory source, the Court must also amend its prior
award of postjudgment interest.°* The same waiver rationale that supported the
prejudgment interest rate undergirded the postjudgment interest rate of 8.85%.3?
Thus, the same jurisdictional limitation forecloses reliance on waiver here.
38 See D.I. 473 at 2 (awarding Plaintiff post-judgment interest at a rate of 8.85%).
*? See LG Elecs., 2025 WL 1545444, at *5 n.45,
11
Defendants acknowledged this principle at oral argument and conceded that
the appropriate rate for postjudgment interest must be the legal rate fixed at the time
of judgment. Here, final judgment was entered on May 27, 2025, when the Federal
Reserve discount rate was 4.5%.” Accordingly, the Court will award postjudgment
interest at 9.5%, which reflects the legal rate at the time of final judgment. This rate
applies to both “the amount of the award plus prejudgment interest” until the
judgment is satisfied.*!
C. COSTS
With respect to Plaintiff's motion for costs, the Delaware Supreme Court
remanded for reconsideration consistent with the its opinion.” The parties agree that
Plaintiff’s motion for costs should be decided based on the existing record from their
post-trial briefing without further submissions.** Further, Defendants do not oppose
Plaintiff’s general entitlement to costs reviving only their opposition to specific
itemized requests as overbroad.“
40 See D.I. 473 (Final Order and Judgment); see also Reply at 7n.1 (acknowledging that the Federal
Reserve discount rate was 4.5% on the judgment date).
4! NGL Energy Partners LP v. LCT Capital, LLC, 319 A.3d 335, 345 (Del. 2024).
42 1G Elecs., 362 A.3d at 1289.
3 Opp’n 6-7; Reply at 1. See Plaintiffs Opening Post-Trial Brief at 1-6 (D.I. 426, hereinafter
“Costs Br.”); Defendants’ Brief in Opposition to Plaintiffs Post-Trial Motion at 25-30 (D.1. 447,
hereinafter “Costs Opp’n’”); Plaintiff's Reply Brief in Support of Its Post-Trial Motion at 2-5 (D.1.
452, hereinafter “Costs Reply”).
44 Opp’n at 6-7.
12
This Court is empowered by 10 Del. C. §5101 to award costs and retains
significant discretion in determining whether and in what amount costs should be
awarded.** In determining costs, Delaware courts consider two questions: first,
whether the requested expense falls within the categories of recoverable costs under
Superior Court Civil Rule 54; and, second, whether the requested amounts are
reasonable.*®
i. Service of Process Fees, Photocopying for the Court, Expert
Witness Fees for Court Attendance
Defendants do not dispute these requested costs. Accordingly, the Court
awards $70.00 in service of process fees, $677.10 in photocopying fees, and
$10,200.00 in expert witness fees for court attendance.
ii. Filing Fees
Filing fees are generally recoverable under Rule 54.7 Defendants broadly
assert that Plaintiff cannot recover all of its requested fees and reiterated at oral
argument that Plaintiff can only recover necessary fees under Rule 54.“ Defendants
rely on Wilson v. James to argue that the filing fees associated with dismissed claims
“S Donovan v. Del. Water & Air Res. Comm’n, 358 A.2d 717, 722-23 (Del. 1976) (“Determining
when costs are awarded and when they are not is, in our judgment, a matter of judicial discretion
under the statute.”).
46 River Valley Ingredients, LLC v, Am. Proteins, 2026 WL 2098226, at *5 (Del. Super. July 20,
2026) (citations omitted).
“7 Id.
“8 Costs Opp’n at 26.
13
should be borne by Plaintiff.49 The Court has already addressed and declined to
adopt this argument.°?
Upon review of Plaintiff’s exhibit detailing its filing fees, the Court finds such
fees both reasonable and necessary.*! Accordingly, the Court exercises the discretion
afforded by Rule 54 and awards Plaintiff $5,942.00 in filing fees.”
iii. Trial Transcript Costs
Trial transcript costs are recoverable under Rule 54.°? Defendants argue that
some of the requested amounts were duplicative because they include various
versions of trial transcripts and multiple real-time feeds and contend that other
charges are unnecessary because they are costs associated with expedition for use to
prepare post-trial briefs, not the trial itself.°* Plaintiff argues that both parties relied
on the expedited transcripts and that the various versions were necessary for trial
presentation.*> At oral argument, Plaintiff also pointed out that this Court ordered
49 Id. at 26 n.15 (citing Wilson v. James, 2010 WL 2683023, at *2 (Del. Super. June 11, 2010)).
°° LG Elecs., 2025 WL 1545444, at *1 n.3 (“Therefore, LG is the prevailing party, and its
recoverable costs and fees will not be reduced because it did not win every claim it originally
asserted.”’).
>! See D.I. 426, Ex. 1 (itemized filing fees).
* Plaintiff’s original request was $7,953.00 but, upon reply, Plaintiff withdrew $2,011.00 in costs
associated with pro hac vice fees. See Costs Reply at 3; Pl. Opening Br. at 6.
3 River Valley Ingredients, LLC, 2026 WL 2098226, at *5.
4 Costs Opp’n at 26.
5 Costs Reply at 3-4.
14
and both parties stipulated to using the transcripts for post-trial briefing.» Under
these circumstances and in light of the underlying amount in controversy, the Court
finds the requested costs are necessary and reasonable. Further, upon review of the
related exhibit, the Court awards the total $33,504.81 requested in trial transcript
costs.*”
iv. Depositions Transcripts and Videos (Detkin, Woo, Obeidat)
This category is governed by Rule 54, which requires that such fees are only
taxable as costs if the transcripts are introduced into evidence.** Rule 54 also
contemplates these fees to include the “production and playback costs associated
with any videotape deposition[.]’°?
Defendants contend that Plaintiff cannot recover both video and stenographic
deposition transcription costs for experts Detkin and Woo because this recovery is
duplicative.’ Defendants also argue that the total costs of the Detkin and Woo video
depositions are not recoverable because Plaintiff only introduced 23 minutes of those
videos at trial.®!
°€ DI. 414 (Order governing trial transcript).
57 See DI. 426, Ex. 4.
°8 Super Ct. Civ. R. 54.
9 Id.
°° Costs Opp’n at 27 (citing Midcap v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 2004 WL 1588343, at *4 (Del.
Super. May 26, 2004)).
61 Td. at 28.
15
Along these same lines, Defendants argue that the entire cost of expert
Obeidat’s 336-page deposition is not recoverable because only five pages were
introduced at trial.°* Defendants suggest a pro-rating methodology resulting in a
total of $204.25 based on the actual trial time occupied by this evidence. For its
part, Plaintiff maintains that all of these costs were necessary and, thus,
recoverable.™
Upon consideration of the extent to which the underlying materials were
introduced into evidence, the Court finds the total amount requested unreasonable.
Accordingly, the Court exercises its discretion, reduces the requested costs, and
awards $7,243.80 for the Detkin and Woo expenses and $2,618.60 for the Obeidat
expenses.®
8 Td.
83 Jd. at 28 n.18.
6 Costs Reply at 3-4.
65 The Court relies on the supporting exhibits to arrive at these figures. See D.I. 426, Exs. 5-6. To
calculate the total for the Detkin and Woo fees, the Court subtracts the charge for the deposition
transcript of Detkin ($1,236.60) to account for the fact that only a portion of the video deposition
was entered into evidence. D.]. 426, Ex. 5, at2. The documentation does not itemize charges for
the deposition transcript of Woo. The Court finds that all other itemized charges are taxable as
costs because they relate to production and playback costs. To calculate the total for the Obeidat
fees, the Court subtracts the $8.19 per page rate for the 331 pages of deposition transcript that were
not introduced at trial ($2,710.89) from the total requested. D.I. 426, Ex. 6, at 1.
16
v. Expert Witness Travel Expenses
The Court is unpersuaded by Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff’s expert Dr.
Bims’ travel expenses are unsubstantiated. The Court finds that the supporting
documentation provides the requisite detail for the disputed transfer and outgoing
flight costs.’ Accordingly, the Court awards the total requested costs of $3,231.88
in travel expenses.
vi. Trial Technology and Graphics Support Fees
Defendants contest $16,500.00 of the total $28,050.00 requested. Defendants
base this objection on Plaintiff’s motion for costs seeking only fees “for the actual
time spent in court” combined with an exhibited invoice that reflects an hourly rate
of $350. Based on these two facts, Defendants compute that these costs should
only total $11,550.00 (33 hours of court time multiplied by $350.00). At oral
argument, Plaintiff clarified that the disputed balance reflects the in-court time of
consultant Dave Johnson who billed $500.00 per hour.
66 See Costs Opp’n at 28-29.
°7 See D.I. 426, Ex. 7. Defendants contend that there is no indication of where Dr. Bims transferred
from or where he flew to upon departing from Philadelphia, a flight that cost three times more than
his incoming flight from DFW. The Court is unpersuaded by this objection.
68 Costs Opp’n at 29 (citing to D.I. 426, at 6 & id., Ex. 9).
°° Id.
17
Upon review of the supporting exhibit, the Court is satisfied with this
explanation.” Plaintiff incurred a total of $103,276.71 in costs for trial technology
and graphics support and appropriately reduced it to the in-court time of two
consultants, one for graphics and one for presentation. Because the Court finds these
expenses reasonable in this case, the Court awards the total requested costs of
$28,050.00.
II. CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained above, Plaintiff is entitled to (1) damages in the
amount of $12,800,000, (2) prejudgment interest at a simple interest rate of 5.25%
from October 19, 2021 to May 27, 2025, (3) postjudgment interest at a simple
interest rate of 9.5% from May 27, 2025 until the judgment is satisfied, and (4) costs
and fees in the amount of $91,538.19. The parties shall confer on a form of order
memorializing the rulings herein.
a
IT IS SO ORDERED.
wr
C
C Sheldon KRennie, Judge
cc: All parties via Lexis File&Serve Express
10 See D.I. 426, Ex. 9, at 2-3.
18