Jay Sunny Bajaj v. OSP Razor Holdings LLC
CourtCourt of Chancery of Delaware
Date FiledJuly 17, 2026
DocketC.A. No. 2025-0976-BWD
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
JAY SUNNY BAJAJ, as Unit )
Holder of RAZOR )
MANAGEMENT )
AGGREGATOR LLC, and as )
Management Holder )
Representative of OSP RAZOR )
HOLDINGS LLC and OSP )
RAZOR MANAGEMENT )
AGGREGATOR LLC, )
)
Plaintiff, )
) C.A. No. 2025-0976-BWD
v.
)
OSP RAZOR HOLDINGS )
LLC, )
)
Defendant. )
POST-TRIAL MEMORANDUM OPINION
Date Submitted: June 30, 2026
Date Decided: July 17, 2026
Brian E. Farnan and Michael J. Farnan, FARNAN LLP, Wilmington, DE; OF
COUNSEL: Travis Robert-Ritter and Michael Showalter, ALBRECHT RITTER,
PLLC, Coral Gables, FL; Attorneys for Plaintiff Jay Sunny Bajaj.
Raymond J. DiCamillo, Matthew W. Murphy, Andrew L. Milam, Zachary R. Greer,
Daniel Boucot, Madison T. Devlin, RICHARDS, LAYTON & FINGER, P.A.,
Wilmington, DE; Attorneys for Defendant OSP Razor Holdings LLC.
DAVID, V.C.
The defendant in this action, OSP Razor Holdings LLC (“Defendant” or the
“Company”), was formed in 2021 to acquire Digital Management Holdings, LLC
(“DMI”), an information technology services company founded by the plaintiff, Jay
Sunny Bajaj (“Plaintiff”), who rolled over equity in the acquisition.
The Company is taxed as a pass-through entity. Under its operating
agreement, the Company must make quarterly advance tax distributions to its
members, “subject to having cash available after taking into account reasonable
reserves as determined in the good faith discretion of the Board.” The operating
agreement includes a highly deferential definition of “good faith” under which “the
Board, acting on behalf of the Company or in connection with the Company’s
business and affairs, shall be conclusively presumed to be acting in good faith” if a
majority of the directors participating in the decision “subjectively believe” that the
decision “is in or is not opposed to the best interests of the Company.”
In 2022, the Company incurred a loss of $10 million, but its rollover members,
including Plaintiff, incurred “phantom” tax liability on taxable income. In August
2023, the Company’s board of directors met, considered the Company’s cash
position, and determined that the Company lacked “cash available after taking into
account reasonable reserves” to pay tax distributions. By August 2025, when
Plaintiff filed this action, the Company still had not paid tax distributions.
1
This memorandum opinion follows an expedited three-day trial in which
Plaintiff sought to prove that the Company has breached its obligation under the
operating agreement to pay tax distributions to the rollover members. Plaintiff seeks
to remedy that breach with an order of specific performance compelling the
Company to pay tax distributions, as well as damages.
At trial, Plaintiff failed to prove that the board acted in bad faith. His primary
theory of bad faith—that the Company’s majority owner caused the board to
withhold tax distributions as a pretext to force a buyout of the rollover members—
did not bear out at trial. Plaintiff did not prove that the board failed to make
“predicate” determinations of “cash available after taking into account reasonable
reserves,” or that the board made determinations in bad faith. Instead, the record of
the Company’s cash position supports a finding that the board reached a rational
decision for comprehensible reasons. Each of Plaintiff’s additional arguments—that
the Company should have incurred additional debt to pay tax distributions, that the
board applied the wrong standard and treated distributions as “optional,” and that
the directors “rewrote” minutes to conceal their misconduct—fail to show that the
board acted in bad faith when deciding that the Company lacked available cash to
pay tax distributions.
Because Plaintiff failed to prove a breach of the operating agreement,
judgment is entered for Defendant.
2
I. BACKGROUND
The following facts are as the Court finds them following a three-day trial
held April 13 through April 15, 2026.1
A. OceanSound Acquires DMI.
Plaintiff founded DMI, a Delaware limited liability company that provides
information technology services, in 2002.2 Plaintiff served as DMI’s Chief
Executive Officer (“CEO”) from its founding until May 2023.3 Plaintiff’s father,
Ken Bajaj, served as DMI’s Chief Operating Officer (“COO”) until 2021, and
Michael Altshuler served as DMI’s Chief Financial Officer (“CFO”) from 2020 until
2024.4
OceanSound Partners, LP (“OceanSound”) is a private equity firm that
focuses on middle-market technology businesses.5 On September 17, 2021,
OceanSound acquired an indirect majority interest in DMI through the Company for
1
The Stipulation and Pre-Trial Order is cited as “PTO ¶ __”. Dkt. 98. Trial testimony is
cited as “Tr. (Witness) at __”. See Dkts. 106–10. Joint exhibits are cited as “JX __” unless
otherwise defined.
2
PTO ¶¶ 2, 7; Tr. (Bajaj) at 709:4–15.
3
PTO ¶ 7.
4
Id. ¶¶ 12, 14.
5
Id. ¶¶ 2, 9; Tr. (Benavides) at 60:1–12.
3
$543.1 million, plus potential earnout payments, pursuant to an equity purchase
agreement (the “Acquisition”).6
The post-Acquisition Company was governed by the Amended and Restated
Limited Liability Company Agreement of OSP Razor Holdings LLC (the “Operating
Agreement”).7 The Company emerged with two members. OSP Razor Equity
Aggregator, LP, an entity indirectly owned by OceanSound, held 82% of the
membership interests in the Company.8 OSP Razor Management Aggregator LLC,
an entity through which Plaintiff and other former DMI equity holders (collectively,
the “Rollover Members”) rolled over $58.9 million of equity into the Company,
owned the remaining 18%.9
After the Acquisition, Plaintiff continued to serve as DMI’s CEO while
nonparty Rocky Thurston replaced Ken Bajaj as COO.10 The Operating Agreement
contemplated a seven-member board of directors (the “Board”) comprising four
classes of directors: one “CEO Director,” one “Rollover Director” appointed by
6
PTO ¶ 17; JX 6; id. § 1.7(a); JX 56 at 18. Plaintiff was entitled to 51% of the earnout
payments from the Acquisition. Tr. (Bajaj) at 719:7–9.
7
JX 9 [hereinafter OA]. The Operating Agreement has since been amended, but the parties
have not identified any material changes to the provisions relevant to this dispute. See JX
1001.
8
PTO ¶¶ 9, 19.
9
Id.
10
Id. ¶¶ 7, 13.
4
Plaintiff in his capacity as the “Principal Rollover Seller,” one “Independent
Director,” and four “OSP Directors” appointed by OceanSound.11 At closing,
Plaintiff served as the CEO Director; Ken Bajaj served as the Rollover Director; Joe
Benavides, Addison Nordin, Jeff Kelly, and Theodore Coons served as the OSP
Directors; and the Independent Director seat was vacant. Benavides served as
Chairman of the Board, and the Operating Agreement vested him with “the majority
voting power of the Board.”12
B. The Operating Agreement Contemplates Pass-Through Tax
Liability And Tax Distributions.
Section 7.3(d) of the Operating Agreement explains that “[t]he Members
intend that the Company shall be treated as a partnership for federal, state and local
income and franchise tax purposes” and provides that “[e]ach Member and the
Company shall file all tax returns consistent with such treatment.”13
Under federal tax law, a member of a limited liability company that elects
pass-through tax treatment may owe taxes on “phantom income,” taxable income
that is allocated to the member even if the company has operated at a loss and the
member has not received cash distributions from the investment.14 Although the
11
OA § 4.1(b)(i).
12
Id. § 4.1(b)(i)(D).
13
Id. § 7.3(d).
14
See JX 107 at 4. Because OSP Razor Management Aggregator LLC has a lower
historical tax basis in the Company and did not receive the purchaser-specific
5
possibility of owing taxes on phantom income may seem onerous, Section 6.2(c) of
the Operating Agreement confirms that “[t]he Members are aware of the tax
consequences of the allocations made” under the Operating Agreement “and agree
to be bound by the provisions of this Section 6.2 in reporting their shares of items of
Company income, gain, loss and deduction.”15
Section 6.3 of the Operating Agreement provides that “[n]o Member shall
have the right to demand or receive Distributions of any amount, except as expressly
provided in this Article VI.”16 Section 6.6 governs tax distributions to Members
(“Tax Distributions”). That section states in its entirety:
Notwithstanding any other provision herein to the contrary, so long as
[the Company] is treated as a partnership for federal income tax
purposes, [the Company] shall, subject to having cash available
after taking into account reasonable reserves as determined in the
good faith discretion of the Board, make quarterly advance cash
distributions to each Member in an amount equal to the Member’s
Quarterly Estimated Tax Amount for such quarter (“Tax
Distributions”), and the Board shall use commercially reasonable
efforts to cause such Tax Distributions to be made at least five days
before estimated U.S. federal income tax payments for individuals are
due. If, on the date of a quarterly estimated distribution, the cash
available to [the Company] (as determined in the good faith discretion
of the Board) is not sufficient to distribute to each Member the full
amount of such Member’s Tax Distribution that would otherwise be
Section 743(b) adjustment allocated to acquisition goodwill, it does not receive
corresponding amortization deductions. See I.R.C. § 743. The resulting taxable income is
then passed through to the Rollover Members with no corresponding deductions passed
through to offset it.
15
OA § 6.2(c).
16
PTO ¶ 30; OA § 6.3.
6
required under this Section 6.6, then (A) distributions shall be made by
[the Company] to the Members pursuant to this Section 6.6 to the extent
of the cash so available in proportion to the amounts that would have
been distributed to each Member pursuant to this Section 6.6 if there
had been a sufficient amount of cash available to [the Company] to
make such Tax Distribution in full, (B) [the Company] shall make
future distributions as soon as reasonably practicable following the date
on which there exists an amount of cash available to [the Company]
after taking into account reasonable reserves as determined in the good
faith discretion of the Board sufficient to pay the remaining portion of
such Member’s required Tax Distribution and (C) [the Company] shall
not, until the remaining portion of each such Member’s required Tax
Distribution is so distributed, make a Distribution other than pursuant
to this sentence. [The Company] shall make commercially
reasonable efforts to ensure that any financing documents allow for
full Tax Distributions. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in
this Agreement, all distributions made to a Member pursuant to this
Section 6.6 shall be treated as an advance against, and thus reduce, the
amount of the next succeeding Distribution or Distributions which
would otherwise have been paid to such Member pursuant to Section
6.4 or Section 11.1, if applicable.17
Under Section 4.7(c), the Board is “conclusively presumed” to have acted in
good faith if a majority of the Board participating in a decision subjectively believes
that the decision “is in or not opposed to the best interests of the Company”:
For all purposes of this Agreement, each Covered Person (acting in its
capacity as such) and the Board, acting on behalf of the Company or
in connection with the Company’s business and affairs, shall be
conclusively presumed to be acting in good faith if such Person (or,
in the case of the Board, a majority of the Directors participating in
the decision) subjectively believe(s) that the action taken (or omitted
to be taken), the consent or approval given or withheld, or the decision
17
OA § 6.6 (emphasis added).
7
or determination made or not made, is in or is not opposed to the
best interests of the Company.18
C. The Company Finances The Acquisition With Debt.
To finance the Acquisition, Plaintiff executed a credit agreement on behalf of
the Company and its affiliates (the “Credit Agreement”) that provided for a $265
million term loan (the “Term Loan”) and a $40 million revolving credit facility (the
“Revolver”).19 By 2025, the variable interest rate on the Term Loan had risen to
approximately 11.25%.20
The Credit Agreement includes covenants restricting the Company’s ability to
incur additional debt, sell assets, engage in transactions with affiliates, make
additional investments, or issue dividends.21 Among other restrictions, under
Section 2.8(c) of the Credit Agreement, if the Company disposes of an asset, it must
use the proceeds to pay down its debt to stay within a specified leverage ratio (the
“Consolidated Total Net Leverage Ratio”):
18
Id. § 4.7(c) (emphasis added). Section 4.7(c) also provides that when the Board or a
director takes action on behalf of the Company, it “shall be entitled to consider only such
interests and factors as it desires, including its own interests, and shall have no duty or
obligation (fiduciary or otherwise) to give any consideration to any interest of or factors
affecting the Company [or] any of the Members.” Id. § 4.7(c).
19
PTO ¶ 22; JX 15 at 10.
20
JX 15 § 1.1 (defining “LIBOR Rate,” “Base Rate,” and “Applicable Margin”); id. § 2.3;
Tr. (Carlson) at 658:14–23. The interest rate on the Revolver is 225 basis points lower
than the interest rate on the Term Loan. PTO ¶ 22; JX 15 § 1.1 (defining “Applicable
Margin”).
21
PTO ¶ 23.
8
[P]romptly upon receipt by a Credit Party and/or such Restricted
Subsidiary of the Net Cash Proceeds of such Disposition or Event of
Loss, the Borrower shall deliver, or cause to be delivered, an amount
equal to either (i) solely in the case of a Disposition or Event of Loss
pursuant to clause (c)(i), 100% of such excess Net Cash Proceeds or
(ii) solely in the case of a Disposition of Identified Assets, the amount
of Net Cash Proceeds to the extent required to cause the Consolidated
Total Net Leverage Ratio not to exceed 3.50 to 1.00 on a pro forma
basis (with no netting of the Net Cash Proceeds of such Disposition in
such calculation), in each case, to the Administrative Agent for
distribution to the Lenders as a prepayment of the Loans, which
prepayment shall be applied in accordance with Section 2.8(f) hereof.22
To obtain additional financing, OSP Razor Intermediate Holdings LLC, a
Company subsidiary,23 also issued a $40 million senior payment-in-kind note
bearing 11.25% interest (the “PIK Note”).24 The PIK Note comes due on October
25, 2028, but requires a payment of approximately $30 million by October 25,
2026.25 Interest on the PIK Note accrues as additional principal.26
D. The Company And OceanSound Execute A Management
Consulting Agreement.
In connection with the Acquisition, the Company and OceanSound entered
into a management consulting agreement (the “Management Consulting
22
JX 15 § 2.8(c).
23
Verified Compl. for Equitable Relief [hereinafter Compl.], Ex. A, Dkt. 1.
24
PTO ¶ 26.
25
JX 14 at 6, 8, § 1.4(b); JX 455 at 28; Tr. (Benavides) at 269:1–5.
26
PTO ¶ 26.
9
Agreement”)27 under which the Company must pay OceanSound an annual
“Advisory Fee” representing “the greater of (i) $1,500,000 (the ‘Base Amount’) and
(ii) three percent (3%) of annual Consolidated EBITDA.”28 The Management
Consulting Agreement also requires the Company to pay OceanSound “Transaction
Fees” for transactions in which OceanSound is involved in “an aggregate
amount . . . equal to the greater of (i) $250,000; and (ii) an amount equal to three
percent (3%) of the Transaction Value.”29
Section 4(c) of the Management Consulting Agreement states:
All Advisory Fees or Transaction Fees shall be paid to the extent
permitted under any credit agreement or other definitive documentation
concerning the financing of the Company Group (the “Financing
Documents”), and if not permitted to be paid, shall be deferred and shall
be payable as soon as permitted under the Financing Documents or
upon the payment in full of all obligations under the Financing
Documents. If any Advisory Fee or Transaction Fee is not timely paid,
such Advisory Fee or Transaction Fee, as applicable, shall accrue
interest at a rate of five percent (5%) per annum, compounded quarterly,
from the date due until the date of payment (the “Interest Payment”).30
E. DMI Makes Acquisitions.
Between March 2022 and early 2023, DMI acquired three additional
businesses. In March 2022, DMI acquired Aurotech, LLC using $14.3 million in
27
PTO ¶ 21; JX 11.
28
PTO ¶ 21; JX 11 § 4(a)(1).
29
PTO ¶ 21; JX 11 § 4(b)(1).
30
JX 11 § 4(c).
10
cash.31 In October 2022, DMI acquired Ambit Group for $37 million, using cash
and OceanSound equity.32 In early 2023, DMI acquired Simplex Mobility Inc. by
drawing down $16 million on the Revolver.33 The Board, including Plaintiff,
unanimously approved each of those transactions.34
F. The Rollover Members, Including Plaintiff, Incur Tax Liability.
Although the Company incurred a loss of $10 million in 2022, the Rollover
Members were allocated approximately $6.628 million in taxable income for that
year.35 OceanSound did not incur a similar tax burden.36
Plaintiff’s tax advisor informed him of his 2022 tax liability in early 2023.37
Thereafter, Plaintiff began to engage with individuals at the Company about Tax
Distributions to the Rollover Members under Section 6.6 of the Operating
Agreement.
At one point in April 2023, Plaintiff and Benavides spoke on the phone about
distributions. According to Plaintiff, Benavides told him that the Company was “not
in a position anytime soon to make Tax Distributions” but “could maybe buy [his]
31
JX 23 at 4.
32
JX 38 at 4.
33
JX 45 at 6, 10.
34
JX 64 at 94; Tr. (Bajaj) at 735:9–17.
35
JX 85 at 1.
36
JX 107 at 4.
37
Tr. (Bajaj) at 677:16–678:2.
11
stock back at $0.50 on the dollar to help ease the pain,” remarking that “I’ve been
squeezed by firms worse in the past” and “I do not feel sorry for you.”38 Benavides
denies making those statements.
In May 2023, the Board terminated Plaintiff as CEO of DMI and hired
Thurston to serve in his place.39 Under the terms of a separation agreement,
OceanSound agreed to appoint Plaintiff as an OSP Director so that he would remain
on the Board when he ceased to be the CEO Director.40
G. DMI Management And The OSP Directors Assess The Company’s
Financial Position To Determine Whether To Recommend A Tax
Distribution.
In the ordinary course, DMI’s finance team prepared 13-week cash flow
forecasts, which were provided to OceanSound to monitor the Company’s
performance.41 On June 20, DMI’s CFO, Michael Altshuler, sent Benavides and
Nordin an update on the Company’s cash flow, explaining with respect to Tax
Distributions that:
All-in, we would need to send tax distr[ibutions] to the management
razor partners in the range of $13M this year. This is having a
significant negative impact on our cash flow as you can imagine, and
38
Tr. (Bajaj) at 678:21–679:1. The only document purporting to describe this call is an
email Plaintiff sent to himself nearly two years later—two months before filing his
Complaint. See JX 420.
39
PTO ¶¶ 7, 13; Tr. (Bajaj) at 679:6–16.
40
JX 297 at 7.
41
Tr. (Benavides) at 80:13–81:8; id. (Nordin) at 312:10–22. Nordin also received daily
cash updates from DMI. Id. at 314:13–24.
12
causing downward pressure beginning in August when our interest
payment is due through the rest of year. We were already in a difficult
cash position given our operational challenges, so this is driving
additional challenges. The cash flow that [management] is sending has
been updated to reflect the latest forecast.42
After reviewing the forecasts, Benavides’ initial reaction was that the Company
“should not be making [T]ax [D]istributions,” and he asked Nordin for input from
PricewaterhouseCoopers (“PwC”), which OceanSound had engaged to improve the
tax structure of its acquisitions.43
On June 26, Nordin told Altshuler that “we are going to recommend that we
don’t make a [T]ax [D]istribution to shareholders” for 2022 because “[w]e do not
think the company has enough cash flow to do that right now.”44
In early July, Benavides sent other OceanSound partners an email describing
PwC’s recommendations and lessons learned from the tax issues the Rollover
Members at DMI were facing:
We’ve done a deep dive into the tax implications of partnership vs
corporate structures due to a $7.8mm tax distribution due at DMI—
which we’re going to elect not to make. In short, there is almost always
more current tax due under the partnership structure than under the
corporate structure (unless the corporate rate exceeds the personal
fed[eral] & state tax rates). A benefit of the partnership structure is that
tax shields get passed forward but that may have limited value on a
future sale. A theoretical benefit is that the tax distributions count as
42
JX 73 at 1.
43
Id.; Tr. (Benavides) at 91:17–92:12; id. at 93:12–24 (“So it was just a teaching moment
to the team at OceanSound . . . .”).
44
JX 77 at 2.
13
return of principal which improve [internal rate of return] but the
benefit doesn’t move the needle.
Going forward unless there’s an incredibly compelling and well
documented/analyzed reason for using the partnership structure, we
will only use fully blocked, corporate structures to set up new portfolio
company investments. For example, if there’s a very large [net
operating loss] AND we have a good sense for what tax distributions
will be for the forward 2-3 years AND our agreements have the
flexibility to not make tax distributions, we can use partnership
structure.
At DMI, we were fortunate to have complete flexibility to NOT make
the payments, but it’s a painful situation for the [Rollover Members].45
OceanSound’s analysis of the Company’s cash position continued into mid-
July. On July 12, Altshuler sent Nordin a new forecast that modeled various
distribution scenarios, recommending that the Company pay a 25% or 50% Tax
Distribution:
Bottom line is the 0% and 25% scenario can be managed through
working capital with no need to draw on line. The 50% is closer, and
may result in very brief period of time where we could spring. 75%
and 100% will definitely spring, and will likely not have enough cash
going into next year to manage through the bonus and earnout without
putting too much pressure. So my recommendation would be
something between the 25% and 50% distr[ibution].46
Thurston responded, “[i]t would be good to cover a portion of this (25%-50% as
Mike suggest[s])—if not for anything other than employee morale and the surprise
45
JX 83 at 2.
46
JX 85 at 1.
14
news of this matter.”47 Nordin “agree[d] with what [Thurston] [was] saying,”
explaining that “[o]nce we have better visibility on the cash flow scenarios described
below, we will be able to decide quickly.”48
On July 14, however, Altshuler sent a “likely more realistic” updated cash
flow projection, noting “[t]he one I saw earlier this week as I said was a bit on [the]
aggressive side” while the updated forecast was “more in our current reality.”49
Altshuler explained that, “[b]ased on this current cash flow, I would exercise more
caution.”50
The next week, Altshuler told the Company’s second-largest Rollover
Member by equity ownership that management was “going to recommend to the
[B]oard that we cannot fund [Tax Distributions] at this point given our current cash
position.”51 As Altshuler socialized the idea of not paying a Tax Distribution, he
reminded Rollover Members “that the operating agreement only requires that we
fund if we believe there is sufficient liquidity and there [i]s not[,]” explaining that
“[s]ome large cash requirements are coming over the next 6-8 months, including a
47
JX 87 at 2.
48
Id. at 1.
49
Id.
50
Id. The updated cash flow projection showed that if the Company paid a 25% partial
Tax Distribution, it would have a negative $2.9 million cash balance in some weeks. Id.
at 4.
51
JX 93 at 1; Tr. (Nordin) at 466:7–11; see also JX 95.
15
few large interest payments, the upcoming earnout payment, and the year-end bonus
payment, all of which we need to manage through.”52 He further explained:
The above items, coupled with the significant rollover of legacy
investors that are not able to take advantage of the tax shield[,] is
creating the perfect storm of pressure on our near-term cash needs. This
is therefore putting us in [a] position where it is not prudent for me to
recommend to the board that we fund the tax distributions until we get
more visibility into some of these growth opportunities and are able to
manage through these near-term cash headwinds.53
On August 3, Altshuler sent an updated 13-week cash flow forecast to
OceanSound, noting significant upcoming payments:
[Y]ou’ll see that we can manage through March next year without
accessing additional capital, but starting with March after bonus
payment, we will need to pull as much as $20M additional off line at
certain points b/w March and June, so will have in excess of $30M on
line. This is no growth model . . . . Bottom line is that we go into next
year with no cash and $13M on the line. We have $8M in bonuses
and $9M in earnout, so $17M, and another $2M in Simplex holdback
payment.54
H. The Board, Including Plaintiff, Votes To Not Make A Tax
Distribution For Tax Year 2022.
On August 7, the Board held a special meeting to determine whether to pay
Tax Distributions to the Rollover Members.55 In advance of the meeting, the Board
received a “Board Update” presentation describing the Rollover Members’ tax
52
JX 103 at 1.
53
Id. at 2.
54
JX 105 at 2 (emphasis added).
55
PTO ¶ 34; JX 119.
16
liability, including the factors that “resulted in a scenario where, despite DMI being
in a taxable loss position of $10m, the management aggregator ultimately end[ed]
up with income and a tax bill.”56 The Board Update explained that:
Under the holding/operating company’s limited liability company
agreement, DMI is required to make [T]ax [D]istributions to its
shareholders to cover projected tax liability if distributions for that year
are not sufficient to cover that projected tax liability, unless the board
determines that the company does not have sufficient liquidity to
support [T]ax [D]istributions[.]
- Due to add-on acquisition expenses, low organic bookings and
high restructuring charges, DMI has drawn its revolver to
$13.5m (out of $40m capacity) and currently has mid-single digit
cash on hand. DMI also has ~$25m of non-operating cash
expenses expected to come out of the company over the next 12
months and could further strain liquidity[.]
- As a result, the DMI management and the OSP [Directors]
recommend that the DMI board does not cause the company to
make any distributions to shareholders until there is improved
liquidity.57
At the meeting, members of management provided an overview of the
Rollover Members’ tax burden and the Company’s financial position, and Board
members asked questions.58 The Board, including Plaintiff, unanimously voted not
to make any Tax Distributions for tax year 2022.59
56
JX 106 at 4.
57
Id.
58
JX 119.
59
Id. at 5.
17
Two months later, on October 5, Plaintiff sent a letter to the Board “regarding
the issue of [the Company’s] distribution obligations to its Members under Section
6.6 of the [Operating Agreement].”60 The letter asserted that, “[a]lthough I voted [at
the August 7 Board meeting], together with the majority of the Board, in favor of
adopting the recommendation of DMI management and the OSP [Directors] that the
Board not cause DMI to make any distributions to shareholders until there is
improved liquidity, our Board discussion left a number of questions unaddressed.”61
Plaintiff asked “[a]t what point will [the Company] have reached sufficiently
‘improved liquidity’ such that [the Company] will resume fulfilling its obligation to
make the required [T]ax [D]istributions,” and whether “future [T]ax [D]istributions
[would] . . . include amounts sufficient to cover any and all interest and penalties
incurred by [Rollover Members] . . . .”62 Plaintiff also “request[ed] that DMI
management provide updates to the Board on a monthly basis that address the
Company’s then-current cash position, so that Board members can assess when it
would be appropriate for DMI to resume fulfilling its tax distribution obligations
under the [Operating] Agreement and, at the appropriate time, to vote to resume
fulfilling those obligations.”63 In response to Plaintiff’s questions about the
60
JX 134 at 2.
61
Id.
62
Id. at 2–3.
63
Id. at 3.
18
Company’s liquidity, DMI’s management began sending its 13-week cash flow
forecasts to Plaintiff, in addition to other regular reporting.64
Plaintiff claims that during a Board meeting in September, Benavides stated
that he would reconsider making Tax Distributions only if the Company exceeded a
“20MM quarterly EBITDA threshold.”65 Benavides denies making this statement.
According to Plaintiff, in late October, he called Benavides for more clarity on this
threshold. When Plaintiff explained that the lack of distributions was “very painful,”
Benavides purportedly replied: “I can either pay your tax distributions or I can pay
your earnout. But not both. So you choose.”66 Plaintiff also claims that Benavides
asked him if he would “consider converting [his] earnout into equity.”67
I. Plaintiff Continues To Push For Tax Distributions Despite The
Company’s Unimproved Cash Position, And OceanSound Removes
Him From The Board.
The Company’s cash position did not markedly improve over the next several
months. On January 30, 2024, Altshuler told Nordin there was “no other way to put
64
See, e.g., JX 152; JX 156; JX 160; JX 165; JX 190; JX 192; JX 196; JX 208; JX 211; JX
213; JX 215; JX 218; JX 223; JX 226; JX 231; JX 238; JX 243; JX 245; JX 253; JX 256;
JX 258; JX 261; JX 267; JX 272; JX 277; JX 281; JX 283; JX 286; JX 310; JX 317; JX
320; JX 323; JX 326; JX 329; JX 331.
65
Tr. (Bajaj) at 682:1–12.
66
Id. at 684:20–685:2.
67
Id. at 685:3–6.
19
it[,] we will miss our numbers significantly. . . . [I] unfortunately don’t need a
crystal ball to say this. [E]ntirely self[-]inflicted.”68
The Board terminated Altshuler as DMI’s CFO and replaced him with Peter
Carlson.69 In February, Ken Bajaj left the Board.70
In the first half of 2024, Plaintiff continued to press for a Tax Distribution. On
a May 10 call, Nordin told Plaintiff that “we very clearly have cash tightness and
that our #1 priority is to dig out of this hole.”71 When Benavides learned of the call,
he asked Nordin if Plaintiff had “thought about selling us his equity? They can take
legal action, and we’ll hose them.”72 Plaintiff says that on another call in June,
Benavides told him that “we do not plan or intend on making any tax distributions.
Maybe you should consider selling your equity back at a discount.”73 Plaintiff then
texted another Rollover Member “to setup a call to debrief you guys on [Benavides’]
stance on the tax and his offer to buy equity back at a discount.”74
On August 19, Plaintiff sent a letter to Benavides addressing “the Board’s
continued failure to authorize [the Company]’s quarterly tax distributions” to the
68
JX 194 at 2.
69
PTO ¶¶ 14, 15; Tr. (Nordin) at 383:7–14.
70
PTO ¶ 12.
71
JX 242 at 2.
72
Id. at 1.
73
Tr. (Bajaj) at 688:8–10.
74
JX 60 at 2.
20
Rollover Members and “a continued lack of transparency with respect to [the
Company]’s intent and ability to make those required distributions,” among other
issues.75 Plaintiff’s letter claimed that “[o]n September 19, 2023 . . . [Benavides]
informed the Board that no [T]ax [D]istributions would be made to the Members
until [the Company] begins recording EBITDA of at least $20 million on a quarterly
basis.”76
On August 26, Benavides sent a letter responding to Plaintiff’s August 19
letter, which asserted, among other things, that:
Given that the Company’s liquidity position and indebtedness have
deteriorated since July 2023 . . . , the Board has had, and continues to
have, ample basis for its discretionary determination that its reasonable
cash reserves needed exceed the cash available and that Tax
Distributions are therefore not required under the [Operating
Agreement].77
The letter further responded that Plaintiff’s “assertion that the Board has imposed a
threshold of achieving $20 million in quarterly EBITDA prior to any Tax
Distributions is incorrect.”78
75
JX 287. The letter is dated August 16 but was sent on August 19.
76
Id. at 3.
77
JX 297 at 3–4.
78
Id. at 4.
21
In addition, Benavides’ August 26 letter notified Plaintiff that OceanSound
had determined to “terminat[e] [Plaintiff’s] status as its designee board member,
effective immediately.”79
J. Plaintiff And Altshuler Request A Buyout.
In September, Altshuler asked Nordin “to socialize a potential buyout with the
powers that be if that is a possibility.”80 According to Altshuler’s notes, Altshuler
told Nordin that a discount of “$.50 on [the] dollar for investment . . . was low” but
between “50 cents and $1.3 [wa]s a reasonable discussion.”81
On October 25, Plaintiff sent a letter responding to Benavides’ August 26
letter.82 Plaintiff concluded his letter by requesting that OceanSound buy out the
Rollover Members’ shares:
Given your positive outlook on the investment, our concerns about the
investment, and our lack of utility to DMI, if we cannot agree to a
meaningful path of course correction, I believe consideration of a
negotiated buy-out of our Class A Shares and a corresponding forfeiture
of all of our rights under the Class A Agreement is warranted, as I
believe it would be in the best interests of both the Class A Rollover
Shareholders and OSP.83
79
Id. at 7.
80
JX 308 at 2.
81
JX 147 at 6.
82
JX 336 at 1.
83
Id. at 6.
22
The same day, another partner at OceanSound emailed Nordin requesting “the
language in the [Operating Agreement] around buyback rights for [Plaintiff]’s
equity[.]”84 At some point, OceanSound purportedly prepared internal documents
modeling a buyout of the Rollover Members “at [a] 50% discount, and current
[management] at cost.”85
K. The OSP Directors Execute A Written Consent Ratifying The
Board’s Decisions To Not Make Tax Distributions Through
September 2024.
On November 1, OSP Directors Benavides, Nordin, Kelly, and Coons
executed a written consent to “ratify and approve [the Company’s] decision not to
make Tax Distributions in respect of the fiscal quarters ending March 31, 2022
through September 30, 2024” (the “November 1 Written Consent”).86 The
November 1 Written Consent recounted:
[T]he Board has previously determined in various meetings beginning
on August 7, 2023, and has now again determined, in its good faith
discretion that, after considering the Company’s operating performance
and trends, liquidity position, outstanding indebtedness, total leverage
ratio, interest and earnout obligations, and cash flow forecasts, among
other factors, the Company has historically not had in any fiscal quarter,
and does not have in the current fiscal quarter, any cash available after
taking into account reasonable reserves for purposes of making Tax
Distributions.
...
84
JX 335.
85
JX 510 (undated document); see JX 509; JX 511.
86
JX 343 at 1.
23
[T]he Company does not have, and has not had at any time during the
fiscal quarters ending March 31, 2022 through September 30, 2024 and