Romic Group Limited v. Rail Engineering Solutions, LLC v. Coleman
CourtSuperior Court of Delaware
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
DocketN24C-12-311 DJB
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
ROMIC GROUP LIMITED, f/k/a )
ROMIC CONSULTING LIMITED, )
Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant, )
)
v. )
)
RAIL ENGINEERING SOLUTIONS, ) C.A. NO. N24C-12-311 DJB
LLC, DAVID WILKERSON, and )
ANDREA OLVERA, )
Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs, )
)
v. )
)
ROBERT COLEMAN, )
Counter-Defendant. )
Date Submitted: October 29, 2026
Date Decided: November 19, 2026
Memorandum Opinion
On Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss – DENIED, without prejudice
Stephanie S. Riley, Esquire, Alexander P. Wharton, Esquire, and Andrew M.
Moshos, Esquire, Womble Bond Dickinson (US) LLP, Wilmington, Delaware,
Attorneys for ROMIC Group Limited and Robert Coleman.
Andrew L. Cole, Esquire, Nathaniel J. Klepser, Esquire, and Jamie P. Clare, Esquire,
Cole Schotz P.C., Wilmington, Delaware, Attorneys for Rail Engineering Solutions,
LLC, David Wilkerson, and Andrea Olvera.
BRENNAN, J.1
1
Sitting as a Vice Chancellor of the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware by
designation of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Delaware pursuant to In
re Designation of Actions Filed Pursuant to In re: DESIGNATION OF THE
I. INTRODUCTION
This litigation spans both the Delaware Superior Court and the Delaware
Court of Chancery. The two related matters, addressed at once in briefing and in this
Opinion, stem from the degradation of the business relationship between the parties.
At the formation of Rail Engineering Solutions, LLC (hereinafter “RES”), all parties
worked cohesively, for profit, in the sale of railroad equipment. When the
relationship took a turn, outstanding contracts, both oral and written, remained
unfulfilled. The filing of the Superior Court breach of contract action by ROMIC
Group Limited, f/k/a Romic Consulting Limited (hereinafter “ROMIC”) against
RES initiated the counterclaims that cross both Superior Court and Chancery.
The Motions to Dismiss filed in each court allege a lack of both subject matter
and personal jurisdiction. The RES LLC Agreement (hereinafter “Agreement”)
contains a mandatory arbitration clause. It is under this clause that ROMIC moves,
in part, to dismiss, arguing an arbitrator is to decide both substantive arbitrability
and all applicable claims. Additionally, Defendant Coleman moves to dismiss
claims against him arguing lack of personal jurisdiction under the Delaware
Corporate Consent Statute.
HONORABLE DANIELLE J. BRENNAN under Del. Const. art. IV § 13(2) dated
October 6, 2025.
The LLC Agreement clearly and unmistakably sets forth that the arbitrator,
and not the court, will decide the issue of arbitrability, given its incorporation of the
Americal Arbitration Association (hereinafter “AAA”), as well as the broad
language used mandating arbitration for “any action” to enforce, interpret, or resolve
disputes. Finally, its lack of designation for any other claims for resolution to any
court buttresses this finding. Therefore, the Motion to Dismiss is DENIED without
prejudice, and both the Superior and Chancery Court actions are STAYED pending
a substantive arbitrability finding by an arbitrator. Should an arbitrator send any
claims back to either Court, a Motion to Dismiss on any remaining jurisdictional
challenges may be re-filed, if applicable.
II. RELEVANT FACTS
RES is a limited liability company in the business of selling locomotives and
rolling stock, formed under the laws of the State of Delaware on May 13, 2021.2 The
founding members of RES were David Wilkerson (hereinafter “Wilkerson”), a
resident of the State of South Carolina, and Robert Coleman (hereinafter
2
Romic Group Limited, f/k/a Romic Consulting Limited v. Rail Engineering
Solutions, LLC, David Wilkerson, and Andrea Olvera v. Robert Coleman, N24C-
12-311 DJB, Docket Item (hereinafter “S.D.I.”) 50, ¶ 7-8; Rail Engineering
Solutions, LLC, David Wilkerson, and Andrea Olvera v. ROMIC Group Limited,
f/k/a ROMIC Consulting Limited and Robert Coleman, 2025-0782-DJB, Docket
Item (hereinafter “C.D.I.”) 19, ¶ 3.
“Coleman”), a resident of England.3 Following its organization, Coleman and
Wilkerson served as the co-managers of RES by “jointly participating in the making
of material business decisions, controlling RES’s operations, and participating in the
management of the LLC.”4 Coleman is also the Director of ROMIC, a corporation
incorporated in the United Kingdom (“hereinafter UK”). At the time RES was
formed, ROMIC was simply a shell company, not doing business independently, but
had a functioning website that was ultimately used for RES business.5
The LLC Agreement
On July 15, 2021, Coleman proposed to Wilkerson “that they create a formal
document to govern the business.”6 Considering his service as RES’s Vice President
of Sales, active participation in RES’s regularly scheduled meetings, and
responsibility for business development, customer relations, and contract
negotiations, Coleman believed he and Wilkerson should be equal partners.7
Following this discussion, a Limited Liability Company Agreement (hereinafter the
“LLC Agreement”) was executed on December 21, 2022.8 The stated purpose of the
LLC Agreement was “to provide for the governance of the Company and the conduct
3
S.D.I. 50, ¶¶ 2, 6, 9-10; S.D.I. 33, pp. 3, 30; C.D.I. 19, ¶¶ 3, 7, 12-13.; C.D.I. 31,
pp. 3, 31.
4
S.D.I. 50, ¶ 11; S.D.I. 33, p. 4; C.D.I. 19, ¶ 21; C.D.I. 31, p. 4.
5
S.D.I. 50, ¶ 17; S.D.I. 33, p. 3; C.D.I. 19, ¶ 27; C.D.I. 31, p. 3-4.
6
S.D.I. 50, ¶ 15; C.D.I. 19, ¶ 25.
7
S.D.I. 50, ¶¶ 12-15; C.D.I. 19, ¶¶ 22-25.
8
S.D.I. 50, ¶ 16; C.D.I. 19, ¶ 26.
of its business, and to specify their relative rights and obligations by this written
Operating Agreement.”9
In connection with the execution of the LLC Agreement, Wilkerson
transferred 10% of his membership interest in RES to Andrea Olvera (hereinafter
“Olvera”). Coleman transferred his membership interests to ROMIC to reduce his
tax exposure.10 At the time, Coleman was President, principal, and controller of
ROMIC and represented ROMIC in all dealings with RES.11 As a result, the
members of RES consisted of Wilkerson owning 45%, ROMIC owning 45%, and
Olvera owning 10%.12
The LLC Agreement includes numerous provisions which subject claims
between the members to arbitration.13 First and foremost, the Agreement begins with
a statement subjecting it to the AAA commercial arbitration rules; this statement is
written in all capital letters, is bolded and underlined.14 Further, the mandatory
arbitration clause in the Agreement states, “this agreement is subject to arbitration
in accordance with the commercial arbitration rules of the American Arbitration
9
S.D.I. 50, ¶ 16; S.D.I. 33, pp. 3, 6; C.D.I. 19, ¶ 26; C.D.I. 31, pp. 3, 6.
10
S.D.I. 50, ¶ 17; S.D.I. 33, p. 3; C.D.I. 19, ¶ 27; C.D.I. 31, pp. 3-4.
11
S.D.I. 50, ¶¶ 4-6; C.D.I. 19, ¶¶ 5-7.
12
S.D.I. 50, ¶ 18; C.D.I. 19, ¶ 28.
13
S.D.I. 33, p. 4; C.D.I. 31, p. 4.
14
S.D.I. 33, pp. 4-5; C.D.I. 33, pp. 4-5.
Association.”15 Section 9.1 of the LLC Agreement includes the following arbitration
provision:
[a]ny action to enforce or interpret this Agreement, or to resolve
disputes with respect to this Agreement as between the Company and a
Member, or between or among the Members, shall be settled by
arbitration in accordance with the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the
American Arbitration Association. Arbitration shall be the exclusive
dispute resolution process.16
The LLC Agreement additionally contains language to seemingly prevent members
from asserting claims against each other.17 Specifically, the LLC Agreement states,
“[e]ach Member hereby waives any and all rights and claims which they may
otherwise have against the other Member and its officers, directors, shareholders,
partners, members, managers, agents, employees and Affiliates” for the following
activities:
engag[ing] or invest[ing] in… any business activity of any type or
description, including without limitation those that might be the same
as or similar to the Company’s business and that might be in direct or
indirect competition with the Company.
…
hold[ing] any investment opportunity or prospective economic
advantage for their own account or… recommend[ing] such
opportunity to Persons other than the Company.18
Section 12.2 of the LLC Agreement contains an integration clause which states:
15
S.D.I. 33, pp. 4-5; C.D.I. 31, pp. 4-5.
16
S.D.I. 33, p. 5; C.D.I. 31, p. 5.
17
Id.
18
S.D.I. 33, pp. 5-6; C.D.I. 31, p. 5.
[t]his Agreement constitutes the entire agreement between the parties
pertaining to the subject matter contained herein and supersedes all
prior and contemporaneous agreements, representations and
understandings of the parties. There are no representations, warranties,
agreements or understandings, express or implied, written or oral
between the parties hereto relating to the subject matter of this
Agreement which are not fully expressed herein.19
Oral Sales Contracts
The following year, in April and May of 2023, an agent in Nigeria submitted
an inquiry to RES about a potential transaction with the agent’s customers regarding
available locomotive inventory.20 Wilkerson, Olvera, and Coleman worked towards
solidifying a deal with the customer, but the locomotive inventory needed for the
potential transaction was located in the United Kingdom.21 Coleman suggested
ROMIC, rather than RES, handle the transaction for two reasons: (1) the seller of
the inventory would not add RES to its buyer database and ROMIC was already a
customer in that database, and (2) RES couldn’t ship the inventory out of the UK
since it didn’t have export authority there, but ROMIC did, as a UK business.22 As
a result, Olvera, Wilkerson, and ROMIC purportedly entered into contracts whereby
19
S.D.I. 33, p. 6; C.D.I. 31, p. 6. The Amended Complaint alleges that following
the execution of the LLC Agreement, date unspecified, the RES members orally
amended the Agreement by having Coleman and Wilkerson continue to act as co-
managers. S.D.I. 50, ¶ 19; C.D.I. 19, ¶ 29. This seems to be disputed by ROMIC,
as it is tangentially challenged in its briefing, although at this point, this issue is not
determinative. S.D.I. 33, p. 4; C.D.I. 31, p. 4.
20
S.D.I. 50, ¶ 22; S.D.I. 33, p. 7-8.
21
S.D.I. 50, ¶¶ 24-25.
22
S.D.I. 50, ¶ 26; S.D.I. 33, p. 8.
Olvera and Wilkerson, personally, agreed to allow ROMIC to pursue sales of
locomotive inventory located in the UK in exchange for ROMIC paying
commissions from the sale to Wilkerson and Olvera directly.23
The Promissory Note
Several months later, on October 24, 2023, ROMIC and RES signed a
promissory note (hereinafter the “Note”) whereby ROMIC loaned RES a total of
$913,950.00.24 Per the Note, RES was to pay interest at a rate of 8% annually, and
make four equal payments of $18,279.00 quarterly for repayment.25 Specifically,
the Note required each $18,279.00 payment due sequentially on January 24, 2024,
April 24, 2024, July 24, 2024, and October 24, 2024.26 Any unpaid principal was
due on October 24, 2024, and any if any unpaid principal remained following that
date, it accrued interest at an annual rate of 8%.27 The Note required RES to pay
ROMIC’s costs of collection in the event RES failed to make obligated payments as
they became due.28 RES made the January 24, April 24 and July 24 payments; no
further payments were made on the Note thereafter.29
23
S.D.I. 50, ¶ 41; S.D.I. 33, p. 8.
24
S.D.I. 1, ¶¶ 1, 21; C.D.I. 31, p. 6.
25
S.D.I. 1, ¶¶ 1, 21; S.D.I. 33, p. 6-7; C.D.I. 31, p. 6.
26
S.D.I. 1, ¶ 21.
27
S.D.I. 1, ¶ 22.
28
S.D.I. 1, ¶ 3.
29
S.D.I. 1, ¶ 25; S.D.I. 10, ¶ 25.
Discord Amongst LLC Members
In late December 2023 and early January 2024, tensions began to rise between
Coleman and Wilkerson regarding RES contracts, business dealings, and pricing of
sales.30 Coleman and ROMIC initiated termination of the relationship with RES on
January 21, 2024, and requested a certification from RES that Coleman had resigned
and had no outstanding financial obligations or commitments to RES.31 At that time,
Coleman acknowledged he owed payments to both Wilkerson and Olvera, stating
ROMIC would be closed unless Coleman, Wilkerson, and Olvera could “find
common ground to work together.”32 As a result, RES held an emergency board
meeting to formally address the issue.33 Following that meeting, RES accepted
ROMIC’s withdrawal and Coleman’s resignation via a January 23, 2024, letter.34 On
April 5, 2024, counsel for RES, memorialized Coleman’s withdrawal, resignation,
transfer of membership units and other legalities surrounding the separation based
upon the Agreement via letter.35
30
S.D.I. 50, ¶ 35; C.D.I. 19, ¶ 32.
31
S.D.I. 50, ¶ 36; S.D.I. 33, p. 8; C.D.I. 19, ¶ 33.
32
S.D.I. 50, ¶ 36; C.D.I. 19, ¶ 33.
33
C.D.I. 19, ¶ 34.
34
S.D.I. 50, ¶ 5; C.D.I. 19, ¶¶ 35.
35
S.D.I. 70, Ex. B; C.D.I. 48, Ex. B.
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
ROMIC filed suit against RES, David Wilkerson and Andrea Olvera in
Superior Court on December 23, 2024.36 ROMIC’s suit against RES alleges Breach
of Contract (Count I), Unjust Enrichment (Count II), Quantum Meruit (Count III),
and Tortious Interference with Contract (Count IV); Counts I-III are against RES;
Count IV is brought against Wilkerson and Olvera, individually.37 RES, Wilkerson,
and Olvera (collectively, “the RES parties”) filed an Answer and Counterclaim
against both ROMIC and Robert Coleman on March 5, 2025.38 Coleman, not an
original party to the Superior Court action, was added as a counterclaim defendant
following the filing of the RES parties’ counterclaims in March.39 Coleman’s
Answer alleges that only Coleman, personally, resigned from RES, and ROMIC’s
interest remained.
The original counterclaim brought five (5) causes of action against ROMIC
and Coleman: a Declaratory Judgment action regarding ROMIC’s status as a
member of RES (Count 1), Misappropriation of Trade Secrets (Count 2), Breach of
Fiduciary Duty (Count 3), Defamation (Count 4), and Breach of Contract (Count
5).40 Due to the jurisdictional limitation of Superior Court, Counts 1 through 3 were
36
S.D.I. 1.
37
S.D.I. 1.
38
S.D.I. 10.
39
S.D.I. 10; S.D.I. 33, p. 7; C.D.I. 31, p. 7.
40
Id.
voluntarily withdrawn from the Superior Court action and an Amended
Counterclaim was filed on July 3, 2025, asserting only Defamation (Count 1) and
Breach of Contract (Count 2); the Defamation count is against Coleman, personally,
the Breach of Contract count is against ROMIC.41
On July 7, 2025, RES filed a Complaint in the Court of Chancery for the
Declaratory Judgment (Count 1), Misappropriation of Trade Secrets (Count 2),
Breach of Fiduciary Duty (Count 3) actions against ROMIC and Coleman,
individually.42 Given the natural overlap and connection between the two court
actions, the parties’ request for cross-designation was granted on October 6, 2025.43
On December 11, 2025, RES filed an Amended Complaint in the Chancery action
and a Second Amended Counterclaim in the Superior Court on February 20, 2026.44
Multiple Stipulations regarding deadlines to file amendments to the counterclaim
and responses to all claims were filed by the parties. Ultimately, ROMIC moved to
dismiss RES’s counterclaims in both RES’ Superior Court and Court of Chancery
actions.45 For purposes of judicial economy, identical motions to dismiss were
permitted to be filed in each court. For those same reasons, both motions will be
considered in this one Opinion, filed separately in each Court.
41
S.D.I. 26.
42
C.D.I. 1.
43
S.D.I. 29; C.D.I. 11, 13.
44
S.D.I. 50; C.D.I. 19.
45
S.D.I. 33, 54; C.D.I. 30-31.
Pending before the Courts are ROMIC and Coleman’s March 24, 2026,
Motions to Dismiss in the Superior Court and in the Court of Chancery.46 Oral
argument on this Motion was held June 10, 2026.47 Following argument, the parties
were permitted supplemental filings as to an issue raised for the first time at
argument. ROMIC’s supplemental filing was submitted on June 11, 2026.48 On
July 1, 2026, RES responded.49 ROMIC filed its brief Reply on July 9, 2026.50
During the Court’s review pending decision, the Court requested counsel provide a
copy of Mr. Coleman’s withdrawal letter to RES.51 This was provided on October
29, 2026.52 The matter is now ripe for decision.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
ROMIC challenges RES’s counterclaims under Superior Court Civil Rule of
Procedure 12(b)(1) & (2), as well as under Chancery Rule of Procedure 12(b)(1),
(2), and (6).
46
S.D.I. 33, 54; C.D.I. 17, 30-31. Note the Motion to Dismiss and the Opening
Brief in Support were filed on separate days in the Court of Chancery docket, the
Motion on March 24, 2026, and the Opening Brief on March 25. C.D.I. 30-31.
47
S.D.I. 57; C.D.I. 32.
48
S.D.I. 64; C.D.I. 42.
49
S.D.I. 66, C.D.I. 43.
50
S.D.I. 67, C.D.I. 45.
51
S.D.I. 68, C.D.I. 46.
52
S.D.I. 69, 70; C.D.I. 47, 48.
A. Superior Court Rule 12(b)(1).
Pursuant to Superior Court Rule 12(b)(1), this Court may dismiss a claim
where it lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter.53 Under Delaware law, a court
“lacks subject matter jurisdiction over a claim that is ‘properly committed to
arbitration.’”54 While the Court cannot compel arbitration, it can determine
“whether an enforceable arbitration agreement exists for purposes of subject matter
jurisdiction.”55 In making this determination, the Court should consider both
“whether a valid binding arbitration agreement exists” and “whether the scope of the
agreement covers the pending claims.”56
The burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction, or lack thereof, rests
with the moving party.57 “On a Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), the Court
must accept every well-pled allegation as true and draw all reasonable inferences in
the non-movant’s favor.”58 Such a motion will be denied unless it appears to a
53
Super. Ct. Civil R. 12(b)(1); see, W. IP Commc'ns, Inc. v. Xactly Corp., 2014 WL
3032270 at *5 (Del. Super. Ct. June 25, 2014).
54
Id. (quoting Aquila of Del., Inc. v. Wilm. Trust Co., 2011 WL 4908406, *1
(Del.Super.Oct. 10, 2011)).
55
Donofrio v. Peninsula Healthcare Servs., LLC, 2022 WL 1054969 at *2 (Del.
Super. Apr. 8, 2022) (citing Jones v. 810 Broom St. Operations, 2014 WL 1347746,
at *1 (Del. Super. June 25, 2014)).
56
Jones v. 810 Broom St. Operations LLC, 2014 WL 1347746 at *1 (Del. Super.
Apr. 7, 2014) (citing Elia v. Hertrich Family of Automobile Dealerships, Inc., 2014
WL 843839 (Del. Super. Mar. 4, 2014)).
57
Donofrio, 2022 WL 1054969 at *2.
58
Skinner v. Peninsula Healthcare Servs., LLC, 2021 WL 778324 at *1 (Del.
Super. Mar. 1, 2021).
“‘reasonable certainty’ that the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any set
of facts that could be proved to support them.”59
B. Superior Court Rule 12(b)(2)
When asserting a claim against a non-resident defendant, a plaintiff generally
does not have the burden to plead facts in a Complaint that establish personal
jurisdiction.60 However, once challenged under Rule 12(b)(2), the burden is upon
the Plaintiff to establish jurisdiction is proper.61 “When no meaningful discovery
has been conducted, the plaintiff must make a prima facie showing that personal
jurisdiction exists.”62 In its review, the Court “is not limited to the pleadings and
can consider affidavits, briefs of the parties, and the record as a whole.”63 Unless an
allegation is contradicted by an affidavit, “the Court must (1) accept as true all well-
pleaded allegations in the complaint; and (2) construe the record in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff.”64
59
Id.
60
State ex rel. Jennings, 2024 WL 98888, at *7 (citing Green Am. Recycling, LLC
v. Clean Earth, Inc., 2021 WL 2211696, at *3 (Del. Super. June 1,
2021) (alteration in original) (quoting Focus Fin. Partners, LLC v. Holsopple, 241
A.3d 784, 800 (Del. Ch. 2020)).
61
State ex rel. Jennings, 2024 WL 98888, at *7 (citing AeroGlobal Cap. Mgmt., LLC
v. Cirrus Indus., Inc., 871 A.2d 428, 437-38 (Del. 2005)).
62
State ex rel. Jennings, 2024 WL 98888, at *7 (internal citations omitted).
63
Green Am. Recycling, LLC v. Clean Earth, Inc., 2021 WL 2211696, at *3 (Del.
Super. June 1, 2021).
64
State ex rel. Jennings, 2024 WL 98888, at *7 (internal citations omitted).
C. Chancery Court Rule 12(b)(1)
Under Chancery Court Rule 12(b)(1), a party may raise lack of subject matter
jurisdiction as a defense to a claim for relief.65 The non-moving party bears the
burden to plead sufficient facts to establish the Court’s jurisdiction.66 To determine
whether the non-movant has satisfied its burden, “the Court should accept the
material factual allegations in the complaint as true, and all inferences therefrom
should be construed in the non-moving party’s favor.”67 In consideration of the
motion, the Court must also “address the nature of the wrong alleged and the remedy
sought to determine whether a legal, as opposed to an equitable, remedy is available
and adequate.”68
D. Chancery Court Rule 12(b)(2)
“Generally, a plaintiff does not have the burden to plead in its complaint facts
establishing a court’s personal jurisdiction over defendant.”69 But “[w]hen a
65
Del. Ch. Ct. R. 12.
66
VT Shareholder Representative, LLC v. Edwards Lifesciences Corp., 2023 WL
8597956, at *5 (Del. Ch. Dec. 12, 2023), aff’d, 326 A.3d 370 (Del. 2024) (citing de
Adler v. Upper New York Inv. Co. LLC, 2013 WL 5874645, at *7 (Del. Ch. Oct. 31,
2013)); see also S'holder Representative Servs. LLC v. Alexion Pharms., Inc., 2021
WL 3925937, at *4 (Del. Ch. Sept. 1, 2021) (citing Hall v. Coupe, 2016 WL
3094406, at *2 (Del. Ch. May 25, 2016)).
67
Shareholder Representative Servs. LLC, 2021 WL 3925937, at *4 (quoting de
Adler, 2013 WL 5874645, at *7).
68
AffiniPay, LLC v. West, 2021 WL 4262225, at *4 (Del. Ch. Sept. 17, 2021)
(quoting Julian v. Julian, 2009 WL 2937121, at *3 (Del. Ch. Sept. 9, 2009)).
69
Partners & Simons, Inc. v. Sandbox Acquisitions, LLC, 2021 WL 3161651, at *3
(Del. Ch. July 26, 2021) (citing Focus Fin. P'rs, LLC v. Holsopple, 241 A.3d 784,
defendant moves to dismiss a complaint pursuant to Court of Chancery Rule
12(b)(2), the plaintiff bears the burden of showing a basis for the court's exercise of
jurisdiction over the defendant.”70 “In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(2) motion, the court
may consider the pleadings, affidavits, and any discovery of record.”71 “If the Court
has not held an evidentiary hearing, ‘plaintiffs need only make a prima facie showing
of personal jurisdiction and the record is construed in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff.’”72
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Substantive Arbitrability Issue is not Waived
ROMIC raised the issue of who decides arbitrability for the first time during
oral argument. In so doing, ROMIC argues that an arbitrator, and not the court,
should make the determination of arbitrability. Objecting to the procedural lateness
of ROMIC’s presentation of this issue, RES urges the Court to decline to consider
this argument waived, since it was not raised in ROMIC’s extensive briefing.73
If the parties have contracted that an arbitrator is to decide issues of
arbitrability, the court’s jurisdiction, while technically proper, is divested to honor
800–02 (Del. Ch. 2020) (quoting Benerofe v. Cha, 1996 WL 535405, at *3 (Del. Ch.
Sept. 12, 1996)).
70
Partners & Simons, Inc., 2021 WL 3161651, at *3 (citing Ryan v. Gifford, 935
A.2d 258, 265 (Del. Ch. 2007)).
71
Partners & Simons, Inc., 2021 WL 3161651, at *3 (citing Ryan, 935 A.2d at 265).
72
Partners & Simons, Inc., 2021 WL 3161651, at *3 (citing Ryan, 935 A.2d at 265).
73
S.D.I. 67, C.D.I. 45.
the contractual terms. Therefore, as this is an issue regarding jurisdiction, any such
argument on this topic cannot be waived.74 Further, upon this issue being raised at
argument, RES was given the opportunity to submit a supplemental submission of
law addressing this claim following time to hear and respond to ROMIC’s
arguments. Therefore, because RES was provided with this time, prejudice is
minimal, if any. While the Court shares in RES’s frustration that this issue was
belatedly raised, it will nonetheless hear and consider it, as ROMIC is correct: this
is a gatekeeping issue and must be decided prior to an examination of the other
arguments raised.75 Judicial economy is best served by addressing this issue at the
forefront and the Court will do so now.
B. The Arbitrator, not the Court, will Determine Substantive
Arbitrability
When the question of who determines substantive arbitrability arises, the
default is that the Court, and not the arbitrator decides.76 An exception to the default
exists when the contract evidences a “clear and unmistakable intent” to submit the
question of substantive arbitrability to the arbitrator.77 When the contracting parties
74
Donofrio v. Peninsula Healthcare, LLC, 2022 WL 1054966, *2 (Del. Super. Apr.
8, 2022).
75
360 Campaign Consulting, LLC v. Diversity Communication, LLC, 2020 WL
1320909, *3 (Del. Ch. Mar. 20, 2020), citing James & Jackson, LLC v. Willie
Garey, LLC, 906 A.2d 76, 79 (Del 2006).
76
SBC Interactive, Inc. v. Corp. Media Pr’rs, 714 A.2d 758, 761 (Del. 1998), see
also 360 Campaign Consulting, 202 WL 1320909 at *6.
77
Willie Garey, LLC, 906 A.2d at 79.
wish the question of arbitrability to be placed before an arbitrator, the “arbitration
clause generally provides for arbitration of all disputes” and the contract
“incorporates a set of arbitration rules that empower arbitrators to decide
arbitrability.”78
The LLC Agreement at issue here beings a sentence, written in all capital
letters, and says: “NOTICE: THIS AGREEMENT IS SUBJECT TO
ARBITRATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION RULES OF THE AMERICAN ARBITRATION
ASSOCIATION.”79 ROMIC argues that this alone satisfies the requirement that the
intent be clear and unmistakable.80 RES disagrees and argues the Court should
decide substantive arbitrability as it interprets the arbitration clause narrowly.81
Clear and unmistakable intent is not found solely from incorporating the AAA rules
into an agreement. As will be discussed, this intent is found not only from the
incorporation of the AAA rules, but in reviewing the Agreement as a whole and,
importantly, considering the clear language in the arbitration clause itself.
Section 9.1 of the Agreement, the arbitration clause, states “[a]ny action to
enforce or interpret this Agreement, or to resolve disputes with respect to this
78
Id. (internal citations omitted).
79
S.D.I. 33, p. 5; C.D.I. 31, p. 5.
80
D.I. 67.
81
D.I. 66.
Agreement as between the Company and a Member, or between or amount the
Members, shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with the Commercial
Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association.”82 This provision
broadly mandating arbitration further evidences the parties’ intent that arbitrator
decide substantive arbitrability.83 The lack of any other language in the Agreement
permitting other disputes to the courts further support such a reading.84
Section 9.2 to the Agreement provides a party the option of “applying to any
court of competent jurisdiction for such injunctive or other provisional relief as
maybe be necessary to protect that party from irreparable harm or injury or to
preserve the status quo pending resolution of a dispute.”85 However, this does not
negate the clear and unmistakable intent expressed elsewhere. Section 9.2
specifically states this option is available only to protect the parties “pending the
resolution of a dispute,” essentially awaiting determination via arbitration. In
82
S.D.I. 33, pp. 4-5; C.D.I. 33, pp. 4-5.
83
See GTSI Corp. v. Eyak Technology, LLC, 10 A.3d 1116, 1119-1120 (Del. Ch.
Nov. 15, 2010) (finding the words “shall” and “any dispute…including the validity,
scope and enforceability of these arbitration provisions” evidenced a clear and
unmistakable intent to send the issue of substantive arbitrability to the arbitrator).
84
C.f. 360 Campaign Consulting, 2020 WL 1320909 at *4 (declining to find clear
and unmistakable intent where the challenged LLC Agreement had an arbitration
clause, but also had separate sections which contemplated that other disputes, such
as disputes not between Members, would be decided by the courts).
85
S.D.I. 33, pp. 5-6; C.D.I. 31, p. 5.
reading the Agreement in its entirety, the parties have evidenced a clear and
unmistakable intent to subject the issue of arbitrability to the arbitrator.86
C. The remaining litigation in both Courts is STAYED Pending the
Decision of the Arbitrator
Because the question of substantive arbitrability is for the arbitrator, the cases
pending in both Superior and Chancery Courts are STAYED following the
arbitrator’s decision,87 and the motions to dismiss are DENIED without prejudice.
Should the arbitrator decide that any claims raised in the instant litigation fall outside
of the LLC Agreement, those matters will remain active and any relevant motions
may be re-filed. To the extent the arbitrator determines that some or all of the claims
currently before the Court fall under the LLC Agreement, those counts will then be
dismissed pursuant to Superior and Chancery Court Rules 12(b)(1), respectively.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
_________________________________
Danielle J. Brennan, Judge
86
See generally, 360 Campaign Consulting, 2020 WL 1320909 (Del. Ch. Mar. 20,
2020).
87
Id. at * 10.