Promier Products Inc v. Gearoz
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
Docket25-2407
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 25-2407
PROMIER PRODUCTS INC.,
Appellant
v.
GEAROZ, AIKERTEC-US, ALESDIRECT, ALICEGIRL-US
BRAND, ALIFA LED FLASHLIGHTS DIRECT STORE, et al.
_____________________________
On Appeal from the U.S. District Court, W.D. Pa.
Judge Robert J. Colville, No. 2:25-cv-00497
Before: HARDIMAN, BIBAS, and RENDELL, Circuit Judges
Argued: Sept. 16, 2026; Filed: Nov. 20, 2026
_____________________________
OPINION OF THE COURT
BIBAS, Circuit Judge. False-advertising claims arise out of
sales to deceived consumers. So to get a judgment from a Penn-
sylvania court, a plaintiff must show that a deceived Pennsyl-
vania consumer, not just a lawyer, bought a falsely advertised
item online. Applying this logic, the District Court rightly
found no reasonable likelihood of success on personal jurisdic-
tion and thus denied a preliminary injunction. But we will va-
cate the District Court’s order and remand for it to figure out
whether some defendants waived personal jurisdiction, and to
further develop the record about personal jurisdiction.
I. PROMIER’S LAWYERS ORDER FLASHLIGHTS
TO PITTSBURGH
Promier Products sells flashlights online through Amazon.
A flashlight’s big selling point is its brightness. Promier wor-
ried that other Amazon sellers were lying about how bright
their competing flashlights are. So it hired a Pittsburgh law
firm to investigate. To measure the flashlights’ brightness, the
law firm bought some on Amazon and had them shipped to its
Pittsburgh office.
Allegedly, more than three-quarters of those flashlights
produced less than one percent of the lumens advertised. So
Promier sued 153 Chinese competitors in a single federal law-
suit in the Western District of Pennsylvania. It claimed false
advertising under Pennsylvania common law and the Lanham
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). And it sought not only damages and
an accounting of profits, but also an injunction (1) ordering
defendants to stop making false claims about their flashlights;
(2) ordering banks to freeze defendants’ bank accounts; and
(3) ordering Amazon and other online marketplaces to
freeze defendants’ access to their platforms, hold defendants’
products in trust, and “restrain” defendants’ funds. App. 74.
Promier also asked for that relief ex parte through a temporary
restraining order, to keep defendants from spiriting their
money out of the country.
At first, the District Court hesitated. Promier is an Illinois
company, and all the defendants are from China. So the Court
ordered Promier to show cause on venue and personal jurisdic-
tion. But Promier managed to assuage those concerns, for a
while. It argued that specific personal jurisdiction was proper
2
because defendants had offered infringing products for sale in
Pennsylvania (through Amazon) and had each made at least
one sale in Pennsylvania (to Promier’s lawyers). Beyond those
sales to Promier’s lawyers, Promier never specifically alleged
how many times or how often each defendant shipped flash-
lights to customers in Pennsylvania, or any other contacts that
they had with customers in Pennsylvania. So, in the alternative,
Promier argued that defendants lacked minimum contacts with
any one state, and were thus subject to jurisdiction under Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2). Accepting those argu-
ments, the court issued a TRO, granting the broad relief
requested.
Over the following month, a few dozen defendants trickled
into court and organized themselves into three groups. Two
groups answered the complaint, one moved to dismiss, two
moved to dissolve the TRO, and all three opposed granting a
preliminary injunction. Some of these filings asserted that the
District Court lacked personal jurisdiction; others did not.
Compare D. Ct. ECF No. 68, at 1 with App. 202, 467.
With the benefit of more time and adversarial briefing, the
District Court revisited its initial finding of personal jurisdic-
tion. It held that Promier’s lawyers could not use their own test
buys to manufacture jurisdiction. It also noted that joining all
153 defendants might have been improper and gave Promier
leave to amend its complaint to address that concern. For both
reasons, the court denied the preliminary injunction.
On appeal, Promier does not contest the District Court’s
joinder ruling. Nor does it argue that personal jurisdiction was
proper under Rule 4(k)(2). Rather, it argues only that personal
3
jurisdiction was proper based on defendants’ presence on
Amazon, their sales to Promier’s lawyers, and the otherwise
unsubstantiated allegations that each defendant made other
sales in Pennsylvania. And whether or not they are subject to
personal jurisdiction, Promier also argues that the two groups
of defendants who answered the complaint waived the issue.
We have jurisdiction to review the denial of a preliminary
injunction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). We review the Dis-
trict Court’s legal rulings de novo, its findings of fact for clear
error, and its ultimate denial of the injunction for abuse of dis-
cretion. Del. State Sportsmen’s Ass’n, Inc. v. Del. Dep’t of
Safety & Homeland Sec., 108 F.4th 194, 198 (3d Cir. 2024).
II. PROMIER MUST SHOW THAT PERSONAL JURISDICTION
IS REASONABLY LIKELY
Under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause,
states may not deprive persons of liberty or property without
due process of law. That clause limits state courts’ power to
assert jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants. Ford Motor
Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 592 U.S. 351, 358 (2021).
By state statute, Pennsylvania courts can exercise personal
jurisdiction up to that constitutional limit. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat.
Ann. § 5322(b). And by federal rule, the same is true of federal
courts in Pennsylvania. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A).
Personal jurisdiction is usually litigated on a motion to dis-
miss, because a defendant must assert that defense in its first
answer or Rule 12 motion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(1). That require-
ment not only prevents gamesmanship, but also conserves judi-
cial time and resources. Bel-Ray Co. v. Chemrite (Pty) Ltd., 181
F.3d 435, 443 (3d Cir. 1999). But a court need not resolve
4
personal jurisdiction so early. To survive a motion to dismiss,
a plaintiff needs only a prima facie case on personal jurisdic-
tion. Metcalfe v. Renaissance Marine, Inc., 566 F.3d 324, 330
(3d Cir. 2009). And unless there is an evidentiary hearing, a
district court must accept the plaintiff’s jurisdictional allega-
tions as true. Id. So a plaintiff might survive a motion to dis-
miss, yet ultimately fail to prove personal jurisdiction by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence (and thus lose at final judgment).
Because of the lower standard for motions to dismiss, a
defendant might be forced to “litigat[e] in a distant or incon-
venient forum,” only for the court to rule in the end that it lacks
jurisdiction. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444
U.S. 286, 292 (1980). But “[i]n the context of due process
restrictions on the exercise of personal jurisdiction, [the Supreme
Court] has recognized that the individual interest protected is
in not being subject to the binding judgments of a forum with
which [the defendant] has established no meaningful contacts,
ties, or relations.” Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517,
526 (1988) (internal quotation marks omitted). After all, it is
primarily when “the judgment is sought to be enforced that lib-
erty or property is in present danger.” York v. Texas, 137 U.S.
15, 20 (1890). That is why the denial of a motion to dismiss for
lack of personal jurisdiction is not immediately appealable.
Van Cauwenberghe, 486 U.S. at 526–27.
A preliminary injunction is different: Like a binding judg-
ment, it puts the defendant’s liberty and property in present
danger. While losing a motion to dismiss merely “exposes
defendants to the State’s coercive power,” losing on a prelim-
inary injunction actually subjects them to it, at least temporar-
ily. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564
5
U.S. 915, 918 (2011) (emphasis added). And the impact goes
beyond the order itself. By empowering the plaintiff to inflict
some pain on the defendant, a preliminary injunction can force
him to “bargain desperately to buy his way out of the injunc-
tion,” putting the court’s weight behind a coerced settlement.
O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao Do Vegetal v. Ashcroft,
389 F.3d 973, 1017 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (McConnell, J.,
concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, plain-
tiffs regularly get such settlements in Lanham Act suits like
this one. Eric Goldman, A SAD Scheme of Abusive Intellectual
Property Litigation, 123 Colum. L. Rev. F. 183, 191–92 (2023).
Because of the property and liberty interests at stake at the
preliminary-injunction stage, a plaintiff must show, and a dis-
trict court must find, a reasonable likelihood that the court has
personal jurisdiction. Indus. Elecs. Corp. v. Cline, 330 F.2d
480, 482 (3d Cir. 1964). An evidentiary hearing or jurisdic-
tional discovery could aid a plaintiff in making the necessary
showing. But a district court need not engage in that factfinding
before deciding the question of personal jurisdiction for pur-
poses of a preliminary injunction. And when personal jurisdic-
tion is challenged at the preliminary-injunction stage, a district
court need not accept the plaintiff’s factual allegations con-
cerning personal jurisdiction as true. Lacking the benefit of a
full evidentiary record, the court should not let “fiction deny
the fair play that can be secured only by a pretty close adhesion
to fact.” McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917).
6
III. SPECIFIC JURISDICTION REQUIRES LINKING
THE FORUM TO THE CLAIM
Modern law divides personal jurisdiction into two types:
specific and general. The Chinese defendants here are almost
certainly not subject to general jurisdiction in Pennsylvania.
General jurisdiction is available only when a defendant is
“essentially at home in the forum State.” Goodyear, 564 U.S.
at 919. For corporations, the “paradigm[atic]” examples are
“the place of incorporation and principal place of business.”
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137 (2014) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Even engaging in a “substantial,
continuous, and systematic course of business” in the forum
state is not enough for general jurisdiction. Id. at 138.
Specific jurisdiction, by contrast, gives state courts power
over any defendant that “purposefully avails itself of the priv-
ilege of conducting activities within the forum State.” Hanson
v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). But while reaching a
broader class of defendants, it covers a narrower class of
claims—only those that “arise out of or relate to” the defend-
ant’s contacts with the forum. Ford, 592 U.S. at 359 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
“The first half of that standard [arising-out-of] asks about
causation.” Id. at 362. There must be a causal link between the
defendant’s contacts with the forum and the claim. Demanding
a causal link protects defendants, letting them “structure their
primary conduct” to avoid certain types of lawsuits in a partic-
ular state. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297. If the
defendant’s contact with the forum directly causes the plain-
tiff’s claim, a single contact could be enough. See, e.g., Kulko
7
v. Super. Ct., 436 U.S. 84, 96 (1978) (noting that single gun-
shot into forum state can sometimes be enough); McGee v. Int’l
Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222–23 (1957) (holding that breach
of contract with single forum-state resident is enough); Moore
v. Little Giant Indus., Inc., 513 F. Supp. 1043, 1045, 1049–50
(D. Del. 1981), aff’d mem., 681 F.2d 807 (3d Cir. 1982) (hold-
ing that shipping a single defective product to forum state,
causing injury there, is enough).
A claim need not be directly caused by a defendant’s con-
tacts with the forum state. It can instead “relate to the defendant’s
contacts with the forum.” Ford, 592 U.S. at 362 (internal quo-
tation marks omitted). And for these more distantly “relate[d]”
claims, courts apply other “real limits” to “adequately protect
defendants foreign to a forum.” Id.
In Ford Motor, for example, Ford had marketed, sold, and
serviced many cars in the forum states. Id. at 365. Because Ford
had “continuously and deliberately exploited” those states’
markets for cars, the Court concluded that it was fair for those
states to exercise jurisdiction over Ford when some of those
cars malfunctioned. Id. at 364 (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). True, the plaintiffs in that case had not bought their cars
in the forum states, so the claims were not directly caused by
Ford’s contacts there. But the accidents happened in the forum
states, to residents of those states. Each plaintiff had sued “in
the most natural State.” Id. at 370. This was not a case of “forum-
shopping—suing in [a state] because it was thought plaintiff-
friendly, even though their cases had no tie to the State.” Id. at
369–70.
8
Ford Motor thus suggests that when a state has a strong
connection to both the defendant and the claim, it may exercise
jurisdiction over the defendant even if his contacts there did
not directly cause the claim. Cf. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v.
Super. Ct., 582 U.S. 255, 264 (2017) (holding that defendant’s
extensive contacts with a forum cannot make up for the lack of
any connection between that forum and the claim). In other
words, as the “intensity of the defendant’s forum contacts”
grows stronger, the required link between his contacts and the
claim can be weaker. Hasson v. FullStory, Inc., 114 F.4th 181,
193 (3d Cir. 2024) (internal quotation marks omitted). The
inverse is equally true: The fewer the defendant’s contacts with
the forum, the stronger the link must be between his contacts
and the claim.
IV. PROMIER HAS NOT MET ITS BURDEN TO
SHOW JURISDICTION
Promier offered evidence of two ways that defendants
availed themselves of Pennsylvania. First, they all opened
storefronts on Amazon, a nationwide retailer. Second, each
defendant sold and shipped its flashlight to Promier’s lawyers.
Promier also asserted that from these two facts, one can infer
that defendants made other sales in Pennsylvania. See, e.g.,
App. 59 (¶ 13) (alleging that “[e]ach Defendant targets …
Pennsylvania, and has packaged, advertised, offered for sale,
and … sold and continues to sell products, including falsely
advertised flashlights, to consumers” there); App. 60 (¶ 17)
(alleging that “Defendants have purposefully directed some
portion of their illegal activities towards consumers in … Penn-
sylvania through the advertisement, offer to sell, sale, and/or
9
shipment of falsely advertised products”). But it did not other-
wise substantiate those assertions, and the defendants who
answered the complaint denied them. So the District Court did
not have to give those assertions any weight.
Five of our sister circuits have addressed similar facts on
motions to dismiss, reaching four different holdings. Am. Girl,
LLC v. Zembrka, 118 F.4th 271, 275, 280 (2d Cir. 2024) (find-
ing personal jurisdiction, even though the one sale was made
to plaintiff’s lawyer and defendant cancelled the order before
shipping it into the forum); NBA Props., Inc. v. HANWJH, 46
F.4th 614, 624–27 (7th Cir. 2022) (finding personal jurisdic-
tion once item shipped, even though the buyer was plaintiff’s
lawyer); Herbal Brands, Inc. v. Photoplaza, Inc., 72 F.4th
1085, 1095, 1097 (9th Cir. 2023) (finding personal jurisdiction
because plaintiff was from forum state and sale was part of
defendant’s “regular course of business,” but suggesting there
might not be jurisdiction if plaintiff’s lawyer bought item just
to create jurisdiction); Bros. & Sisters in Christ, LLC v. Zazzle,
Inc., 42 F.4th 948, 953–54 (8th Cir. 2022) (no personal juris-
diction where plaintiff alleged only one sale into state, with no
mention of whether sale was to lawyer); Admar Int’l, Inc. v.
Eastrock, LLC, 18 F.4th 783, 788 n.1 (5th Cir. 2021) (same).
Two district courts in this circuit have even addressed this
recurring fact pattern by issuing standing orders, effectively
trying to settle a contested question of constitutional law in the
guise of administrative rules. In re: “Schedule A” Cases,
Standing Order No. 2025-04, at *2 (D.N.J. Sept. 25, 2025)
(“[T]he law is also well-settled that that plaintiff cannot create
personal jurisdiction by ordering a product to be shipped to the
forum.”); In re: “Schedule A” Cases, Standing Order No. 2:25-
10
CV-926, at *4 (W.D. Pa. July 10, 2025) (same). Though seem-
ingly exceeding those courts’ authority to make procedural
rules, these standing orders highlight the need for guidance
from this Court.
A. Defendants might have had minimum contacts with
Pennsylvania
Listing a product on Amazon’s website is not a contact with
Pennsylvania. Amazon sellers just seek “to exploit a national
market that necessarily include[s] Pennsylvania.” Shuker v.
Smith & Nephew, PLC, 885 F.3d 760, 780 (3d Cir. 2018) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted). That is not enough to avail one-
self of Pennsylvania specifically.
Shipping something into the state can change things.
“[P]hysical entry into the state … through … mail … is cer-
tainly a relevant contact” for personal jurisdiction. Walden v.
Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 285 (2014). Of course, neither this Court
nor the Supreme Court has ever held that one shipment of one
item into the forum is necessarily enough for jurisdiction. Has-
son, 114 F.4th at 195 n.5; Ford, 592 U.S. at 366 n.4. After all,
the Supreme Court has “long treated isolated or sporadic trans-
actions differently from continuous ones.” Id. (second source).
So if one shipment, unaccompanied by additional follow-on
contacts with a customer, can satisfy the contacts prong, that is
the bare minimum. As a result, to provide jurisdiction, it would
have to be coupled with a claim that is closely related to that
shipment. Hasson, 114 F.4th at 193.
11
B. Promier’s claims do not arise out of or relate to
defendants’ known contacts
False-advertising claims protect against “injury to a com-
mercial interest in reputation or sales.” Lexmark Int’l v. Static
Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 132 (2014) (interpret-
ing Lanham Act); cf. Penn. St. Univ. v. Univ. Orthopedics, Ltd.,
706 A.2d 863, 870 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998) (noting that federal
law “serves as persuasive authority” in interpreting Pennsylva-
nia’s common law of unfair competition). This injury “occurs
when deception of consumers causes them to withhold trade
from the plaintiff.” Lexmark Int’l, 572 U.S. at 133; see also
Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 639 (2d
Cir. 1956) (“[T]he wrong takes place … where the deceived cus-
tomer buys the defendant’s product in the belief that he is buy-
ing the plaintiff’s.”) (emphasis added). Here, that happens
when a consumer buys a defendant’s flashlight instead of
Promier’s because false advertising deceives him.
Promier’s false-advertising claims thus arise out of defend-
ants’ sales to deceived consumers—not Promier’s lawyers.
After all, the law firm “obviously was not confused” about the
goods’ qualities. Buccellati Holding Italia S.p.A. v. Laura Buc-
cellati, LLC, 935 F. Supp. 2d 615, 624 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). And
though the claims also arise out of defendants’ listings on
Amazon, those listings are not contacts with Pennsylvania spe-
cifically. See Shuker, 885 F.3d at 780. So Promier has not
shown that its claims were directly caused by any contacts that
defendants made with Pennsylvania.
Nor has Promier shown that its claims are related to defend-
ants’ contacts with Pennsylvania. Again, for each defendant,
12
Promier has shown only one Pennsylvania-specific contact: its
own lawyers’ test buy. It has not shown that defendants “sys-
tematically served a market” in Pennsylvania such that they
should expect to be held accountable there. Ford Motor, 592
U.S. at 365. Given the truly minimal contacts that Promier has
shown—just one sale by each defendant—the relatedness bar
is high. After all, relatedness “does not mean anything goes.”
Id. at 362. Promier has not shown that the “relationship among
the defendants, the forum, and the litigation is close enough to
support specific jurisdiction.” Id. at 371 (cleaned up).
To show personal jurisdiction at trial, Promier will need to
prove at least one sale to a deceived consumer in Pennsylvania
by a preponderance of the evidence (though we do not decide
whether only one sale would be enough). So for a preliminary
injunction, Promier must show a reasonable likelihood that it
will eventually be able to prove that. This requires more than
just showing that the defendants offered goods for nationwide
sale through Amazon. The question is: Based on the evidence
before us, how likely is it that evidence of actual sales will fol-
low? And here, the sales to Promier’s lawyers add nothing
beyond what a screenshot of an Amazon profile would reveal—
that defendants are willing and able to ship to all fifty states.
So the District Court did not err in finding that Promier’s evi-
dence fell short.
V. SOME DEFENDANTS MAY HAVE WAIVED
PERSONAL JURISDICTION
Still, personal jurisdiction is waivable. For parties who
have appeared in a case, judges may not dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction sua sponte. Zelson v. Thomforde, 412
13
F.2d 56, 59 (3d Cir. 1969). And even if a defendant disputes
personal jurisdiction in its answer, it may later waive (more
accurately, forfeit) it by asking for affirmative relief without
resolving jurisdiction first. Bel-Ray, 181 F.3d at 443.
On remand, the District Court should consider whether any
defendants have waived this defense. See D. Ct. ECF Nos. 36,
49, 53, 68; App. 202, 442–43, 448–60, 467. For those defend-
ants who have waived personal jurisdiction, the court should
consider the preliminary-injunction motion afresh. To guide its
analysis, we note that if a plaintiff shows a likelihood of suc-
cess on the merits of a Lanham Act false-advertising claim,
irreparable harm is rebuttably presumed. 15 U.S.C. § 1116(a);
Nichino Am., Inc. v. Valent U.S.A. LLC, 44 F.4th 180, 185–86
(3d Cir. 2022) (detailing the burden-shifting approach for this
rebuttable presumption). Of course, that presumption, even if
unrebutted, might carry less weight in the context of a non-
comparative advertising suit (like this one) than it would in a
comparative-advertising or trademark-infringement case. See
N. Am. Med. Corp. v. Axiom Worldwide, Inc., 522 F.3d 1211,
1227 (11th Cir. 2008). We leave this for the District Court to
consider in the first instance.
For those defendants who have not waived personal juris-
diction, denying a preliminary injunction does not end the case.
The order under review decided only that Promier’s showing
at this stage fell short. Presumably, on remand, the District
Court will take up the issue of personal jurisdiction anew, per-
haps allowing jurisdictional discovery or conducting an evi-
dentiary hearing. Though Promier claims that defendants have
made more sales in Pennsylvania, it does not yet have the facts
to back up those claims. But given defendants’ presence on
14
Amazon and evident willingness to ship goods to Pennsylva-
nia, those allegations are not frivolous. See Toys “R” Us, Inc.
v. Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446, 456 (3d Cir. 2003). This is not
a case where “ ‘due process’ means ‘no process.’ ” Robert H.
Jackson, What Price “Due Process”?, 5 N.Y. L. Rev. 435, 436
(1927). It simply requires more process.
*****
False-advertising claims arise out of sales to deceived con-
sumers, not resourceful lawyers. The District Court got that
right, but it erred in overlooking whether some defendants may
have forfeited the issue. We will thus VACATE and REMAND to
let it consider that question and allow jurisdictional discovery.
Counsel for Appellant
Stanley D. Ference, III [Argued]
FERENCE & ASSOCIATES
Counsel for Appellees, Gearoz, et al.
Shaoyi Che
Zhongyi Huang [Argued]
YOUNGZEAL LLP
Counsel for Appellees, AlesDirect, et al.
Jianyin Liu [Argued]
LAW OFFICES OF JIANYIN LIU, PLLC
15