T-Mobile West v. Ramallo CA4/1

Filed 10/27/26 T-Mobile West v. Ramallo CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or or dered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE STATE OF CALIFORNIA T-MOBILE WEST, LLC, D086593 Plaintiff and Respondent, v. (Super. Ct. No. CIVSB2413693) LUIS O. RAMALLO et al., Defendants and Appellants. APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Bernardino County, Jay H. Robinson, Judge. Affirmed. Law Office of Robert D. Conaway and Robert D. Conaway for Defendants and Appellants. Mintz Levin Cohn Ferris Glovsky & Popeo, Antony Nash, Nada I. Shamonki, and Nadia A. Zivkov for Plaintiff and Respondent.  I. INTRODUCTION Defendants1 are developing a UFO-themed hotel along the freeway in Baker, between Southern California and Las Vegas. Plaintiff T-Mobile West, LLC (T-Mobile) provides wireless telecommunication services and operates antenna facilities on tower space it leases on property adjacent to Defendants’ hotel project. T-Mobile alleges that when Defendants added steel “ray gun” thematic features to the rooftop of their hotel, the decorative pieces obstructed radio signals from T-Mobile’s neighboring antenna. T-Mobile sued Defendants alleging that the rooftop features’ obstruction violates an easement that entitles users of the T-Mobile site “to clear and keep clear . . . obstructions as may . . . be necessary for the protection” of communication facilities contemplated in the easement. T-Mobile sought a preliminary injunction requiring Defendants to remove the rooftop adornments. T-Mobile argued it was likely to prevail on the merits because the publicly recorded easement encumbers Defendants’ property and entitles T-Mobile (as successor to the easement’s original grantee) to clear the obstruction. T-Mobile argued the balance of interim harms favored T-Mobile because the obstruction impacted seven critical wireless facilities, and alternative workarounds were too time-consuming and speculative to pursue. Defendants countered that T-Mobile was unlikely to prevail on the merits because no valid easement existed or encumbered Defendants’ property. They argued the balance of harms weighed against an injunction 1 The defendants are Luis O. Ramallo; Susana T. Ramallo; and The Ramallos, Inc. doing business as Alien Fresh Jerky (together, Defendants). 2 because estimated construction and operating delays would cost Defendants upwards of $50,000,000. The trial court issued a preliminary injunction requiring removal of the rooftop features. The court found the likelihood of success prong was “pretty straightforward.” And although the court found the balancing of harms to be “a very, very close question,” the court concluded it favored T-Mobile because T-Mobile would face more contingencies in implementing a workaround than Defendants would face in removing the rooftop appurtenances. The court ordered T-Mobile to post a $750,000 undertaking, setting further proceedings to reevaluate the amount of the undertaking and to determine the specific work required to remove the rooftop features. After reviewing the parties’ supplemental submissions, the court left the injunction and undertaking unchanged. On appeal, Defendants argue that T-Mobile’s evidence regarding the likelihood of prevailing, the balance of harms, and the proper undertaking amount was unpersuasive and conflicted with Defendants’ evidence. They maintain these conflicts precluded the trial court from issuing a preliminary injunction and required resolution by jury trial. As we will explain, Defendants’ arguments misunderstand well-established appellate principles and the nature of provisional relief. Accordingly, we affirm the preliminary injunction. II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND A. The Parties and Their Property Interests 1. Defendants The Ramallos own property located at 72302 Baker Boulevard in unincorporated Baker (the Ramallo Property). The Ramallos are officers of 3 The Ramallos, Inc. doing business as Alien Fresh Jerky, which operates a successful jerky store on the Ramallo Property. Around 2014, the Ramallos began developing a UFO-themed hotel (the UFO Hotel) on the Ramallo Property to capitalize on tourist traffic to “Area 51” in Nevada. Construction of the flying-saucer-shaped hotel structure was largely completed in 2024. Steel and fiberglass “ray gun” thematic elements (the rooftop features) were installed on the hotel rooftop in 2023. 2. Plaintiff T-Mobile is a wireless telecommunications company with millions of customers in the United States. To provide its service, T-Mobile secures property rights to install, access, and maintain thousands of wireless facilities. At issue here is a wireless facility located at 72316 Baker Boulevard in Baker, which the parties sometimes refer to as the “AT&T Property.” The AT&T Property is adjacent to the Ramallo Property and is currently owned by Pacific Bell Telephone Company (Pacific Bell). In 2005, Pacific Bell entered a license agreement with T-Mobile’s predecessor-in-interest, Omnipoint Communications, Inc. (Omnipoint), to grant Omnipoint and its successors and assigns use and rights to the AT&T Property. Specifically, under the agreement, Pacific Bell licensed access to T-Mobile’s attorney in fact, CCTMO LLC, which in turn leases property access rights to T-Mobile. B. The Easement In December 1961, when the AT&T Property was owned by Pacific Bell’s predecessor — Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Company (Pacific Telephone) — the then-owner of the Ramallo Property, Jeanette M. Howard Metheny, granted an easement to Pacific Telephone (the Easement). The 4 Easement was publicly recorded on February 20, 1962. The Easement granted Pacific Telephone and “its successors and assigns” the right to install telecommunications facilities and to keep them accessible and unobstructed. With regard to facilities, the Easement grants “an exclusive easement to construct, place, operate, maintain, repair, replace and remove such aerial and underground telephone, telegraph and communication structures consisting of a 10’ x 10’ x 40’ Central Office building, one existing 10’ x 10’ x 8’ concrete block building, surface testing terminals, poles, wires, cables, conduits, manholes and necessary fixtures and appurtenances in, under and upon real property” legally described in the Easement. As to access and obstruction, the Easement grants “the right to clear and keep cleared from said easement such brush or other obstructions as may in the opinion of [the] Grantee [i.e., Pacific Telephone and its successors and assigns] be necessary for the protection of said building or structures in the use of said easement.” C. The Complaint In April 2024, T-Mobile filed a complaint against Defendants for breach of easement, declaratory judgment, and private nuisance, stemming from the UFO Hotel’s alleged interference with radio signals from T-Mobile’s wireless facilities on the AT&T Property. The complaint refers to these as the “Impacted Wireless Facilities.” T-Mobile alleges it did not observe any obstruction of its wireless facilities during initial stages of the hotel’s construction. However, T-Mobile alleges, “recent construction” of “[s]teel beams and some architectural features . . . directly in front of one of T-Mobile’s Impacted Wireless Facilitates” was “obstructing radio frequency emissions to and from 5 T-Mobile’s Impacted Wireless Facilities and the services they provide.” The complaint alleges the hotel’s interference with T-Mobile’s wireless facilities violates the Easement provision giving the grantee the right to clear obstructions as the grantee deems necessary. The complaint prays for (among other things) “[a]n injunction requiring Defendants to remove the steel beams, architectural features, or any other objects on top of their UFO Hotel.” D. Preliminary Injunction 1. T-Mobile’s Motion In October 2024, about six months after filing its lawsuit, T-Mobile moved for a preliminary injunction “prohibiting the placement of steel beams, architectural features, or any other objects on top of Defendants’ UFO Hotel that interfere with or reduce the full functionality of T-Mobile’s use of its Impacted Wireless Facilities.” T-Mobile supported its motion with a declaration from its Director of Network Engineering & Operations, Lowell Handy. Handy described the parties, their property interests, and the Easement as summarized above.2 (See part II.A., ante.) He then addressed the UFO Hotel’s interference with T-Mobile’s wireless facilities, its impact on T-Mobile’s operations, and T-Mobile’s efforts to mitigate the interference. Handy identified the UFO Hotel’s rooftop features as the source of interference. He explained that “[b]efore construction of the decorative features began, the Hotel structure was not causing interference and 2 Handy’s declaration attached as an exhibit an assessor’s parcel map showing the Easement in relation to the Ramallo Property. 6 disruption to T-Mobile’s wireless facilities.” But the erection of “steel beams, architectural features, and other objects on the rooftop . . . directly in front of one of T-Mobile’s Impacted Wireless Facilities” began “significantly impacting and disrupting T-Mobile’s . . . Impacted Wireless Facilities” by “obstruct[ing] radio frequency emissions.” Handy explained why the “full functionality of T-Mobile’s Impacted Wireless Facilities in this location is essential.” “The Impacted Wireless Facilities serve as a ‘donor’ to seven other facilities in the greater area. As a ‘donor’ site, the Impacted Wireless Facilities use point to point microwave transmissions to send wireless signals to and from other T-Mobile wireless sites, which then retransmit the signals to provide personal wireless service in the areas surrounding those sites. T-Mobile’s microwave transmissions require a clear, unimpeded path (or ‘line of sight’) between the sending and receiving microwave facilities. Moreover, the Impacted Wireless Facilities provide critical wireless services for T-Mobile’s customers and the surrounding community.” Because of the integrated nature of these wireless facilities, the hotel’s obstruction of the Impacted Wireless Facilities on the AT&T Property was “causing significant connection issues that are affecting T-Mobile’s wireless facilities and services even beyond the immediate vicinity of the Impacted Wireless Facilities.” Handy asserted that this interference “render[ed] T-Mobile’s ability to use the AT&T Property essentially useless” and, therefore, “wasted the time, money, and other resources that T-Mobile poured into negotiating and improving the AT&T Property.” Handy described “several steps” T-Mobile took or considered “to address Defendants’ interference with its Impacted Wireless Facilities. For example, T-Mobile has sought potential relocation of the Impacted Wireless Facilities on the AT&T Property . . . . If the Impacted Wireless Facilities on 7 the AT&T Property were raised, continued interference would be highly likely to continue. In addition to relocating the Impacted Wireless Facilities to a different property—which would render the Easement useless for its intended use and to T-Mobile—relocating or constructing a temporary facility on a different property would require substantial time, expense, administrative processes with the County, and ultimately, there is no certainty that a different location could be found, secured, or approved.” Handy further explained that the interference financially impacted T-Mobile by “diminish[ing] the value of the Easement,” “caus[ing] T-Mobile to spend money and resources to find solutions to restore signal connectivity,” and by “significantly damag[ing]” T-Mobile’s reputation for “quality of service” in the “highly competitive” wireless telecommunications industry. Handy reasoned that “[w]ithout an injunction, T-Mobile will continue to suffer substantial harm to its reputation and goodwill with customers,” who will “switch[] providers.” Finally, Handy concluded that “[f]inding an alternate location” for the Impacted Wireless Facilities was “simply not feasible” because “start[ing] all over at a new site . . . generally takes years and millions of dollars to find the appropriate site location (if even possible), negotiate a lease agreement, apply for permits, design power supplies, construct and install the wireless facilities, and integrate and activate them.” T-Mobile’s attorney submitted a declaration explaining he had researched a previous lawsuit involving an easement dispute between the AT&T Property and the Ramallo Property. Records from the lawsuit showed it involved a damaged underground cable. Resolution of that case did not “waive[] or reduce[]” T-Mobile’s rights under the Easement. 8  Based on this evidence, T-Mobile argued it was likely to prevail on its claims for breach of easement and private nuisance. Specifically, T-Mobile cited its right under the Easement “to clear and keep cleared from said easement such . . . obstructions as may in the opinion of the Grantee be necessary.” T-Mobile also argued it would “suffer far greater harm than Defendants if it cannot restore its Impacted Wireless Facilities.” On one hand, T-Mobile maintained that it would continue to suffer harm from the interference with the Impacted Wireless Facilities, diminished value of the Easement and property rights in the AT&T Property, and interference with customers’ “ability to use their contractual benefits with T-Mobile.” T-Mobile reasoned “no amount of money” could compensate for these harms. “In contrast,” T-Mobile argued, “the only harm conceivably faced by Defendants is loss of a decorative element on top of the Hotel.” 2. Defendants’ Opposition Defendants opposed T-Mobile’s motion and filed seven declarations and a request for judicial notice. Defendants argued T-Mobile was unlikely to prevail on the merits of its claims for several reasons. Regarding standing, Defendants argued it was “questionable” whether T-Mobile was the proper plaintiff because government records attached to Defendants’ request for judicial notice showed that the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) license for T-Mobile’s Impacted Wireless Facilities were issued in the name of a different T-Mobile entity that was not registered with the Secretary of State to do business in California. Conversely, Defendants argued T-Mobile named the 9 wrong defendants because the UFO Hotel building was owned by The UFO Hotel, Inc., which was not named in the lawsuit. Defendants also challenged the validity of the Easement in several ways. First, they argued they prevailed in previous litigation that determined the Ramallo Property was not subject to an easement serving the AT&T Property. Defendants supported this argument with Mr. Ramallo’s declaration briefly describing the litigation, documents regarding the judgment in that litigation, and a declaration filed in that litigation from a Pacific Bell employee who determined no easement authorized Pacific Bell to place underground wires on the Ramallo Property. Second, Defendants argued the Easement was invalid because the purported grantor (Ms. Matheny) no longer owned the Ramallo Property when she ostensibly granted the Easement. Defendants supported this assertion with the declaration from a licensed professional land surveyor, Joseph Miller, who stated he determined Matheney “did not own or have any rights to the property” when she granted the easement in 1962 because she had already conveyed title to C.E. Huffman and Lena A. Huffman in 1961. Miller also opined that the location of the Easement as shown on the annotated assessor’s parcel map attached to Handy’s declaration in support of T-Mobile’s motion was incorrect. Miller further asserted that the antenna tower on which T-Mobile’s Impacted Wireless Facilities were installed was outside the Easement area on the AT&T Property. Third, Defendants disputed the scope of rights that the Easement granted. Defendants argued it was limited to brush clearance, not unobstructed radio waves. Defendants also raised several challenges to T-Mobile’s claim that it suffered irreparable injury. First, Defendants disputed that the Impacted 10 Wireless Facilities had, in fact, been affected by construction of the rooftop features. Defendants asserted that a T-Mobile employee whom Defendants deposed to prepare their opposition — Market Manager Muhammad Ahmed — acknowledged that T-Mobile based its interference claim only on photos and not network performance data. Defendants countered this claim with photos of the Impacted Wireless Facilities purporting to show that they were not obstructed. Mr. Ramallo also stated there had been “[n]o cell signal degradation” at the Ramallo Property, though he did not specify whether he had T-Mobile service. Second, Defendants asserted T-Mobile had already implemented a workaround for any signal interference. Defendants cited T-Mobile Market Manager Ahmed’s deposition testimony that T-Mobile rerouted microwave signal communication from a different location, which provided relief to four of the seven interconnected wireless facilities. The witness added, however, that the temporary solution was already at 99 percent capacity. Defendants argued that the balance of harms weighed in their favor. On one hand, Defendants asserted that T-Mobile could eliminate any obstruction by simply repositioning the impacted microwave dish about 10 feet higher on the same tower. Defendants cited Ahmed’s testimony that T-Mobile has done this at other locations in the past when “there is specific distance available between the [wireless service] antennas and the microwave.” Mr. Ramallo stated he received an estimate that repositioning the microwave dish would cost less than $10,000. On the other hand, Defendants maintained they would incur substantial expense and delay if the court issued the requested injunction. A civil engineer involved with the UFO Hotel project, Ricky Sarmiento, submitted a one-page declaration with a one-page scope of work “explain[ing] 11 the significant amount of rework that would be created by granting the . . . preliminary injunction.” Sarmiento opined the retrofitting would (1) involve approximately 55,000 pounds of steelwork, including retrofitting other parts of the building’s steel structure “due to the unbalanced loading condition as a result of removing the roof theme elements”; (2) possibly require new construction permitting that could take up to three years to process; and (3) “require extensive engineering work” and “extensive shoring to stabilize the whole structure.” Dennis Santiago, a licensed contractor and the “project overseer and superintendent” of the UFO Hotel project, submitted a declaration estimating that the cost of retrofitting the hotel to remove the rooftop features “could potentially exceed $30 million” because of “the hotel’s remote desert location” and “the high liability associated with [its] unconventional structure.” Santiago believed the work would require “removal of the upper steel structure of the UFO Hotel.”3 Santiago’s declaration was about two pages and attached no exhibits. Business consultant Peter Mehit submitted a declaration attaching portions of a business plan he prepared for the UFO Hotel. He estimated projected hotel revenues would exceed $20 million during its first three years of operation. Defendants requested that, if the court were to issue a preliminary injunction, the court require T-Mobile to post a $20 million undertaking. 3 Mr. Ramallo likewise stated in his declaration that the rooftop features “are connected to structural steel” and “steel footings” that were “designed to handle the load” of the rooftop features. 12  3. T-Mobile’s Reply T-Mobile filed a reply brief addressing Defendants’ arguments. Regarding its own standing, T-Mobile pointed out that Handy explained in his declaration that the plaintiff entity is the operator of the licensed frequencies for the wireless facilities on the AT&T Property. Regarding Defendants’ argument that T-Mobile sued the wrong defendant, T-Mobile submitted evidence that The UFO Hotel, Inc. was not in good standing with the California Secretary of State records and, in any event, the Ramallos (who are named defendants) are the entity’s only officers. Responding to Defendants’ challenges to the Easement’s validity, T-Mobile submitted a preliminary title report showing that the Easement encumbers the Ramallo Property. T-Mobile also submitted a quitclaim deed showing that the Easement’s original grantor did not convey the Ramallo Property to the Huffmans until 1965 — over three years after she granted the Easement. In contrast to these title records, T-Mobile observed that Defendants offered no documentary evidence to support their surveyor’s conclusory assertions regarding the Ramallo Property’s chain of title. Further, T-Mobile explained that the previous easement litigation involved a claimed prescriptive easement arising from a land patent and had no relation to the Easement. Regarding the Easement’s location, T-Mobile explained that even if “the physical footprint of the Easement is solely within the AT&T Property” — that is, that the Easement granted the right to construct facilities only on that property — “it would have no impact on T-Mobile’s rights . . . to protect the dominant estate [i.e., the AT&T Property] from interference on the servient Ramallo Property.” T-Mobile also cited authority supporting the proposition that the right to remove obstructions to buildings 13 and phone lines included the right to remove obstructions to radio waves because radio waves are the natural evolution of the telecommunications technology covered by the Easement. (Citing Salvaty v. Falcon Cable Television (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 798, 803 [holding that “the addition of cable television equipment on surplus space on [a] telephone pole was within the scope of [an] easement for” telephone and power lines because, “[a]lthough the cable television industry did not exist at the time the easement was granted, it is part of the natural evolution of communications technology”].) T-Mobile also disputed Defendants’ claim that the rooftop features did not obstruct the Impacted Wireless Facilities. T-Mobile submitted excerpts of Market Manager Ahmed’s deposition testimony stating that he (1) “as an engineer,” could “clearly tell” from photos “that the microwave dish path . . . is obstructed, and it will be causing interference”; and (2) reviewed “received[-]signal level” and “site[-]availability” data that confirmed the obstruction, which at times involved “losing complete sites during the day.” T-Mobile reiterated that its temporary workaround addressed only four of the seven interconnected towers and was already at 99 percent capacity. Ahmed submitted a declaration rebutting Defendants’ claim that T-Mobile could eliminate the obstruction by repositioning the microwave dish higher on the existing tower. First, doing so would not allow sufficient separation between the microwave dish and the wireless service antennas already at the top of the tower, “which would cause interference among the 14 radiofrequency signals.”4 Second, raising the microwave dish 10 feet “would not provide sufficient clearance to resolve the interference” from the rooftop features, but rather, would cause “an even more significant impact on the microwave link.” Third, “the tower would need to be structurally capable of handling the weight and loading factors of the dish at that point on the tower.” Finally, because T-Mobile does not own the tower, T-Mobile would need the owner’s permission to move the dish. Regarding the balance of harms, T-Mobile attacked Defendants’ evidence as “speculative and unsubstantiated.” T-Mobile estimated the removal “should realistically cost in the tens of thousands not tens of millions” of dollars. Accordingly, T-Mobile stated it was “prepared to post a $250,000 undertaking” if the court issued a preliminary injunction. T-Mobile lodged evidentiary objections to much of Defendants’ supporting evidence. 4. Hearing and Trial Court’s Ruling The trial court heard T-Mobile’s motion on February 4, 2025. The court granted the parties’ requests for judicial notice and overruled T-Mobile’s evidentiary objections. After hearing extensive argument from counsel, the trial court granted T-Mobile’s motion. Preliminarily, the court determined that because the nature of relief T-Mobile sought was a mandatory injunction — “it requires affirmative acts on behalf of the enjoined party” (i.e., “removal of at least one part of a 4 The tower is 60 feet tall. T-Mobile has wireless service antennas at the very top of the tower, extending down to 57 feet above the ground. The obstructed microwave dish is located on the tower at a centerline of 49 feet above ground level. 15 structure”) — “[t]here is a stronger showing that is required.” The court nevertheless concluded T-Mobile met this heightened threshold. The court found that T-Mobile “sustained its burden on its likelihood to prevail on the merits of each of its causes of action.” The court found the evidence on this point “pretty straightforward.” The court then turned to the “the second part of the analysis, which is . . . the interim harm the plaintiff will suffer if the injunction is not issued compared to the harm the defendant would suffer if it . . . is issued.” The court deemed this “a very, very close question” that ultimately favored T-Mobile. On one hand, the court was unpersuaded by Defendants’ projected lost revenue because the hotel “business hasn’t opened yet.” On the other hand, the court noted the importance of T-Mobile’s “telecommunications service, including emergency services, in a very rural area of Southern California.” This importance was heightened by the fact T-Mobile was “already operating on an improvised solution” that left T-Mobile without “an additional redundancy.” The court also found that “the number of adjustments that would be needed to T-Mobile’s communications network that would provide the same level of service prior to the obstruction . . . is subject to far more contingencies and far less certainty than the adjustment that the defense would need to make.” The court reasoned that because “the county has already permitted [the UFO Hotel] structure, it would stand to reason that the county would also permit adjustments” to the hotel to facilitate emergency communication services in the area. In contrast, “the number of contingencies and the number of uncertainties that inure to T-Mobile’s detriment” — “potentially separate litigation proceedings as to each one of their seven locations,” 16 followed by system testing and adjustments — “tilt[ed] the court’s analysis in [T-Mobile’s] favor.” The court ordered T-Mobile to post a $750,000 undertaking. Because of the mandatory nature of the injunction, the court directed Defendants to submit additional evidence describing “the exact actions” required to remove the rooftop features and the “effect . . . that would have on the remaining footprint of the hotel.” The court set a hearing on these issues for March 6, 2025, which the court later continued to April 1, 2025. E. Motion for Reconsideration In the meantime, in February 2025, Defendants moved the court to reconsider or dissolve the preliminary injunction. (See Code Civ. Proc.,5 §§ 1008 [reconsideration], 533 [modification or dissolution of injunction “when the ends of justice would be served”].) In addition to restating their original opposition to T-Mobile’s motion, Defendants argued the court’s order and request for additional information violated Defendants’ rights under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Defendants supported their motion with additional evidence regarding FCC licensure of T-Mobile entities, county permit records from 1996 regarding installation of wireless facilities on the AT&T Property, and an email showing that AT&T hired surveyor Miller in 2012 for easement work (which Defendants argued shows that “Miller was considered by both sides to be a go to guy”). Defendants’ attorney explained in a declaration that he did not initially submit some of this additional evidence because he 5 Statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise indicated. 17 “thought [Defendants’ original evidentiary showing] was sufficient to raise [a] factual dispute and felt the additional paperwork might be . . . cumulative.” In opposition, T-Mobile argued that (1) Defendants’ motion did “not present any new facts, circumstances, or law,” but rather merely “rehash[ed] or recharacterize[d] the very same arguments and ‘evidence’ Defendants presented in their opposition”; and (2) “the motion fail[ed] to establish its allegedly new facts and circumstances could not be presented at the preliminary injunction hearing.” In reply, Defendants reargued (1) the import of T-Mobile’s deponent’s testimony given before the preliminary injunction hearing, (2) surveyor Miller’s opinions regarding the existence and location of the Easement, and (3) the previous easement litigation. F. Submissions Regarding Removal of the Rooftop Features 1. Defendants’ Submission On March 4, 2025, Defendants filed the supplemental material requested by the trial court regarding the scope of work required to remove the UFO Hotel’s rooftop features. A supporting declaration from contractor Santiago described the work required to remove the rooftop features and estimated it would cost more than $28 million. Defendants’ engineer, Sarmiento, stated in a declaration that the removal work would take about 18 months and cost $28 million, “more or less.” Surveyor Miller submitted a declaration clarifying statements he made in his earlier declaration and discussing the previous easement litigation. He 18 attached a preliminary title report for the Ramallo Property that showed the property was not encumbered by the Easement. The UFO Hotel project’s “architect of record,” Tom Steeno, submitted a declaration asserting that the county’s approval of the hotel project specified that revisions would require a new county review and approval process. Steeno also discussed his views regarding the validity of the Easement. Business consultant Mehit submitted a declaration elaborating on his estimate of revenue Defendants would lose from removing the rooftop features. Mr. Ramallo submitted a declaration discussing (1) land surveys conducted during previous development of the Ramallo Property that did not reveal the Easement; (2) the previous easement litigation; (3) the preliminary title report for the Ramallo Property that did not show it was encumbered by the Easement; and (4) the fact that the UFO Hotel’s roof and structure are complete and that changes will require new permits and engineering, which will trigger delays. 2. T-Mobile’s Submission T-Mobile filed a brief and declarations from its attorney and an engineer. The attorney explained that Defendants refused to allow T-Mobile to inspect the UFO Hotel’s rooftop or to access its latest construction plans. The engineer, Kevin McCoy, stated he had “more than 30 years of experience in the fields of civil and structural engineering, forensic engineering, and civil and structural design and analysis.” After Defendants refused to allow a site inspection or to provide construction plans, McCoy visited the county’s development office and reviewed the plans there. Based on his review of those plans and the supplemental declarations from 19 Sarmiento and Santiago, McCoy asserted that the representations in those declarations were “not credible.” Specifically, McCoy opined that, “[c]ontrary to insinuations in Mr. Sarmiento’s and Mr. Santiago’s declarations” that the rooftop features are fully integrated into the hotel structure, the rooftop features “are just attached to the roof framing” and “can be pulled off and put back on.” Moreover, removing the rooftop features “would ultimately make the UFO Hotel lighter and more compact and would not require the significant ‘retrofitting’ and ‘additional support’ suggested by Mr. Sarmiento and Mr. Santiago.” Accordingly, McCoy opined that T-Mobile’s $750,000 undertaking was “more than sufficient to cover” the removal, storage, and reinstallation (if necessary) of the rooftop features. T-Mobile objected generally to Defendants’ supplemental submissions to the extent they sought to merely relitigate issuance of the preliminary injunction. T-Mobile also asserted specific evidentiary objections to portions of Defendants’ evidence. G. Hearing and Trial Court’s Ruling On April 1, 2025, the trial court heard Defendants’ motion for reconsideration and considered the submissions regarding removal of the rooftop features. Regarding reconsideration, the court denied Defendants’ motion and overruled T-Mobile’s evidentiary objections. To the extent Defendants characterized their motion as one for reconsideration under section 1008, the court denied it because, “[o]verall, there appear[ed] to be no new evidence as required by the statute, meaning different facts, circumstances or law for the court to consider that it had not already considered.” Additionally, “[t]o the 20 extent that any of the facts that were submitted in support of the motion were new, there [was] insufficient justification proffered by the defense . . . for not offering it at the time that the court granted the injunction.” The court also found, “[a]t this preliminary stage, [that] there [was] insufficient evidence for the court to grant the alternative relief under section 533 that the ends of justice would be served by modifying or dissolving the injunction.” Turning to removal of the rooftop features, the trial court deemed the evidence from Defendants’ contractor and engineer conclusory and unsupported. The court “didn’t see any supporting facts or documentation about how a modification to a decorative aspect” of the hotel would cost $28 million when construction of the entire UFO Hotel to date cost only $27 million. III. DISCUSSION A. Preliminary Injunction Standards “ ‘[T]rial courts should evaluate two interrelated factors when deciding whether or not to issue a preliminary injunction. The first is the likelihood that the plaintiff will prevail on the merits at trial. The second is the interim harm that the plaintiff is likely to sustain if the injunction were denied compared to the harm that the defendant is likely to suffer if the preliminary injunction were issued.’ ” (White v. Davis (2003) 30 Cal.4th 528, 554; see Midway Venture LLC v. County of San Diego (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 58, 76 (Midway Venture).) “The trial court’s determination must be guided by a ‘mix’ of the potential-merit and interim-harm factors; the greater the plaintiff’s showing on one, the less must be shown on the other to support an injunction.” (Butt v. State of California (1992) 4 Cal.4th 668, 678 (Butt); see Midway Venture, at p. 76.) “A trial court,” however, “may not grant a 21 preliminary injunction, regardless of the balance of interim harm, unless there is some possibility that the plaintiff would ultimately prevail on the merits of the claim.” (Butt, at p. 678.) “Our review of a preliminary injunction ‘may trigger any or all of the three standards of appellate review.’ ” (Anderson v. County of Santa Barbara (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 554, 568 (Anderson); accord, Midway Venture, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at p. 76.) First, “[w]e review de novo the trial court’s application of legal principles.” (Anderson, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 568; accord, Midway Venture, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at p. 76.) Second, “[t]he trial court’s evaluation and weighing of the parties’ likelihood of success on the merits and the balance of harm is reviewed for abuse of discretion.” (Anderson, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 568, accord, Butt, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 678.) “The appellate court will find an abuse of ‘discretion only when [the trial court] has exceeded the bounds of reason or contravened uncontradicted evidence. [Citation.] The burden rests with the party challenging the trial court’s ruling to make a clear showing of an abuse of discretion.” (Santa Clara Valley Water Dist. v. Eisenberg (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th 714, 728 (Eisenberg).) “In reviewing the lower court’s ruling for abuse of discretion, we do not reweigh the evidence or evaluate the credibility of witnesses.” (Ryland Mews Homeowners Assn. v. Munoz (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 705, 712 (Munoz).) “When ‘the preliminary injunction mandates an affirmative act that changes the status quo, we scrutinize it even more closely for abuse of discretion.’ ” (Eisenberg, at p. 728.) Third, “the superior court’s express and implied findings of fact are accepted by appellate courts if supported by substantial evidence.” (Midway Venture, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at p. 77; accord, Anderson, supra, 22 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 568.) “Where the evidence before the trial court was in conflict, we do not reweigh it or determine the credibility of witnesses on appeal. ‘[T]he trial court is the judge of the credibility of the affidavits filed in support of the application for preliminary injunction and it is that court’s province to resolve conflicts.’ [Citation.] Our task is to ensure that the trial court’s factual determinations, whether express or implied, are supported by substantial evidence. [Citation.] Thus, we interpret the facts in the light most favorable to the prevailing party and indulge in all reasonable inferences in support of the trial court’s order.” (Shoemaker v. County of Los Angeles (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 618, 625 (Shoemaker).) We review the trial court’s ruling based on the record as it existed when the trial