International Construction Products LLC v. Caterpillar Inc.
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
Docket25-1629
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
Nos. 25-1629 & 25-1635
____________
INTERNATIONAL CONSTRUCTION PRODUCTS, LLC,
Appellant in No. 25-1635
v.
CATERPILLAR, INC; KOMATSU AMERICA CORP.; ASSOCIATED AUCTION
SERVICES, LLC d/b/a Cat Auction Services
Caterpillar, Inc.,
Appellant in No. 25-1629
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Delaware
(D. C. No. 1:15-cv-00108)
District Judge: Honorable Richard G. Andrews
Argued on July 9, 2026
Before: KRAUSE, FREEMAN and ROTH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: November 19, 2026)
George W. Hicks, Jr. (Argued)
Kirkland & Ellis
1301 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20004
David J. Baldwin
Periann Doko
Berger McDermott
1105 N Market Street
11th Floor
Wilmington, DE 19801
Paul C. Cuomo
Baker Botts
700 K Street NW
Washington, DC 20001
Joseph A. Ostoyich I
Clifford Chance US
2001 K Street NW
Washington, DC 20006
Counsel for Appellant/Cross-Appellee Caterpillar, Inc.
Katherine B. Forrest (Argued)
Ekaterina Stynes
Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison
1345 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10019
William Isaacson
Dunn Isaacson Rhee
401 9th Street NW
Washington, DC 20004
Counsel for Appellee/Cross Appellant International Construction
Products, LLC
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION *
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
2
ROTH, Circuit Judge:
International Construction Products, LLC (ICP) sued Caterpillar Inc., alleging that
Caterpillar violated the Sherman Antitrust Act and tortiously interfered with ICP’s contract
with IronPlanet, a third-party company, by pressuring IronPlanet to breach that contract.
The jury rejected ICP’s antitrust claim but found Caterpillar liable for tortious interference
with contract, awarding ICP compensatory damages of $100 million. The District Court
denied ICP’s motion for a new trial on the antitrust claim and Caterpillar’s motion for
judgment as a matter of law (JMOL), and alternatively, for a new trial, on the tortious
interference claim. Yet, the District Court vacated the jury’s damages award to ICP,
holding that ICP failed to present evidence during trial to support a reasonably certain
award.
Both parties appealed. Caterpillar challenges the District Court’s denial of its
request for JMOL on the tortious interference with contract claim, and in the alternative,
requests a new trial on that claim because it contends that the District Court allowed ICP
to present inadmissible evidence. ICP asserts that the District Court improperly vacated
the jury’s $100 million damages award, and it seeks a new trial on its antitrust claim based
on an allegedly erroneous jury instruction. Because neither party’s arguments warrant
disturbing the District Court’s ruling, we will affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
3
ICP and Caterpillar are both in the heavy construction industry, but differ markedly
in scale—ICP is a startup while Caterpillar is a major industry player. Although ICP and
Caterpillar are the only parties to this litigation, other relevant companies include
Caterpillar Auction Services (Cat Auction), a used construction equipment seller and
IronPlanet, an online marketplace for such equipment. During the relevant period,
Caterpillar owned stakes of approximately 30% in Cat Auction and 10% in IronPlanet.
In early 2014, Cat Auction was in talks to merge with IronPlanet. In March 2014,
ICP contracted with IronPlanet to import newly-made construction equipment
manufactured by Lonking, a Chinese competitor of Caterpillar, and sell it on IronPlanet’s
e-commerce platform. Internal Caterpillar emails show that employees expressed concerns
about the ICP-Iron Planet contract, and relayed them to Cat Auction leadership given their
ongoing merger discussions with IronPlanet. During the first month of the contract
between ICP and IronPlanet, ICP made one sale of the Lonking equipment on IronPlanet’s
e-commerce platform. A month later, IronPlanet terminated the contract and removed
ICP’s online store from its website.
In January 2015, ICP sued Caterpillar in the District of Delaware, alleging that
Caterpillar pressured IronPlanet to terminate its contract with ICP. The complaint asserted
claims under the Sherman Antitrust Act and for tortious interference with contract under
Illinois law. 1 After an eight day trial, the jury rejected ICP’s antitrust claim, but found that
1
During trial, the District Court observed that the “parties appear to have agreed that
Illinois law applies” with respect to the tortious interference with contract claim. Appx.
808 n.12. On appeal, ICP disputes that characterization, contending that the law of North
Carolina could apply because it is ICP’s home state. ICP further argues that “the [D]istrict
4
Caterpillar tortiously interfered with ICP’s contract with IronPlanet and awarded ICP $100
million in damages. Caterpillar moved for JMOL on the tortious interference with contract
claim, while ICP moved for a new trial and a motion to alter or amend the judgment with
respect to the antitrust claim. The District Court denied ICP’s motions and partially granted
Caterpillar’s motion, vacating the jury’s $100 million award. The two parties appealed.
II. DISCUSSION 2
A. Tortious Interference with Contract Claim
In order to succeed on its tortious interference of contract claim, ICP had to prove
by a preponderance of evidence that: (1) a contract existed between ICP and IronPlanet;
(2) Caterpillar knew of the contract; (3) Caterpillar intentionally and unjustifiably induced
IronPlanet to breach the contract; (4) IronPlanet subsequently breached the contract
[C]ourt’s application of Illinois law was premised on the assumption that there was no
conflict of laws” between Illinois and North Carolina law “on any material issue,” and that
the District Court’s vacatur of the jury’s damages award undermined that premise. ICP
Reply Br. 16. This argument comes too late. At no point before the District Court did ICP
assert that the tortious interference claim could be governed by North Carolina law.
Instead, at the motion-to-dismiss stage, ICP argued that either Illinois or Florida law
applied; at summary judgment, it made no choice-of-law argument; and at trial, it jointly
submitted with Caterpillar proposed jury instructions applying Illinois law. Having charted
that course throughout the litigation, ICP cannot now change maps on appeal. By
affirmatively arguing below that Illinois or Florida law governed the claim—and never
suggesting that North Carolina law applied—ICP waived the choice-of-law argument it
now pursues on appeal. See Barna v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs. of Panther Valley Sch. Dist., 877
F.3d 136, 147 (3d Cir. 2017) (“Waiver . . . is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment
of a known right.”) (citation modified) (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733
(1993)); see also Williams v. BASF Catalysts LLC, 765 F.3d 306, 316 (3d Cir. 2014)
(“[P]arties may waive choice-of-law issues.”). Consequently, we analyze the tortious
interference with contract claim under Illinois law.
2
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1337, and 1367. We have
appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
5
because of Caterpillar’s wrongful conduct; and (5) the contractual breach resulted in
damages to ICP. 3 Caterpillar argues it is entitled to JMOL on this claim because ICP failed
to present evidence sufficient to prove the third, fourth, and fifth elements. In the
alternative, Caterpillar requests a new trial based on its assertion that the District Court
allowed ICP to present inadmissible evidence. ICP, in turn, challenges the District Court’s
vacatur of the $100 million in damages the jury awarded for this claim.
1. Caterpillar’s Motion for JMOL 4
i. Third Element
Caterpillar first asserts that ICP did not sufficiently prove that Caterpillar induced
IronPlanet to breach the contract because it failed to present evidence showing any direct
communications between Caterpillar and IronPlanet. Although the trial record is devoid
of such evidence, that absence does not necessarily compel judgment in Caterpillar’s
favor. The record contains ample circumstantial evidence from which a jury could
conclude that Caterpillar pressured IronPlanet to breach its contractual agreement,
including numerous internal Caterpillar emails, emails between Caterpillar and Cat
Auction, and emails between Cat Auction and IronPlanet, all discussing Caterpillar’s
concerns with the potential Cat Auction-IronPlanet merger in light of the IronPlanet-ICP
contract.
3
See Healy v. Metro. Pier & Exposition Auth., 804 F.3d 836, 842 (7th Cir. 2015).
4
We exercise plenary review and apply the same standard as the District Court when
reviewing an appeal of a JMOL—that is, we evaluate whether there was “insufficient
evidence from which a jury reasonably could find liability.” Lightning Lube, Inc. v.
Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 1167 (3d Cir. 1993).
6
Next, Caterpillar argues that even if there was sufficient evidence to demonstrate
that it induced IronPlanet to breach the contract, its inducement was justified because
Illinois law provides for a privilege excusing interference with a contract when “the
defendant was acting to protect an interest which the law deems to be of equal or greater
value than the plaintiff’s contractual rights.” 5 Caterpillar contends it has two interests that
qualify for this privilege: (1) its own business interest in refusing to deal “with IronPlanet
if IronPlanet was going to facilitate the sale of new, Chinese equipment, in direct
competition with Caterpillar’s business model and operations”; and (2) its shareholder
interest as a partial owner of Cat Auction and IronPlanet. 6 Neither of these interests are
applicable here, however.
While refusal to deal may provide a privilege against a tortious interference claim,
that privilege does not apply when the defendant goes beyond merely refusing to deal and
instead uses its economic leverage “as a means of affirmative inducement, compulsion or
pressure to” cause a third party to breach its contract. 7 As discussed above, the jury heard
substantial evidence that Caterpillar did just that by leveraging its influence over the Cat
Auction-IronPlanet merger negotiations to induce IronPlanet to breach its contract with
ICP.
Nor can Caterpillar invoke its shareholder status to claim the privilege, which does
not apply when the shareholder defendant “acted in its own interests and contrary to the
5
Nation v. Am. Cap., Ltd., 682 F.3d 648, 651 (7th Cir. 2012) (citation modified).
6
Caterpillar First-Step Br. 45–51.
7
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766 cmt. l (1979).
7
interests of its principal.” 8 Sufficient evidence supported the jury’s finding that Caterpillar
acted to protect its own interests—not those of either Cat Auction or IronPlanet—when it
interfered with the contract. After all, the evidence showed that the introduction of new,
Chinese-made construction equipment into the United States only threatened Caterpillar’s
interests; Cat Auction and IronPlanet, by contrast, operated in the used construction
equipment market and would not have been similarly affected. The jury also had sufficient
evidence to conclude that Caterpillar acted contrary to both Cat Auction and IronPlanet’s
interests because IronPlanet viewed its agreement with ICP as a means to expand its
offerings, and Caterpillar’s interference with the merger negotiations undermined Cat
Auction’s stated intention to merge with IronPlanet.
ii. Fourth Element
Caterpillar argues that because IronPlanet had a valid basis to terminate the contract,
ICP failed to prove that IronPlanet breached any contractual obligations. Specifically,
Caterpillar points to the contract provision requiring ICP to possess “all necessary rights,
permits, registrations and authorizations to resell Equipment,” and contends that the
evidence showed that ICP lacked certain authorizations. 9 Consequently, Caterpillar
maintains that ICP’s material breach justified IronPlanet’s termination of the contract. But
that argument overlooks a critical limitation in the agreement—even when a material
breach occurs, the terminating party must provide 30 days’ written notice and an
opportunity to cure before terminating the contract. Yet, the record contains no evidence
8
Citylink Grp., Ltd. v. Hyatt Corp., 729 N.E.2d 869, 877 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000).
9
Appx. 1918–19.
8
that IronPlanet satisfied that prerequisite for termination. The jury therefore had sufficient
evidence to conclude that IronPlanet’s termination did not comply with the contract and
thus constituted a breach.
iii. Fifth Element
Because the District Court vacated the $100 million in damages the jury awarded
ICP for the tortious interference claim, Caterpillar reasons that ICP necessarily failed to
prove the damages element of the claim. Caterpillar misconstrues the District Court’s
ruling. The District Court did not conclude that ICP failed to prove it suffered any
damages; to the contrary, it left intact the jury’s liability finding and held only that the
evidence did not support the damages amount awarded. As discussed below, 10 we agree
that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the jury’s $100 million award. But the
insufficiency of evidence supporting ICP’s damages amount does not entitle Caterpillar to
JMOL on the issue of Caterpillar’s liability.
For these reasons, the District Court did not err in denying Caterpillar’s JMOL
motion.
2. Caterpillar’s Motion for a New Trial 11
10
See infra Part II.A.3.
11
We review an appeal of a motion for new trial for abuse of discretion, see Leonard v.
Stemtech Int’l Inc, 834 F.3d 376, 386 (3d Cir. 2016), and we evaluate a challenge to the
District Court’s admission of evidence for clear error, see United States v. Vega, 285 F.3d
256, 264 (3d Cir. 2002).
9
Caterpillar argues it is entitled to a new trial because the District Court clearly erred
in admitting testimony from Tim Frank, ICP’s founder, explaining that Jeff Jeter,
IronPlanet’s president, told Frank that Caterpillar was exerting pressure on IronPlanet to
stop selling ICP’s equipment on its website. Caterpillar contends that Jeter’s out-of-court
statement constituted inadmissible hearsay. Yet, any error would be harmless if “there is
a ‘high probability’ that the discretionary error did not contribute to the verdict.” 12 We can
be assured that a high probability exists where the record contains substantial independent
evidence supporting the jury’s verdict. 13 Caterpillar emphasizes the importance of Frank’s
testimony because it is the closest the evidence comes to establishing a direct exchange
between Caterpillar and IronPlanet. However, as discussed above, 14 the record contains
ample circumstantial evidence from which the jury could have determined that Caterpillar
induced IronPlanet to breach the contract. Given the plethora of other evidence before the
jury, we readily conclude that any error in admitting Frank’s testimony was harmless.
Accordingly, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Caterpillar’s motion
for a new trial.
3. The District Court’s Vacatur of the Jury’s Damages Award 15
12
Langbord v. United States Dep’t of Treasury, 832 F.3d 170, 196 (3d Cir. 2016)
(quoting McQueeney v. Wilmington Trust Co., 779 F.2d 916, 924–25 (3d Cir. 1985)).
13
See id. (“Our review of the entire record leads us to conclude that the Government was
able to clearly and convincingly prove the elements of its case without reliance on the
tainted evidence.”).
14
See supra Part II.A.1.i.
15
We review ICP’s appeal of the District Court’s vacatur of the damages award under the
JMOL standard, asking whether sufficient evidence supported the jury’s award. See
Lightning Lube, Inc., 4 F.3d at 1167.
10
The District Court vacated the jury’s damages award in favor of ICP for the tortious
interference claim because in its view, “ICP failed to offer sufficient evidence to render its
damages reasonably certain,” as required by Illinois law. 16 ICP challenges that decision,
arguing that the evidence it presented during trial sufficiently allowed the jury to determine
the damages award with reasonable certainty.
Under Illinois’ “new business rule,” the expected profits of a new business “are
considered too uncertain, specific and remote to permit recovery.” 17 Despite this general
rule, however, Illinois courts allow startups and other emerging enterprises to recover lost
profits by showing “evidence of revenues of a similar product or a similar business in a
similar market.” 18 ICP contends that it met this requirement in two ways. First, it argues
that it sufficiently presented evidence of revenue from a similar product in a similar market
because the equipment it sought to sell was not materially different from equipment already
sold in the North American heavy construction equipment market. Second, ICP points to
testimony from industry veterans and its expert as its basis for establishing the revenues of
a similar business operating in a similar market. Neither argument is persuasive.
i. Similar Product in a Similar Market
The Illinois Supreme Court discussed in Ivey v. Transunion Rental Screening
Solutions, Inc., how challenging it is for a company to show lost profits when its product
16
Appx. 19; see Ivey v. Transunion Rental Screening Sols., Inc., 215 N.E.3d 871, 877
(Ill. 2022).
17
TAS Distrib. Co. v. Cummins Engine Co., 491 F.3d 625 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing SK
Hand Tool Corp. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 284 Ill. App. 3d 417, 426 (1996)).
18
Ivey v. Transunion Rental Screening Sols., Inc., 215 N.E. 3d 871, 880 (Ill. 2022).
11
is wholly new and “did not have an established market.” 19 There, the plaintiff sought to
recover lost profits for his first-of-its-kind lease system, designed for integration into an
electronic software platform, by relying on sales data from existing lease products. 20
Because landlords at the time were not using electronic leasing platforms, the court found
that the plaintiff was “attempting to sell a new and untested product to a new market,”
giving rise to “the specter of impermissible speculation.” 21 And the plaintiff was unable
to overcome that specter because it “did not present evidence of revenues of a similar
product or a similar business in a similar market.” 22
The holding in Ivey does not preclude a startup from ever showing lost profits. The
court discussed Milex Products, Inc. v. Alra Laboratories, Inc., 23 where an Illinois
appellate court found a new business plaintiff to have sufficiently shown evidence of lost
profits because its product was a type of generic medication, and the plaintiff successfully
used data of sales of brand-name medication with the same active ingredient as support for
its requested damages amount. 24 Because the product in Milex had a sufficiently
comparable benchmark in a brand-name medication with actual sales data, the court found
that the plaintiff’s lost-profits estimate was supported with a “reasonable degree of
certainty.” 25
19
Ivey, 215 N.E.3d at 880.
20
Id. at 874.
21
Id.
22
Id. at 880.
23
603 N.E.2d 1226 (1992).
24
Id. at 1235–37.
25
Id. at 1235.
12
ICP’s product more closely resembles the novel electronic lease platform in Ivey
rather than the generic medication in Milex. ICP attempted to sell new, Chinese-made
heavy construction equipment in North America via an online platform. There was much
about this endeavor that was unprecedented: Chinese-manufactured heavy construction
equipment had never been sold in North America, and new heavy construction equipment
had never been available for purchase online.
ICP attempts to downplay the novelty of its product and market. It argues that the
Lonking equipment was materially similar to heavy construction equipment already sold
in North America and that its use of an online platform is irrelevant because the internet is
merely a sales channel, not a distinct market. Neither argument is persuasive. The Lonking
equipment was not necessarily comparable to existing North American products, as the
record contains no evidence that it complied with Environmental Protection Agency
requirements. But even assuming the equipment was materially similar, ICP’s argument
overlooks the salient point: Chinese-manufactured heavy construction equipment had
never before been sold in North America. Any projected demand for such products was
therefore necessarily speculative. Nor can ICP dismiss the significance of its use of an
online platform. Whether labeled a “sales channel” or a “market,” the online platform was
not an incidental feature of ICP’s business model. Much like the electronic platform in
Ivey, ICP’s approach of selling its products online was a core component of its effort to
differentiate itself from existing industry offerings, rendering comparisons to brick-and-
mortar sales inherently unreliable.
13
Accordingly, ICP did not provide sufficient evidence of a similar product in a
similar market.
ii. Similar Business in a Similar Market
ICP contends the jury’s damages award was also supported by evidence of a similar
business in a similar market, pointing to the evidence it provided of Lonking and
IronPlanet’s revenues. This argument, however, fails for many of the same reasons as
ICP’s argument that it provided sufficient evidence of a similar product in a similar market.
While ICP relies on IronPlanet’s or Lonking’s sales as evidence of a similar business in a
similar market, neither company operated in a market sufficiently comparable to the unique
niche that ICP tried to carve out. As discussed above, Chinese-manufactured heavy
construction equipment had never before been sold in North America, meaning Lonking’s
sales could not provide a reliable baseline for ICP’s projected sales. Likewise, IronPlanet’s
revenues from the online sales of used equipment shed little light on ICP’s expected
revenues from the online sale of new equipment, much less new Chinese-manufactured
equipment. ICP also emphasizes the extensive industry experience of its leadership, who
developed the company’s projections, and its expert, who testified that ICP was more likely
than not to achieve those projections. However, that experience cannot transform
speculative projections into reliable evidence. ICP’s leadership and its expert may have
possessed industry knowledge, but they did not possess a crystal ball capable of revealing
whether those projections would become reality. Without evidence grounding those
projections in a similar business in a similar market, ICP’s damages award rested on
speculation rather than reasonable certainty.
14
Consequently, the District Court did not err in vacating the jury’s damages award.
B. Antitrust Claim 26
ICP asserts that it is entitled to a new trial on its antitrust claim because the District
Court improperly instructed the jury. The District Court instructed the jury that ICP could
prevail only if the jury found that Caterpillar and various other companies “agreed to
pressure or to threaten IronPlanet to cut off ICP’s access to” IronPlanet’s online
marketplace. 27 The District Court further instructed that, even if such an agreement
existed, ICP could not succeed if it “had an active avenue of competition.” 28 ICP
challenges this latter instruction, arguing that Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act
requires only substantial foreclosure from competition—not complete foreclosure—to
establish a group boycott. 29 ICP contends that the phrase “an active avenue of competition”
improperly suggested that it needed to show that it was entirely excluded from the market,
imposing a higher burden than the law requires. 30
We need not decide the merits of ICP’s challenge, however, because the jury never
reached the issue of whether ICP had an active avenue of competition. Instead, the jury
rejected the antitrust claim at an earlier stage, finding that Caterpillar and the other
companies never agreed to pressure or threaten IronPlanet. Any error in the instruction
26
We apply the abuse of discretion standard to the District Court’s choice of wording for
jury instructions. See United States v. Lee, 359 F.3d 194, 203 (3d Cir. 2004).
27
Appx. 1623.
28
Id.
29
15 U.S.C. § 1.
30
Appx. 1623.
15
was therefore harmless; as a result, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying
IronPlanet’s motion for a new trial.
16
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s denial of Caterpillar’s
motions for JMOL and a new trial on the tortious interference with contract claim, the
District Court’s vacatur of the jury’s damages award on that claim, and the denial of ICP’s
motion for a new trial on the antitrust claim.
17