Celious v. City of Los Angeles CA2/8

Filed 11/5/26 Celious v. City of Los Angeles CA2/8 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION EIGHT AARON CELIOUS, B338624 Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 22SMCV00915) v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES et al., Defendants and Respondents. APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Edward B. Moreton, Jr., Judge. Affirmed. Aaron Celious, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant. Hydee Feldstein Soto, City Attorney, Denise C. Mills, Chief Deputy City Attorney, Kathleen A. Kenealy, Chief Assistant City Attorney, Shaun Dabby Jacobs, Assistant City Attorney, and Merete Rietveld, Deputy City Attorney, for Defendants and Appellants. _________________________________  INTRODUCTION Plaintiff Aaron Celious appeals from the judgment of dismissal entered after the trial court sustained without leave to amend the demurrer to Celious’s second amended complaint filed by defendants City of Los Angeles (City) and Andrew Westall, Holly Wolcott, Capri Maddox, and Joey Garcia.1 Celious’s claims arise out of the City’s solicitation of public contracts for two projects funded by the City. Celious is an independent contractor for a company that submitted unsuccessful bids for those projects. He contends that the trial court erred in finding the City and the individual City defendants cannot be held liable for common law torts, violations of the Unfair Competition Law (UCL) (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq.), and federal due process violations for their roles in allegedly misawarding the contracts to companies other than the one for which Celious works as an independent contractor. Celious also argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying him leave to amend his complaint. We affirm. BACKGROUND 1. The public contracts Maroon Society Inc. (Maroon Society) provides “data compilation, analysis, planning, and strategic consulting services for government agencies to improve program administration, and policy development.” Almost all of Maroon Society’s revenue comes from government contracts procured through competitive bidding procedures. 1 We collectively refer to Westall, Walcott, Maddox, and Garcia as the “individual City defendants.” 2  Celious is one of Maroon Society’s independent contractors. He “holds a Commission Agreement with Maroon Society to prepare bids, proposals, and all tasks related to procuring new contracts” for the company. Maroon Society pays Celious a commission of 25% of the total value of contracts that are awarded to the company. In July 2021, the City issued a request for proposals (RFP) for “professional assistance to provide the [Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD)] Redistricting Commission with assistance in its outreach efforts” (LAUSD Project). The RFP for the LAUSD Project stated that it was “seeking proposals from qualified firms with extensive experience in ethnic and small market outreach, outreach strategy/messaging, and outreach to residents who are not civically engaged throughout the School District.” The RFP required anyone who submitted a proposal for the LAUSD Project to accept several terms and conditions, including one stating that “[a]ll costs incurred in responding to this RFP shall be borne by the proposer. The City shall not, in any event, be liable for any pre-contractual expenses incurred by the proposer in the preparation and/or submission of its proposal.” In October 2021, the City issued an RFP seeking “a qualified consultant to provide strategic planning services” to the City’s Civil, Human Rights and Equity Department (CHRED Project). The RFP required anyone who submitted a proposal for the CHRED Project to accept several terms and conditions, including one that states “[e]ach proposal prepared in response to this RFP shall be prepared at the sole cost and expense of the Proposer and with the expressed understanding that no claims against the City for reimbursement will be accepted.” 3  The City awarded a public contract for the LAUSD Project to North Star Alliances LLC (North Star), and a public contract for the CHRED Project to Star Insights, LLC (Star Insights). Maroon Society submitted unsuccessful bids for both projects. Celious filed timely protests to the City’s award of contracts to North Star and Star Insights. The City denied the protests without hearings. 2. Celious’s government claims In January 2022, Celious filed two government claims with the City, challenging its decisions to award public contracts to North Star for the LAUSD Project and Star Insights for the CHRED Project. For the claim challenging the CHRED Project award, Celious listed himself as the claimant, and for the claim challenging the LAUSD Project award, Celious listed “Mr. Aaron Celious Maroon Socie [sic]” as the claimant. Celious asserted that City employees and officials responsible for reviewing bids for the two projects published sham RFP’s, failed to follow the review procedures set forth in the published RFP’s, and blocked the release of public records “via a lawful FOI request.” Celious asserted that City officials knew the RFP’s contained false statements, that he justifiably relied on the false statements published in the RFP’s, and that those false statements proximately caused him to suffer damages. With respect to the LAUSD Project claim, Celious sought $60,000 in damages, consisting of $20,000 in costs associated with preparing a bid in response to the RFP, plus $60,000 as punitive damages. With respect to the CHRED Project claim, Celious sought $60,000, consisting of $15,000 in costs associated with preparing a bid in response to the RFP, plus $45,000 as punitive damages. 4  The City denied Celious’s government claims. 3. Celious’s lawsuit In September 2023, Celious filed the operative second amended complaint against: (1) the City; (2) Westall, an independent contractor for the City and the executive director of the LAUSD Redistricting Commission; and (3) Wolcott, Maddox, and Garcia, the employees of the City. Celious also named Ernesto Morales, an executive at North Star, and Robin Engel, an executive at Star Insights, as defendants. Celious alleged that he was suing in his individual capacity and as an assignee of Maroon Society’s claims against the defendants. Celious asserted the following causes of action: (1) fraud against Westall, Wolcott, Maddox, and Garcia for their conduct in the process of awarding contracts for the LAUSD and CHRED projects to companies other than Maroon Society; (2) negligence against all the City defendants; (3) due process violations under title 42 United States Code section 1983 against the City and the individual City defendants; (4) intentional interference with prospective economic relations against the individual City defendants; (5) negligent interference with prospective economic relations against the individual City defendants; and (6) violation of the Unfair Competition Law (UCL) (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq.) against the individual City defendants. The gravamen of Celious’s claims “centers on the fact that two companies—North Star and Star Insights—were awarded contracts in response to the LAUSD RFP and CHRED RFP, respectively, even though the companies failed to (a) complete the bidding requirements specified in the RFPs in order to be responsive, and (b) misrepresented their qualifications to gain an unfair advantage over the Plaintiff.” According to Celious, the 5 individual City defendants were motivated by corruption when they misawarded the contracts for the LAUSD and CHRED projects to North Star and Star Insights. Celious alleged that those defendants “fraudulently represented to [Celious], and other bidders[,] that the City would follow specific guidelines for evaluating bids,” “failed to evaluate bids based on criteria in the RFPs—as it was never the intention of defendants to conduct an honest and lawful procurement process,” and “covered up the extent of their corruption by refusing [Celious’s] freedom of information act … request to disclose the individuals that supposedly ‘evaluated’ bids on the two RFPs.” The trial court sustained without leave to amend the City and the individual City defendants’ demurrer to Celious’s second amended complaint. The court found that Celious could not state any state law claims against the individual City defendants because they are immune from liability for their conduct in reviewing bids for public contracts under Government Code sections 820.2 and 822.2. The court also found that Celious’s negligence claim fails because the City is immune from liability for common law negligence, and Celious failed to plead any statutory basis for holding the City liable for its decision to award public contracts to companies other than Maroon Society. Finally, the court found that Celious could not state a claim for federal due process violations under title 42 United States Code section 1983 because he failed to allege the violation of any protected liberty or property interests arising out of the City’s and the individual City defendants’ conduct. 6  The trial court entered judgment dismissing all of Celious’s claims against the City and the individual City defendants. Celious appeals.2 DISCUSSION 1. Standard of review We independently review a trial court’s order sustaining a demurrer to determine whether the operative complaint alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action. (Ivanoff v. Bank of America, N.A. (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 719, 725.) We assume the truth of all properly pled factual allegations and matters that are judicially noticeable, and we liberally construe the complaint’s allegations with a view toward substantial justice. (Ibid.; Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 43, fn. 7.) If the trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend, we must decide whether there is a reasonable possibility that the plaintiff can amend his complaint to cure the defect. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) If the defect can be cured, the trial court has abused its discretion, and we reverse. (Ibid.) If the defect cannot be cured, the trial court has not 2 While this appeal was pending, Celious filed a motion to augment the appellate record with a copy of a contract between the City and a private company, through which the entities agreed that Westall would serve as the executive director of the LAUSD Redistricting Commission. We deny Celious’s motion. As he acknowledges in his supporting declaration, the contract was never introduced below and, as a result, is not a part of the trial court’s record. (See Gaylord v. Municipal Court (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 1348 [appellate court’s review of ruling on demurrer is limited to record before the trial court].) 7 abused its discretion, and we affirm. (Ibid.) “The burden of proving such reasonable possibility is squarely on the plaintiff.” (Ibid.) Such a showing can be made for the first time on appeal. (Smith v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 700, 711.) 2. Celious failed to state a claim for negligence against the City In his second cause of action, Celious asserted that the City was negligent in how it administered the “procurement process for the LAUSD RFP and the CHRED RFP,” and that he was harmed by that negligence when the City awarded contracts for those projects to companies other than Maroon Society. The trial court found that Celious failed to state a claim for negligence because the City is generally immune from liability for common law torts, and Celious did not plead any statutory basis for liability. We agree that Celious failed to state a claim for negligence against the City. In California, public entities cannot be held “liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of the public entity or a public employee or any other person,” unless liability is imposed by statute. (Gov. Code, § 815.) Government Code section 815 abolishes all common law or judicially declared forms of liability for public entities, except for such liability as may be required by statute or the state or federal constitution. (San Mateo Union High School Dist. v. County of San Mateo (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 418, 427 (San Mateo Union High School Dist.).) Thus, a public entity, like the City, cannot be held directly liable for its own negligence, unless a statute provides otherwise. (Patterson v. Sacramento City Unified School Dist. (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 821, 829.) 8  Celious argues that the City can be sued for negligence under Government Code section 815.6, which provides, “Where a public entity is under a mandatory duty imposed by an enactment that is designed to protect against the risk of a particular kind of injury, the public entity is liable for an injury of that kind proximately caused by its failure to discharge the duty unless the public entity establishes that it exercised reasonable diligence to discharge the duty.” Specifically, Celious argues that the City can be held liable for violating mandatory duties imposed by two of its local ordinances that govern its review of competitive bids for public contracts. First, Celious claims that under section 10.15 of the Los Angeles Administrative Code (L.A. Admin. Code, art. 2, § 10.15) (Section 10.15), the City is obligated to fairly evaluate public contract bids. Second, he claims that under section 10.40.2 of the Los Angeles Administrative Code (L.A. Admin. Code, art. 14, § 10.40.2) (Section 10.40.2), the City is required to properly verify bidder qualifications. According to Celious, both ordinances impose mandatory, ministerial duties upon the City, which it violated when it awarded contracts for the LAUSD and CHRED projects to companies other than Maroon Society. Before liability may be imposed against a public entity under Government Code section 815.6, three requirements must be met: (1) an enactment must impose a mandatory duty on the public entity; (2) the enactment must be meant to protect against the kind of risk of injury suffered by the plaintiff; and (3) breach of the mandatory duty must be a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury. (San Mateo Union High School Dist., supra, 213 Cal.App.4th at p. 428.) The first requirement “is that ‘the enactment at issue be obligatory, rather than merely 9 discretionary or permissive, in its directions to the public entity; it must require, rather than merely authorize or permit, that a particular action be taken or not taken.’ ” (Ibid.) Whether an enactment is intended to impose a mandatory duty, as opposed to an obligation to perform a discretionary function, is a question of law for the courts to decide. (Id. at pp. 428–429.) As a threshold matter, Celious has not met his burden to show that the trial court erred by failing to find that Section 10.15 imposes mandatory duties upon the City that would support his claim for negligence. We presume an appealed judgment is correct. (Hernandez v. First Student, Inc. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 270, 277 (Hernandez).) The appellant may not “ ‘ “rest on the bare assertion of error but must present argument and legal authority on each point raised.” ’ ” (Ibid.) “ ‘When an appellant raises an issue “but fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority, we treat the point as waived.” ’ ” (Ibid.) Here, Celious fails to explain how Section 10.15 imposes any mandatory duties on the City. That ordinance is complex. It spans several pages, and it includes numerous subdivisions, many of which include numerous subsections. The ordinance sets forth various procedures for the solicitation, submission, and review of competitive bids for public contracts. (See ibid.) Some of the provisions govern the conduct of proposed contractors (see, e.g., id., subd. (d)), while other provisions govern the City’s conduct (see, e.g., id., subd. (c)). Although Celious states that the ordinance “authorizes City officials to enter into contracts and generally requires awards to the lowest responsible bidder,” he does not point to any specific language in the ordinance, let alone explain how any specific provision of the ordinance imposes a 10 mandatory duty on the City. Celious has, therefore, failed to meet his burden on appeal to show that the City can be held liable for failing to follow any duties or obligations imposed by Section 10.15. (Hernandez, supra, 37 Cal.App.5th at p. 277.) As for Section 10.40.2, we conclude that ordinance does not impose any mandatory duties upon the City that would support a claim for liability under Government Code section 815.6. As we noted above, “the enactment at issue [must] be obligatory, rather than merely discretionary or permissive, in its directions to the public entity.” (Haggis v. City of Los Angeles (2000) 22 Cal.4th 490, 498.) That is, the enactment “must require, rather than merely authorize or permit, that a particular action be taken or not taken.” (Ibid.) In addition, it is not enough “that the public entity or officer have been under an obligation to perform a function if the function itself involves the exercise of discretion.” (Ibid.) Accordingly, the use of the term “ ‘shall’ ” in an enactment does not necessarily establish that the enactment imposes a mandatory duty on a public entity. (San Mateo Union High School Dist., supra, 213 Cal.App.4th at p. 429.) Rather, courts focus on the particular action required by the enactment. (Ibid.) An enactment creates a mandatory duty only where the commanded action “ ‘did not lend itself to a normative or qualitative debate over whether it was adequately fulfilled.’ ” (Ibid.) The portion of Section 10.40.2 that Celious relies on states: “Prior to awarding a contract, the City shall make a determination that the prospective contractor is one that has the necessary quality, fitness and capacity to perform the work set forth in the contract. Responsibility will be determined by each awarding authority from reliable information concerning a 11 number of criteria, including but not limited to: management expertise; technical qualifications; experience; organization, material, equipment and facilities necessary to perform the work; financial resources; satisfactory performance of other contracts; satisfactory record of compliance with relevant laws and regulations; and satisfactory record of business integrity.” (Id., subd. (a).) As its language makes clear, Section 10.40.2 requires the City to engage in a qualitative analysis. The ordinance identifies a long, non-exhaustive list of criteria that the City should consider when determining whether a prospective contractor is qualified to perform the work necessary for the underlying public contract. The portion of the ordinance that Celious discusses does not mandate that the City weigh the identified criteria in a particularly rigid manner. Indeed, some of the listed criteria— like evaluating a bidder’s management expertise, technical qualifications, and quality of performance of other contracts— necessarily require the City to rely on its own “expertise and judgment” to evaluate a bidder’s qualifications. (See San Mateo Union High School Dist., supra, 213 Cal.App.4th at p. 430.) In other words, the ordinance gives City officials discretion to determine which prospective bidders are sufficiently qualified to perform work under a given public contract. (Id. at p. 431.) Accordingly, “[t]his is not a case in which the plaintiff seeks to impose liability for clear breach of a mandatory ministerial or regulatory directive that leaves no choice other than to execute the enacted requirement.” (Id. at pp. 431–432.) In short, Celious has not met his burden to show that the City can be held liable under Government Code section 815.6 when it decided to award the LAUSD and CHRED contracts to 12 companies other than Maroon Society. Nor has Celious shown that any other statute exposes the City to liability for such conduct. The trial court, therefore, correctly found that Government Code section 815 precludes Celious’s claim for negligence against the City. 3. The individual City defendants are immune from liability for state law claims Against the individual City defendants, Celious asserted causes of action for fraud, negligence, intentional interference with prospective economic relations, negligent interference with prospective economic relations, and violation of the UCL for their roles in awarding contracts for the LAUSD and CHRED projects to companies other than Maroon Society. The trial court found that Celious cannot state any of these claims against the individual City defendants because they are immune from liability for their conduct in awarding public contracts. We agree with the court’s ruling. Under Government Code section 820.2, “a public employee is not liable for an injury resulting from his act or omission where the act or omission was the result of the exercise of the discretion vested in him, whether or not such discretion be abused.” The misaward of a public contract to one other than the lowest responsible bidder is an abuse of discretion, which “comes within the discretionary immunity to tort liability established by [Government Code] sections 815, 815.2, subdivision (b), and 820.2.” (Swinerton & Walberg Co. v. City of Inglewood-L.A. County Civic Center Authority (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 98, 101.) Thus, Government Code section 820.2 immunizes public employees from liability for their conduct in reviewing bids for public contracts, including any fraudulent or allegedly false 13 representations those employees make about their intent to fairly evaluate such bids. (Curcini v. County of Alameda (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 629, 648–649 (Curcini).) Here, Celious’s state law claims are based on allegations that the individual City defendants did not fairly evaluate bids for the public contracts for the LAUSD and CHRED projects, including failing to follow review standards set forth in the City’s RFP’s for the projects, and awarded those contracts to two companies that were not qualified to receive them. These allegations fall squarely within Government Code section 820.2’s immunity granted to public employees for their discretionary actions in awarding public contracts. As the court in Curcini explained, to immunize public employees for alleged abuses of discretion in awarding public contracts, while allowing disappointed bidders to sue those same employees for allegedly making false promises to fairly or properly evaluate bids for those contracts, “would eviscerate the immunity provided by Government Code section 820.2 for the public employees’ exercise of discretion.” (Curcini, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at pp. 648–649.) Celious contends that under Government Code section 822.2, he stated claims for fraud against the individual City defendants arising out of their misrepresentations made during the bid review process for the LAUSD and CHRED projects, such as their promises to fairly evaluate contract proposals under the criteria set forth in each project’s RFP. We disagree. Under Government Code section 822.2, a public employee “acting in the scope of his employment is not liable for an injury caused by his misrepresentation, whether or not such misrepresentation be negligent or intentional, unless he is guilty of actual fraud, corruption or actual malice.” The statute’s 14 exception to immunity applies only where, in addition to the elements of common law fraud, the plaintiff alleges facts showing that the public employee was motivated by “ ‘ “corruption or actual malice, i.e., a conscious intent to deceive, vex, annoy or harm the injured party.” ’ ” (Curcini, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 649, quoting Masters v. San Bernardino County Employees Retirement Assn. (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 30, 42.) Conclusory allegations of corruption or malice are insufficient to fall within Government Code section 822.2’s exception. (Curcini, at p. 649.) Throughout his second amended complaint, Celious asserted that several of the defendants engaged in conduct that evinces their “corruption” and “malice,” but he only supported those assertions with allegations that the defendants failed to fairly evaluate proposals for the LAUSD and CHRED projects. For instance, Celious claims that Westall and some City employees were motivated by corruption because they: (1) fraudulently represented to potential bidders that the City would follow specific guidelines for evaluating bids, (2) failed to evaluate bids based on criteria set forth in the RFP’s, and (3) tried to hide their corruption by denying Celious’s “freedom of information act” request. Celious makes similar allegations with respect to Maddox and other City employees’ review of bids for the CHRED project. These allegations do not support findings of actual malice or corruption against any of the individual City defendants. Instead, these allegations, if true, simply show that despite promising to do otherwise, the defendants failed to follow proper guidelines when evaluating bids for the LAUSD and CHRED projects. But, as we just explained, government employees are immune from liability for their conduct in reviewing bids for 15 public contracts, including any fraudulent or false representations they make about their intent to fairly evaluate such bids. (Curcini, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at pp. 648–649.) Celious cannot circumvent this immunity through conclusory allegations that the defendants were motivated by corruption or malice when they evaluated the LAUSD and CHRED project bids. (Id. at p. 649.) Finally, Celious argues that the trial court erred in dismissing any claims against Westall because he is an independent contractor for the City and, as such, is not immune from liability for his conduct in awarding contracts for the LAUSD and CHRED projects. Celious forfeited this argument by not raising it below. To preserve an issue for appeal, an appellant generally must raise it in the trial court. (Perez v. Grajales (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 580, 591–592.) This rule applies in the demurrer context. (See Thompson v. Ioane (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 1180, 1192 (Thompson).) Accordingly, if an appellant does not raise an argument opposing a demurrer in the trial court, he forfeits that argument on appeal. (Ibid.) Throughout their demurrer, defendants repeatedly argued that Government Code sections 820.2 and 822.2 immunize the individual City defendants, including Westall, for their conduct in awarding the contracts for the LAUSD and CHRED projects to companies other than Maroon Society. Celious, therefore, was aware that defendants challenged his causes of action against Westall on the ground that Westall, like the other defendants who work for the City, is immune from liability for his role in the public contract review process. Celious responded to these arguments in his opposition to the demurrer, arguing that the 16 individual City defendants’ conduct, including Westall’s conduct, fell outside the scope of these statutes. But Celious did not argue that Westall lacks immunity based on his status as an independent contractor for the City. In its order sustaining the demurrer, the trial court found that all the individual City defendants, including Westall, are immune from liability under Government Code sections 820.2 and 822.2 for their conduct in reviewing contract proposals for the LAUSD and CHRED projects. Celious now claims, for the first time on appeal, that the court’s finding that Westall is immune from liability under Government Code sections 820.2 and 822.2 was erroneous because Westall is not entitled to immunity based on his status as an independent contractor for the City. Celious forfeited this argument by failing to raise it in his opposition to the City and individual City defendants’ demurrer to his second amended complaint. (Thompson, supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at p. 1192.) 4. Celious failed to state a claim for violation of his due process rights under section 1983 of title 42 of the United States Code Celious also asserted a cause of action against the City and individual City defendants for violation of his federal due process rights under section 1983 of title 42 of the United States Code. Specifically, Celious alleged that the defendants violated his procedural due process rights by depriving him of “the pursuit of his occupation without first providing him an opportunity to be heard and confront the individuals who deemed [his] proposal as non-responsible.” On appeal, Celious identifies what he claims are two protected property interests that were infringed by the City’s decision to award the contracts for the LAUSD and 17 CHRED projects to companies other than Maroon Society: (1) his commission agreement with Maroon Society; and (2) procedural entitlements to protest hearings guaranteed by the RFP’s for each project. As we explain, the trial court properly found Celious failed to state a claim for violation of his federal due process rights. To the extent Celious claimed that the City’s alleged misaward of contracts for the LAUSD and CHRED projects to companies other than Maroon Society and its failure to properly consider his protests to those awards violated his due process rights, such a claim does not exist. The right to bid on a public contract is not a property right. (Golden Day Schools, Inc. v. State Dept. of Educ. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 695, 704.) Accordingly, “[a] prospective contractor has neither a liberty interest nor a property interest in receiving a government contract.” (Mednik v. State Dept. of Health Care Services (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 631, 641 (Mednik).) Celious likewise failed to allege that the City defendants infringed any liberty interest he may have in being considered for a government contract. “California law recognizes that a party who has been dealing with the government on an ongoing basis has a liberty interest in being considered for a contract.” (Mednik, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 642.) Generally, this right is implicated where an individual is barred from doing business with the government. (Ibid.) While a temporary suspension from doing business with the government generally does not implicate this liberty interest, a more permanent suspension, including one that lasts several years, can implicate this right. (Ibid.) Celious did not allege that he or Maroon Society has been suspended from doing business with the City or that the City has otherwise 18 prohibited him or Maroon Society from submitting bids for government contracts in the future. Accordingly, Celious failed to state a due process claim based on the deprivation of any liberty interest in being considered for a government contract. Celious’s due process claim also fails to the extent he alleged that the City’s conduct deprived him of the pursuit of his occupation. To establish a due process violation based on the deprivation of a right to practice one’s profession, the plaintiff must show that state action caused a complete deprivation of his or her right to engage in a calling. (Dittman v. California (9th Cir. 1999) 191 F.3d 1020, 1029, citing Conn v. Gabbert (1999) 526 U.S. 286, 292.) Celious did not allege that the City or the individual City defendants engaged in any conduct that completely deprived him of his right to engage in his chosen profession. In short, the trial court correctly found that Celious failed to state a claim for violation of his due process rights under section 1983 of title 42 of the United States Code. 5. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend the second amended complaint Celious next argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied him leave to amend his second amended complaint. We disagree. First, Celious contends that the trial court should have granted him leave to add a promissory estoppel cause of action that is consistent with the holding in Kajima/Ray Wilson v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transp. Authority (2000) 23 Cal.4th 305 (Kajima). There, our Supreme Court addressed when, if ever, a disappointed bidder for a public contract may sue a public 19 entity for monetary damages. The Court held that where a public entity promises to award a public contract to the lowest responsible bidder but ultimately awards the contract to an entity that does not meet that requirement, the entity that was actually the lowest responsible bidder may sue the public entity to recover only the costs it incurred preparing its bid for the public contract. (Id. at pp. 308, 315–321.) The Court observed that in such a case, the disappointed bidder cannot bring a tort or breach of contract cause of action against the public entity, but it instead must rely on a promissory estoppel theory to recover its bid preparation costs. (Id. at p. 315; see also id. at p. 315, fn. 2.) The trial court found that Celious was precluded from pursuing a promissory estoppel theory under Kajima because when Maroon Society, the actual disappointed bidder in this case, submitted proposals for the LAUSD and CHRED projects, it agreed that the City could not be held liable for any costs associated with preparing or submitting those proposals—i.e., the only type of monetary damages available to a disappointed bidder is under a promissory estoppel theory. (See Kajima, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 308.) Celious does not address this aspect of the court’s holding or otherwise try to explain why he and Maroon Society are not precluded from suing the City to recover bid preparation costs under the express terms of the RFP’s for the LAUSD and CHRED projects. Celious has, therefore, failed to show the court abused its discretion when it denied him leave to add a claim for promissory estoppel against the City. Second, Celious argues that the trial court should have granted him leave to allege more particularized facts for his negligence cause of action. Celious claims that he can add allegations “more precisely tying Defendants’ conduct to specific, 20 mandatory statutory and ordinance-based procurement duties.” Celious does not describe, however, what allegations he could add to his complaint to achieve this goal. For instance, Celious does not identify any enactments in addition to the ones we already addressed above that would support a claim for liability against the City under Government Code section 815.6. Celious has, therefore, not shown the court abused its discretion when it denied him leave to amend his negligence cause of action. Third, Celious argues that the trial court should have granted him leave to strengthen his allegations of “bad faith and fraud based on defendants’ knowledge of falsified bid credentials.” Celious also argues that he can add allegations showing that Westall’s control over the bid review process strip Westall of immunity for his conduct in reviewing contract proposals for the LAUSD project. Again, Celious does not describe what allegations he could add to cure the defects we addressed above, including how he could allege particularized facts that would support a finding that the defendants’ actions were motivated by corruption or malice. (Curcini, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 649.) In short, Celious has not shown the trial court abused its discretion when it sustained the City defendants’ demurrer to his second amended complaint without leave to amend. 21  DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. Respondents shall recover their costs on appeal. VIRAMONTES, J. WE CONCUR: STRATTON, P. J. WILEY, J. 22