Tech Chem LLC and James Gibson v. Blackwell Chemical Company
CourtTexas Court of Appeals, 11th District (Eastland)
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
Docket11-25-00159-CV
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Opinion filed November 19, 2026
In The
Eleventh Court of Appeals
__________
No. 11-25-00159-CV
__________
TECH CHEM LLC AND JAMES GIBSON, Appellants
V.
BLACKWELL CHEMICAL COMPANY, Appellee
On Appeal from the 244th District Court
Ector County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. C25020207CV
MEMORANDUM OPINION
The parties’ dispute in this case concerns the nonpayment of services and
chemical products that Appellee, Blackwell Chemical Company (Blackwell),
provided to Appellant Tech Chem LLC (Tech Chem). Blackwell sued Tech Chem
and Appellant James Gibson, Tech Chem’s president, alleging various causes of
action. The trial court signed a default judgment against Tech Chem and Gibson in
Blackwell’s favor, and Tech Chem and Gibson now appeal from that judgment.
In their sole issue, Tech Chem and Gibson argue that the trial court erred when
it signed a default judgment against them because Blackwell did not allege sufficient
facts to support the default judgment. We affirm.
I. Factual Background
From October to December 2024, Blackwell provided an array of services and
chemical products to Tech Chem, which Tech Chem agreed to pay Blackwell within
thirty days of receipt of such products and services. Blackwell sent Tech Chem
several invoices; on January 3, 2025, the balance due Blackwell for the services and
products it had provided was $335,015.09.
Tech Chem’s corporate privileges had been involuntarily forfeited since
February 23, 2024, and Gibson was Tech Chem’s president on the date the
underlying lawsuit was filed. On February 19, 2025, Blackwell sued Tech Chem
and Gibson on a sworn account and, alternatively, for quantum meruit. Additionally,
Blackwell sought to hold Gibson personally liable for Tech Chem’s debts to
Blackwell pursuant to Section 171.255 of the Texas Tax Code. See TEX. TAX CODE
ANN. § 171.255 (West 2015); see also Fuchs v. Savanna Drilling LLC, No. 11-25-
00168-CV, 2026 WL 2191680, at *8 (Tex. App.—Eastland July 30, 2026, pet. filed)
(discussing Section 171.255). Because neither Tech Chem nor Gibson answered or
otherwise appeared in Blackwell’s lawsuit, Blackwell filed a motion for default
judgment. Consequently, on April 22, 2025, the trial court, after considering
Blackwell’s motion by submission, signed a default judgment against Tech Chem
and Gibson and found them jointly and severally liable for damages to Blackwell in
the amount of $335,015.09, pre-judgment interest, attorney’s fees, court costs, and
postjudgment interest. Tech Chem and Gibson did not move for a new trial.
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II. Analysis
At the outset, we note that Tech Chem’s and Gibson’s appellate brief does not
comply with the requirements of Rule 38.1 of the Texas Rules of Appellate
Procedure. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1. An appellant must “state concisely all issues or
points presented for review” and make “a clear and concise argument” for each issue
raised “with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record.” Villani v.
Vanderbilt Mortg. and Fin., Inc., No. 11-24-00321-CV, 2026 WL 1593648, at *4
(Tex. App.—Eastland June 4, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.) (quoting TEX. R.
APP. P. 38.1(f), (i)). Furthermore, the “[f]ailure to cite legal authority or to provide
substantive analysis of the legal issues presented results in waiver of the complaint.”
Dipprey v. Double Diamond, Inc., 637 S.W.3d 784, 801 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2021,
no pet.) (quoting Smale v. Williams, 590 S.W.3d 633, 639 (Tex. App.—Texarkana
2019, no pet.)).
Here, Tech Chem and Gibson cite only two cases in their brief that generally
set forth the standard for pleading sufficiency, then globally assert that Blackwell
was required to plead the applicable provisions of Section 171.255 in its petition, yet
they provide no authority or substantive analysis to support this argument.
Nonetheless, and despite these deficiencies, we will address the merits of Tech
Chem’s and Gibson’s “complaint,” because the supreme court has instructed that
“[c]ourts ‘should hesitate to resolve cases based on procedural defects and instead
endeavor to resolve cases on the merits.’” See Bertucci v. Watkins, 709 S.W.3d 534,
541–42 (Tex. 2025) (quoting Lion Copolymer Holdings, LLC v. Lion Polymers,
LLC, 614 S.W.3d 729, 732 (Tex. 2020)).
A. Standard of Review
We review a trial court’s grant of a default judgment for an abuse of
discretion. See Cottonwood Valley Home Owners Ass’n v. Hudson, 75 S.W.3d 601,
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603 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2002, no pet.). We will affirm the trial court’s ruling so
long as the trial court’s decision is not arbitrary, unreasonable, and without any
reference to any guiding rules or principles. Id. (citing Goode v. Shoukfeh, 943
S.W.2d 441, 446 (Tex. 1997)).
B. Application
Tech Chem and Gibson argue that the trial court erred when it granted
Blackwell’s motion for default judgment because Blackwell’s petition did not negate
the affirmative defenses set out in Section 171.255(c).1
A trial court properly grants a motion for default judgment based on the
plaintiff’s pleading unless (1) the cause of action pled is not within the jurisdiction
of the trial court, (2) the pleading fails to give fair notice of the claim asserted, or
(3) the pleading demonstrates that the claim is invalid. See Konkel v. Otwell, 65
S.W.3d 183, 188 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2001, no pet.) (citing Paramount Pipe &
Supply Co., Inc. v. Muhr, 749 S.W.2d 491, 494 (Tex. 1988)).
Generally, “in cases of [a] default judgment, the defendant’s failure to answer
is an admission of the facts [that are] properly pleaded and the justice of the
plaintiff’s claim.” Simon v. BancTexas Quorum, N.A., 754 S.W.2d 283, 286 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 1988, writ denied) (citing Wall v. Wall, 630 S.W.2d 493, 496 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 1982, writ ref’d n.r.e.)); see also Stoner v. Thompson, 578 S.W.2d
679, 682 (Tex. 1979) (holding that a non-answering party admits to the facts that are
properly pled). When a party does not answer and a default judgment is granted
against them, the non-answering party waives their right to present evidence that
relates to any affirmative defense(s) they may have asserted to defeat the plaintiff’s
1
While Tech Chem and Gibson are parties to this appeal, the only argument advanced by them is
that Blackwell’s petition did not properly plead a basis to hold Gibson personally liable for Tech Chem’s
debts. Therefore, to the extent that they are seeking a reversal as to Tech Chem, that argument is waived
as not adequately briefed. See Dipprey, 637 S.W.3d at 801.
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claims. See Simon, 754 S.W.2d at 286; see also Downer v. Aquamarine Operators,
Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 243 (Tex. 1985) (discussing when a default judgment is
granted, a defendant is not entitled to pursue an affirmative defense).
In Texas, if a corporate entity’s privileges are forfeited, “each director or
officer of the corporation is liable for each debt of the corporation that is created or
incurred in this state after” the date of the forfeiture and before the entity’s privileges
are revived. See TAX § 171.255(a); Fuchs, 2026 WL 2191680, at *8. However,
there is a safe harbor provision that provides:
(c) A director or officer is not liable for a debt of the corporation if the
director or officer shows that the debt was created or incurred:
(1) over the director’s objection; or
(2) without the director’s knowledge and that the exercise of
reasonable diligence to become acquainted with the affairs of the
corporation would not have revealed the intention to create the
debt.
TAX § 171.255(c) (emphasis added). These provisions in Section 171.255 are
affirmative defenses. See PACCAR Fin. Corp. v. Potter, 239 S.W.3d 879, 882 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2007, no pet.) (describing the above referenced provisions in
Section 171.225 as “affirmative defenses”); State v. Barbee, No. 03-99-00560-CV,
2000 WL 766274, at *4 (Tex. App.—Austin June 15, 2000, pet. denied) (not
designated for publication) (same).
In this instance, Blackwell was not required to plead and foreclose the
application of Section 171.255’s safe harbor provisions because those provisions are
affirmative defenses. In Simon, the Fifth Court of Appeals addressed a situation
factually similar to the matter before us—the defendant sought to set aside a default
judgment based on an affirmative defense that was not pled by the plaintiff. See
Simon, 754 S.W.2d at 285–86. There, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant
executed a note in his individual capacity, however, after defaulting, the defendant
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argued that he was entitled to assert the affirmative defense that he executed the note
in a different capacity—as a corporate representative. Id. The court reasoned that,
because the defendant defaulted and the argument that the defendant advanced
concerned an affirmative defense, the argument was waived. Id.
Like the argument to avoid liability that was raised in Simon, Gibson also
premises his avoidance of liability on an affirmative defense which he, not
Blackwell, bore the burden of pleading and proving. See Roark v. Stallworth Oil
and Gas, Inc., 813 S.W.2d 492, 494 (Tex. 1991) (“A party relying on an affirmative
defense must specifically plead the defense.”). In Simon, the unalleged affirmative
defense was that the defendant signed the note in a representative capacity, while
here the unasserted affirmative defense is that Gibson was shielded from liability
under Section 171.255(c). However, the reason that forecloses one’s ability to avoid
an adverse judgment is the same in both scenarios—both Gibson and the defendant
in Simon sought to assert affirmative defenses only after they had defaulted and
therefore waived the defense.
Moreover, one of the two cases cited by Tech Chem and Gibson—Stoner—
supports our holding. There, the Texas Supreme Court explained:
[The] plaintiff’s pleadings must be adequate for the [trial] court to be
able, from an examination of the plaintiff’s pleadings alone, to ascertain
with reasonable certainty and without resorting to information aliunde
the elements of plaintiff’s cause of action and the relief sought with
sufficient information upon which to base a judgment.
Stoner, 578 S.W.2d at 683 (citing C&H Transp. Co. v. Wright, 396 S.W.2d 443 (Tex.
App.—Tyler 1965, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (emphasis added)). Stoner confirms that the
focus in a pleading analysis is the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s cause of action, not a
hypothetical affirmative defense which the defendant, not the plaintiff, bears the
burden of pleading. See Roark, 813 S.W.2d at 494. Therefore, because the
provisions in Section 171.255(c) are affirmative defenses—and not part of a
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plaintiff’s underlying cause of action—Blackwell was not required to plead them.
As such, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it granted the default
judgment in favor of Blackwell.
Even assuming, arguendo, that the provisions in Section 171.255(c) are not
affirmative defenses, the allegations in Blackwell’s petition are sufficient to apprise
Gibson that it was seeking to hold him personally liable for Tech Chem’s debts.
Under the “fair notice” pleading standard, we look “to whether the opposing party
can ascertain from the pleading the nature and basic issues of the controversy and
what testimony will be relevant.” Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp. v. Auld, 34
S.W.3d 887, 896 (Tex. 2000) (citing Broom v. Brookshire Bros., Inc., 923 S.W.2d
57, 60 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1995, writ denied)); see also TEX. R. CIV. P. 45, 47. Here,
the issue—that Blackwell sought to hold Gibson personally liable for Tech Chem’s
debts—was made clear in its petition. Blackwell’s petition expressly referenced
Section 171.255 and stated that “[b]ecause Tech Chem’s corporate privileges were
forfeited, each officer and director of Tech Chem LLC is liable for Tech Chem’s
debt, including but not limited to, Tech Chem’s president, James Gibson.”
Therefore, given this clear reference to the relevant statute and the intention to hold
Gibson personally liable, we conclude that Blackwell’s petition sufficiently apprised
Gibson that Blackwell sought to hold him personally liable for Tech Chem’s debt to
it. See McLeod v. McLeod, 644 S.W.3d 792, 803–05 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2022,
no pet.) (holding that the plaintiff adequately pled the cause of action despite the
pleading not containing the exact factual theory of liability that was submitted to the
jury).
Accordingly, we overrule Tech Chem’s and Gibson’s sole issue on appeal.
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III. This Court’s Ruling
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
W. STACY TROTTER
JUSTICE
November 19, 2026
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.
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