Full Opinion

Opinion filed November 19, 2026 In The Eleventh Court of Appeals __________ No. 11-25-00159-CV __________ TECH CHEM LLC AND JAMES GIBSON, Appellants V. BLACKWELL CHEMICAL COMPANY, Appellee On Appeal from the 244th District Court Ector County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. C25020207CV MEMORANDUM OPINION The parties’ dispute in this case concerns the nonpayment of services and chemical products that Appellee, Blackwell Chemical Company (Blackwell), provided to Appellant Tech Chem LLC (Tech Chem). Blackwell sued Tech Chem and Appellant James Gibson, Tech Chem’s president, alleging various causes of action. The trial court signed a default judgment against Tech Chem and Gibson in Blackwell’s favor, and Tech Chem and Gibson now appeal from that judgment. In their sole issue, Tech Chem and Gibson argue that the trial court erred when it signed a default judgment against them because Blackwell did not allege sufficient facts to support the default judgment. We affirm. I. Factual Background From October to December 2024, Blackwell provided an array of services and chemical products to Tech Chem, which Tech Chem agreed to pay Blackwell within thirty days of receipt of such products and services. Blackwell sent Tech Chem several invoices; on January 3, 2025, the balance due Blackwell for the services and products it had provided was $335,015.09. Tech Chem’s corporate privileges had been involuntarily forfeited since February 23, 2024, and Gibson was Tech Chem’s president on the date the underlying lawsuit was filed. On February 19, 2025, Blackwell sued Tech Chem and Gibson on a sworn account and, alternatively, for quantum meruit. Additionally, Blackwell sought to hold Gibson personally liable for Tech Chem’s debts to Blackwell pursuant to Section 171.255 of the Texas Tax Code. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.255 (West 2015); see also Fuchs v. Savanna Drilling LLC, No. 11-25- 00168-CV, 2026 WL 2191680, at *8 (Tex. App.—Eastland July 30, 2026, pet. filed) (discussing Section 171.255). Because neither Tech Chem nor Gibson answered or otherwise appeared in Blackwell’s lawsuit, Blackwell filed a motion for default judgment. Consequently, on April 22, 2025, the trial court, after considering Blackwell’s motion by submission, signed a default judgment against Tech Chem and Gibson and found them jointly and severally liable for damages to Blackwell in the amount of $335,015.09, pre-judgment interest, attorney’s fees, court costs, and postjudgment interest. Tech Chem and Gibson did not move for a new trial. 2 II. Analysis At the outset, we note that Tech Chem’s and Gibson’s appellate brief does not comply with the requirements of Rule 38.1 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1. An appellant must “state concisely all issues or points presented for review” and make “a clear and concise argument” for each issue raised “with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record.” Villani v. Vanderbilt Mortg. and Fin., Inc., No. 11-24-00321-CV, 2026 WL 1593648, at *4 (Tex. App.—Eastland June 4, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.) (quoting TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(f), (i)). Furthermore, the “[f]ailure to cite legal authority or to provide substantive analysis of the legal issues presented results in waiver of the complaint.” Dipprey v. Double Diamond, Inc., 637 S.W.3d 784, 801 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2021, no pet.) (quoting Smale v. Williams, 590 S.W.3d 633, 639 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2019, no pet.)). Here, Tech Chem and Gibson cite only two cases in their brief that generally set forth the standard for pleading sufficiency, then globally assert that Blackwell was required to plead the applicable provisions of Section 171.255 in its petition, yet they provide no authority or substantive analysis to support this argument. Nonetheless, and despite these deficiencies, we will address the merits of Tech Chem’s and Gibson’s “complaint,” because the supreme court has instructed that “[c]ourts ‘should hesitate to resolve cases based on procedural defects and instead endeavor to resolve cases on the merits.’” See Bertucci v. Watkins, 709 S.W.3d 534, 541–42 (Tex. 2025) (quoting Lion Copolymer Holdings, LLC v. Lion Polymers, LLC, 614 S.W.3d 729, 732 (Tex. 2020)). A. Standard of Review We review a trial court’s grant of a default judgment for an abuse of discretion. See Cottonwood Valley Home Owners Ass’n v. Hudson, 75 S.W.3d 601, 3 603 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2002, no pet.). We will affirm the trial court’s ruling so long as the trial court’s decision is not arbitrary, unreasonable, and without any reference to any guiding rules or principles. Id. (citing Goode v. Shoukfeh, 943 S.W.2d 441, 446 (Tex. 1997)). B. Application Tech Chem and Gibson argue that the trial court erred when it granted Blackwell’s motion for default judgment because Blackwell’s petition did not negate the affirmative defenses set out in Section 171.255(c).1 A trial court properly grants a motion for default judgment based on the plaintiff’s pleading unless (1) the cause of action pled is not within the jurisdiction of the trial court, (2) the pleading fails to give fair notice of the claim asserted, or (3) the pleading demonstrates that the claim is invalid. See Konkel v. Otwell, 65 S.W.3d 183, 188 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2001, no pet.) (citing Paramount Pipe & Supply Co., Inc. v. Muhr, 749 S.W.2d 491, 494 (Tex. 1988)). Generally, “in cases of [a] default judgment, the defendant’s failure to answer is an admission of the facts [that are] properly pleaded and the justice of the plaintiff’s claim.” Simon v. BancTexas Quorum, N.A., 754 S.W.2d 283, 286 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1988, writ denied) (citing Wall v. Wall, 630 S.W.2d 493, 496 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1982, writ ref’d n.r.e.)); see also Stoner v. Thompson, 578 S.W.2d 679, 682 (Tex. 1979) (holding that a non-answering party admits to the facts that are properly pled). When a party does not answer and a default judgment is granted against them, the non-answering party waives their right to present evidence that relates to any affirmative defense(s) they may have asserted to defeat the plaintiff’s 1 While Tech Chem and Gibson are parties to this appeal, the only argument advanced by them is that Blackwell’s petition did not properly plead a basis to hold Gibson personally liable for Tech Chem’s debts. Therefore, to the extent that they are seeking a reversal as to Tech Chem, that argument is waived as not adequately briefed. See Dipprey, 637 S.W.3d at 801. 4 claims. See Simon, 754 S.W.2d at 286; see also Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 243 (Tex. 1985) (discussing when a default judgment is granted, a defendant is not entitled to pursue an affirmative defense). In Texas, if a corporate entity’s privileges are forfeited, “each director or officer of the corporation is liable for each debt of the corporation that is created or incurred in this state after” the date of the forfeiture and before the entity’s privileges are revived. See TAX § 171.255(a); Fuchs, 2026 WL 2191680, at *8. However, there is a safe harbor provision that provides: (c) A director or officer is not liable for a debt of the corporation if the director or officer shows that the debt was created or incurred: (1) over the director’s objection; or (2) without the director’s knowledge and that the exercise of reasonable diligence to become acquainted with the affairs of the corporation would not have revealed the intention to create the debt. TAX § 171.255(c) (emphasis added). These provisions in Section 171.255 are affirmative defenses. See PACCAR Fin. Corp. v. Potter, 239 S.W.3d 879, 882 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, no pet.) (describing the above referenced provisions in Section 171.225 as “affirmative defenses”); State v. Barbee, No. 03-99-00560-CV, 2000 WL 766274, at *4 (Tex. App.—Austin June 15, 2000, pet. denied) (not designated for publication) (same). In this instance, Blackwell was not required to plead and foreclose the application of Section 171.255’s safe harbor provisions because those provisions are affirmative defenses. In Simon, the Fifth Court of Appeals addressed a situation factually similar to the matter before us—the defendant sought to set aside a default judgment based on an affirmative defense that was not pled by the plaintiff. See Simon, 754 S.W.2d at 285–86. There, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant executed a note in his individual capacity, however, after defaulting, the defendant 5 argued that he was entitled to assert the affirmative defense that he executed the note in a different capacity—as a corporate representative. Id. The court reasoned that, because the defendant defaulted and the argument that the defendant advanced concerned an affirmative defense, the argument was waived. Id. Like the argument to avoid liability that was raised in Simon, Gibson also premises his avoidance of liability on an affirmative defense which he, not Blackwell, bore the burden of pleading and proving. See Roark v. Stallworth Oil and Gas, Inc., 813 S.W.2d 492, 494 (Tex. 1991) (“A party relying on an affirmative defense must specifically plead the defense.”). In Simon, the unalleged affirmative defense was that the defendant signed the note in a representative capacity, while here the unasserted affirmative defense is that Gibson was shielded from liability under Section 171.255(c). However, the reason that forecloses one’s ability to avoid an adverse judgment is the same in both scenarios—both Gibson and the defendant in Simon sought to assert affirmative defenses only after they had defaulted and therefore waived the defense. Moreover, one of the two cases cited by Tech Chem and Gibson—Stoner— supports our holding. There, the Texas Supreme Court explained: [The] plaintiff’s pleadings must be adequate for the [trial] court to be able, from an examination of the plaintiff’s pleadings alone, to ascertain with reasonable certainty and without resorting to information aliunde the elements of plaintiff’s cause of action and the relief sought with sufficient information upon which to base a judgment. Stoner, 578 S.W.2d at 683 (citing C&H Transp. Co. v. Wright, 396 S.W.2d 443 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1965, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (emphasis added)). Stoner confirms that the focus in a pleading analysis is the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s cause of action, not a hypothetical affirmative defense which the defendant, not the plaintiff, bears the burden of pleading. See Roark, 813 S.W.2d at 494. Therefore, because the provisions in Section 171.255(c) are affirmative defenses—and not part of a 6 plaintiff’s underlying cause of action—Blackwell was not required to plead them. As such, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it granted the default judgment in favor of Blackwell. Even assuming, arguendo, that the provisions in Section 171.255(c) are not affirmative defenses, the allegations in Blackwell’s petition are sufficient to apprise Gibson that it was seeking to hold him personally liable for Tech Chem’s debts. Under the “fair notice” pleading standard, we look “to whether the opposing party can ascertain from the pleading the nature and basic issues of the controversy and what testimony will be relevant.” Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp. v. Auld, 34 S.W.3d 887, 896 (Tex. 2000) (citing Broom v. Brookshire Bros., Inc., 923 S.W.2d 57, 60 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1995, writ denied)); see also TEX. R. CIV. P. 45, 47. Here, the issue—that Blackwell sought to hold Gibson personally liable for Tech Chem’s debts—was made clear in its petition. Blackwell’s petition expressly referenced Section 171.255 and stated that “[b]ecause Tech Chem’s corporate privileges were forfeited, each officer and director of Tech Chem LLC is liable for Tech Chem’s debt, including but not limited to, Tech Chem’s president, James Gibson.” Therefore, given this clear reference to the relevant statute and the intention to hold Gibson personally liable, we conclude that Blackwell’s petition sufficiently apprised Gibson that Blackwell sought to hold him personally liable for Tech Chem’s debt to it. See McLeod v. McLeod, 644 S.W.3d 792, 803–05 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2022, no pet.) (holding that the plaintiff adequately pled the cause of action despite the pleading not containing the exact factual theory of liability that was submitted to the jury). Accordingly, we overrule Tech Chem’s and Gibson’s sole issue on appeal. 7 III. This Court’s Ruling We affirm the judgment of the trial court. W. STACY TROTTER JUSTICE November 19, 2026 Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J., Trotter, J., and Williams, J. 8