Coalition of Am. Mfrs. of Mobile Access Equip. v. United States

Slip Op. 26-119 UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE Court No. 24-00219 COALITION OF AMERICAN MANUFACTURERS OF MOBILE ACCESS EQUIPMENT, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES, Defendant, and ZHEJIANG DINGLI MACHINERY CO., LTD., Defendant-Intervenor. Court No. 24-00221 ZHEJIANG DINGLI MACHINERY CO., LTD., Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES, Defendant, and COALITION OF AMERICAN MANUFACTURERS OF MOBILE ACCESS EQUIPMENT, Defendant-Intervenor. Before: M. Miller Baker, Judge Ct. Nos. 24-00219, 24-00221 Page 2 OPINION [Sustaining the Department of Commerce’s determi- nation in two actions.] Dated: September 23, 2026 Timothy C. Brightbill, Laura El-Sabaawi, Enbar Tole- dano, and Theodore P. Brackemyre, Wiley Rein LLP, Washington, DC, on the briefs for the Coalition of American Manufacturers of Mobile Access Equipment, plaintiff in Case 24-219 and defendant-intervenor in Case 24-221. Ned H. Marshak, Dharmendra N. Choudhary, and Jordan C. Kahn, Grunfeld, Desiderio, Lebowitz, Sil- verman & Klestadt LLP, New York, NY, on the briefs for Zhejiang Dingli Machinery Co., Ltd., plaintiff in Case 24-221 and defendant-intervenor in Case 24-219. Kristin E. Olson, Trial Attorney, Commercial Litiga- tion Branch, Civil Division, U.S. Department of Jus- tice, Washington, DC, on the briefs for Defendant. Of counsel for Defendant was Charlie Chung, Attorney, Office of the Chief Counsel for Trade Enforcement & Compliance, U.S. Department of Commerce, Washing- ton, DC. Baker, Judge: The Department of Commerce’s im- position of an antidumping duty is but the first step in a sometimes decades-long cycle of administrative re- views in which the agency determines the actual rates Ct. Nos. 24-00219, 24-00221 Page 3 for the preceding 12-month period. 1 These two cases involve the first such review of an antidumping order on mobile access equipment imported from China. 2 In Case 24-221, Zhejiang Dingli Machinery Co., Ltd. (Dingli), a Chinese producer, challenges the De- partment’s choice of a primary surrogate country for valuing inputs and asserts that the agency committed certain legal errors. In Case 24-219, the Coalition of American Manufacturers of Mobile Access Equipment, a group of domestic producers, takes issue with how Commerce valued various inputs, including its use of a secondary surrogate country. 1 See Hung Vuong Corp. v. United States, 483 F. Supp. 3d 1321, 1332 n.4 (CIT 2020) (“On the anniversary of an anti- dumping order, various affected parties (e.g., foreign pro- ducers and exporters and domestic competitors) may re- quest an ‘administrative review’ to determine the actual assessment rates as to particular subject merchandise for the preceding twelve-month period. In short, each review is distinct, factually and legally, from any preceding re- view(s) and is best understood as periodic maintenance of the original antidumping order.”). 2 See also Coal. of Am. Mfrs. of Mobile Access Equip. v. United States, Slip Op. 24-66, 2024 WL 2796654 (CIT 2024) (Mobile Access I) (partially sustaining and partially re- manding Commerce’s original determination imposing the antidumping order); Coal. of Am. Mfrs. of Mobile Access Equip. v. United States, Slip Op. 25-150, 2025 WL 3555132 (CIT 2025) (Mobile Access II) (sustaining the Department’s redetermination following remand). Ct. Nos. 24-00219, 24-00221 Page 4 Finding the Department’s determination supported by substantial evidence and otherwise in accordance with law, the court sustains it in both cases. I Invoking jurisdiction conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c), the Coalition and Dingli filed their respec- tive suits under 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(2)(B)(iii) to at- tack different aspects of Commerce’s final decision. Each then intervened in the other’s case, essentially theorizing that the opponent’s desired relief would only make matters worse. Caught in the crossfire, the government urges the court to sustain the agency de- termination as-is. In § 1516a(a)(2) actions, “[t]he court shall hold un- lawful any determination, finding, or conclusion found . . . to be unsupported by substantial evidence on the record, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i). The question is not whether the court would have reached the same deci- sion on the same record. Rather, it is whether the ad- ministrative record as a whole permits Commerce’s conclusion. Substantial evidence has been defined as more than a mere scintilla, as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. To determine if substan- tial evidence exists, we review the record as a whole, including evidence that supports as well as evidence that fairly detracts from the sub- stantiality of the evidence. Ct. Nos. 24-00219, 24-00221 Page 5 Nippon Steel Corp. v. United States, 337 F.3d 1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (cleaned up); see also SSIH Equip. S.A. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 718 F.2d 365, 382 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (if Commerce makes a choice be- tween “two fairly conflicting views,” the court may not substitute its judgment even if its view would have been different “had the matter been before it de novo”) (quoting Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951)). The court also reviews to ensure the agency en- gaged in “reasoned decisionmaking,” meaning its re- sult must be “within the scope” of its authority and “the process” it uses to reach that outcome “must be logical and rational.” Michigan v. EPA, 576 U.S. 743, 750 (2015). The agency must “examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation . . . in- cluding a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (cleaned up). But courts will “uphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if the agency’s path may reasonably be discerned.” Id. II A Under the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, an anti- dumping duty represents the amount by which subject merchandise’s “normal value” exceeds its “export price,” i.e., the U.S. price. 19 U.S.C. § 1673. Usually, “normal value” is “the price at which the foreign like product is first sold . . . for consumption in the export- ing country.” Id. § 1677b(a)(1)(B)(i). Ct. Nos. 24-00219, 24-00221 Page 6 But an exception applies when the goods come from a nonmarket-economy country 3 like China. In such cases, the Department must assume that home-mar- ket sales are not reliable indicators of normal value because the economy is presumed to be under state control. See, e.g., Taian Ziyang Food Co. v. United States, 637 F. Supp. 2d 1093, 1105 (CIT 2009). Instead, the statute instructs Commerce to deter- mine normal value from “the factors of production uti- lized in producing the merchandise.” 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(1). The calculation of their worth must “be based on the best available information regarding . . . such factors in a market economy country or countries considered to be appropriate by” the agency. Id. The market-economy proxies the Department uses are known as “surrogate values.” In choosing them, “Commerce ‘attempts to construct a hypothetical mar- ket value of [the subject merchandise] in the [nonmar- ket-economy country].’୻” Changzhou Trina Solar En- ergy Co. v. United States, 975 F.3d 1318, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (first alteration in original) (quoting Down- hole Pipe & Equip., L.P. v. United States, 776 F.3d 1369, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). Here, Commerce found that both Turkey and Bul- garia provided the best available information overall— for some inputs, Turkey provided the best figures, but 3 This term means “any foreign country that [Commerce] determines does not operate on market principles of cost or pricing structures, so that sales of merchandise in such country do not reflect the fair value of the merchandise.” Id. § 1677(18)(A). Ct. Nos. 24-00219, 24-00221 Page 7 for others Bulgaria’s were superior. Appx1014–1015. It chose the former country as the primary surrogate for two reasons. First, the Bulgarian data for domestic movement expenses came from 2020 and the record lacked “in- flators” 4 the agency could use to adjust the amounts to reflect figures accurate for the period of review. The Turkish information, on the other hand, included the necessary inflators. Appx1015. Second, the financial statement for Bulgarian com- pany Dimexlift lacked explanatory material the De- partment considered necessary, while the two Turkish statements on the record were “detailed” and “compre- hensive” and included the critical explanatory notes. Appx1016–1017. But because Turkish data were una- vailable for some inputs, Commerce also selected Bul- garia as a “secondary surrogate country.” Appx1017. 4 This term refers to how Commerce adjusts prior years’ data that are non-contemporaneous with the relevant pe- riod of review to reflect what the amounts would have been during that period. The agency uses an inflator when the record lacks contemporaneous figures. See Changzhou Trina Solar Energy Co. v. United States, 255 F. Supp. 3d 1312, 1323 (CIT 2017). For example, it might use consumer price index data as a way to estimate the extent to which prices or costs would have changed from one year to the next. See New Am. Keg v. United States, Slip Op. 22-106, at 5–6, 2022 WL 4363320, at *2 (CIT 2022) (rejecting agency’s unexplained use of Brazilian consumer price index infor- mation to adjust non-contemporaneous Mexican wage rates). Ct. Nos. 24-00219, 24-00221 Page 8 Dingli now attacks the selection of Turkey and ar- gues that the agency should have chosen Bulgaria in- stead for everything. 1 The Department has “broad discretion to determine whether information is the best available because the statute does not define the term.” Zhejiang DunAn He- tian Metal Co. v. United States, 652 F.3d 1333, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2011). “This court’s duty is not to evaluate whether the information Commerce used was the best available, but rather whether a reasonable mind could conclude that [it] chose the best available infor- mation.” Id. (cleaned up). Dingli, however, wrongly asserts that “this Court must assert its independent judgment in deciding whether Commerce’s methodology resulted in reliance on the ‘best available information.’୻” Case 24-221, ECF 52, at 19 (citing Loper Bright Enters. v. Rai- mondo, 603 U.S. 369, 369–70, 400 (2024)). On reply, the company doubles down, arguing that “best availa- ble information” is a matter of statutory construction requiring the court to decide whether the agency actu- ally chose the best available information. Case 24-221, ECF 49, at 4 (citing Jiangsu Dingsheng New Materials Joint-Stock Co. v. United States, 794 F. Supp. 3d 1334, 1342 (CIT 2025), which Dingli claims relied on Loper Bright). Ct. Nos. 24-00219, 24-00221 Page 9 The company’s invocation of Dingsheng violates the chutzpah doctrine. 5 Contrary to Dingli’s characteriza- tion, that decision quite rightly rejected the contention (advanced by the same counsel, see 794 F. Supp. 3d at 1337) that “the statutory requirement to select the ‘best available information’ somehow strips Commerce of any deference to its determination of this case,” find- ing that argument “without merit.” Id. at 1341. While a statutory term’s meaning is a legal question, “the ap- plication of that term to the record is a factual deter- mination for the agency. . . . Commerce’s task is a mixed question of law and fact requiring it to apply the statutory term to the record information.” Id. at 1342. “Thus, the Court reviews whether Commerce’s selec- tion of . . . the primary surrogate country, because its information is better than all other information avail- able, is supported by substantial evidence, i.e., reason- able on this record.” Id. 2 Dingli also takes issue with how Commerce weighed the Turkish versus the Bulgarian infor- mation. The company asserts that the former country’s “hyperinflation is the single most important consider- ation on this record” and that the problems the De- partment found with the latter nation’s data—a lack of movement inflators and unusable financial 5 See NTSF Seafoods Joint Stock Co. v. United States, Slip Op. 22-38, at 11, 2022 WL 1375140, at **3–4 (CIT 2022) (citing Marks v. Comm’r, 947 F.2d 983, 986 (D.C. Cir. 1991), for the “୻‘chutzpah’ doctrine”). Ct. Nos. 24-00219, 24-00221 Page 10 statements—“are significantly less important.” Case 24-221, ECF 49, at 5. It is not for the court to decide what consideration is “most important” or whether any factor is “signifi- cantly less important.” Such questions are for the De- partment, as “the court may not reweigh the evidence or substitute its own judgment for that of the agency.” Usinor v. United States, 342 F. Supp. 2d 1267, 1272 (CIT 2004). Commerce did not contest Dingli’s assertion that Turkey suffered from hyperinflation during the period of review. Rather, it disagreed that hyperinflation ren- dered the country’s data unreliable. Appx1045. 6 The agency did acknowledge that import data reported in Turkish lira would be unreliable due to hyperinflation, but it disagreed that the same concern applied to fig- ures reported in other currencies. Appx1046. And it said the Turkish data here were in euros. Id. (citing Appx12903–12929). 7 Dingli argues that nothing in the record establishes that Turkish import prices were denominated in euros, arguing that “this reasoning is impeached by Trade Data Monitor [Turkey] import data that are officially reported in Turkish Lira.” Case 24-221, ECF 49, at 6 6 In so doing, the agency declined to rely on an expert econ- omist opinion proffered by the company. Id. The Depart- ment explained that because counsel retained the expert, his neutrality was “suspect.” Id. 7The cited pages support the agency’s statement. See Appx12925 (table valuing factors of production in euros). Ct. Nos. 24-00219, 24-00221 Page 11 (emphasis in original). The Department, however, did not use that source. Instead, it used the Global Trade Atlas. Appx1026. And while the company argues that the latter’s fig- ures are “originally reported” in lira, it cites no evi- dence supporting that contention. Instead, it argues that a statement to that effect in its agency brief “has not been challenged.” Case 24-221, ECF 52, at 24 (cit- ing Appx2840, which itself cited no evidence to support the statement either). “Briefs,” however, “are arguments, not evidence.” Morgenstern v. Burton, 86 F.2d 341, 342 (CCPA 1936); see also Estee Lauder Inc. v. L’Oreal, S.A., 129 F.3d 588, 595 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“[A]rguments of counsel can- not take the place of evidence lacking in the record.”). Dingli overlooks that the agency’s decision is pre- sumed to be correct unless the party challenging it proves otherwise. 28 U.S.C. § 2639(a)(1). Because the company cites no evidence contradicting the Depart- ment’s finding that the Global Trade Atlas data were denominated in euros, that argument fails. 8 Bizarrely, Dingli injects an argument about the Ca- nadian government’s antidumping investigation of Turkish rebar. Again citing only its own agency 8 Similarly, Dingli argues that Commerce’s finding that “inflation cannot automatically preclude the consideration of [Turkey] as a primary surrogate country,” Case 24-221, ECF 52, at 21 (quoting Appx1044), “ignores a plethora of record evidence” purportedly linking hyperinflation to dis- tortion in surrogate value data and financial statements, id. But it cites nothing to support that accusation. Ct. Nos. 24-00219, 24-00221 Page 12 briefing, it asserts that Commerce was involved in that foreign proceeding. See Case 24-221, ECF 52, at 25–26 (claiming that “de-dollarization of the Turkish econ- omy . . . was recognized by Commerce in the Canadian AD investigation” and that “the record in this proceed- ing does not contain any information contradicting Commerce’s factual findings in the Canadian investi- gation”) (emphasis added). It is unclear what “find- ings” the company believes the Department made as part of a foreign government’s investigation. In any event, Dingli ignores the agency’s observation that the Canadian government applied its own law, not U.S. antidumping law, and compiled its own record. See Appx1047. Commerce also pointed out that Dingli cited no precedent requiring consideration of a foreign govern- ment’s findings, especially as to unrelated products and inputs. Appx1048. The company calls that state- ment “unpersuasive” and argues that the lack of any rebuttal to the Canadian findings means they are the “best available information.” Case 24-221, ECF 52, at 31. But it should be obvious that the Department must apply U.S. law to analyze its own record. Com- merce reasonably explained why it deemed the Cana- dian government’s analysis irrelevant. The Department’s finding that hyperinflation did not render Turkey inappropriate as a primary surro- gate country is supported by substantial evidence. Ct. Nos. 24-00219, 24-00221 Page 13 3 Dingli’s next attack on the selection of Turkey as surrogate involves the financial statements the agency employed. “Commerce values certain factors of produc- tion, such as selling, general, and administrative ex- penses, factory overhead, and profit, by using financial ratios derived from financial statements of producers of comparable merchandise in the surrogate country.” Ad Hoc Shrimp Trade Action Comm. v. United States, 618 F.3d 1316, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2010). The Department uses multiple firms’ statements, if possible, “to nor- malize any potential distortions that may arise from using the statements of a single producer.” NTSF Sea- foods Joint Stock Co. v. United States, 487 F. Supp. 3d 1310, 1318 (CIT 2020). The Coalition provided financial statements for two Turkish companies, Tümosan and Türk Traktör. 9 Appx1015. Commerce found they produce goods com- parable to mobile access equipment. Appx1016. Dingli submitted statements from five Bulgarian firms, but the agency found that only one—Dimexlift Group AD—produced similar merchandise. Id. That issue mattered for determining whether the companies are likely to use inputs akin to those needed for making mobile access equipment. Id. The Department found the Turkish companies’ statements “detailed” and “comprehensive” and ac- companied by explanatory notes. Id. But Dimexlift’s 9 7PRVDQ0RWRUYH7UDNW|U6DQD\L$ûDQG7UN7UDNW|U 9H=LUDDW0DNLQHOHUL$û$SS[ Ct. Nos. 24-00219, 24-00221 Page 14 was far less so, “comprised only of an income state- ment, balance sheet, and a short director’s report.” Appx1016–1017. The latter also contained a column headed “Annex” with numerical codes referring to ex- planatory notes, but the notes were not part of the ma- terial Dingli submitted. Appx1017. Commerce there- fore concluded that the two Turkish statements were the best available information “because the sole finan- cial statements of a Bulgarian producer of comparable merchandise [were] incomplete.” Id. Dingli now disputes both the Turkish statements’ usability and the Bulgarian ones’ deficiencies. As an initial matter, on reply the company asserts that the record in the second administrative review of the same antidumping duty order at issue here calls the Depart- ment’s conclusions into question. Case 24-221, ECF 49, at 12–15. Recall that this case involves the first such review. It is generally improper to raise an argument for the first time in a reply brief. See, e.g., Stauffer v. Brooks Bros. Grp., Inc., 758 F.3d 1314, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2014). An even bigger problem is that the material Dingli seeks to add is not part of the record here. The company acknowledges that hurdle but shrugs it off by suggesting the court take judicial notice. Case 24-221, ECF 49, at 12–13. 10 10 Dingli asserts that the court has “take[n] judicial notice of documents in other Commerce [antidumping] proceed- ings that are publicly available on ACCESS,” the agency’s (footnote continues on next page) Ct. Nos. 24-00219, 24-00221 Page 15 That workaround isn’t available. The standard of review directs the court to review the matter on the record that existed before the agency at the time of its decision. See Jiaxing Bro. Fastener Co. v. United States, 428 F. Supp. 3d 1364, 1379 n.29 (CIT 2020) (“[J]udicial review of [Commerce’s] determinations must be limited to the record before the agency that was compiled during that segment of the proceeding.”) (citing QVD Food Co. v. United States, 658 F.3d 1318, 1324–25 (Fed. Cir. 2011)). Not only was the second ad- ministrative review’s record not before the agency here, it couldn’t have been, as it didn’t exist yet. And Dingli itself portrays the decision from the second electronic records system. Case 24-221, ECF 49, at 13 (cit- ing Calgon Carbon Corp. v. United States, 145 F. Supp. 3d 1312, 1327 (CIT 2016)). But Calgon says nothing about tak- ing judicial notice. The issue there was the agency’s use of information from a prior review without considering whether more contemporaneous data were more accurate. 145 F. Supp. 3d at 1327. And Dingli’s other cited case, Catfish Farmers of America v. United States, 918 F. Supp. 2d 1381 (CIT 2013), likewise did not involve taking judicial notice of extra-record mate- rial. It involved the seventh administrative review of an antidumping duty order. The plaintiffs filed a “notice of supplemental authority” citing the results of the eighth re- view. The court denied the government’s motion to strike, reasoning that the plaintiffs did not purport to try to sup- plement the record. Significantly, however, the court de- clined to address whether the proffered “supplemental au- thority” was relevant—all it held was that it was unneces- sary to grant the motion to strike to ensure adherence to the proper standard of review. Id. at 1383. Ct. Nos. 24-00219, 24-00221 Page 16 review as relying on information apparently generated after the period of review here. 11 The simple fact is that, on the record that was be- fore the Department in this first administrative re- view and that is before the court here, the Turkish gov- ernment had instructed companies not to adjust their financial statements for 2022. Appx1050–1051. “In the absence of record evidence to the contrary, Commerce has no reason to question the Turkish accounting and auditing standards authority’s finding” that no adjust- ment was necessary. Appx1051 (emphasis added). Turning to Dingli’s argument about hyperinflation, the Department cited an earlier decision, Metal Lock- ers from China,12 that stated it is not enough for a party to allege that financial statements “may be dis- torted by significant inflation.” Rather, the party must “provide specific evidence of any such distortion, iden- tify any inflation adjustments that should have [been] made, [and] identify any past instances where Com- merce made inflation adjustments in the determina- tion of surrogate financial ratios.” Appx1052 (quoting I&D Memo at 14 accompanying 86 Fed. Reg. 35,737). The agency found that Dingli failed to satisfy any of those requirements here. 11 The period of review ran from April 13, 2022, to March 31, 2023. See Appx1001. Dingli wants to expand the record to include the Turkish companies’ full 2023 financial state- ments. See Case 24-221, ECF 49, at 15. 12 86 Fed. Reg. 35,737. Ct. Nos. 24-00219, 24-00221 Page 17 While the company argues that the record shows that the Turkish statements were distorted, it offers no serious response to the Department’s observation that Metal Lockers from China held “that hyperinfla- tion is not one of the agency’s considerations in select- ing surrogate financial statements, much less surro- gate countries.” Appx1052. The company simply says that is not a reason to reject its argument. Case 24-221, ECF 52, at 42. But it cites no authority to over- come the Department’s practice. 13 Dingli alternatively challenges Tümosan’s—but not Türk’s—financial statements by alleging that they may be distorted by countervailable subsidies from two Turkish government programs. See Appx1052 (agency’s summary of argument). The Department re- jected that theory because the company did not cite “any explicit evidence” in Tümosan’s statement or the accompanying explanatory notes. Id. The agency said its practice is “to disqualify surrogate financial state- ments when they indicate evidence of subsidies found by Commerce to be countervailable.” Appx1053. It ex- plained that the programs in question are not ones it has found countervailable. Id. 13 And while, on reply, Dingli asserts that the government’s arguments in support of Commerce’s decision are “unsup- ported by substantial evidence,” Case 24-221, ECF 49, at 6, that theory inverts the standard of review. It is not the gov- ernment’s obligation to support its own arguments with substantial evidence, nor must it prove that the Depart- ment’s decision is so supported. The burden of proving that the agency decision lacks evidentiary support falls on the party challenging it—Dingli. See 28 U.S.C. § 2639(a)(1). Ct. Nos. 24-00219, 24-00221 Page 18 The company responds by citing case law, and leg- islative history, 14 it describes as requiring the Depart- ment to reject financial statements when there is “rea- son to believe or suspect” that receipt of countervaila- ble subsidies distorted the information. It argues, “Commerce was only required to determine if there was a reason to believe or suspect that Tümosan’s fi- nancial statement was distorted by subsidies.” Case 24-221, ECF 52, at 42 (citing Shenzhen Xinboda Indus. Co. v. United States, 976 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1374 (CIT 2014)). But contrary to Dingli’s characterization, Xinboda supports the agency’s conclusion here. First, that deci- sion observed that “where Commerce has ‘reason to be- lieve or suspect’ that a potential surrogate may have benefited from subsidies that the agency has previ- ously found to be countervailable, it is [its] practice to disregard the financial statements of that company if there is other useable data on the record.” 976 F. Supp. 2d at 1368 (emphasis added). As noted above, Dingli cited no evidence that any subsidies Tümosan may have received were ones the agency had previously 14 Peculiarly, Dingli argues that “Congress expressly in- structs Commerce” through the legislative history. Case 24-221, ECF 52, at 43. The court disagrees. The First Branch directs agencies through statutes. The company fails to cite any statutory language. Ct. Nos. 24-00219, 24-00221 Page 19 found to be countervailable, and it cites no such evi- dence before this court, either. 15 Second, Xinboda also stated, as the agency did here, that in considering whether there is “reason to believe or suspect” receipt of countervailable subsi- dies, “Commerce relies on information in financial statements on an ‘as is’ basis, and does not look beyond a company’s financial statements to consider other in- formation on the administrative record.” 976 F. Supp. 3d at 1368 (cleaned up). The Department reasonably invoked that principle to reject an opinion from Dingli’s paid expert that Tümosan “likely” received subsidies. Appx1053. 16 Dingli then argues that Dimexlift’s financial state- ment was superior. Id. at 47–48. It contends the state- ment “breaks out expenses for all ‘vital’ cost and ex- pense categories.” Id. at 48 (citing Appx2857). But the only citation it offers in support is to a single page of its agency case brief, which, again, is not evidence. More importantly, Commerce explained that without 15 One of the programs Dingli flags is Turkey’s “Exemp- tions on Banking and Insurance Transaction Tax.” Case 24-221, ECF 52, at 44. Commerce found that program is not a countervailable subsidy because it is not specific. See Kaptan Demir Celik Endustrisi ve Ticaret A.S. v. United States, 803 F. Supp. 3d 1276, 1280 (CIT 2025), appeal pend- ing, No. 26-1229 (Fed. Cir.). 16 The company presumably agrees that rejection was ap- propriate because it admits—elsewhere in its brief—that when Commerce has a routine practice, it must apply it. See Case 24-221, ECF 52, at 6 (citing Save Domestic Oil, Inc. v. United States, 357 F.3d 1278, 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). Ct. Nos. 24-00219, 24-00221 Page 20 the explanatory notes, it cannot confirm whether the statement’s breakout of expenses “is sufficient.” Appx1060. The company does not respond to that con- cern. The Department’s issue was not that the state- ment does not “break[ ] out expenses.” Its problem was that it could not verify that the statement did so properly. That explanation is also reasonable and con- stitutes substantial evidence. 4 Dingli’s remaining challenges to Commerce’s selec- tion of Turkey invite the court to re-weigh the evi- dence. The company gives the game away with its as- sertion that “Commerce improperly rejected Bulgaria based on deficiencies that are minor relative to the un- reliability of Turkey’s data.” Case 24-221, ECF 52, at 47. First, Dingli objects to Commerce’s finding that the Bulgarian data lacked necessary inflators for adjust- ing expenses. Id. (citing Appx1059). The company con- tends that “movement expenses are not major” factors of production, such that the inflators’ absence “does not support rejection of Bulgaria” as the primary sur- rogate country. Id. It doubles down on reply, insisting that hyperinflation “is the single most important con- sideration” and that “the alleged ‘record-based limita- tions of Bulgaria’s dataset (movement inflators and unusable financial statements)’ are significantly less important.” Case 24-221, ECF 49, at 5 (citation omit- ted) (quoting Case 24-221, ECF 55, at 27). But that de- cision is the agency’s—not the court’s—to make. Ct. Nos. 24-00219, 24-00221 Page 21 Second, on reply the company asserts that the Bul- garian inflator data were on the record after all. See id. at 18 (citing Appx10051–10052, Appx10346– 10355). Its explanation appears to be that both it and the Department overlooked the information because the record was “voluminous.” See id. at 18 n.1. That is effectively an admission that even if the inflators were on the record, Dingli never called them to the Depart- ment’s attention, 17 which in turn means it failed both to exhaust its administrative remedies and to carry its burden of building an adequate record. “The law does not require Commerce to build the record on the plain- tiffs’ behalf.” Linyi City Kangfa Foodstuff Drinkable Co. v. United States, Slip Op. 16-89, at 8–9, 2016 WL 5122648, at *3 (CIT 2016) (citing QVD Food, 658 F.3d at 1324). Third and finally, the company attacks the Depart- ment’s rejection of a financial statement from Bulgar- ian firm Balkancar. Recall that Dingli submitted statements from five Bulgarian companies, but Com- merce found that only one—Dimexlift—produced rele- vant merchandise. Appx1015. The company disagrees, asserting that Balkancar makes trucks and other lift- ing and transport equipment, as well as components 17 Dingli actually says the inflators “were not noticed by [it] or Commerce during” the second administrative review “on account of the voluminous [surrogate value] record.” Id. (emphasis added). Recall that the court has rejected the company’s effort to import information from that (later) proceeding. Ct. Nos. 24-00219, 24-00221 Page 22 for them. Case 24-221, ECF 52, at 52 (citing Appx7106, Appx7114, Appx7126). But the Department rejected Balkancar’s data for other reasons as well. It found that the absence of an auditor’s opinion rendered the statement unusable. Appx1063. The agency emphasized that without such an opinion, it “cannot ascertain whether the financial statements present financial information fairly in all material respects.” Id. It said that alone is disqualify- ing, citing a general practice of not using financial statements that lack an auditor’s opinion if the record contains other usable ones. Id. (citing I&D Memo, Cmt. 1B, accompanying 85 Fed. Reg. 58,333). Dingli objects that the Bulgarian government did not require audited financial statements, and it con- tends that this court has “approved” Commerce’s use of such documentation that was suitable aside from the lack of an auditor’s opinion. Case 24-221, ECF 52, at 54 (citing Dingsheng, 794 F. Supp. 3d at 1343). But Dingsheng noted that the Department treated the statement as audited “based on the existence of an au- ditor’s fee.” 794 F. Supp. 3d at 1343. The court did not “approve” the use of unaudited statements or other- wise address that issue. For its part, Dingli cites no evidence to establish that Balkancar’s information was in fact audited, nor does it dispute that the Turk- ish statements on the record were. Under agency prac- tice as explained by Commerce, that rendered the lat- ter superior. Ct. Nos. 24-00219, 24-00221 Page 23 * * * The court holds that the Department’s selection of Turkey as the primary surrogate country is supported by substantial evidence and therefore sustains it. B The next issue in Dingli’s case involves how the agency compares normal value with export price. The Department usually compares “the weighted average of the normal values with the weighted average of the export prices,” a process known as the “average-to-av- erage method.” 19 C.F.R. § 351.414(b)(1), (c)(1). In some cases, however, it instead compares the weighted average of the normal values to the export prices for individual transactions—the “average-to-transaction method.” Id. § 351.414(b)(3). The former is the default unless the agency finds a different procedure more ap- propriate in a particular case. Id. § 351.414(c)(1). Here, Commerce used a test known as Cohen’s d to assess whether the alternative “average-to-transac- tion” method was more appropriate, but it concluded in the negative. Appx1080. Dingli attacks the agency’s use of that test as unlawful. Case 24-221, ECF 52, at 55–56 (citing Marmen Inc v. United States, 134 F.4th 1334, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2025)). Both the government and the Coalition observe that the Department found the test results did not warrant a departure from the default “average-to-av- erage” method that Dingli wanted the agency to use. Case 24-221, ECF 55, at 57 (government); Case 24-221, ECF 51, at 8 (Coalition). They urge the court Ct. Nos. 24-00219, 24-00221 Page 24 to dismiss the company’s claim on this issue for lack of standing because the company cannot show either an injury in fact or that the court can provide redress. Case 24-221, ECF 55, at 57–58; Case 24-221, ECF 51, at 9–11. The court disagrees that the company lacks stand- ing. Dingli has indisputably suffered injury in fact from Commerce’s imposition of antidumping duties on its products. In this suit, it seeks to have the agency reconsider its calculation of those duties and thereby reduce them, if not eliminate them altogether. If the court were to remand the selection of a pri- mary surrogate country for purposes of that calcula- tion, the company could conceivably suffer a negative result from the Department’s use of Cohen’s d—after all, the use of Bulgarian data would change the under- lying information and thus Dingli’s margin. The poten- tial for obtaining relief from that potentially adverse outcome suffices for constitutional standing purposes. “Where Congress has accorded a procedural right to a litigant, such as the right to appeal an administrative decision, certain requirements of standing—namely immediacy and redressability, as well as prudential aspects that are not part of Article III—may be re- laxed.” Dalian Meisen Woodworking Co. v. United States, 571 F. Supp. 3d 1364, 1380 (CIT 2021) (cleaned up) (quoting Consumer Watchdog v. Wis. Alumni Rsch. Found., 753 F.3d 1258, 1261 (Fed. Cir. 2014)). But the court is not remanding the primary surro- gate country issue (nor any other), so even if the agency’s use of Cohen’s d was error, it was harmless in Ct. Nos. 24-00219, 24-00221 Page 25 this context. Thus, there is no need for the court to take up that question, much less remand it to the agency for reconsideration. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (provid- ing that when a court hears a challenge to an agency action, “due account shall be taken of the rule of prej- udicial error”); Suntec Indus. Co. v. United States, 85 F.3d 1363, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that § 706 “requires application of a traditional harmless-error analysis and . . . the person seeking relief from the er- ror has the burden of showing prejudice caused by” it). C Dingli argues that it was “unlawful” for Commerce to deduct Section 301 duties 18 from its U.S. sales prices. By statute, the Department must adjust the U.S. price (the export price) by deducting the amount, if any, included in such price, at- tributable to any additional costs, charges, or ex- penses, and United States import duties, which are incident to bringing the subject merchandise from the original place of shipment in the ex- porting country to the place of delivery in the United States. 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(c)(2)(A) (emphasis added). 18 Section 301 duties are meant to combat certain trade practices in foreign countries. See 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (author- izing such duties); Appx1081–1083 (agency explanation). Ct. Nos. 24-00219, 24-00221 Page 26 Dingli acknowledges four cases 19 in which this court has held that Section 301 levies are deductible as “import duties,” but says that it “respectfully disa- grees with [all of them] and requests that this Court find that Section 301 duties are special duties and therefore are not deductible.” Case 24-221, ECF 52, at 57. It argues that they are “special duties” because their purpose is to convince the Chinese government to eliminate unfair trade practices. Id. at 61. The company’s opening brief conspicuously ignores the Federal Circuit’s decision in Borusan Mannes- mann Boru Sanayi ve Ticaret A.S. v. United States, 63 F.4th 25 (Fed. Cir. 2023), which affirmed a CIT ruling sustaining the Department’s deduction of Section 232 duties20 from U.S. prices. The court of appeals defined the question as “whether a duty is to be imposed on top of the amount of antidumping duties that would be due without the [Section 232] duty or, instead, is to partly or wholly substitute for such duties.” Id. at 34. To answer that question, the court held it is neces- sary to examine the document imposing the levy. If it is in addition to any other duties, it is a “United States 19 Shangha