PSEG Renewable Transmission LLC v. Arentz Family, LP

USCA4 Appeal: 25-1730 Doc: 64 Filed: 08/06/2026 Pg: 1 of 47 PUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 25-1730 PSEG RENEWABLE TRANSMISSION LLC, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. ARENTZ FAMILY, LP; BARNEY'S FARM, LLC; HZ PROPERTIES, LLC; M & R, LLC; THE DUG HILL ROD AND GUN CLUB, INC.; TROYER FARMS, LLC; TROYER REAL ESTATE, LLC; ALENE R. STICKLES; ROBERT H. STICKLES, SR.; AMY GAYLE YOUNGBLOOD; ANDREW D. MCLEAN; REBECCA MCLEAN; BENJAMIN EUGENE NUSBAUM; KENNETH EUGENE NUSBAUM; BETTY LOU MILLER; CARL E. MILLER; BRYAN N. HENDRIX; CONSTANCE M. HENDRIX; CARMEN COCKEY; CHRISTOPHER D. COCKEY; CATHERINE V. MILLER; WAYNE D. MILLER; CHARLES WILLIAM BOND; MORGAN DAVIS BOND; CHARLOTTE RUTH BIXLER; CHRIS N. RESH; DOROTHY I. DONMOYER; PETRICE MARIE DONMOYER- RESH; ROBERT L. DONMOYER; DEBORAH H. MAEDER; JOHN D. MAEDER; DIANE M. COOK; JAMES R. COOK; ERICH CHARLES STEIGER; REBECCA IRENE SCOLLAN; ESTHER JOHANN LENTZ-BUENGER; FAY ANN MILLER; KENNETH E. MILLER; GARY J. BROCKMEYER; NANCY M. BROCKMEYER; HELEN L. BULL; JOSEPH L. GLOVER; RAINA C. GLOVER; JULIA LU; ZHEJUN FAN; JUSTIN WRIGHT; KEITH EMERSON ENSOR; KEVIN LEE ENSOR; KIMBERLY A. JOHNSTON; LESLIE ALFRED WHITE; MATT UNKLE; TOMI UNKLE; MOHAMAD A. KOURANI; NADA E. KOURANI; MORRIS L. BOHLAYER; SHARON L. BOHLAYER; NANCY P. MACBRIDE; RICHARD M. DOSTER; THOMAS B. COLLINS; TRACY W. COLLINS, Defendants – Appellants, and DELLS GENERATION FARMS, LLC; GROVES MILL, LLC; PANORA ACRES, INC.; PETER AND JOHN RADIO FELLOWSHIP, INC.; RBC REAL ESTATE I, USCA4 Appeal: 25-1730 Doc: 64 Filed: 08/06/2026 Pg: 2 of 47 LLC; SCHOOL OF LIVING; ALLAN PATRICK SANDERS; ROY FRANCIS SANDERS; ANNE F. PRICE-DAVIS; MICHAEL A. DAVIS; AUSTIN L. KALTRIDER; JOYCE E. KALTRIDER; MARLIN L. KALTRIDER; MARVIN L. KALTRIDER; SHAWN L. KALTRIDER; BARCLAY G. CARAS; PAMELA J. CARAS; BRANDON HILL; BRUCE E. DOAK; GAYLE M. DOAK; C. WILLIAM KNOBLOCH, JR. AND CAROL KNOBLOCH REVOCABLE LIVING TRUST AGREEMENT DATED JANUARY 30, 2019; CAROL J. FERTITTA; JOSEPH V. FERTITTA, III; CATHERINE M. GESTIDO; EDUARDO E. GESTIDO; CHARLES GARY ATKINSON; INDRANEE KURUPPUNAYAKE; STEPHEN GORDON ATKINSON; CHARLES WILLIAM ATKINSON; CHERYL ANN GEARY; PAUL JOSEPH GEARY; CHRISTINE D. EYRING; JOHN M. EYRING, JR.; DANIEL GEORGE SCHWARTZ; ERIK J. LENZ; FAITH J. WEEKS; MICHAEL D. HANDS, JR.; FRANCIS LEE DELL; MARIAN V. DELL; HENRY WHITAKER; KAREN A. SCHLEPER; HOECKEL FAMILY SELF SETTLED ASSET PROTECTION FAMILY IRREVOCABLE TRUST; JAMES A. O'DONNELL; PATRICIA J. O'DONNELL; JUDITH A. FIEDLER; JULIUS J. PITRONE; LINDA S. GRESOCK; THOMAS S. GRESOCK; LISA M. WARD; ZACHARY J. WARD; MABEL E. WILSON REVOCABLE DEED OF TRUST DATED 3/25/1998; MATTHEW LEE DELL; NANCY E. CRAMER; NANCY EILEEN PIERCE; PAMELA M. WILSON; ROBERT KEITH WILSON; PHYLLIS A. REHMEYER; TODD M. REHMEYER, Defendants. ------------------------------ COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF CARROLL COUNTY, MARYLAND, Amicus Supporting Appellant Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. Adam B. Abelson, District Judge. (1:25-cv-01235-ABA) Argued: May 5, 2026 Decided: August 6, 2026 Before WILKINSON, RICHARDSON, and BERNER, Circuit Judges. 2 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1730 Doc: 64 Filed: 08/06/2026 Pg: 3 of 47 Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Berner wrote the opinion, in which Judge Wilkinson joined. Judge Richardson wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment. ARGUED: Harris Eisenstein, David Matthew Wyand, ROSENBERG MARTIN GREENBERG, LLP, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellants. Kurt James Fischer, VENABLE, LLP, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Lauren M. McLarney, ROSENBERG MARTIN GREENBERG, LLP, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellants. J. Joseph Curran, III, Christopher S. Gunderson, Kenneth L. Thompson, Susan R. Schipper, Emily J. Wilson, VENABLE LLP, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee. Timothy F. Maloney, Alyse L. Prawde, JOSEPH, GREENWALD & LAAKE, P.A., Greenbelt, Maryland, for Amicus Curiae. 3 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1730 Doc: 64 Filed: 08/06/2026 Pg: 4 of 47 BERNER, Circuit Judge: Foundational principles of statutory interpretation under Maryland law direct courts to presume that the Maryland General Assembly intends for its enactments to operate together as a consistent and harmonious body of law. This court, when construing Maryland statutes, must avoid an interpretation that renders a statutory scheme unworkable. The case before us turns on these principles. PSEG Renewable Transmission LLC (PSEG) received federal approval to construct the Maryland Piedmont Reliability Project (MPRP), a transmission line intended to address the region’s emerging electricity shortage. Before construction can begin, PSEG is required to obtain a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity (CPCN) from Maryland’s Public Service Commission (PSC). PSEG submitted a CPCN application to the PSC, which referred its review to Maryland’s Power Plant Research Program (PPRP). The PPRP submitted a report to the PSC deeming the CPCN application incomplete until PSEG completes certain field-based studies. To conduct the surveys necessary for these studies, PSEG must access the properties over which the MPRP would run. The owners of these properties, the appellants in this case, refused such access. PSEG filed suit against the property owners for injunctive relief and moved for a preliminary injunction which would permit PSEG to access the properties under Section 12-111(a) of the Maryland Code’s Real Property Article. The district court granted PSEG’s motion, and the property owners appealed. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the preliminary injunction and thus affirm. 4 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1730 Doc: 64 Filed: 08/06/2026 Pg: 5 of 47 I. Factual Background The following facts are drawn from the record “as it comes to us on this preliminary, interlocutory appeal.” Real Time Med. Sys., Inc. v. PointClickCare Techs., Inc., 131 F.4th 205, 213 (4th Cir. 2025). Where appropriate, we may take judicial notice of facts, including matters of public record, pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201, as did the district court. See Goldfarb v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 791 F.3d 500, 508–09 (4th Cir. 2015). Plaintiff-Appellee PSEG Renewable Transmission LLC (PSEG) is a New Jersey-based transmission development company that develops, constructs, and owns transmission projects. This case concerns a transmission line project proposed by PSEG: the Maryland Piedmont Reliability Project (MPRP). The MPRP is a high-voltage transmission line that will transmit energy to residents of Maryland and the surrounding region. It is planned to traverse approximately sixty-seven miles through three Maryland counties: Baltimore County, Carroll County, and Frederick County. The MPRP was developed in response to a federal government solicitation for proposed solutions to a growing energy crisis centered in the Mid-Atlantic region. Some brief regulatory background will be helpful to understand the federal process relevant to this appeal. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) is a government agency that regulates the interstate transmission of energy resources, including electricity. See 16 U.S.C. § 824. It oversees the planning and cost allocation of new transmission infrastructure through regional transmission organizations like PJM Interconnection, LLC (PJM), which covers parts of the Mid-Atlantic and Midwest, including the State of 5 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1730 Doc: 64 Filed: 08/06/2026 Pg: 6 of 47 Maryland. See id. § 824s (governing transmission infrastructure investment). Once a transmission line enters service, its operating company may become subject to federal regulation by FERC as a federal public utility. See Md. Code Ann., Pub. Util. (PU) § 7-207(b)(3)(iii). Thus, PSEG will be regulated as a federal public utility if the MPRP enters service. Still, state governments retain substantial authority under federal law to decide questions of transmission siting and construction. See 16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (preserving state authority); PU § 7-207 (governing public utility companies). The interplay between federal and state regulation lies at the heart of this case. For several years, PJM has observed a significant growth in electricity use in Maryland and Virginia that threatens to overload the energy grid by 2027. To respond to this increase and the retirement of power generation facilities in the region, PJM determined that the region needs additional transmission capacity. In February 2023, PJM solicited proposed solutions. PSEG submitted a proposal to develop and construct the MPRP. PJM selected the proposal and, in April 2024, entered into a Designated Entity Agreement (DEA) with PSEG to develop and construct the MPRP. The DEA includes a development schedule with several milestone dates that PSEG is required to meet. Relevant here, the DEA requires PSEG to have acquired all necessary federal, state, county, and local site permits by September 1, 2026. It also requires PSEG to have the MPRP in-service by June 1, 2027. These milestone dates are not set in stone, however. They may be extended by PJM. Having obtained federal approval, PSEG sought the necessary permits as required by the State of Maryland. Maryland requires entities seeking to construct a transmission 6 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1730 Doc: 64 Filed: 08/06/2026 Pg: 7 of 47 line in the state to first obtain a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity (CPCN) from the Maryland Public Service Commission (PSC). See PU § 7-207(b)(3)(i). PSC is an independent state agency that regulates “each public service company that engages in or operates a utility business in” the state. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Wash. Cnty. v. Perennial Solar, LLC, 212 A.3d 868, 875 n.12 (Md. 2019). Without a CPCN, “a person may [not] acquire by condemnation . . . any property or right necessary for the construction or maintenance of the transmission line.” PU § 7-207(b)(3)(v)(2). PSEG submitted its CPCN application to the PSC in December 2024. See In re Application of PSEG, Case No. 9773 (Md. Pub. Serv. Comm’n 2024), https://webpscxb.pscmaryland.com/DMS/case/9773 [https://perma.cc/RK3P-D3AV] (last visited June 30, 2026). The PSC then began its review, which is still ongoing, to assess whether PSEG has shown a need for the MPRP and whether to approve the proposed route for the MPRP. As part of its application, PSEG was required to submit, among other information, certain “environmental, natural resources, and socioeconomic information.” Md. Code Regs. (COMAR) 20.79.01.06(K) (detailing CPCN application filing requirements). This includes a “summary of the environmental and socioeconomic effects of the construction and operation of the project” and copies “of all studies of the environmental impact of the proposed project prepared by the applicant.” COMAR 20.79.04.04(B)–(C). The PSC is not responsible for determining whether the CPCN application is complete, however. The Maryland General Assembly assigned that responsibility to the Power Plant Research Program (PPRP), a division of the Maryland 7 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1730 Doc: 64 Filed: 08/06/2026 Pg: 8 of 47 Department of Natural Resources. See Md. Code Ann., Nat. Res. (NR) § 3-303 (governing PPRP). In January 2025, the PSC directed PPRP to determine whether PSEG’s CPCN application was complete. The PPRP reported in March 2025 that it lacked sufficient information to make the requisite determination. Relevant here, PPRP needed field studies of the environmental and socioeconomic effects of the construction and operation of the MPRP in order to determine whether the route for the MPRP was acceptable. PSEG was unable to complete the required field studies without accessing the properties through which the MPRP would run. Many of these properties are owned by private landowners, including the Arentz Family and 116 other defendant-appellants (collectively, the Property Owners), who would not permit PSEG onto their properties. The properties at issue differ greatly. Some of the Property Owners operate multi-generational farms. Others have forest and wetlands conservation and preservation easements. Several operate commercial businesses on their properties. Lacking the requisite field studies, PSEG opted to submit its CPCN application with desktop studies that it completed using secondary sources and without accessing the properties. In its report to the PSC on PSEG’s CPCN application, PPRP made clear that the desktop studies could not be verified and that field studies were necessary. While PPRP acknowledged that PSEG lacked “the necessary access to conduct field studies,” PPRP continued to require the studies. Parties’ Joint Appendix (J.A.) 258. Thus, PSEG’s application was found “administratively incomplete.” J.A. 260. PPRP estimates that it takes approximately thirty months to assess a CPCN application after it is filed. 8 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1730 Doc: 64 Filed: 08/06/2026 Pg: 9 of 47 PSEG sought access from the Property Owners to conduct the requisite field studies. It asserted a right under Section 12-111(a) of the Maryland Code’s Real Property Article to access “private land to make surveys” and to “obtain information relating to the acquisition or future public use of the property or for any governmental report, undertaking, or improvement.” Md. Code Ann., Real Prop. (RP), § 12-111(a)(1) (governing property access rights of entities having power of eminent domain). Whether PSEG likely possesses this right of access is the question before us. Most relevant to the factual background, though, is that PSEG proceeded as if it had this right. PSEG notified the Property Owners that it would seek access to their land and requested their consent. 1 The Property Owners refused, and this suit followed. II. Procedural History PSEG filed suit against the Property Owners for injunctive relief and moved for a preliminary injunction permitting it “to enter onto the properties [of the Property Owners] and to remain on the property to the extent necessary to make surveys . . . or obtain information relating to the acquisition and future use of the properties in connection with the [MPRP].” J.A. 1744; see also RP § 12-111(b) (providing cause of action to enforce right of access in Section 12-111(a)). The Property Owners opposed the preliminary injunction. 1 The parties do not contest the district court’s finding that this notice satisfied the requirements of Section 12-111(a). 9 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1730 Doc: 64 Filed: 08/06/2026 Pg: 10 of 47 Following a hearing, the district court issued a memorandum opinion granting PSEG a preliminary injunction. PSEG Renewable Transmission LLC v. Arentz Fam., LP, 788 F. Supp. 3d 705 (D. Md. 2025). The district court found that PSEG met its burden on each of the four Winter factors necessary to obtain a preliminary injunction: likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable harm, the balance of equities, and the public interest. See id. at 735; Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). Interpreting Section 12-111 of the Maryland Code’s Real Property Article based on its “text, statutory and regulatory context, legislative history, and purpose,” PSEG, 788 F. Supp. 3d at 727, the district court concluded that PSEG had demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits, id. at 735–37. The right to access “any private land to make surveys” under Section 12-111(a) can be invoked only by certain persons “acting on behalf of the State or of any of its instrumentalities or any body politic or corporate having the power of eminent domain[.]” RP § 12-111(a). The district court found that PSEG likely qualifies as a “body politic or corporate having the power of eminent domain.” PSEG, 788 F. Supp. 3d at 726–730, 735. The parties primarily disputed—and continue to dispute on appeal—the second part of this finding, whether PSEG has the power of eminent domain. Although State entities inherently possess the power of eminent domain, Mayor & City Council of Balt. City v. Valsamaki, 916 A.2d 324, 335 (Md. 2007), it is less clear when an applicant to become a federal public utility, like PSEG, gains that power. To answer that question, the Property Owners pointed to Section 7-207(b)(3)(v) of the Maryland Code’s Public Utility Article, which prohibits an entity that will be regulated as a federal public utility from “acquir[ing] [property] by condemnation” until it is issued “a [CPCN] for the 10 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1730 Doc: 64 Filed: 08/06/2026 Pg: 11 of 47 construction of an overhead transmission line[.]” PSEG responded that although Section 7-207(b)(3)(v) conditions the exercise of the power of eminent domain to condemn property on receiving a CPCN, it asserts that the power of eminent domain is granted earlier in the permitting process for purposes of access to conduct surveys under Section 12- 111(a). Agreeing with PSEG, the district court reasoned that PSEG obtained the power of eminent domain, for purposes of Section 12-111(a), when it was directed to conduct the requisite surveys by PPRP, acting on behalf of the Maryland Department of Natural Resources and other state agencies. PSEG, 788 F. Supp. 3d at 727–28. As such, the district court found that, PSEG will be acting “at the direction of, and in some senses on behalf of, state agencies” that possess eminent domain power when conducting the studies. Id. at 728. That PSEG was “select[ed] by PJM for this project” added legitimacy to this direction. Id. at 729. Because field studies are required as a condition of granting a CPCN, the district court explained, requiring PSEG to obtain a CPCN before it could gain access to conduct the surveys on which the studies are based would render the statutory scheme unworkable. Id. at 727–29. Significantly, Section 12-111(a) allows entities to conduct surveys “for the purpose of determining whether eminent domain” should be “exercised.” Id. at 728. For this reason, the issuance of the CPCN is the determination that eminent domain can be exercised under Section 7-207(b)(3)(v), and thus an applicant must be permitted access under Section 12-111(a) before receiving a CPCN. Id. at 729. The Property Owners also argued that the statutory scheme would remain unworkable even under PSEG’s 11 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1730 Doc: 64 Filed: 08/06/2026 Pg: 12 of 47 interpretation because Section 12-111 does not permit geotechnical surveys, which the Property Owners contend are required for the CPCN application. The district court rejected this argument. Id. at 730. The district court noted that its conclusion accorded with “the most analogous case any of the parties have identified,” Transource Maryland, LLC v. Scott et al., No. 12-C- 18-000549 (Harford Cnty. Cir. Ct. June 24, 2018). Id. at 729. There, a Maryland state court “granted a petition by Transource Maryland, a subsidiary of a transmission line construction company, for an order authorizing entry under § 12-111.” Id. The Maryland court “held that § 12-111 authorizes entry before issuance of a CPCN” because “[n]o other reading makes sense.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). Hence, the district court concluded that PSEG satisfied the first Winter factor. The district court next considered whether PSEG satisfied the remaining Winter factors. On the question of irreparable harm, the district court concluded that PSEG was likely to suffer harm in the form of “lost revenues,” resulting from a delay in construction, that PSEG would not be able to recover. Id. at 739. Without the permission granted in the preliminary injunction to access the properties to conduct the surveys, construction of the MPRP will be delayed indefinitely. Relying on Fourth Circuit precedent, the district court reasoned that economic losses that would, absent a preliminary injunction, likely result from delays in the construction of a large public infrastructure project constitute irreparable harm. Id. at 738 (citing Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC v. 6.56 Acres of Land, Owned by Sandra Townes Powell, 915 F.3d 197, 216–19 (4th Cir. 2019) and E. Tenn. Nat. Gas Co. 12 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1730 Doc: 64 Filed: 08/06/2026 Pg: 13 of 47 v. Sage, 361 F.3d 808, 828–29 (4th Cir. 2004)). The district court also rejected attempts by the Property Owners to distinguish this precedent. Id. at 739. Although the district court acknowledged that economic losses do not generally constitute irreparable harm, it reasoned that they do here because they “would not be recoverable at the end of litigation.” Id. (quoting Mountain Valley, 915 F.3d at 218). The district court next concluded that the balance of equities weighs in PSEG’s favor. Id. at 739–40. The Property Owners would suffer only “temporary, limited, non-invasive” access to their properties by PSEG to conduct surveys. Id. at 739. Because the injunction provides only “the narrow right of entry to conduct studies” permitted by Section 12-111(a), the district court found that any harm which could result from the actual construction of the transmission line itself was not relevant to this inquiry. Id. If harm to the properties does occur while PSEG carries out the surveys, the district court noted that Section 12-111(c) provides the Property Owners “a cause of action for damages.” Id. at 740. Finally, the district court concluded that the preliminary injunction was in the public interest. PSEG, 788 F. Supp. 3d at 740. It reasoned that advancing energy infrastructure projects, like the MPRP, “is generally in the public interest.” Id. (citing Mountain Valley, 915 F.3d at 221–22 and Sage, 361 F.3d at 830). The district court also found significant that the PPRP, which the Maryland General Assembly tasked with assessing the environmental and socioeconomic effects of the MPRP, determined that conducting the surveys “is necessary for [the PPRP] to discharge its statutory duties.” Id. 13 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1730 Doc: 64 Filed: 08/06/2026 Pg: 14 of 47 Having concluded that PSEG met its burden as to all four Winter factors, the district court granted the preliminary injunction. Id. The district court subsequently amended the preliminary injunction to clarify its scope. The Property Owners timely appealed both the original and amended preliminary injunction orders. The district court denied the Property Owners’ motion to stay the preliminary injunction pending appeal. The Property Owners then moved to stay the injunction before this court, which we denied. The County Commissioners of Carroll County, Maryland, filed an amicus brief in support of the Property Owners. We exercise jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal of the grant of a preliminary injunction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). III. Analysis On appeal, the Property Owners argue that the district court abused its discretion in finding that PSEG is likely to succeed on the merits, as well as in finding that PSEG satisfied the remaining Winter factors. They also contend that the preliminary injunction is improper because it is mandatory in nature. This court reviews a district court’s grant of a preliminary injunction under the deferential abuse of discretion standard. Pashby v. Delia, 709 F.3d 307, 319 (4th Cir. 2013). Although “a clear error in factual findings or a mistake of law” is grounds for reversal, we “may not reweigh evidence the district court considered.” Salomon & Ludwin, LLC v. Winters, 150 F.4th 268, 274 (4th Cir. 2025). Nor may we “reverse so long as the district court’s account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety.” 14 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1730 Doc: 64 Filed: 08/06/2026 Pg: 15 of 47 Real Time Med. Sys., 131 F.4th at 224 (quoting Roe v. Dep’t of Def., 947 F.3d 207, 219 (4th Cir. 2020)). Moreover, we may affirm a preliminary injunction “on any ground appearing in the record, including theories not relied upon or rejected by the district court.” Jensen v. Md. Cannabis Admin., 151 F.4th 169, 174 (4th Cir. 2025) (quoting United States v. McHan, 386 F.3d 620, 623 (4th Cir. 2004)). To obtain a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must demonstrate that she has met all four Winter factors, that: 1) she will likely succeed on the merits; 2) she will likely suffer irreparable harm in the absence of a preliminary injunction; 3) the balance of equities weighs in her favor; and 4) the public interest favors the preliminary injunction. League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 236 (4th Cir. 2014) (citing Winter, 555 U.S. at 20). Because this action is brought pursuant to diversity jurisdiction and the claims involve Maryland statutes and regulations, we must apply the substantive law of the State of Maryland to determine the likelihood of success on the merits. See, e.g., Real Time Med. Sys., 131 F.4th at 224–25 (applying state law to determine likelihood of success, the first Winter factor); Certified Restoration Dry Cleaning Network, LLC v. Tenke Corp., 511 F.3d 535, 541 (6th Cir. 2007) (“While we apply our own procedural jurisprudence regarding the factors to consider in granting a preliminary injunction, we apply [state] law to determine whether Plaintiff has met the first of these factors by demonstrating a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of his underlying diversity action.” (citing Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938)). We apply federal standards to the other three Winter factors. See Direx Israel, Ltd. v. Breakthrough Med. Corp., 952 F.2d 802, 811 (4th Cir. 15 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1730 Doc: 64 Filed: 08/06/2026 Pg: 16 of 47 1991); Cap. Tool & Mfg. Co. v. Maschinenfabrik Herkules, 837 F.2d 171, 172–73 (4th Cir. 1988). We discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s grant of the preliminary injunction. We first consider whether the preliminary injunction is mandatory and then address each Winter factor in turn. A. Whether the Preliminary Injunction is a Mandatory One The Property Owners argue that the preliminary injunction is improper because it is a mandatory injunction. A mandatory injunction is one that does not “preserve the status quo[.]” Pashby, 709 F.3d at 320. If we conclude that a preliminary injunction is mandatory in nature, then “our review must be more searching.” Sage, 361 F.3d at 830 (citation and quotation marks omitted). Under this searching review, we may affirm the preliminary injunction “only in those circumstances when the exigencies of the situation demand such relief.” Wetzel v. Edwards, 635 F.2d 283, 286 (4th Cir. 1980). The Property Owners contend that the preliminary injunction is mandatory because it grants the relief sought by PSEG in its complaint, thereby altering the status quo. The district court recognized this, noting that it was “sensitive to the fact that the relief PSEG [sought] in the form of a preliminary injunction is largely congruent with the final relief that PSEG seeks through its complaint,” but nevertheless granted the preliminary injunction. PSEG, 788 F. Supp. 3d at 736. In determining whether a preliminary injunction is mandatory, we consider only the “preliminary injunction’s tendency to preserve the status quo,” which is the “last 16 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1730 Doc: 64 Filed: 08/06/2026 Pg: 17 of 47 uncontested status between the parties [that] preceded the controversy.” Pashby, 709 F.3d at 320 (citation omitted). Whether the preliminary injunction affords final relief is not the relevant inquiry. Ultimately, here, we need not decide whether the preliminary injunction preserves the status quo. This is because “the circumstances are sufficiently demanding for the award of mandatory relief.” Sage, 361 F.3d at 830 (affirming grant of mandatory preliminary injunction in part because the preliminary injunction was necessary to meet a deadline to construct an energy infrastructure project). The remainder of our decision explains why this is so. B. Likelihood of Success on the Merits We turn now to the Winter factors, beginning with the first, and most contested factor: likelihood of success on the merits. The parties dispute whether PSEG possesses the power of eminent domain necessary to access private property under Section 12-111(a) of the Maryland Code’s Real Property Article. To resolve a question of state law, we look to “decisions of the state’s highest court and, if those decisions do not resolve the matter, ‘predict how [that] court would rule on the state law issue in question.’” Real Time Med. Sys., 131 F.4th at 224 (quoting Koppers Performance Chems., Inc. v. Argonaut-Midwest Ins. Co., 105 F.4th 635, 640 (4th Cir. 2024)). While “the decisions of [state] intermediate appellate courts constitute the next best indicia of what state law is,” these decisions “are never binding and may be disregarded” if we are “convinced by other persuasive data that the highest court of the state would 17 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1730 Doc: 64 Filed: 08/06/2026 Pg: 18 of 47 decide otherwise.” Id. (quoting Colo. Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Acad. Fin. Assets, LLC, 60 F.4th 148, 154 (4th Cir. 2023)). We may also look to “canons of construction, restatements of the law, treatises, recent pronouncements of general rules or policies by the state’s highest court, well considered dicta, and the state’s trial court decisions.” Moore v. Equitrans, L.P., 27 F.4th 211, 220 (4th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted). We begin by discussing the Maryland law relevant to our analysis. We then apply this law and conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that PSEG met its burden to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits. i. Relevant Maryland Law Two areas of Maryland law are relevant here: eminent domain and statutory interpretation. First, eminent domain. Maryland governmental entities have the inherent power of eminent domain “to take privately owned property . . . and convert it to public use, subject to reasonable compensation.” Valsamaki, 916 A.2d at 335 (citation omitted) (explaining that this inherent power is circumscribed by the Maryland and the United States constitutions). “Condemnation,” the process by which property is taken, “is a function of the State’s power of eminent domain.” Id. The Maryland General Assembly has exclusive discretion over the “mode and manner of the exercise” of this power. J.L. Matthews, Inc. v. Md.-Nat’l Cap. Park & Plan Comm’n, 792 A.2d 288, 297 (Md. 2002) (citation omitted). The General Assembly may delegate this power and limit its use by “provid[ing] that there be a necessity for the taking [of property].” Id. (citation omitted). 18 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1730 Doc: 64 Filed: 08/06/2026 Pg: 19 of 47 Next, statutory interpretation. “The goal of statutory construction is to discern and carry out the intent of the Legislature.” Westminster Mgmt., LLC v. Smith, 312 A.3d 741, 758 (Md. 2024) (citation omitted). An undefined term must be interpreted in the first instance by its “ordinary and popular meaning,” looking to “dictionary definitions as a starting point.” Id. (citation omitted). A court, however, may not “read statutory language in a vacuum” or confine its interpretation “of a statute’s plain language to the isolated section alone.” Lockshin v. Semsker, 987 A.2d 18, 29 (Md. 2010). It must, rather, view the plain language “within the context of the statutory scheme to which it belongs, considering the purpose, aim, or policy of the Legislature in enacting the statute.” Id. “Presuming the General Assembly intends its enactments to operate together as a consistent and harmonious body of law,” a court must “seek to reconcile and harmonize the parts of a statute, to the extent possible consistent with the statute’s object and scope.” Westminster Mgmt., 312 A.3d at 758 (citation and quotation marks omitted). In so doing, a court must also read “statutes on the same subject” together and harmonize them “to the extent possible[.]” Whiting-Turner Contracting Co. v. Fitzpatrick, 783 A.2d 667, 671 (Md. 2001). This inquiry requires consideration of whether a statutory construction would result in a 19 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1730 Doc: 64 Filed: 08/06/2026 Pg: 20 of 47 consequence contrary to the General Assembly’s intent in passing that statute. Chesapeake Charter, Inc. v. Anne Arundel Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 747 A.2d 625, 628 (Md. 2000). 2 ii. The Power of Eminent Domain Section 12-111(a) of the Maryland Code’s Real Property Article permits persons “acting on behalf of the State or of any of its instrumentalities or any body politic or corporate having the power of eminent domain” to access “any private land to make surveys . . . or obtain information relating to the acquisition or future public use of the property or for any governmental report, undertaking, or improvement.” To determine the plain meaning of “having,” we must first consult “those dictionaries that were contemporaneous at the time” the General Assembly added this term to the language of Section 12-111(a). Md. Overpak Corp. v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 909 A.2d 235, 254 n.20 (Md. 2006). The plain meaning of “having,” which first appeared in Section 12- 111(a) in 1963, 1963 Md. Laws, Ch. 52, is the present participle of the verb “have” that denotes the ongoing “hold[ing] [of something] in possession as property” or “in one’s use, service, or affection or at one’s disposal,” Webster’s Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary 2 The Property Owners contend that statutes granting the power of eminent domain must be construed strictly. The district court did not apply this principle, however, because “this case is not about whether . . . eminent domain [should] be exercised. This case is only about whether, under § 12-111, PSEG is entitled to conduct certain studies as directed by PPRP.” PSEG, 788 F. Supp. 3d at 729–30. We note no abuse of discretion in this conclusion. Even if we construe the statutes strictly, we would affirm the district court’s finding that PSEG de