Saronic Technologies, Inc. v. United States
CourtUnited States Court of Federal Claims
Date FiledNovember 12, 2026
Docket26-358
JudgeElaine Kaplan
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
In the United States Court of Federal Claims
(Bid Protest)
)
SARONIC TECHNOLOGIES, INC, )
)
Plaintiff, ) No. 26-358
) (Filed Under Seal: October 23, 2026.
v. ) Reissued for Publication: November
) 12, 2026) *
THE UNITED STATES, )
)
Defendant. )
)
Anne Perry, Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff. Ryan E.
Roberts, Katie A. Calogero, Christie M. Alvarez, and Lillia J. Damalouji, Sheppard Mullin
Richter & Hampton LLP, Washington, DC, and Kendra L. Wharton, Wharton Law PLLC, Of
Counsel.
Delisa M. Sánchez, Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, U.S.
Department of Justice, Washington, DC, with whom were William J. Grimaldi, Assistant
Director, Patricia M. McCarthy, Director, and Brett A. Schumate, Assistant Attorney General,
for Defendant. Todd W. Muse, Attorney Advisor, Naval Sea Systems Command Office of
Counsel, Washington, DC, Of Counsel.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
KAPLAN, Judge.
This pre-award bid protest arises out of a challenge to the acquisition plan that the Naval
Sea Systems Command (“NAVSEA”) adopted to fulfill its requirements under the Littoral
Combat Ship Mission Modules Development, Engineering, Production and Sustainment Program
(“DEPS Program”). That acquisition plan, under which the Solicitation at issue in this case was
published on January 16, 2026, contemplates that the Navy will employ a single contract vehicle
to procure Operations and Sustainment (“O&S” or “sustainment”) services worldwide, covering
both littoral combat ship (“LCS”) mission modules and small unmanned surface vehicles
(“sUSVs”). 1
Plaintiff Saronic Technologies, Inc. (“Saronic”) is a small-business, nontraditional
defense contractor that designs and produces autonomous surface vessels like the sUSV. Compl.
¶¶ 1, 17, ECF No. 1. It holds a prototype Other Transaction (“OT”) agreement to produce the
*
This Opinion was initially issued under seal, and the parties were given the opportunity to
request redactions. The parties did not propose any redactions. Therefore, the Court reissues this
Opinion for publication in its original form.
1
sUSVs are sometimes referred to in the record as small unmanned surface vessels, rather than
small unmanned surface vehicles.
Corsair sUSV, a 24-foot unmanned speedboat. Compl. ¶¶ 17, 20. Saronic alleges that it lacks the
capability to perform the requirements set forth in the Solicitation for O&S services for the
mission modules, but that it could provide such services to the Navy on a commercial basis for
the sUSVs. Tr. of Oral Arg. at 6 [hereinafter Tr.], ECF No. 39.
Saronic contends that when the Navy issued a Solicitation that included both O&S
services for mission modules and O&S services for sUSVs, it violated 10 U.S.C. § 3453, which
obligates agencies to ensure that, “to the maximum extent practicable—the requirements of the
agency with respect to a procurement of . . . services . . . are defined so that commercial
services . . . may be procured to fulfill such requirements.” 10 U.S.C. § 3453(a)(2). “Instead of
identifying and segregating services that could be fulfilled by commercial service providers,”
Saronic claims, “the Agency bundled together a variety of tasks for the [littoral combat ships]
and sUSVs that, when combined, can only be performed by a large, non-commercial, traditional
defense contractor.” Compl. ¶ 10. Saronic also asserts that the Navy incorporated terms and
conditions into the Solicitation that “preclude[d] commercial service providers from competing,
and in some cases, actually penalize[d] offerors for offering commercial services with their
commercial terms.” Id. Finally, it argues the Navy “should have set aside the sUSV O&S portion
of the Solicitation for small businesses . . . .” Id. ¶ 12.
The government, for its part, has moved to dismiss the complaint under RCFC 12(b)(6).
It alleges that—under the reasoning of Percipient.AI, Inc. v. United States, 153 F.4th 1226 (Fed.
Cir. 2025) (en banc)—Saronic does not have statutory standing to pursue this protest under 28
U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1). On the merits, it contends that the administrative record “overwhelmingly
demonstrates that the Navy conducted extensive market research, evaluated commercial
alternatives, considered small business participation, assessed potential procurement structures,
and reasonably concluded that integrated worldwide O&S support was operationally necessary to
support active fleet readiness.” Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss and, in the Alt., Resp. in Opp’n to Pl.’s
Mot. for J. on the Admin. R. and Cross-Mot. for J. on the Admin. R. at 15 [hereinafter Def.’s
Mot.], ECF No. 25.
On October 15, 2026, this Court issued an order denying the government’s motion to
dismiss, denying Saronic’s motion for judgment on the administrative record, and granting the
government’s cross-motion for judgment on the administrative record. ECF No. 42. In this
memorandum opinion, the Court provides the basis for those rulings.
BACKGROUND
I. The DEPS Program
As noted, the procurement at issue in this protest is for the worldwide provision of O&S
services for littoral combat ship mission modules and sUSVs. As stated in the Acquisition Plan,
the littoral combat ship “is the [Navy’s] surface combatant class focused on support of littoral
warfare and optimized for shallow seas and operations within 100 nautical miles of the shore.”
AR Tab 11 at 190 (Acquisition Plan). Its mission is to “counter littoral mine, surface, and air
threats to assure maritime access for Joint Forces worldwide.” Id.
Littoral combat ships “are equipped with modular mission packages that enable them to
rapidly configure and execute a wide range of missions.” Id.; see also AR Tab 10b at 162 (“The
[littoral combat ship] uses a modular design approach where the seaframe provides sensors,
2
external communications, and a basic force application capability while the installed Mission
Package (MP) provides tailored mission capabilities necessary to meet performance
requirements.”); AR Tab 7 at 87 (“The [littoral combat ship mission module] & sUSV Program
provides tailored mission capabilities for use on the [littoral combat ship] Seaframe to counter
unique littoral threats.”). The following image is a diagram of a littoral combat ship:
AR Tab 3c at 26.
Organized in squadrons, littoral combat ships are modular, “single mission-focused
ship[s] capable of defeating conventional and asymmetric access-denial threats” near the shore.
AR Tab 10b at 162. Littoral combat ships “carr[y] limited onboard resources to maintain and
repair the mission systems, support containers, support equipment, and other equipment that
make up the [mission packages].” Id. at 163. Accordingly, “significant maintenance and repair
work is assigned to an off-ship, shore-based workforce.” Id.
Littoral combat ships are outfitted with mission packages tailored to suit the Navy’s
needs in different combat situations. Id. Mission packages “consist of one or more [mission
modules] plus specifically trained crew and support aircraft.” Id. Each mission module “contains
mission systems, such as specialized sensors, vehicles, communication, and weapon systems,” as
well as computing and software support equipment. Id. These systems combine together “to
perform a specific function or logical task related to a mission and their associated support
equipment.” Id. As depicted in the diagram below, sUSVs are among the mission systems that
may be a part of mission modules:
3
AR Tab 3c at 20.
While littoral combat ships are manned by crews, sUSVs are unmanned vessels. AR Tab
10b at 164. sUSVs are much smaller than littoral combat ships and “can be deployed from
various host platforms” but can also be operated from ashore. Id. at 163. The following
4
photographs include depictions of a variety of sUSVs:
AR Tab 3c at 31.
To ensure “rapid support” for both littoral combat ship mission modules and sUSVs, all
assigned repair, maintenance, and field engineering support takes place at specific stateside and
overseas locations using personnel stationed at those locations. AR Tab 10b at 162–63.
Specifically, littoral combat ship mission modules and the sUSVs are “maintained, stored, and
centrally managed through the Mission Package Support Facility (MPSF)” at Naval Base
Ventura County Port Hueneme, located in California, and at Mission Module Readiness Centers
(“MMRCs”) in Singapore, Bahrain, San Diego, California, and Mayport, Florida. Id. at 163. 2
2
MPSFs “provide and coordinate maintenance, technical support, spares management, and
ensure components (mission systems, mission modules, support containers, support equipment,
or other equipment) are delivered to the Fleet.” AR Tab 10b at 163. “The MPSF team plans,
arranges, schedules, coordinates, and manages the execution of all maintenance and
modernization tasks performed in the facilities or on the ships.” Id. The team “coordinates with
assigned Depots to schedule and ship [mission package] equipment to the Depots when work is
not performed within the MPSF or MMRCs.” Id. MMRCs are extensions of the MPSF that are
“designed to have appropriate maintenance, administrative, and storage capabilities” and
“provide the base for specific operations” such as pier-side maintenance and the installation or
deinstallation of mission packages. Id.
5
II. The Navy’s Market Research Efforts
Prior to the events at issue in this case, the Navy procured both littoral combat ship
mission module production hardware and O&S services for mission modules through the DEPS
contract (Solicitation No. N00024-17-C-6311). 3 In October and November 2024, PMS 420, the
Navy office within NAVSEA responsible for both the Littoral Ship program and sUSVs,
conducted market research to determine if there were sources available that would allow it to
break the requirements of the DEPS contract into “two smaller contract vehicles, one for
production and one for sustainment.” AR Tab 8 at 119. 4 The Navy sought information about
“industry capabilities in the provision of production, manufacturing, engineering, and
sustainment support for PMS 420’s diverse [Mission Package] and sUSV product lines.” Id.
The Navy divided its market research into two categories: (1) production hardware and
(2) O&S support. Id. Production Hardware covered “all manufacturing and production of [littoral
combat ship mission package] hardware end items” and “require[d] vendors capable of
manufacturing to either build-to-specification or build-to[-]print, producing multiple systems,
sub-systems and/or components, then integrating the delivered hardware into final end items.”
Id. “Operations and Sustainment Support strategy cover[ed] all operations and sustainment
requirements during the fielding and deployment of all PMS 420 [mission package] and sUSV
product lines, which are based on the overall [littoral combat ship] seaframe and evolving
geographic Commander requirements both [stateside] and [overseas].” Id.
According to the Market Research Report that PMS 420 prepared, the Navy held an
Industry Day on November 1, 2024. AR Tab 3a at 4. At the event, PMS 420 representatives
briefed attendees about the DEPS Program. Id. They explained that the purpose of the Navy’s
market research was “to determine if sources exist that can satisfy the Navy’s anticipated
requirements for its [littoral combat ship mission module] and sUSV programs, with the focus on
industry’s capability to provide production, manufacturing, engineering and sustainment support
for a variety of new and existing programs.” AR Tab 3c at 51. Attendees were advised that
information was being sought “to help determine the level of interest, technical and
manufacturing capabilities, knowledge, experience level, and qualifications of Industry to meet
the Government’s needs.” Id. PMS 420 further advised attendees that it was “approaching this
opportunity with the goal of increasing competition and developing more informed future
solicitations within current industry constraints.” Id.
As part of the Industry Day, the government held a select number of one-on-one
engagement sessions with individually approved companies. The sessions were “intended for
industry to ask questions and provide feedback to the Navy.” AR Tab 3a at 4. Twenty-four
3
The administrative record does not reveal how O&S services for sUSVs are currently procured.
4
PMS 420 is the Navy’s shorthand for the Program Executive Office Unmanned and Small
Combatants (“PEO USC”), Littoral Combat Ship Mission Modules Program Office. It is the
“Navy’s lead Program Office for the development of rapidly deployable modular naval
capabilities and innovative small-unmanned surface technologies capable of recognizing,
intercepting, and preventing threats to the United States and her allies.” AR Tab 3a at 4.
6
vendors participated in the Industry Day, including ten that identified themselves as small
businesses. AR Tab 8 at 120; AR Tab 3b.
In addition to holding the Industry Day, NAVSEA issued a Sources Sought Notice or
Request for Information (“RFI”) on behalf of PMS 420. AR Tab 4. Its stated purpose was “to
determine if sources exist that can satisfy the Navy’s anticipated program requirements for the
[littoral combat ship mission module] program.” Id. at 60–61. The Navy advised that it sought
“to understand industry capabilities to provide production, manufacturing, engineering and
sustainment support for the [littoral combat ship mission modules].” Id. at 61.
With respect to O&S services, the RFI asked potential sources to explain, among other
things, how they would “support pier side maintenance, intermediate maintenance, and field
engineering support” both within and outside the continental United States and how they would
“manage staffing to ensure that there is adequate coverage for all maintenance activities
including surge periods and high-demand scenarios for [stateside] and [overseas] Operations.”
Id. at 63. The RFI also asked respondents to state whether they had “worked with MPSF,
MMRC, and/or similar large scale storage facilities [stateside]/[overseas]” and to describe their
experience providing organizational and intermediate level maintenance for modular systems as
well as identify the specific systems and/or components the source had supported in the past. Id.
Lastly, the RFI asked that respondents describe how they would “ensure timely and effective
communication and collaboration with the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) to resolve
maintenance issues that arise during the Sustainment Phase.” Id. at 64.
III. The Results of the Market Research
Saronic did not attend Industry Day or respond to the RFI. See AR Tab 4a. However, the
Navy received 18 “comprehensive responses” from other vendors. AR Tab 8 at 119; see AR Tab
4a. It reported that there were seven sources that could meet the Navy’s O&S needs as to both
the littoral combat ship mission modules and the sUSVs and that these sources were likely to bid
on the sustainment contract. The likely bidders identified in the Market Research Report
included Northrop Grumman, the holder of the incumbent contract. AR Tab 8 at 122, 125.
Based on its Market Research, the Navy determined that the littoral combat ship mission
module contracts were not suitable for a small business set-aside. Id. Its conclusion was based on
the complexity of the program technology, responding vendors’ limited or no
familiarity with large scale NAVSEA product delivery requirements . . ., the
required facility capacity and capability for [mission package] production, the
global complexity . . . of all sustainment support requirements, and simply the level
of ‘in house’ resources required to successfully execute the [Mission Module]
Program in terms of [Mission Package] Production and [Mission Package] and
sUSV Sustainment.
Id.
The Navy determined that there were two small businesses that could partially meet the
agency’s needs with respect to hardware production. Id. at 120–21. But neither of those
businesses had the size or scale to support the Navy’s O&S support needs across five global
locations. Id.
7
The Market Research Report recounts that the Navy planned to decouple the Production
and Sustainment programs, which it hoped would increase competition and give small and
medium sized companies the opportunity to bid on one or both requirements. Id. at 125.
“Unfortunately,” it concluded, “based on responses to our Sources Sought Notice, in-person
engagement sessions during Industry Day, and additional video teleconferences with requesting
vendors,” the Navy was unable to identify a small business that might be capable of successfully
bidding on either or both the Production and Sustainment Requests for Proposals (“RFPs”). Id.
In short, the Report explained, “[g]iven the large number of responses to the RFI and
attendance at Industry Day, the Navy has determined that there are several companies capable of
executing either or both the LCS [mission package] Production and LCS [mission package] and
sUSV Sustainment requirements.” Id. It recommended “[f]ull and open solicitation of both the
LCS [mission package] Production Contract and the LCS [mission package] and sUSV
Sustainment Contract, released in tandem to prevent any confusion with our industry
partners . . . .” Id. at 126.
IV. This Action
On July 1, 2025, three months after the Market Research Report was finalized, the Navy
announced its intent to issue two solicitations pursuant to FAR part 15 procedures. AR Tab 10a
at 151. The first solicitation would cover hardware production for littoral combat ship mission
modules and the second would encompass O&S services for both littoral combat ship mission
modules and sUSVs. The Navy issued the latter solicitation, Solicitation
No. N00024-26-R-6311, on January 16, 2026, setting a closing date of March 6, 2026. AR Tab
16.
Saronic did not submit an offer in response to the Solicitation. In its complaint, Saronic
explains that it “downloaded and reviewed the Solicitation, intended to compete, and began
assessing the requirements” but concluded that “it could not fairly submit a proposal due to the
terms and conditions challenged” in its complaint. Compl. ¶ 16. Therefore, on March 4, 2026,
two days before proposals were due, it filed the present bid protest.
Saronic filed its motion for judgment on the administrative record on May 6, 2026. Pl.’s
Mot. for J. on the Admin. R. [hereinafter Pl.’s Mot.], ECF No. 21. In response, on June 10, 2026,
the government filed a combined motion to dismiss Saronic’s claims pursuant to RCFC 12(b)(6)
for lack of statutory standing and cross-motion for judgment on the administrative record. Def.’s
Mot. The Court held oral argument on the motions on October 6, 2026.
On October 15, 2026, the Court issued an order denying the government’s motion to
dismiss, as well as Saronic’s motion for judgment on the administrative record, and granted the
government’s motion for judgment on the administrative record. Order, ECF No. 42.
DISCUSSION
I. The Government’s Motion to Dismiss Based on Lack of Statutory Standing
The government has filed a motion to dismiss Saronic’s complaint in accordance with
RCFC 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. It contends that the allegations in the complaint, taken
as true, are insufficient to establish Saronic’s standing to challenge the Navy’s Solicitation of
8
bids for the proposed sustainment services contract under 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1). Def.’s Mot. at
7–13. That provision states, in pertinent part, that the Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction to
render judgment in actions “by an interested party objecting to [(1)] a solicitation by a Federal
agency for bids or proposals for a proposed contract” or (2) “any alleged violation of statute or
regulation in connection with a procurement or a proposed procurement.” 28 U.S.C.
§1491(b)(1).
Under § 1491(b)(1), an interested party is “an actual or prospective bidder or offeror
whose direct economic interest would be affected by the award of the contract or by failure to
award the contract.” Percipient.AI, Inc., 153 F.4th at 1228; Wks. Marine, Inc. v. United States,
575 F.3d 1352, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps. v. United States, 258
F.3d 1294, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). Saronic’s allegations, taken as true, are sufficient to establish
its status as an interested party. The Court finds the government’s arguments to the contrary
unpersuasive.
A. Saronic’s Status as a Prospective Offeror
First, Saronic has alleged facts sufficient to establish its status as a prospective offeror. It
claims that by including O&S services for sUSVs and O&S services for littoral combat ship
mission modules as requirements in a single Solicitation, the agency violated several statutory
and regulatory provisions, foremost among them, 10 U.S.C. § 3453. It further alleges that—to
comply with that provision and others—the Navy was obligated to decouple the sustainment
requirements for the sUSVs from the sustainment requirements for the littoral combat ship
mission modules. Had the Navy done so, Saronic argues, it could and would have submitted an
offer and competed for a contract that included in its scope only the sustainment services for
sUSVs. Compl. ¶ 16.
Further, Saronic filed its protest here before the closing date for offers set forth in the
Solicitation. It has also actively pursued that protest. Therefore, Saronic is eligible to assert
interested party status as a prospective offeror. See CGI Fed. Inc. v. United States, 779 F.3d
1346, 1349, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (holding plaintiff was a “prospective bidder” where it filed its
GAO protest before the close of the bidding period and “diligently and continuously pursued its
rights in the GAO and then, immediately upon dismissal by the GAO, in the Court of Federal
Claims”); Digitalis Educ. Sols., Inc. v. United States, 664 F.3d 1380, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(observing that “in order to be eligible to protest, one who has not actually submitted an offer
must be expecting to submit an offer prior to the closing date of the solicitation” and that the
opportunity to be treated as a prospective bidder continues until the proposal period ends
(quoting MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. United States, 878 F.2d 362, 365 (Fed. Cir. 1989)); Rex
Serv. Corp. v. United States, 448 F.3d 1305, 1308 (same).
The government bases its challenge to Saronic’s status as a prospective offeror almost
entirely upon its reading of the court of appeals’ en banc decision in Percipient. Def.’s Mot. at 9–
11. Percipient, however, is inapposite.
In Percipient, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (“NGA”) issued a solicitation
that sought bids to: (1) build and operate a repository to “store, disseminate, and regulate access
to data” and (2) provide “Computer Vision” capabilities. Percipient.AI, 153 F.4th at 1228–29.
9
Percipient alleged that, while it lacked the capacity to satisfy the repository component of the
solicitation, it could offer a commercial platform to provide computer vision capabilities. Id. at
1229.
NGA awarded the contract covering both types of services to CACI. Id. Percipient then
reached out to CACI for an evaluation of its commercial platform for use as a subcontractor. Id.
After CACI failed to follow up with Percipient, Percipient contacted NGA asking it to evaluate
the capabilities of Percipient’s product, asserting that NGA was required to do so to comply with
10 U.S.C. § 3453. Dissatisfied with NGA’s response to its outreach, Percipient filed suit here. Id.
at 1229–30.
The court of appeals held that Percipient lacked statutory standing to pursue its claims.
Id. at 1243. The court reasoned that Percipient was not a prospective offeror on the contract
awarded to CACI because it never intended to bid on the solicitation as a prime contractor. Id.
Rather, it sought to participate in the procurement as a subcontractor. Id. Further, Percipient filed
its protest several years after the contract was awarded. Id. at 1229. The court of appeals
concluded that Percipient was a disappointed subcontractor and so, by definition, not an
interested party. Id. at 1243 (explaining that Congress explicitly contemplated and rejected
including subcontractors as interested parties).
In this case, Saronic does not seek to supply the sUSV sustainment services as a
subcontractor to any successful awardee for the prime contract. Instead, as set forth above, its
argument is that the Navy must restructure the procurement to remove what it alleges are
unjustified barriers to commercial service providers like itself being able to compete for the
prime contract. The government’s reliance on Percipient is therefore unavailing.
B. Saronic’s Non-Trivial Competitive Injury
As noted, to establish statutory standing, Saronic must also show that it had a direct
economic interest that would be affected by the award or failure to award the contract. CGI Fed.
Inc., 779 F.3d at 1351 (quoting Wks. Marine, 575 F.3d at 1361–62); Sys. Application & Techs.,
Inc. v. United Staes, 691 F.3d 1374, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (same). In the context of a pre-award
bid protest, on a motion to dismiss, a protester must allege sufficient facts to show that it has
suffered a “non-trivial competitive injury which can be addressed by judicial relief.” Wks.
Marine, 575 F.3d at 1361 (quoting WinStar Commc’ns, Inc. v. United States, 41 Fed. Cl. 748,
763 (1998)).
For purposes of determining the existence of a non-trivial competitive injury at the
motion to dismiss phase, a court must “assume that the party will, if permitted to proceed with its
claim, prevail on the merits.” REV, LLC v. United States, 91 F.4th 1156, 1164 (Fed. Cir. 2024);
see also Am. Relocation Connections, L.L.C. v. United States, 789 F. App’x 221, 226 (Fed. Cir.
2019) (observing that “[f]or standing, we presume the party bringing a bid protest will succeed
on the merits of its claim and ask whether it has alleged an injury (or prejudice) caused by the
procuring agency's actions” (citing Info. Tech. & Applications Corp. v. United States, 316 F.3d
1312, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
In this case, the Court must assume that Saronic will succeed on the merits of its claim
that the Navy violated 10 U.S.C. § 3453 when it included sustainment services for the sUSVs
10
and sustainment services for littoral combat ship mission modules in the same Solicitation. See
Compl. ¶¶ 62–63. Further, the Court assumes Saronic will prevail on its claims that the Navy
should have set aside the procurement for small businesses and that the Navy “bundled” the two
sustainment requirements together without adequate justification. Compl. ¶¶ 64–66, 77–93.
The Court further finds that the allegations in the complaint are sufficient to show
that—if these alleged errors were rectified, and the two sustainment requirements
decoupled—Saronic would have been able to compete for a contract covering the sUSV
sustainment services and would have had “greater than an insubstantial chance of securing the
contract.” Am. Relocation Connections, 789 F. App’x at 226–27; see also CliniComp Int’l, Inc.
v. United States, 904 F.3d 1353, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (noting that to establish prejudice, a
pre-award protestor must show that if the error was rectified, it could compete for the new
contract).
Thus, Saronic alleges that it “specializes in designing, developing, and producing
Autonomous Surface Vehicle (‘ASVs’) often described as maritime drones—for naval and
maritime applications.” Compl. ¶ 17. It further alleges that it has secured government contracts
“to collaborate on autonomous maritime systems,” including an OT agreement with the Navy for
the production of Corsair sUSVs, and that it is capable of performing O&S work for sUSVs. Id.
¶¶ 18, 20.
These allegations, if taken as true, suffice to show Saronic could have at least competed
for a contract to perform sustainment service for sUSVs, had the littoral combat ship mission
module sustainment services been segregated out into a separate procurement as Saronic alleges
the law required. Therefore, Saronic has sufficiently alleged that it suffered a non-trivial
competitive injury as a result of the actions it challenges in this case and has standing to pursue
this protest.
II. The Cross-Motions for Judgment on the Administrative Record
A. Standard of Review
The court reviews agency procurement decisions under the standards used to evaluate
agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 706. Bannum, Inc. v.
United States, 404 F.3d 1346, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(4). As such, “[i]n a
bid protest case, the inquiry is whether the agency’s action was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law and, if so, whether the error is prejudicial.”
Glenn Def. Marine (ASIA), PTE Ltd. v. United States, 720 F.3d 901, 907 (Fed. Cir. 2013); see 5
U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
This “highly deferential” standard of review requires a reviewing court to “sustain an
agency action evincing rational reasoning and consideration of relevant factors.” Advanced Data
Concepts, Inc. v. United States, 216 F.3d 1054, 1058 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing Bowman Transp.,
Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 285 (1974)). The court cannot substitute
its judgment for that of the agency. See Honeywell, Inc. v. United States, 870 F.2d 644, 648
(Fed. Cir. 1989) (holding that as long as there is “a reasonable basis for the agency’s action, the
court should stay its hand even though it might, as an original proposition, have reached a
different conclusion . . . .” (quoting M. Steinthal & Co. v. Seamans, 455 F.2d 1289, 1301 (D.C.
Cir. 1971))). Its review is limited to “determin[ing] whether ‘the contracting agency provided a
11
coherent and reasonable explanation of its exercise of discretion.’” Impresa Construzioni Geom.
Domenico Garufi v. United States, 238 F.3d 1324, 1332–33 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (quoting Latecoere
Int’l, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Navy, 19 F.3d 1342, 1356 (11th Cir. 1994)); see also Motor Vehicle
Mfrs. Ass’n v. State farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 436 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (noting that a court should
review agency action to determine if the agency has “examine[d] the relevant data and
articulate[d] a satisfactory explanation for its action” (quoting Burlington Truck Lines v. United
States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)).
The court reviews bid protests on the basis of the administrative record. Axiom Res.
Mgmt., Inc. v. United States, 564 F.3d 1374, 1381 (Fed Cir. 2009); see also Bannum, 404 F.3d at
1353–54. Parties may move for judgment on the administrative record pursuant to RCFC 52.1.
The court makes “factual findings under RCFC [52.1] from the record evidence as if it were
conducting a trial on the record.” Bannum, 404 F.3d at 1357.
The court’s inquiry in ruling on a motion for judgment on the administrative record is
“whether, given all the disputed and undisputed facts, a party has met its burden of proof based
on the evidence of record.” XOtech, LLC v. United States, 950 F.3d 1376, 1379–80 (Fed. Cir.
2020) (quoting Palantir USG, Inc. v. United States, 904 F.3d 980, 989 (Fed. Cir. 2018)). Unlike a
summary judgment proceeding, genuine issues of material fact do not foreclose the entry of
judgment on the administrative record. Bannum, 404 F.3d at 1356.
III. FASA’s Preference for Procuring Commercial Services to Meet Agency
Requirements
Under FASA, agencies are obligated to ensure that, “to the maximum extent
practicable—[the] requirements of the agency with respect to a procurement of . . . services . . .
are defined so that commercial services . . . may be procured to fulfill such requirements” and
that “offerors of commercial services . . . are provided an opportunity to compete in any
procurement to fill such requirements.” 10 U.S.C. § 3453(a); see FAR 11.002(a)(2). 5 Further,
and to those ends, FASA requires agencies to “modify requirements in appropriate cases to
ensure that the requirements can be met by commercial services.” 10 U.S.C. § 3453(b); see FAR
12.101(b).
FASA also requires agencies to “conduct market research appropriate to the
circumstances” before developing new specifications for a procurement or soliciting offers. 10
U.S.C. § 3453(c)(1)(A) & (B); FAR 10.001(a)(2); see FAR 12.101(a); see also Palantir, 904 F.3d
at 984 (observing that “FASA achieves its preference for commercial items in part through
preliminary market research”). An agency conducts market research by “collecting and analyzing
5
The phrase “commercial services” includes, among other things, installation, maintenance,
repair, or training services that are “procured for support of a commercial product” where “the
source of such services provides similar services contemporaneously to the general public under
terms and conditions similar to those offered to the Federal Government.” FAR 2.101. It also
includes “[s]ervices of a type offered and sold competitively in substantial quantities in the
commercial marketplace[—(A)] based on established catalog or market prices for specific tasks
performed or specific outcomes to be achieved[;] and [(B)] under standard commercial terms and
conditions.” Id.
12
information about capabilities within the market to satisfy [its] needs” and “obtaining
information specific to the [item] being acquired.” FAR 2.101; FAR 10.002(b)(1). The “extent of
market research will vary, depending on such factors as urgency, estimated dollar value,
complexity, and past experience.” FAR 10.002(b)(1).
Once an agency has conducted market research, it must use the results of that research “to
‘determine’ whether there are commercial items that ‘meet the agency’s requirements; could be
modified to meet the agency’s requirements; or could meet the agency’s requirements if those
requirements were modified to a reasonable extent.’” Palantir, 904 F.3d at 990 (quoting 10
U.S.C. § 3453(c)(2)). Agencies are required to document the results of their research “in a
manner appropriate to the size and complexity of the acquisition.” 10 U.S.C. § 3453(4); FAR
10.002(e).
These provisions “reflect[] Congress’s understanding that ‘[t]he purchase of proven
products such as commercial and nondevelopmental items can eliminate the need for research
and development, minimize acquisition leadtime, and reduce the need for detailed design
specifications or expensive product testing.’” Palantir, 904 F.3d at 983 (alteration in original)
(quoting S. Rep. No. 103-258, at 5 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2561, 2566). 6
IV. The Navy’s Market Research Efforts Reflect Its Compliance with FASA
The administrative record reflects that the agency met its obligations under FASA to
conduct market research and use that research to determine the structure of the procurement,
including whether it could use commercial services to meet its requirements and whether it was
feasible to set aside the sustainment work for small businesses. It shows that, from the outset, the
Navy was interested in increasing the number and types of businesses that could compete to
provide sustainment services for both the littoral combat ship mission modules and the sUSVs.
That is why it decided to break the existing contract into “two smaller contract vehicles, one for
production and one for sustainment . . . .” AR Tab 8 at 119.
As described in some detail above, the Navy’s research and its consultations with
industry were designed to help determine what impact decoupling the production and
sustainment requirements might have on competition. It hosted an Industry Day to discuss
“[Littoral Combat Ship] Mission Modules and Small Unmanned Surface Vehicles” on November
1, 2024. AR Tab 3c. Its goal, the Navy explained, was to “increas[e] competition and develo[p]
more informed future solicitations within current industry constraints.” AR Tab 3c at 51.
Further, the Navy followed up on Industry Day by issuing an RFI. The RFI’s stated
purpose was to enable the agency “to understand industry capabilities to provide production,
manufacturing, engineering and sustainment support for the [littoral combat ship mission
modules].” AR Tab 4 at 61. The RFI did not focus on sustainment support for sUSVs. See AR
Tab 4. Nonetheless, the agency’s Market Research Report reflects that it considered the capacity
6
FASA’s policies are reinforced by Executive Order No. 14271, 90 Fed. Reg. 16433 (Apr. 15,
2025). Entitled “Ensuring Commercial, Cost-Effective Solutions in Federal Contracts,” the stated
purpose of that Order is “to enforce existing laws directing the Federal Government to utilize, to
the maximum extent practicable, the competitive marketplace and the innovations of private
enterprise to provide better, more cost-effective services to taxpayers.” Id.
13
of the industry respondents to perform those services and identified “several companies capable
of executing either or both the LCS [mission package] Production and LCS [mission package]
and sUSV Sustainment requirements.” AR Tab 8 at 125.
Unfortunately, the Navy’s market research revealed that none of the companies capable
of performing either or both types of O&S services were small businesses. The Navy therefore
recommended a full and open solicitation for both a Production Hardware contract for the LCS
mission packages, as well as a sustainment contract for both the LCS mission packages and the
sUSVs, that would be “released in tandem to prevent any confusion with our industry
partners . . . .” Id. at 126.
V. Saronic’s Arguments Regarding the Navy’s Compliance with FASA
Saronic contends that the Navy’s determination that there were no commercial sources
available that could meet the agency’s sustainment needs was conclusory and unsupported. See
Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss and Cross-Mot. for J. on the Admin. R. [hereinafter Pl.’s
Resp.] at 11, ECF No. 27 (citing Pl.’s Mot. at 21–29). It also complains that the Navy’s market
research—including its RFI—was too focused on the littoral combat ship mission module work
and not enough (if at all) on the sUSV requirement. Id. at 12 (citing AR