Full Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0323-25 ALTEVA OF WARWICK, LLC, AN ARCHTOP COMPANY d/b/a WARWICK VALLEY TELEPHONE and ARCHTOP FIBER, LLC, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. PLANET FIBER NJ, LLC, Defendant-Respondent. ___________________________ Submitted November 5, 2026 – Decided November 17, 2026 Before Judges Mawla and DeAlmeida. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Sussex County, Docket No. C-000016-25. Nissenbaum Law Group LLC, Maria T. Browne (Davis Wright Tremaine LLP) of the District of Columbia bar, admitted pro hac vice, and Susan M. Stith (Davis Wright Tremaine LLP) of the District of Columbia bar, admitted pro hac vice, attorneys for appellants (Anthony C. Gunst, IV, of counsel and on the briefs; Salma A. Attia, Maria T. Browne, and Susan M. Stith, on the briefs). Andrew M. Klein (Klein Law Group, PLLC), attorney for respondent. PER CURIAM Plaintiffs Archtop Fiber, LLC and Alteva of Warwick, LLC d/b/a Warwick Valley Telephone Company (WVT) appeal from an August 13, 2025 order dismissing their complaint against defendant Planet Fiber NJ, LLC. We affirm in part, and reverse and remand in part, for the reasons expressed in this opinion. Plaintiffs own numerous poles in the State and attach their facilities to poles owned by other entities, including Sussex Rural Electric Cooperative (SREC). Defendant provides internet and voice over internet services and entered into a pole attachment agreement with SREC on March 5, 2021. The parties do not have a pole attachment agreement with each other. On April 14, 2023, defendant filed an informal complaint before the State Board of Public Utilities (BPU) because plaintiffs refused to enter into a pole attachment agreement. Plaintiffs responded defendant had not provided documentation supporting its right to attach to their poles and had unlawfully attached equipment to plaintiffs' poles. Defendant replied it was licensed to A-0323-25 2 attach to SREC's poles and except for one mistaken attachment, which it subsequently removed, it avoided plaintiff's poles. Plaintiffs asserted state law claims for trespass, conversion, unfair business practices, unjust enrichment, and anti-competitive practices. They also sought an order to remove defendant's attachments from their poles, for defendant to "accept liability and indemnify" plaintiffs, and pay the fees and costs of a pole attachment agreement. Defendant later filed a petition before the BPU to compel plaintiffs to enter into a pole attachment agreement to which plaintiffs responded, asserting affirmative defenses and requesting their own relief. On May 16, 2025, plaintiffs filed a complaint and order to show cause in the Chancery Division alleging defendant moved plaintiffs' pole attachments without authorization. Plaintiffs claimed this threatened public safety, damaged plaintiffs' network, and risked customer service outages. They also sent defendant a cease-and-desist letter because they claimed defendants violated the National Electrical Safety Code and "used inferior equipment to re-secure [plaintiffs]'[] cables to the pole[s]." Defendant claimed it searched the "SREC database" to ensure it was not using plaintiffs' poles and stated it would remove attachments on nine of A-0323-25 3 plaintiffs' poles. Plaintiffs alleged defendant's conduct gave defendant a competitive advantage, resulted in a loss of customers for plaintiffs, and blocked plaintiffs' planned fiber network upgrade. They again asserted claims of: trespass, conversion, nuisance, negligence, tortious interference with contracts, unfair business practices, and unjust enrichment. After filing their complaint, plaintiffs sought to suspend the proceedings before the BPU because they believed "[t]he Superior Court proceeding will provide comprehensive information on and a resolution of the issues between the parties." They argued the BPU lost jurisdiction because under federal law it was required to act on the complaint withing 180 days of its filing and had not done so. Although federal law placed regulatory authority, in the absence of BPU action, with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), plaintiffs claimed jurisdiction did not revert to the FCC because only the court could address their state law claims, and claims of trespass, conversion, negligence, nuisance, unfair competition, and unjust enrichment. Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint, contending plaintiffs were usurping the BPU's authority by forum shopping. Court was not the proper forum because jurisdiction reverted to the FCC once the 180-day window for the BPU to act lapsed. The FCC had primary jurisdiction and plaintiffs' failure A-0323-25 4 to exhaust their administrative remedies affected the judge's ability to decide the matter in any event. On August 13, 2025, the trial judge granted defendant's motion to dismiss. Relying on Magic Petroleum Corporation v. Exxon Mobile Corporation, 218 N.J. 390, 405-07 (2014), the judge observed under the primary jurisdiction doctrine, our law requires courts defer to the "'special competence of an administrative body' . . . unless to do so would defeat statutory purpose or deprive a party of an available and effective remedy." Referencing factors we first elucidated in Boldt v. Correspondence Management, Inc., 320 N.J. Super. 74, 85 (App. Div. 1999), the judge recounted the court should consider the following: "Whether the matter is within the conventional experience of the courts; . . . Whether it is peculiarly within the agency's discretion or requires agency expertise; . . . The risk of inconsistent rulings; and [T]he existence of pending or concluded agency action." The judge found the issues raised in the underlying dispute were "not foreign to the BPU or FCC." Both agencies "have . . . comprehensive procedures for addressing such issues, and . . . are equipped with technical expertise . . . for resolving factually complex, highly technical disputes" of the sort raised in this case. Although some of the state law claims could be heard by the court, "the A-0323-25 5 overwhelming weight of both state and federal authority holds that, where the regulatory regime is so comprehensive and the issues so technically related, such claims cannot be used to circumvent or preempt the agency's exclusive authority." The judge found the agency's technical know-how combined with the risk of inconsistent rules weighed against the court adjudicating claims before the agency had the opportunity to do so. The arguments raised before him were the same ones raised before the BPU. The judge also found because plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies, they could not forum shop by raising those claims in court. The judge observed the law permitted him to dismiss or stay the matter pending the agency proceedings. He opted for dismissal because the FCC had jurisdiction and defendant had already begun the process of transferring the matter to the FCC. Given the risk of inconsistent outcomes and because "the core facts and legal questions are inextricably intertwined with the agency's primary expertise" staying the case was not an option. The judge applied a similar logic as to why he could not address plaintiffs' state law claims, noting he did not want usurp the agency's functions.1 1 The judge's opinion also addressed defendant's request for counsel fees and costs and plaintiff's cross-motion for enforcement of litigant's rights, neither of which are relevant to this appeal. A-0323-25 6 On September 1, 2025, defendant filed an informal complaint before the FCC, alleging plaintiffs violated the Federal Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151 to 646, by failing to provide reasonable and nondiscriminatory access to plaintiffs' poles. Defendant noted plaintiffs were found in violation of New York laws and rules in a case involving one of defendant's businesses. It also stated the FCC had jurisdiction since the BPU did not take any final action within the 180-day statutory period, which was subsequently confirmed in a letter from the State's Division of Rate Counsel. Defendant requested the FCC find plaintiffs engaged in unjust and unreasonable practices and requir e plaintiffs to enter into a pole attachment agreement with defendant. I. Plaintiffs contend the FCC and the BPU do not have regulatory authority over SREC-owned poles and the judge erred when he dismissed plaintiffs' state law tort claims under the primary jurisdiction doctrine. They note the federal Pole Attachment Act (PAA), 47 U.S.C. § 224, limits the FCC's jurisdiction to "investor-owned utilities and local exchange carriers; cooperatively owned poles are expressly excluded from the [PAA]'s coverage." Therefore, the judge erred as a matter of law when he found the FCC had jurisdiction. A-0323-25 7 Plaintiffs also argue the FCC lacks jurisdiction over state law claims and does not have the authority to grant all the relief sought in its complaint as a matter of law, namely, compensatory damages and injunctive relief. In fact, the FCC has previously found the remedy for line damage and trespass is under contract and tort law, not regulatory relief. State regulations also make clear these issues belong in court. Plaintiffs argue the judge misapplied the primary jurisdiction factors. They point out their complaint raised basic state law claims, which the trial judge could readily adjudicate, and courts have routinely adjudicated claims involving utility poles. The FCC's expertise is not required to address the issues in the complaint because its role is to decide rates, terms, and conditions of a pole attachment agreement—all claims plaintiffs have not raised. Moreover, any relief from the FCC would be prospective, which does not address the tort claims and the damages sought. These points prove there could be no inconsistent rulings by having the matter proceed in court and before the FCC. The facts also show plaintiffs lacked an adequate remedy before the FCC and the court was required to hear their claims. Plaintiffs make similar arguments regarding the judge's finding they did not exhaust their administrative remedies. A-0323-25 8 Plaintiffs deny they were forum shopping. They reiterate if it is true defendant's concession it is not attached to plaintiffs' poles then any decision by the FCC will not affect plaintiffs' claims, since the FCC does not have jurisdiction over the cooperatively owned poles. Even if the BPU has jurisdiction to address defendant's complaint, it does not have jurisdiction over the SREC poles because it failed to take final action on the complaint within the statutory 180-day timeframe. Plaintiffs argue the judge misapplied the primary jurisdiction doctrine because he should have stayed rather than dismissed their complaint while the FCC addressed their dispute. If the judge wished to defer to the FCC, it should have been regarding the terms and conditions of defendant's access to plaintiffs' poles. Regardless, a stay is more appropriate than a dismissal because the FCC can quickly complete its review as plaintiffs filed an informal complaint. II. "Primary jurisdiction is defined as the circumstance in which a 'court declines original jurisdiction and refers to the appropriate body those issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an administrative body.'" Muise v. GPU, Inc., 332 N.J. Super. 140, 158 (App. Div. 2000) (quoting Daaleman v. Elizabethtown Gas Co., 77 N.J. A-0323-25 9 267, 269 n.1 (1978)); accord Est. of Kotsovska ex rel. Kotsovska v. Liebman, 221 N.J. 568, 588 (2015). One purpose of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction "is to allow an agency to apply its expertise to questions which require interpretation of its regulations." Muise, 332 N.J. Super. at 159. "Thus, 'when enforcement of a claim requires resolution of an issue within the special competence of an administrative agency, a court may defer to a decision of that agency.'" Est. of Kotsovska, 221 N.J. at 588 (quoting Campione v. Adamar of N.J., Inc., 155 N.J. 245, 263-64 (1998)). Whether to invoke the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Ibid. This means we will not reverse a trial judge's decision unless it was "made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established practices, or rested on an impermissible basis." Ibid. (quoting Flagg v. Essex Cnty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002)). A court should not dismiss a complaint when it finds the doctrine of primary jurisdiction applicable. Boss v. Rockland Elec. Co., 95 N.J. 33, 40 (1983). The primary jurisdiction doctrine requires "only a stay of the proceedings pending the agency's determination." Richardson v. Standard Guar. Ins. Co., 371 N.J. Super. 449, 475 (App. Div. 2004); accord Boldt, 320 N.J. Super. at 89. A-0323-25 10 "[T]he doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not absolute but a matter of discretion to be exercised after a careful weighing process in the interest of justice." Boldt, 320 N.J. Super. at 82. Courts engage in a balancing test to determine the "interests of justice" by considering whether: the "claims will be heard, as a preliminary matter, by a body possessing expertise in the area; . . . administrative exhaustion allows the parties to create a factual record necessary for meaningful appellate review; and . . . the agency decision may satisfy the parties and thus obviate resort to the courts." Id. at 82-83 (alteration in original) (quoting Abbott v. Burke, 100 N.J. 269, 297-98 (1985)). Exceptions to the doctrine exist and include those instances when: "only a question of law need be resolved"; "the administrative remedies would be futile"; "irreparable harm would result"; "jurisdiction of the agency is doubtful"; and "an overriding public interest calls for a prompt judicial decision ." Abbott, 100 N.J. at 298. Dismissal under the administrative exhaustion doctrine is also not mandatory; a matter may be stayed pending resolution before an agency. See id. at 301. The PAA defines utilities subject to the FCC's jurisdiction as "any person who is a local exchange carrier or an electric, gas, water, steam, or other public utility, and who owns or controls poles, ducts, conduits, or rights-of-way used, A-0323-25 11 in whole or in part, for any wire communications." 47 U.S.C. § 224(a)(1). It expressly excludes "cooperatively organized" entities. Ibid. Plaintiffs are a local exchange carrier, so they are subject to the PAA's regulations. 47 U.S.C. § 224(a)(1). While plaintiffs assert the SREC's poles are at issue, their complaint addresses only defendant's conduct on their own poles. The complaint's mention of SREC's poles and any jointly owned poles between SREC and plaintiffs are not a basis of the harm alleged by plaintiffs because they only claimed defendant's attachment to their poles was improper and illegal. The FCC plainly has jurisdiction over plaintiffs' poles and the claims related to them in the complaint. The FCC has authority over rates, terms, and conditions of utilities when a State has not certified it has a regulatory body in charge of pole attachment regulations. 47 U.S.C. § 224(b). When a State has a regulator in charge of such actions, the FCC does not have jurisdiction. 47 U.S.C. § 224(c)(1). However, under section 224(c)(3)(B)(i), a State regulator loses jurisdiction over an individual matter if a State fails to make a final decision within 180 days of the filing of the complaint. See FCC's Telecommunication Rule, 47 C.F.R. § 1.1414 (2026). The FCC also has authority to review whether a utility has provided non-discriminatory access to poles. 47 U.S.C. § 224(f). Section 224(f)(2) also A-0323-25 12 notes a utility may deny a pole attachment for safety reasons. 47 U.S.C. § 224(f)(2). The FCC's regulations state if access is not provided within certain specified timeframes, then "the utility must confirm the denial in writing." 47 C.F.R. § 1.1403. The regulations also provide procedures for both informal and formal complaints. 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.711 to .740. They include provisions on damages. 47 C.F.R. § 1.723. Although cross-complaints and counterclaims are prohibited, a party with such claims may file "a separate complaint." 47 C.F.R. § 1.727. The FCC also regulates primary jurisdiction referrals from courts to determine how to procedurally handle matters, including "the nature of the issues involved." 47 C.F.R. § 1.739. Our Supreme Court has examined "the relationship between a court and an administrative agency in determining the legal rights of parties when resolution of a dispute depends in part upon determination of factual issues that have been placed within the special competence of the administrative body." Boss, 95 N.J. at 36. It held a court should refer factual issues to the agency but retain jurisdiction to determine legal issues. Ibid. The Court later reaffirmed the applicability of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction to address these issues in Magic Petroleum. 218 N.J. at 406. Although the Court has held individuals A-0323-25 13 can bring common law claims in court "even when the subject matter of the claims is related to the agency's purview" the primary jurisdiction doctrine remains applicable and the agency should determine claims subject to its authority. Campione, 155 N.J. at 260, 264. The trial judge correctly found the BPU's inaction within the statutorily prescribed period gave the FCC jurisdiction over defendant's claims. Defendant's informal complaint alleged plaintiffs did not provide non- discriminatory access to their poles or reach a pole attachment agreement. This issue fell squarely within the FCC's jurisdiction. 47 U.S.C. § 224(f); 47 C.F.R. § 1.1403. We reject plaintiffs' arguments the FCC cannot grant them relief. The regulations permit the filing of separate complaints for damages. 47 C.F.R. § 1.723; 47 C.F.R. § 1.727. As happened in Boss, the FCC should address the issues of defendant's access to plaintiffs' poles. This may resolve the claims of alleged trespass and harm to the poles because the factual determination of access falls within the FCC's jurisdiction and is central to plaintiffs' allegations. The judge examined each Boldt factor. He determined the matter was not within the conventional experience of the court, and the FCC or the BPU's expertise was required due to the complexity of the technical aspects of pole attachments, access, and safety. The judge noted the risk of inconsistent rulings A-0323-25 14 because the FCC may issue a decision on the matter, which was a pending action. His analysis was adequate and gave a "rational explanation." Flagg, 171 N.J. at 571. For these reasons, the judge's invocation of the primary jurisdiction doctrine was neither an abuse of discretion nor a mistake of law. The judge's ruling regarding the failure to exhaust their administrative remedies was also correct because the matter is still pending before the FCC, which will decide whether plaintiffs failed to provide non-discriminatory access to their poles. The proceeding will also create a factual record, which will help create a record for "meaningful appellate review." Boldt, 320 N.J. Super. at 83. The FCC's decision may also obviate the need for court action since it could determine the extent of either parties' failure to comply with the PAA. Ibid. Finally, we part ways with the judge's dismissal of the complaint. Although under the primary jurisdiction doctrine, a court may defer to an agency and its fact-finding determinations, Estate of Kotsovska, 221 N.J. at 558, it is error to dismiss a complaint on this basis. Boss, 95 N.J. at 40. Instead, a stay is appropriate. Richardson, 371 N.J. Super. at 475. Similarly, the doctrine of the exhaustion of administrative remedies does not require dismissal, and a stay is sufficient to protect the interests of both parties. See Abbott, 100 N.J. at 301. A-0323-25 15 Plaintiffs were not foreclosed from bringing their common law state claims in court. Campione, 155 N.J. at 260. As Boss noted, "the judicial process is suspended pending referral of . . . issues to the administrative body for its views." 95 N.J. at 40-41. The FCC has jurisdiction over the specific issue of the access to plaintiffs' poles and whether their actions violated the Federal Communications Act. Thereafter, what remains of the parties' claims may be returned to court. The judge should have stayed, rather than dismissed the case. For these reasons, we reverse the portion of the order dismissing the complaint. We remand for entry of an order staying the matter pending the FCC's resolution of the issues before it. Affirmed in part, and reversed and remanded in part. We do not retain jurisdiction. A-0323-25 16