Full Opinion

Opinion filed November 19, 2026 In The Eleventh Court of Appeals __________ No. 11-25-00045-CV __________ MINERAL TECHNOLOGIES, INC. AND CARTER D. COPELAND, Appellants V. FRANKS EXPLORATION COMPANY, L.L.C.; JAMES J. WOODCOCK OIL & GAS, LP; EDWARD L. YARBROUGH, JR.; FUTURE FUNDS, INC.; TBO OIL & GAS, LLC; JATEX OIL & GAS EXPLORATION, L.P.; BLACK RIVER OPERATING, LLC; CHARLES E. SMITH; DOYLE RABUN SMITH, JR.; LAKEWAY DEVELOPMENT, LLC; HANLEY PETROLEUM LLC; AND LHAH PROPERTIES LLC, Appellees On Appeal from the 118th District Court Glasscock County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. DC-2121-CV OPINION It is a fundamental principle that the corporate structure normally insulates shareholders, officers, and directors of the corporate entity from individual liability for the debts, liabilities, and obligations of the entity. See Keyes v. Weller, 692 S.W.3d 274, 278 (Tex. 2024); Willis v. Donnelly, 199 S.W.3d 262, 271–72 (Tex. 2006). However, their abuse of this privilege may result in the “piercing [of] the corporate veil” and the imposition of individual liability. Keyes, 692 S.W.3d at 277– 78; Castleberry v. Branscum, 721 S.W.2d 270, 271 (Tex. 1986). Theories exist that provide a basis for piercing the corporate veil. But these theories and the attempts to utilize them do not constitute substantive causes of action. Keyes, 692 S.W.3d at 278; Mapco, Inc. v. Carter, 817 S.W.2d 686, 688 (Tex. 1991). Rather, they are a means by which to impose against an individual, who might otherwise be shielded from liability, the corporate entity’s liability for an underlying debt or cause of action. Keyes, 692 S.W.3d at 278; Dick’s Last Resort of the West End, Inc. v. Market/Ross, Ltd., 273 S.W.3d 905, 909 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, pet. denied). The matter before us concerns an oil and gas accounting dispute between an operator and certain working-interest owners. An audit initiated by Appellees, the non-operators,1 revealed that over $2 million in overcharges were assessed to the parties’ joint account by the operator, MTI. The non-operators sued MTI for breach of the governing joint operating agreements (JOAs) and sought to pierce the corporate veil to hold MTI’s majority owner, Copeland, individually liable for the damages they sought. This matter proceeded to trial before a jury, and the jury returned verdicts in favor of the non-operators that pierced the corporate veil and found MTI and Copeland jointly and severally liable for the damages awarded. The 1 All parties are working-interest owners. Appellant Mineral Technologies, Inc. (MTI) owns a small interest and operates the properties. Appellant Carter D. Copeland owns 90% of MTI and another company, CDC Energy, Ltd., which owns a 48% working interest in the properties. 2 trial court signed a final judgment in accordance with the jury’s verdicts and awarded the non-operators attorney’s fees and costs. On appeal, MTI and Copeland contend that the trial court erred when it: (1) signed a judgment against Copeland when there is no evidence that he (a) received any direct personal benefit or (b) used MTI to perpetrate a fraud; (2) admitted Castleberry-factor evidence;2 and (3) signed a judgment against MTI based on the results of the court-ordered audit. Because we hold that there is legally insufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that Copeland received a direct personal benefit, which is necessary to pierce the corporate veil, we reverse that part of the trial court’s judgment and render judgment that the non-operators take nothing from Copeland. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects. I. Factual Background The parties hold working interests in four subject properties and, through four essentially identical JOAs, jointly developed and operated the properties to produce oil and gas. These agreements instructed the operator to charge all working interest owners their proportionate share of operating costs, to issue credits, and to pay the non-operators their share of the realized proceeds. The JOAs (1) provided that each non-operator has the right to access the operator’s books and records, and (2) incorporated the accounting guidelines recommended by the Council of Petroleum Accountants Societies (COPAS) as the governing accounting procedures that the parties were to utilize. 3 In December 2021, Franks Exploration Company, LLC, a non-operator, sent notice to MTI of its intent to exercise its right to audit MTI’s books and records 2 See Castleberry, 721 S.W.2d at 272 & n.3. 3 “COPAS is the recognized authority for the petroleum accounting industry and is responsible for promulgating accounting procedures which are attached to virtually every operating agreement.” Cass v. Stephens, 156 S.W.3d 38, 53 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2004, pet. denied). 3 pursuant to the terms of the JOAs. Prior to issuing that notice, Franks and other non- operators contacted MTI concerning certain charges that were made to the joint account; however, MTI did not respond to their inquiries. In March 2022, the auditor hired by Franks, Carolyn Sczepanski, notified the other non-operators of the impending audit; some returned ballots indicating their choice to participate in the costs of the audit, others did not. On multiple occasions, Sczepanski attempted, unsuccessfully, to schedule the audit with MTI. Approximately seven months after its initial notice, Franks and non-operators Woodcock Oil & Gas, LP and Edward L. Yarbrough, Jr. filed suit against MTI for breach of contract and sought a court-ordered audit under Rule 172 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 172. The parties later executed a Rule 11 agreement that outlined the terms of the audit process. Pursuant to that agreement, the trial court appointed Sczepanski to conduct an audit of the joint account for charges made to it from January 2019 through November 2022.4 The parties agreed that the audit would be conducted in accordance with the JOAs and COPAS guidelines and to certain deadlines that would govern the process. MTI agreed to cooperate with the audit by providing electronic records of its transactions in its role as the operator. The parties further agreed that if, in performing the audit procedures, Sczepanski “identifies information that, in her judgment, requires further inquiry or additional procedures, she will submit proposed supplement procedures to the parties first and, if necessary, to the Court.” Lastly, the Rule 11 agreement reserved for future determination the period for which each individual plaintiff was entitled to seek relief based on the results of the audit. 4 The text of the agreement defined the audit period as “the period of 2019 to the present” and required MTI to provide its records of its transactions as operator on or before October 20, 2022. Sczepanski’s final audit report covered the period of January 2019 to November 2022. 4 Despite this agreement, MTI consistently delayed, failed to respond, or only partially responded to Sczepanski’s requests for information. Because of this, the non-operators filed a motion to compel MTI to produce documents and other information that Sczepanski had requested. At the hearing on the motion, counsel for MTI and Copeland represented that everything requested by Sczepanski had been produced. Copeland testified: “If I had the resources and abilities to look back at that Rule 11 [agreement] differently, I would have -- I would have wished I would have performed more quickly on things.” The trial court granted the motion in part and ruled that, based on its representation that it had complied with Sczepanski’s requests for information, MTI was barred from producing any additional documents or information in response to those specific requests. However, MTI was permitted to respond to any new requests for information from Sczepanski. The trial court also ordered that Sczepanski treat all undocumented charges—including any for which the auditor had requested, but not yet received, additional or follow-up information—as exceptions in her final report. After this, Sczepanski submitted two additional requests for information, which overlapped with her prior requests and to which MTI failed to respond. Sczepanski then submitted her final report, in which she found nine exceptions that totaled approximately $2.2 million in unsubstantiated charges to the joint account. Many of these exceptions were based on a lack of supporting documentation, pursuant to the trial court’s order. MTI filed exceptions to the report, the non- operators moved to adopt the report and strike MTI’s objections, and the trial court held a hearing on the parties’ motions. At this hearing, the trial court permitted MTI to offer additional documents that purportedly supported invoices that were responsive to Sczepanski’s largest exception, which totaled approximately $1.1 million in unverified charges. This exception was based on an information request for supporting documentation, such 5 as invoices, for 159 unique transactions that Sczepanski had selected for examination. MTI indicated that it had previously e-mailed these documents to Sczepanski in response to her request for information. Copeland testified: I probably did not understand the nuances of Rule 11’s and 172 since my background is really in the actual underlying COPAS agreement. .... Now, in hindsight, looking back at it compared to my previous testimony, I realize that my clerk did not provide sufficient -- and that is my fault because I did not review what she sent. . . . They provided the worksheets, not the underlying documents. They, at that point, thought that’s what was wanted, and it was my error. He also testified that he believed Sczepanski was conducting an “advocacy audit” because she excepted too many undocumented oilfield service charges, stating: “So when I see evidence of that flavor, if you will, in the report, where it’s an all-or- nothing on documentation that is not arm’s length and is basically an internal calculation, yeah, I tend to view that as something less than an unbiased report.” In a post-hearing letter to the trial court, counsel for the non-operators asserted that, upon review, the evidence offered at the hearing was not responsive to Sczepanski’s requests for information and did not contain any of the invoices that she had requested. The trial court took MTI’s exceptions under advisement and later ordered that the evidence admitted at the hearing be sent to Sczepanski for her consideration of its responsiveness to her exception. In her supplemental report, Sczepanski found that of the 240 invoices submitted in this evidentiary exhibit, only one corresponded to the 159 transactions for which she had requested supporting documentation. Nearly all the invoices provided in this exhibit pertained to other document requests to which MTI had previously responded by providing these invoices. Sczepanski credited the single corresponding invoice—which supported a $12,000 transaction. The trial court 6 subsequently denied MTI’s objections to Sczepanski’s report and adopted her report as supplemented. Pursuant to the terms of the JOAs, the working interest owners voted to remove MTI as operator and to designate Black River Operating, LLC as operator. Nevertheless, MTI refused to relinquish operations to Black River and continued to operate the properties. The non-operators subsequently amended their petition to name Copeland as a defendant, seeking to hold him individually liable for MTI’s alleged breach of contract; they also sought a temporary injunction against MTI to cease operations and relinquish them to Black River. They alleged, among other things, that MTI failed to maintain and operate the wells in a good and workmanlike manner. The trial court granted a temporary injunction after a hearing. Rio Energy International, Inc., a purchaser of production from the wells, filed a petition in interpleader and sought to tender all funds from the properties’ sale of production into the registry of the trial court until the parties’ dispute was resolved. Rio named as defendants, among others, multiple working-interest owners who had not joined the suit against MTI and Copeland. Two of these parties, Appellees Hanley Petroleum LLC and LHAH Properties LLC, who were working-interest owners in one of the four properties, filed cross-claims for breach of contract against MTI and, like the non-operators, sought to hold Copeland individually liable for MTI’s alleged breach. Thereafter, several additional working-interest owners joined the non- operators’ suit against MTI and Copeland, the non-operators amended their petition to seek a permanent injunction against MTI, and the parties proceeded to a jury trial. At trial, James Woodcock, president of Woodcock Oil & Gas, testified that some of the non-operators discussed Franks’s initiation of the audit before its notice was sent to MTI in December 2021. James Warren Babin III, the controller for Franks, 7 testified that he did not include other non-operators in the 2021 notice letter because he believed that the audit pertained to the joint account and therefore included all interests. The trial court’s charge asked the jury to determine whether MTI failed to comply with the JOAs by (1) failing to conduct operations in a good and workmanlike manner, (2) failing to allow access at reasonable times to its books and records, and (3) refusing to honor the removal and replacement vote of the majority in interest. It further asked, with respect to each breach-of-contract question, if the jury answered “yes,” whether the non-operators suffered harm because of that breach. Finally, the charge asked whether Copeland was responsible for MTI’s conduct. The jury answered all submitted questions in the affirmative. The trial court signed a final judgment, which recited that, during the presentation of the case, the parties agreed on the record that the non-operators had executed a Rule 11 agreement amongst themselves “concerning the division of damages based upon working interest ownership applied to the audit conducted by the Court appointed auditor” and that its judgment was consistent with that agreement. In its judgment, the trial court awarded specific sums to each non- operator party to have and recover from MTI and Copeland, jointly and severally. II. Analysis A. Piercing the Corporate Veil In their first and second issues, MTI and Copeland contend that the trial court erred when it: (1) signed a judgment in favor of the non-operators on their alter ego claim because the evidence is legally insufficient to support the jury’s finding; and (2) admitted Castleberry-factor evidence. Specifically, they argue that there is no evidence that Copeland: (1) used MTI’s corporate formation to perpetrate an actual fraud against the non-operators for his direct personal benefit; or (2) received any direct personal benefit. 8 1. Standard of Review The standard for legal sufficiency is whether the evidence in support of the challenged finding rises to a level that would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to arrive at the verdict under review. W & T Offshore, Inc. v. Fredieu, 610 S.W.3d 884, 897–98 (Tex. 2020); City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 807, 827 (Tex. 2005). When a party challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support an adverse finding on which that party did not have the burden of proof at trial, the party must demonstrate that there is no evidence to support the adverse finding. Gonzalez v. Sanchez, 717 S.W.3d 516, 526 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2025, no pet.) (citing Exxon Corp. v. Emerald Oil & Gas Co., L.C., 348 S.W.3d 194, 215 (Tex. 2011)). Under a legal sufficiency review, we consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, make every reasonable inference in that party’s favor, disregard contrary evidence unless a reasonable factfinder could not, and indulge every reasonable inference that would support it. See Albert v. Fort Worth & W.R.R. Co., 690 S.W.3d 92, 97 (Tex. 2024); City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 807, 822, 827. The evidence is legally insufficient to support a finding only if: (1) the record discloses a complete lack of evidence of a vital fact; (2) the court is barred by rules of law or evidence from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact; (3) there is no more than a mere scintilla of evidence to prove a vital fact; or (4) the evidence conclusively established the opposite of a vital fact. United Rentals N. Am., Inc. v. Evans, 668 S.W.3d 627, 640 (Tex. 2023) (citing Gunn v. McCoy, 554 S.W.3d 645, 658 (Tex. 2018)); City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 810. “Anything more than a scintilla of evidence is legally sufficient to support the finding.” Mullins v. McWhirter, 724 S.W.3d 571, 578 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2025, pet. denied) (quoting Formosa Plastics Corp. USA v. Presidio Eng’rs & Contractors, Inc., 960 S.W.2d 41, 48 (Tex. 1998)). “More than a mere scintilla of evidence exists to prove 9 a vital fact, making reversal on legal-sufficiency grounds improper, when the evidence rises to a level that would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to differ in their conclusions.” Albert, 690 S.W.3d at 97; City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 827. On the other hand, if the evidence is so weak that it only creates a “mere surmise or suspicion” of the existence of a vital fact, “it is regarded as no evidence.” Waste Mgmt. of Texas, Inc. v. Texas Disposal Sys. Landfill, Inc., 434 S.W.3d 142, 156 (Tex. 2014). In reviewing the sufficiency of evidence, “[o]ur review is restricted to the [trial court’s] charge as submitted when there was no objection to the instruction.” Seger v. Yorkshire Ins. Co., Ltd., 503 S.W.3d 388, 407 (Tex. 2016). “[I]t is the court’s charge, not some other unidentified law, that measures the sufficiency of the evidence when the opposing party fails to object to the charge.” Id. (quoting Osterberg v. Peca, 12 S.W.3d 31, 55 (Tex. 2000)); Sw. Energy Prod. Co. v. Berry-Helfand, 491 S.W.3d 699, 713 (Tex. 2016) (recognizing that the court reviews the sufficiency of the evidence “against the factors submitted in the charge to determine whether evidence supports both the existence of damages and the amount awarded”). 2. Governing Law “Under longstanding Texas common law, corporate shareholders, officers, and directors are generally shielded from liability for corporate obligations.” Keyes, 692 S.W.3d at 278; Phillips v. United Heritage Corp., 319 S.W.3d 156, 158 (Tex. App.—Waco 2010, no pet.). “But ‘courts will disregard the corporate fiction’—i.e., pierce the corporate veil—and hold such agents individually liable for those corporate obligations when the agents ‘abuse the corporate privilege.’” Keyes, 692 S.W.3d 278 (quoting Willis, 199 S.W.3d at 271); Phillips, 319 S.W.3d at 158. 10 Section 21.223 of the Texas Business Organizations Code codifies this “longstanding Texas common law” principle. Keyes, 692 S.W.3d at 278. It provides, in relevant part: (a) A holder of shares, an owner of any beneficial interest in shares, or a subscriber for shares whose subscription has been accepted, or any affiliate of such a holder, owner, or subscriber or of the corporation, may not be held liable to the corporation or its obligees with respect to: .... (2) any contractual obligation of the corporation or any matter relating to or arising from the obligation on the basis that the holder, beneficial owner, subscriber, or affiliate is or was the alter ego of the corporation or on the basis of actual or constructive fraud, a sham to perpetrate a fraud, or other similar theory[.] .... (b) Subsection (a)(2) does not prevent or limit the liability of a holder, beneficial owner, subscriber, or affiliate if the obligee demonstrates that the holder, beneficial owner, subscriber, or affiliate caused the corporation to be used for the purpose of perpetrating and did perpetrate an actual fraud on the obligee primarily for the direct personal benefit of the holder, beneficial owner, subscriber, or affiliate. TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 21.223 (West 2020) (emphasis added). Section 21.223 is the exclusive method for holding an interest owner or shareholder5 individually liable for the contractual obligations of the corporation. TransPecos Banks v. Strobach, 487 S.W.3d 722, 729–30 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2016, no pet.) (citing BUS. ORGS. § 21.224). The statute’s restriction on individual liability and the exception to it likewise apply equally to limited liability companies. Plan B We use the term “shareholder” to encompass the statute’s applicability to “[a] holder of shares, an 5 owner of any beneficial interest in shares, or a subscriber for shares whose subscription has been accepted.” Keyes, 692 S.W.3d at 278 n.5 & n.12 (quoting BUS. ORGS. § 21.223(a)). 11 Holdings, LLC v. RSLLP, 681 S.W.3d 443, 458 (Tex. App.—Austin 2023, no pet.) (citing BUS. ORGS. § 101.002(a)). Several of our sister courts have interpreted the requirements for disregarding the corporate structure under Section 21.223 as two-fold, including a requirement to establish that the interest owner or shareholder is the alter ego of the corporation, namely: (1) the relationship between the [persons or] entities, and (2) whether the entities’ use of limited liability was illegitimate. Thus, to pierce the corporate veil and impose liability under an alter-ego theory, the plaintiff must demonstrate (1) that the [persons or] entit[ies] on which it seeks to impose liability is the alter ego of the [corporation], and (2) that the corporate fiction was used for an illegitimate purpose, that is, to perpetrate an actual fraud on the plaintiff for the defendant’s direct personal benefit. U.S. KingKing, LLC v. Precision Energy Servs., Inc., 555 S.W.3d 200, 213–14 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, no pet.) (first citing SSP Partners v. Gladstrong Invs. (USA) Corp., 275 S.W.3d 444, 455 (Tex. 2008); and then citing Tryco Enters., Inc. v. Robinson, 390 S.W.3d 497, 508 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, pet. dism’d)); see, e.g., Labrado v. Legarreta, 720 S.W.3d 358, 370 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2025, pet. denied); 6 Am. Akaushi Assoc., Inc. v. Twinwood Cattle Co., Inc., No. 14- 21-00701-CV, 2025 WL 450750, at *29 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 11, 2025, pet. denied, reh’g filed). We agree with this approach. 3. Application Assuming, without deciding, that there is legally sufficient evidence to support the jury’s findings of alter ego and actual fraud, we conclude that there is no 6 Labrado involved a tort claim for workplace injuries, not a contractual claim, but the court noted that it was required to “address the law pertaining to contract-based claims because the [unobjected-to] charge required the jury to determine whether Labrado used the corporation to perpetrate an actual fraud on Legarreta for his own personal benefit.” Labrado, 720 S.W.3d at 370 n.6. 12 evidence that Copeland received a direct personal benefit, which is dispositive of this issue. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1. Section 21.223 does not define the phrase “direct personal benefit.” See BUS. ORGS. § 21.223. Therefore, to find that alleged fraud was perpetrated “primarily for the direct personal benefit” of the individual, courts have typically relied on and required that the evidence show that the funds “derived from the corporation’s allegedly fraudulent conduct were pocketed by or diverted to the individual defendant or at least put to personal use by [him].” Am. Akaushi, 2025 WL 450750, at *29 (citing Hong v. Havey, 551 S.W.3d 875, 885 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.)); see Solutioneers Consulting, Ltd. v. Gulf Greyhound Partners, Ltd., 237 S.W.3d 379, 388 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.). Further, the use of a company to perpetrate an actual fraud for the direct personal benefit of its owner must have some connection to the transaction at issue. Hong, 551 S.W.3d at 887; Viajes Gerpa, S.A. v. Fazeli, 522 S.W.3d 524, 533–34 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet. denied). When, however, funds that flow from the actual fraud are not used primarily for the defendant-owner’s direct personal benefit, courts have refused to hold the defendant-owner personally liable for the corporate entity’s debts and obligations under an alter ego theory. Am. Akaushi, 2025 WL 450750, at *29–30; see Gulf View Private Investment, Inc. v. GC System, A.S., 716 S.W.3d 830, 869–70 (Tex. App.— San Antonio 2024, pet. denied); Hong, 551 S.W.3d at 886; Morgan v. Fuller, No. 07- 15-00314-CV, 2016 WL 2766106, at *2–3 (Tex. App.—Amarillo May 11, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.). For example, if the evidence shows that fraudulently procured funds were used to satisfy the corporation’s financial obligations, this “cuts against the notion that the fraud was perpetrated primarily for the direct personal benefit of an individual.” Hong, 551 S.W.3d at 886; see Solutioneers, 237 S.W.3d at 389. 13 In their brief, the non-operators summarize the following evidence they claim constitute a personal benefit to Copeland that arose directly from his fraudulent conduct in using MTI: • There was no record of payments from CDC (the working-interest owner in the [property], owned 90% by Copeland) to MTI (as operator), such that there was no proof that CDC paid the bills that MTI was overcharging to other non-operators; • Copeland admitted that the relationship between his service company and MTI created a “direct benefit . . . for any dollars that MTI has available”; • Actual profits were diverted to Copeland through the unexplain[ed] and undocumented cash flow between . . . his interrelated entities, including between [Owl Energy Services] and MTI; • Copeland used money that went to MTI to [reimburse himself] for loans taken from an entity that he formed for his children; • Funds “may stay in MTI” after keeping credits owed to non-operators and end up in Copeland’s pockets as “management fees between the companies”; • Although Copeland did not take distributions from MTI, Copeland [received] a salary from Owl, the substance of which was composed of the funds raised from billings that MTI sent to non-operators; • [Copeland testified that] “anything that benefits MTI or Owl or PMM” benefits [him]; and • Copeland recognized [that] the JOAs were not to be used as a “money generating machine by a markup,” yet many of the charges that passed through MTI were marked up. In other words, the non-operators contend, Copeland used MTI to overcharge the non-operators with Owl’s inflated invoices; then, MTI reimbursed Owl, and Owl paid the profits to Copeland via his salary. Appellees contend that “MTI did not receive any benefit from this scheme, but instead was the conduit for Owl to [generate] profits that flowed directly” to Copeland. According to the non-operators, 14 when crediting this evidence and reviewing it in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, a reasonable jury could find that Copeland received a direct personal benefit from his relationship with Owl and his use of MTI. Thus, they contend there is legally sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that Copeland received a direct personal benefit from his misuse of MTI. On this record, we do not agree. Because Copeland received a salary from Owl is not, on its own, evidence of a direct personal benefit to him. See Viajes Gerpa, 522 S.W.3d at 534–35 (reversing a personal liability finding despite evidence that the fraudulent transactions kept the defendant-owner’s business afloat and allowed him to continue to receive a salary because there was no evidence connecting the specific fraud alleged to the specific salary the defendant-owner received). Moreover, there is no evidence of what Copeland’s salary was, or if it changed, when the profits from Owl’s charges to the non-operators through MTI were made. See Solutioneers, 237 S.W.3d at 388–89 (“[E]ven if we assume maintaining a personal salary from or ownership interest in Solutioneers—by misappropriating the Miller sponsorship payment in order to keep Solutioneers afloat—constitutes a direct personal benefit . . . we find no evidence in the record regarding any salary Haynes received from Solutioneers or any evidence illustrating how Haynes’s conduct surrounding the Miller transaction affected this salary.”); see also Hong, 551 S.W.3d at 887 (There must be a connection between the alleged fraud and the direct personal benefit.); Viajes Gerpa, 522 S.W.3d at 533– 34 (same). Copeland’s statements that the relationships between his companies created a “direct benefit” and that anything that benefits his companies also benefited him are general, logical statements that apply to any business owner. See Gulf View, 716 S.W.3d at 870 (rejecting an “all money is fungible” approach to the direct personal benefit analyses); TransPecos, 487 S.W.3d at 737 n.11 (holding that benefits to the 15 corporation from fraudulently obtained funds, standing alone, do not suggest personal benefit, and any personal benefit shown must be related to the specific fraudulent transaction rather than general benefits from operating the corporation); Solutioneers, 237 S.W.3d at 388–89 (holding that a shareholder could not be held personally liable for the corporation’s obligations, where the evidence established that the funds fraudulently obtained by the corporate shareholder only benefitted the corporation itself, and there was no evidence that the defendant used the funds to purchase personal items or to pay personal debts); Menetti v. Chavers, 974 S.W.2d 168, 175 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, no pet.) (holding that even evidence that shareholders used corporate funds for personal expenses is insufficient unless the benefit relates to the specific transaction at issue); Morgan, 2016 WL 2766106, at *2–3 (holding that fraudulently obtained funds were used to satisfy corporate demands and keep the company afloat, not diverted to or pocketed by the defendant- owner). The evidence that Copeland used money that was funneled to MTI to reimburse himself for loans that were taken from and associated with an entity he formed for his children shows that corporate funds were used to satisfy a corporate debt. See TransPecos, 487 S.W.3d at 737 n.11; Menetti, 974 S.W.2d at 175. Despite this, the non-operators rely on Farr, which is distinguishable because the shareholder there used corporate funds to pay off his personal loans. Farr v. Sun World Savings Ass’n, 810 S.W.2d 294, 298 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1991, no writ). Further, the evidence that funds “may stay in MTI” after keeping credits owed to the non-operators and which end up “in Copeland’s pocket” as “management fees between the companies” does not connect the overcharges to Copeland at all and thus only shows generic corporate management. Without more, this is no evidence of any direct personal benefit to Copeland. See Gulf View, 716 S.W.3d at 870; Menetti, 974 S.W.2d at 175; Morgan, 2016 WL 2766106, at *2–3. Moreover, the 16 non-operators’ contention that the faulty or opaque intercompany accounting procedures between MTI and CDC leaves a $2.2-million gap and explains the alleged fraud directed by Copeland lacks a concrete connection to Copeland’s personal benefit. See Gulf View, 716 S.W.3d at 869–70; TransPecos, 487 S.W.3d at 737 n.11; Solutioneers, 237 S.W.3d at 388–89; see also Am. Akaushi, 2025 WL 450750, at *29. In sum, neither the evidence marshaled by the non-operators nor the record as a whole provides more than a scintilla of evidence that Copeland received a direct personal benefit from the complained-of overcharges. The evidence on which the non-operators rely either establishes only a benefit to one or more of Copeland’s companies (such as intercompany transfers, management fees, and the general economic benefits that Copeland derived from his ownership of the companies) or identifies a benefit to him personally (such as his salary or reimbursement of corporate loans) without concretely connecting that benefit to the complained-of overcharges. Contrary to the non-operators’ contention, the evidence fails to establish that the funds derived via MTI’s charges to the joint account were pocketed by, diverted to, or otherwise used for Copeland’s direct personal benefit. See, e.g., Hong, 551 S.W.3d at 885–87. Absent that connection, or any evidence to support it, the jury could only speculate, which cannot support the finding, as to whether those charges ultimately produced a direct personal benefit to Copeland. See Gulf View, 716 S.W.3d at 869–70; Solutioneers, 237 S.W.3d at 388–89. We have reviewed the entire record in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, see Albert, 690 S.W.3d at 97; W & T Offshore, 610 S.W.3d at 897–98; City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 802, 807, 827, and conclude that there is legally insufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that Copeland received a direct personal benefit. See Gonzalez, 717 S.W.3d at 526. Accordingly, we sustain MTI’s and 17 Copeland’s first issue. Because we do, we need not address their second issue. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1. B. Propriety of the Audit In their third issue, MTI and Copeland contend that the trial court erred when it signed a judgment against them based on the results of Sczepanski’s audit. Specifically, they argue that: (1) the audit process violated MTI’s right to due process; (2) the trial court improperly applied Sczepanski’s report to parties that failed to timely exercise their audit rights; and (3) the trial court did not have the authority to permit non-operators who did not pay their proportionate share of the bills to participate in the audit. 1. Standards of Review and Governing Law Rule 172 permits the trial court to appoint an auditor to investigate accounts “for the purpose of justice between the parties to any suit.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 172. If a party files exceptions to the auditor’s report, for the purpose of disputing it, the excepting party may present evidence that supports the exceptions. TEX. R. EVID. 706. However, if neither party excepts to the report, it is conclusive as to the matters it covers. Burns v. Burns, 2 S.W.3d 339, 345 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1999, no pet.). We review a trial court’s decision to appoint an auditor and adopt the auditor’s report for an abuse of discretion. See 2100 Ricchi, LLC v. Hilliard Office Solutions of Texas, Ltd., No. 05-21-00158-CV, 2022 WL 3053872, at *9 n.2 (Tex. App.— Dallas Aug. 3, 2022, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citing Padon v. Padon, 670 S.W.2d 354, 360 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1984, no writ)). Although we review a trial court’s decision under this standard, we decide de novo the question of whether its decision comports with due process. Elm Creek Owners Ass’n v. H.O.K. Investments, Inc., 12 S.W.3d 495, 497 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1999, no pet.) (citing Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Malone, 972 S.W.2d 35, 45 (Tex. 1998)). 18 “A trial court abuses its discretion when it denies constitutional protections like due process.” Id. (citing Star-Telegram, Inc. v. Walker, 834 S.W.2d 54, 55 (Tex. 1992)). Due process at a minimum requires notice and an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. Univ. of Tex. Med. Sch. at Houston v. Than, 901 S.W.2d 926, 930 (Tex. 1995) (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976)); Barrientos v. Barrientos, 675 S.W.3d 399, 405 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2023, pet. denied). Because evaluating a due process claim involves a two-part test, we must determine (1) whether MTI has a liberty or property interest that is entitled to procedural due process protection, and (2) if so, what process is due MTI. Mosley v. Tex. Health & Hum. Servs. Comm’n, 593 S.W.3d 250, 264 (Tex. 2019) (citing Than, 901 S.W.2d at 929). Rule 11 agreements are contracts that relate to litigation, and thus we construe them de novo under the same rules that we employ when construing a contract. Shamrock Psychiatric Clinic, P.A. v. Tex. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., 540 S.W.3d 553, 560 (Tex. 2018); see TEX. R. CIV. P. 11 (“Unless otherwise provided in these rules, no agreement between attorneys or parties touching any suit pending will be enforced unless it be in writing, signed and filed with the papers as part of the record, or unless it be made in open court and entered of record.”). In construing a contract, we look to the language of the parties’ agreement to ascertain their objective intent as expressed in the writing. SM Energy Co. v. Buzzard Roost Farms, Inc., 727 S.W.3d 525, 544 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2025, no pet.) (citing URI, Inc. v. Kleberg Cnty., 543 S.W.3d 755, 764 (Tex. 2018)). We begin by examining the ordinary meaning of the contractual language, giving it its plain, grammatical meaning unless doing so would clearly defeat the parties’ intentions. Id. at 545 (citing Barrow-Shaver Res. Co. v. Carrizo Oil & Gas, Inc., 590 S.W.3d 471, 479 (Tex. 2019)). These same principles apply to joint operating agreements. See, e.g., Evans Res., L.P. v. Petroplex Energy, Inc., 732 S.W.3d 620, 628 (Tex. App.— 19 Eastland 2026, pet. denied) (citing Tawes v. Barnes, 340 S.W.3d 419, 425–26 (Tex. 2011)). 2. Application a. Due Process MTI and Copeland complain that (1) the trial court improperly permitted Sczepanski to “unilaterally decide what documentation was required and whether sufficient supporting documentation had been provided,” and (2) MTI was denied the opportunity to ask Sczepanski why she rejected, in her supplemental report, the invoices they provided. The non-operators respond that the extensive and detailed procedure used by the trial court and Sczepanski presented little risk of an erroneous deprivation of MTI’s financial interest, and that the COPAS guidelines and other procedures out