Chugach Logistics and Facility Services Jv, LLC v. United States

In the United States Court of Federal Claims FOR PUBLICATION No. 25-2075C (Filed: August 17, 2026∗) ) CHUGACH LOGISTICS AND ) FACILITY SERVICES JV, LLC, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) ) UNITED STATES, ) ) Defendant, ) ) and ) ) CCS KING GEORGE 2 LLC, ) ) Defendant-Intervenor. ) ) Aron C. Beezley, Bradley Arant Boult Cummings LLP, Washington, DC, for plaintiff. With him on the briefs were Nathaniel J. Greeson and Gabrielle A. Sprio (argued), Bradley Arant Boult Cummings LLP, Washington, DC. Russell J. Upton (argued), Senior Trial Counsel, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for defendant. With him on the briefs were Brett A. Shumate, Assistant Attorney General; and Patricia M. McCarthy, Director, and Douglas K. Mickle, Acting Deputy Director, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC. Erin L. Hernandez, Senior Associate Counsel, and Andrew Campos, Associate Counsel, Naval Facilities Engineering Systems Command Southwest, U.S. Department of the Navy, San Diego, CA, Of Counsel. ∗ This decision was filed under seal in accordance with the protective order entered in this case on August 10, 2026. On August 17, 2026, the parties filed a joint notice confirming no proposed redactions. Roger V. Abbott (argued), Miles & Stockbridge PC, Washington, DC, for defendant- intervenor. With him on the briefs were Stephen P. Ramaley, Mitchell D. Dolman, and Samara A. Rahman, Miles & Stockbridge PC, Washington, DC. OPINION AND ORDER BONILLA, Judge. This post-award bid protest involves a nearly $100 million United States Navy Base Operations Support Contract (BOSC). Plaintiff Chugach Logistics and Facility Services JV, LLC (Chugach) contests the award of the BOSC to defendant-intervenor CCS King George 2, LLC (CCS KG). Among the procurement issues raised, Chugach argues the Navy improperly: (1) credited CCS KG with non-prime corporate experience, (2) failed to consider the experience of CCS KG’s protégé member, (3) ignored CCS KG’s known negative past performance on a predecessor contract, (4) neglected to conduct a price risk analysis, and (5) made a flawed best-value determination. Chugach seeks permanent injunctive relief canceling the contract award to CCS KG and directing the Navy to reevaluate the proposals. Pending before the Court are the parties’ cross-motions for judgment on the administrative record. The Court heard oral argument on July 31, 2026. For the reasons below, plaintiff’s dispositive motion is granted-in-part and denied-in-part, and, conversely, defendant’s and defendant-intervenor’s dispositive cross-motions are denied-in-part and granted-in-part. BACKGROUND Headquartered in San Diego, California, the Naval Facilities Engineering Systems Command Southwest (NAVFAC-SW) is one of ten naval facilities engineering commands. Serving nineteen military installations across six states (Arizona, California, Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, and Utah), NAVFAC-SW “oversees a wide range of critical services, including public works, planning, engineering and design, construction, real estate management, environmental services, and the acquisition and disposal of facilities and real estate.”1 To perform this mission, NAVFAC-SW employs over 3,500 service members and civil servants. On August 30, 2024, NAVFAC-SW issued a solicitation seeking proposals for a consolidated BOSC for Naval Base Coronado, California. The stated purpose for the eight-year, firm-fixed price, indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity contract was to “provide various customers at [Naval Base Coronado] with a single responsive, efficient, and reliable means of obtaining integrated base operations support 1 See About Us, NAVFAC SW., available at https://perma.cc/U988-MAAN. 2 services.”2 AR 3.3 The statement of work consolidated twelve requirements from preexisting naval service contracts and five new requirements. The aggregated list includes: custodial services, portable toilet rentals, photovoltaic maintenance, exhaust vent cleaning, pool and chemical maintenance, grease trap pumping services, grounds maintenance, bulk pumping, biomedical waste, integrated solid waste management, personal protective equipment, vertical transportation equipment, auto lift maintenance, boat washing maintenance, pavement clearance, biomedical cleaning, and “Hood Ansul Suppression System” certification.4 AR 4–5. Of note, custodial services is the largest component of the procurement, accounting for nearly half of the total annual contract value. The procurement employed a best-value source selection process balancing price against five evaluative factors: Corporate Experience (Factor 1), Past Performance (Factor 2), Key Personnel (Factor 3), Quality Management System (Factor 4), and Safety (Factor 5). For all factors save Past Performance, proposals were assigned a combined technical/risk adjectival rating ranging from “unacceptable” to “outstanding.”5 For Past Performance, proposals were assigned a performance confidence assessment adjectival rating ranging from “no confidence” to “substantial confidence.”6 As to the relative weight afforded each factor, the solicitation instructed that the four technical factors (Corporate Experience, Key Personnel, Quality Management System, and Safety) “[we]re of equal importance to each other and, when combined, [we]re equal in importance to [Past Performance].” AR 271. The combination of the five non-price factors, in turn, was “significantly more important than price.” Id. Under Corporate Experience (Factor 1), the solicitation required offerors to provide between two and four examples of “recent, relevant projects that aggregately demonstrate[d] [the offeror’s] experience as a prime contractor.” AR 256. To be considered recent, the project must have been ongoing (for at least one year) or completed within five years of the August 30, 2024 solicitation release date. To qualify as relevant, a project was required to have a total annual contract value of at least $10 million and encompass work in at least two of three maintenance and 2 The maximum performance period was broken down into a six-month base period followed by seven one-year option periods and one six-month option period. 3 “AR __” is a citation to a Bates-numbered page in the administrative record. 4 “Hood Ansul Suppression System” likely refers to a type of fire suppression system manufactured by ANSUL, a company specializing in fire suppression systems and solutions across different industries. See Why We Do What We Do, ANSUL, available at https://perma.cc/KQ3K-MM29. The Court was unable to determine which specific system is referenced in the solicitation using publicly available information. 5 The complete range of combined technical/risk adjectival ratings included: outstanding, good, acceptable, marginal, and unacceptable. 6 The complete range of performance confidence assessment adjectival ratings included: substantial confidence, satisfactory confidence, neutral confidence, limited confidence, and no confidence. 3 service areas: facility investment, custodial, and other (training pools).7 The solicitation defined “prime contractor” experience to “include[] the prime experience of any partnerships, joint ventures, teaming arrangements (e.g., first-tier small business subcontractor), or corporate affiliates (subsidiary, sister subsidiary, sister company, or parent company).” AR 256 (parentheticals cleaned up). The solicitation also contemplated bifurcated levels of credited experience requirements: partnerships, joint ventures, and teaming arrangements had no additional submission requirements beyond the standard project narratives; corporate affiliates (subsidiaries, sister subsidiaries, sister companies, and parent companies), however, were required to submit a narrative and organizational chart explaining “the corporate relationship of the affiliates.” AR 257. For Past Performance (Factor 2), the solicitation instructed offerors to submit Contractor Performance Assessment Reporting System (CPARS) evaluations and Past Performance Questionnaires (PPQ) for all projects submitted under Corporate Experience (Factor 1).8 The solicitation emphasized that “[w]hile the Government may elect to consider data from other sources, the burden of providing detailed, current, accurate, and complete past performance information rests with the Offeror.” AR 260. Relying on the submitted information and “consider[ing] the recency and relevance of the information, the source of the information, context of the data, and general trends in the Offeror’s performance,” the Navy would then consider how well the offeror performed the projects from the Corporate Experience (Factor 1) section of the proposal. Id. The evaluation criteria for Factor 2 further provided, in a section titled “Past Performance on All CPARS Evaluations for Services”: The Government may review all CPARS evaluations for Offerors, for projects other than those submitted under Factor 1, with specific focus on quality, schedule and management. CPARS evaluations that contain ratings for marginal to unsatisfactory for quality, schedule, and/or management may lower the overall confidence assessment rating. For offerors submitting as any type of teaming arrangement, when reviewing all CPARS evaluations the Government will review all available CPARS evaluations for the Offeror as a whole as well as any entities within the teaming arrangement. AR 260–61. The solicitation stated that price proposals would be evaluated for fairness and reasonableness. Definitionally, this meant the Navy would “identify any pricing that 7 “Other (training pools)” included services such as “[c]hemical replenishment, water testing, pool light operations, seasonal startups, filtration maintenance, service calls, vacuuming, swimming pool operator maintenance and operations of training pools.” AR 257. 8 Where an interim or final CPARS was submitted for a project, the Navy would review only the CPARS evaluation and not the PPQ(s) for that project. 4 is unreasonably high,” cautioning that such pricing could result in disqualification. AR 255–56. When discussing the evaluation of price and potential disqualification, the solicitation consistently described the analysis to be performed as focused on “unreasonably high/inconsistently priced proposal[s].”9 While the solicitation did not explicitly mention a price risk analysis, it did incorporate by reference Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) provision 252.204-7024 (Notice on the Use of the Supplier Performance Risk System), AR 232, which defines “price risk” as “a measure of whether a proposed price for a product or service is consistent with historical prices paid for that item or service” and instructs the contracting officer to “consider [Supplier Performance Risk System (SPRS)] risk assessments during the evaluation of . . . offers received in response to th[e] solicitation . . . .” 48 C.F.R. § 252.204-7024(a), (c)(2).10 In response to the BOSC solicitation, the Navy received four proposals ahead of the October 10, 2024 submission deadline, including from Chugach and CCS KG. Chugach is a Small Business Administration (SBA)-certified 8(a) mentor-protégé joint venture (MPJV) comprised of mentor Wolf Creek Federal Services, Inc. (Wolf Creek) and protégé Chugach Solutions Enterprise, LLC (Chugach Solutions).11 Both Wolf Creek and Chugach Solutions are subsidiaries of Chugach Government Solutions, LLC.12 Headquartered in Anchorage, Alaska, Chugach Government Solutions is itself a subsidiary of Chugach Alaska Corporation and describes itself as 9 See, e.g., AR 255 (“As analysis is performed to determine a fair and reasonable price, the Government will seek to identify any pricing that is unreasonably high. . . . Pricing may be considered unreasonably high when . . . the price of one or more prices . . . is significantly overstated. An offer may be rejected if the proposed price is unreasonably high . . . .”); AR 256 (“[I]f unique and innovative approaches are the basis for an apparently unreasonably high/inconsistently priced proposal, the nature of these approaches and their impact on price must be completely documented.”); id. (“A price that is found unreasonably high in relation to the proposed work may be indicative of an inherent lack of understanding of the solicitation requirements and may result in the overall proposal not being considered for award.”). 10 In a bid protest before the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the Source Selection Evaluation Board (SSEB) chairperson admitted that, although the solicitation incorporated the DFARS provision by reference, he “did not use the SPRS tool during the evaluation of proposals . . . .” AR 6475. In the same proceedings, the Navy presented uncontested evidence that the SPRS contained no usable assessments for CCS KG or Chugach. 11 Under the SBA’s mentor-protégé program, an approved firm may serve as a mentor to a protégé firm “to provide business development assistance” and “improve the protégé firms’ ability to successfully compete for federal contracts.” 13 C.F.R. § 125.9(a). Under this program, a mentor and a protégé may form a joint venture. Id. § 125.9(d). To be eligible for an 8(a) small business set-aside, however, the MPJV—if it “exists as a formal separate legal entity” from its comprising members—must either be unstaffed or consist solely of members who would individually be eligible for the contract. Id. § 121.103(h)(1)(i)–(ii). Additionally, the 8(a) protégé member must perform at least 40% of the work, meaning the mentor member can perform up to 60% of the work. Id. § 124.513(d). 12 See Subsidiary Companies, CHUGACH GOV’T SOLS., available at https://perma.cc/GA7B-M949. 5 delivering solutions ranging “[f]rom logistics and facilities to IT, engineering, and operational support.”13 CCS KG is also an SBA-certified 8(a) MPJV, comprised of mentor King & George LLC (King & George) and protégé Cascade Contracting & Services (Cascade). Headquartered in Fort Worth, Texas, with satellite offices in four other states and Washington, DC, King & George provides general contracting [and] construction management, facilities [operations and maintenance], vehicles [and] equipment maintenance, call centers, and environmental services . . . [supporting a] wide array of commercial and government clients, including federal agencies such as the [U.S. Army Corps of Engineers], U.S. Air Force, [U.S.] Navy, the [Federal Aviation Administration], and the National Oceanic Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). About Us, King & George, available at https://perma.cc/57HZ-U6TK. Cascade describes itself “as an SBA-certified 8(a) firm . . . wholly owned by a non-profit Native Hawaiian Organization,” headquartered in Aiea, Hawaii, with offices in Washington, Nevada, and Texas.14 After an initial evaluation in November 2024, “the SSEB determined that discussions [we]re desirable and recommend[ed] entering discussions with all four (4) Offerors . . . .” AR 3533. Following discussions in early 2025 and submissions of final proposal revisions, the SSEB presented its final evaluation results to the Source Selection Authority (SSA) in a May 6, 2025 report. Relevant here, the SSEB assigned CCS KG and Chugach the following adjectival technical ratings: Offeror Factor 1: Factor 3: Factor 4: Quality Factor 5: Overall Corporate Key Personnel Management Safety Technical Experience System Rating CCS KG Outstanding Good Outstanding Outstanding Outstanding Chugach Outstanding Outstanding Outstanding Outstanding Outstanding AR 3532–33.15 For Past Performance (Factor 2), the SSEB assigned CCS KG an adjectival rating of substantial confidence, whereas Chugach received a rating of satisfactory confidence. And Chugach’s evaluated price of $107,240,818.63, while relatively close to the prices proposed by the two offerors not discussed herein and 13 See Newsroom, CHUGACH GOV’T SOLS., available at https://perma.cc/7TT6-JFUY. 14 See About Us, CASCADE CONTRACTING & SERVS., available at https://perma.cc/ZN99-TV2B. 15 The SSEB awarded a third proposal significantly lower technical adjectival ratings. The fourth proposal was eliminated from further consideration. 6 in line with the Independent Government Cost Estimate (IGCE), was the highest proposed price. Indeed, Chugach’s proposed price was approximately thirty percent higher than CCS KG’s proposed price of $82,444,251.27. The SSEB found that “CCS KG had the strongest overall technical proposal with both the highest possible overall technical rating and the highest possible performance confidence assessment rating.” AR 3533. Noting that both CCS KG and Chugach received the highest overall technical rating of outstanding,16 the SSEB highlighted the delta in the weighted past performance confidence assessment ratings between CCS KG (substantial confidence) and Chugach (satisfactory confidence). The SSEB further stressed that CCS KG’s proposal offered the lowest price. Weighing these considerations, the SSEB concluded that “CCS KG provide[d] the greatest value to the Government for technical, past performance, and price. As such, an award to CCS KG [wa]s in the best interest of the Government from a price and technical (non-price) standpoint.” AR 3534. Based on these findings, in a final report dated May 6, 2025, the SSEB recommended awarding the contract to CCS KG. Three days later, the Source Selection Advisory Council concurred. In a Source Selection Decision Document dated May 20, 2025, the SSA formally selected CCS KG for the BOSC award. In its winning proposal, CCS KG submitted four projects under Corporate Experience (Factor 1): two awarded to KJS MP Joint Venture, LLC (an MPJV consisting of King & George as protégé and J&J Worldwide Services as mentor); one awarded to KGJJ Engineering Solutions, LLC (another MPJV consisting of King & George as protégé and J&J Worldwide Services as mentor); and one awarded to AKG Services, LLC (a joint venture consisting of King & George as managing member and Ameritac, Inc.). For each of these projects, CCS KG listed the above joint ventures and members thereof next to “Name of Firm that Performed the Work” on the pre-printed form and checked the box marked “Prime Contractor.” AR 2882, 2890, 2898, 2906. CCS KG then checked the boxes marked “Subsidiary” and “Parent Company” under the following subheading: “If the firm who performed this project differs from the Offeror submitting a proposal under this solicitation, identify the relationship to the Offeror below . . . .”17 Id. CCS KG then detailed King & George’s membership in each of the named entities and specified its prominent role in project work under the amended subheading: “If this project was performed by Offeror key personnel, identify the name of the individual, name of firm they worked for, and describe their involvement on this project . . . .” Id. Rating these projects, Navy evaluators documented which legal entity performed the work on each project and identified the relationship between the 16 Although Chugach received a higher adjectival rating for Key Personnel (Factor 3) and three more technical factor strengths than CCS KG, both proposals netted the same overall technical rating. 17 The BOSC Corporate Experience (Factor 1) pre-printed form did not include a box for any type of joint venture. 7 performing entity and CCS KG. Evaluating the first submitted project, for example, Navy evaluators noted: “Project was performed by: KJS MP Joint Venture, LLC (a Mentor-Protégé JV between Member King [&] George, Protégé and J&J Worldwide Services, Mentor),” further finding that King & George “performed the work as the prime contractor.” AR 3476. Navy evaluators made similar findings regarding the other three submitted projects. See AR 3477–79; accord AR 3480 (“The Offeror is a MPJV. Of the four (4) relevant projects, all were performed by the JV Mentor: King [&] George LLC.”).18 In assigning CCS KG an outstanding rating for Corporate Experience (Factor 1), the SSEB credited the MPJV with demonstrating corporate “experience without relying on corporate affiliates (e.g., subsidiaries, sister subsidiaries, sister companies, and parent companies).” AR 3481. For Past Performance (Factor 2), the SSEB considered the same four projects identified by CCS KG under Corporate Experience (Factor 1) and, based on “[t]he submitted past performance evaluations,” assigned a rating of substantial confidence. AR 3494. Notably absent from the SSEB’s assessment, however, is any mention of King & George’s performance of a recent predecessor janitorial services contract at Naval Base Coronado for which King & George received a marginal rating for quality. The history of that contract and the details of King & George’s performance thereunder are murky. It is unclear, for instance, when and why King & George’s performance under the contract ended. The Court was unable to verify Chugach’s claim that King & George’s poor performance prompted the government to prematurely terminate the contract and re-award essentially the same contract to Chugach. That said, a public database indicates both that the King & George contract ended without the government exercising all available options and that Chugach began performing a similar contract at the same location the next day.19 At oral argument, counsel for CCS KG declined to endorse Chugach’s characterization of events and pointed out that the same public database indicates that the government made some payments to King & George under the contract as recently as April 2026, long after the contract’s apparent end date and alleged re-award to Chugach.20 Government counsel declined to weigh in on the matter. Despite this confusion, one thing is clear: King & George received a marginal rating for quality on the predecessor Naval Base Coronado janitorial services contract. 18 For clarity, the referenced “Offeror” denotes the MPJV comprised of mentor King & George and protégé Cascade. 19 Compare Contract Summary for Contract No. N6247321F5388, USASPENDING.GOV, available at https://perma.cc/C2JV-PLGC (listing end date of March 31, 2024, for King & George’s janitorial services contract), with Contract Summary for Contract No. N6247324C1613, USASPENDING.GOV, available at https://perma.cc/72GQ-GAFK (listing start date of Apr. 1, 2024, for Chugach’s janitorial services contract). 20 See Contract Summary for Contract No. N6247321F5388, supra note 19 (showing a “funding . . . action” of $19,078 for King & George’s contract on April 9, 2026; indicating funding was for “O[ption] Y[ear] 1”). 8  CCS KG did not submit the janitorial services contract as one of its Corporate Experience (Factor 1) projects and did not submit the corresponding CPARS under Past Performance (Factor 2). The four-year janitorial services contract valued at nearly $22.3 million yielded an annual value of roughly $5.6 million. Because (1) the annual value did not meet the solicitation’s $10 million threshold and (2) the scope of work was limited to just one applicable service area (custodial services) rather than the BOSC solicitation’s minimum of two, this contract did not meet the definition of “relevant project” included in Corporate Experience (Factor 1). AR 256–57.21 Of note, the assessing official who signed the CPARS for Kiing & George’s janitorial services contract on October 17, 2023, was one of three SSEB members for the BOSC procurement at issue. Compare AR 6473 (CPARS), with AR 3470 (SSEB Report). Justifying the marginal rating, the assessing official explained: Clients continue to . . . identify[] the lack in custodial services. Services are not performed within the contract[] . . . Schedule (daily services, weekly service, monthly and annual services). Custodians are not completing the services per the contract[’]s Performance standards. The Contractor management team has identified the custodians who have not provided services to the contract and have been working with the union to replace the custodians or implement corrective actions to ensure the custodians improve performance. The Government has recognized the Contractor[’]s willingness to ensure performance is met by their management approach and scheduling controls[,] which have been implemented, however, performance has improved since the base year of the contract[,] and less negative evaluations . . . have been submitted. The Contractor[] is provided a rating of Marginal in this field as there is still room for improvement. 21 In post-award litigation before the GAO, the Navy insisted that it did not rely solely on information submitted by the offerors and had, in fact, conducted a search for additional CPARS evaluations. More specifically, the SSA declared: I went to the CPARS database to pull CPARS history for all offerors and their mentor partners, as applicable, using the criteria of: assessments dating back 5 years before the solicitation issuance date, Business Sector: Facilities Services, and NAICS: 561210; the results of this search yielded no history of derogatory (less than satisfactory) past performance. I went to the Government’s own ieFacman contracts database[] and pulled a list of NAVFAC Base Operations Support Contract by Purpose: BOS – Base Operating Support. I reviewed the list of Base Operations Support Contracts for all offerors, affiliates, mentor partners, and mentor partners performing in other joint ventures. AR 6488–89. The due diligence performed, according to the Navy, did not unearth the CPARS for the predecessor janitorial services contract; nor could it have since the search was limited to CPARS under NAICS code 561210 and contracts with a listed purpose of “BOS – Base Operating Support.” AR 6489. The janitorial services contract, by contrast, lists an NAICS code of 561720. AR 6469. 9 AR 6471.22 Yet the assessing official included the following recommendation at the end of the CPARS: “Given what I know today about the contractor’s ability to perform in accordance with this contract or order’s most significant requirements, I would recommend them for similar requirements in the future.” AR 6473 (bold reflecting the fill-in-the-blank entry on the preprinted form). Chugach, in turn, submitted three projects for the Corporate Experience (Factor 1) component of its proposal: two performed by Wolf Creek (Chugach’s mentor partner) and a third performed by Defense Base Services, Inc. (a sister company of Chugach). As noted by the Navy evaluators, “[Chugach] provided the one-page narrative and organization chart required when affiliate companies are used to demonstrate experience.” AR 3484. Finding all projects submitted by Chugach recent and relevant, the Navy assigned Chugach an outstanding rating for Corporate Experience (Factor 1). AR 3482. Addressing Past Performance (Factor 2), the SSEB considered only two of the three projects Chugach submitted under Corporate Experience (Factor 1). The Navy excluded the project performed by Defense Base Services, Inc., citing Chugach’s “fail[ure] to submit a correct CPARS report for the project.” AR 3495 (“This CPARS is not associated with the project admitted in Factor 1.” (alteration to capitalization)). Based on the CPARS for the other two projects, the SSEB assigned Chugach a Past Performance (Factor 2) rating of satisfactory confidence, meaning “the Government ha[d] a reasonable expectation that the Offeror w[ould] successfully perform the required effort.” AR 3494–95. After awarding the BOSC to CCS KG on May 20, 2025, the Navy notified Chugach and the other offerors of their non-selection. Following a requested post-award debrief, Chugach filed a bid protest with the GAO, challenging the Navy’s evaluation of proposals under Corporate Experience (Factor 1) and Past Performance (Factor 2) as well as the Navy’s price evaluation and resulting best-value determination. On November 20, 2025, the GAO denied the protest on all grounds. Chugach filed this action on December 8, 2025. DISCUSSION I. Standard of Review When reviewing a federal agency’s procurement decision, this Court employs the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) standard to determine whether the challenged action was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise contrary to law. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(4) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706). “The arbitrary and capricious standard is highly deferential and requires this Court to sustain an agency action evincing rational reasoning and consideration of relevant factors.” Clean Team 22 King & George received satisfactory ratings for schedule, management, and regulatory compliance. 10 Janitorial Serv., Inc. v. United States, 171 Fed. Cl. 1, 8 (2024) (first citing Advanced Data Concepts, Inc. v. United States, 216 F.3d 1054, 1058 (Fed. Cir. 2000); and then citing CHE Consulting, Inc. v. United States, 552 F.3d 1351, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). An agency’s procurement decision is arbitrary and capricious “if either: (1) the procurement official’s decision lacked a rational basis; or (2) the procurement procedure involved a violation of regulation or procedure.” Impresa Construzioni Geom. Domenico Garufi v. United States, 238 F.3d 1324, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (citations omitted); accord Centech Grp., Inc. v. United States, 554 F.3d 1029, 1037 (Fed. Cir. 2009). With respect to challenges brought under the first ground, the Court must “determine whether the contracting agency provided a coherent and reasonable explanation of its exercise of discretion, and the disappointed bidder bears a heavy burden of showing that the award decision had no rational basis.” Centech, 554 F.3d at 1037 (quoting Impresa, 238 F.3d at 1332–33). A decision lacks a rational basis, and is therefore arbitrary and capricious, where the agency “entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem . . . .” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983); see Ala. Aircraft Indus., Inc.-Birmingham v. United States, 586 F.3d 1372, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (applying this standard in the bid-protest context). As for the second ground, “the disappointed bidder must show a clear and prejudicial violation of applicable statutes or regulations.” Centech, 554 F.3d at 1037 (quoting Impresa, 238 F.3d at 1333). Procurement officials “are given broad discretion” in their procurement duties; when a procurement officer makes a reasonable decision within the scope of that discretion, “a court may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency.” DynCorp Int’l, LLC v. United States, 10 F.4th 1300, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (quoting R & W Flammann GmbH v. United States, 339 F.3d 1320, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). While the scope of review under this standard is narrow and a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency, the agency must nonetheless “examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action including a ‘rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.’” State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43 (quoting Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)). The “evaluation of past performance is a matter within the discretion of the contracting agency[,] and . . . the ‘agency’s reasonable interpretation of the facts is entitled to considerable deference.’” Taahut v. United States, 849 F. App’x 260, 266 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (quoting Glenn Def. Marine (ASIA), PTE Ltd. v. United States, 720 F.3d 901, 910 (Fed. Cir. 2013)); accord CW Gov’t Travel, Inc. v. United States, 154 Fed. Cl. 721, 748 (2021) (collecting cases). Similarly, “technical ratings . . . involve discretionary determinations of procurement officials that a court will not second guess.” Allicent Tech., LLC v. United States, 166 Fed. Cl. 77, 118 (2023) (quoting E.W. Bliss Co. v. United States, 77 F.3d 445, 449 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). Therefore, a protester “bears a heavy burden” to overcome the presumption of regularity that courts afford to an agency decision. Impresa, 238 F.3d at 1338. In a best-value tradeoff analysis, an agency’s exercise of discretion is entitled to additional 11 deference, and “the agency’s consideration” of the relative merits of competing proposals will not be disturbed absent a showing that the tradeoff analysis was irrational or arbitrary. AM Gen., LLC v. United States, 115 Fed. Cl. 653, 700 (2014). The “focal point” for judicial review of a procurement decision is “the administrative record already in existence” at the time the agency acted. Axiom Res. Mgmt., Inc. v. United States, 564 F.3d 1374, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973) (per curiam)). This principle places a direct documentation obligation on procuring agencies: “Where an agency fails to document or retain evaluation materials, it bears the risk that there may not be adequate supporting rationale in the record for [the Court] to conclude that the agency had a reasonable basis for its evaluation conclusions.” Mgmt. & Training Corp. v. United States, 161 Fed. Cl. 578, 597 (2022) (additional citations omitted) (quoting Trident Vantage Sys., LLC, B-415944 et al., 2018 CPD ¶ 166 (Comp. Gen. May 1, 2018)). Post hoc rationalizations advanced by an agency—whether in litigation briefs, declarations, or debriefing materials—cannot provide the reasoned explanation the agency was required to provide at the time of the challenged decision. See DynCorp Int’l, 10 F.4th at 1316 (“[A]n agency cannot rely on a new rationale for an old decision.”); IAP Worldwide Servs., Inc. v. United States, 159 Fed. Cl. 265, 286 (2022) (“[T]he Court will not put words in an agency’s mouth or invent supporting rationales the agency has not itself articulated in the administrative record; post hoc explanations for agency decisions ordinarily will be rejected.”); e.g., Sys. Stud. & Simulation, Inc. v. United States, 152 Fed. Cl. 20, 32 (2020) (declining to credit SSA declaration submitted during litigation as a “post hoc rationalization created in the heat of litigation” (cleaned up)), aff’d, 22 F.4th 994 (Fed. Cir. 2021). A post hoc rationale is “any rationale that departs from the rationale provided at the time the procuring agency made its decision.” Sys. Stud., 152 Fed. Cl. at 32 (quoting Raytheon Co. v. United States, 121 Fed. Cl. 135, 158 (2015), aff’d, 809 F.3d 590 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). That said, where the agency’s “path may reasonably be discerned” from the contemporaneous record—even if the documented reasoning is not of “ideal clarity”— the Court will sustain the decision. Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 285–86 (1974) (first citing SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947); and then citing Colo. Interstate Gas Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 324 U.S. 581, 595 (1945)). Lastly, to prevail in a bid protest, a protester must do more than identify some error in the procurement process. The identified error must be significant and prejudicial. WellPoint Mil. Care Corp. v. United States, 953 F.3d 1373, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (quoting Alfa Laval Separation, Inc. v. United States, 175 F.3d 1365, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1999)); see also 5 U.S.C. § 706 (“[D]ue account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error.”). To establish prejudice, the protester must demonstrate that “there was a ‘substantial chance’ it would have received the contract award but for the [agency’s] errors.” Bannum, Inc. v. United States, 404 F.3d 1346, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2005). This test is more lenient than showing actual causation, but the protestor must do more than show a “mere possibility” that, but for the agency errors, it “would 12 have received the contract.” Data Gen. Corp. v. Johnson, 78 F.3d 1556, 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1996); accord AM Gen., LLC, 115 Fed. Cl. at 702. II. Corporate Experience A. Prime Contractor Experience Chugach challenges the Navy’s evaluation of CCS KG’s Corporate Experience (Factor 1). The solicitation required offerors to submit between two and four reference projects demonstrating their “experience as a prime contractor.” AR 256. The parties agree that, for an entity competing as a joint venture, the prime contractor experience of one member of the joint venture (e.g., King & George) can be credited as prime contractor experience of the joint venture (e.g., CCS KG). Chugach charges, however, that CCS KG failed to submit any qualifying reference projects. In support, Chugach relies on the fact that the four reference contracts submitted by CCS KG were awarded to neither King & George nor Cascade; the first two were awarded to KJS MP Joint Venture, LLC, the third to KGJJ Engineering Solutions, LLC, and the fourth to AKG Services, LLC. Acknowledging that King & George was a member of each awardee,23 Chugach maintains that the sole “prime contractor” on each contract was the joint venture that held the contract—not the joint venture’s members. On this premise, Chugach argues it was impermissible for the Navy to credit King & George and, in turn, CCS KG, with “prime contractor” experience for the reference contracts. This argument, if correct, would disqualify CCS KG for failure to submit any qualifying reference projects. But it relies on a narrow, literal interpretation of “prime contractor” that is unsupported by the solicitation. When interpretating terms in a solicitation, the Court “must consider the [s]olicitation as a whole and interpret ‘it in a manner that harmonizes and gives reasonable meaning to all of its provisions.’” Safeguard Base Operations, LLC v. United States, 989 F.3d 1326, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (quoting Banknote Corp. of Am. v. Unite