Fyi-For Your Information, Inc. v. United States

In the United States Court of Federal Claims FYI-FOR YOUR INFORMATION, INC., Plaintiff, No. 26-cv-0032 v. Filed Under Seal: August 24, THE UNITED STATES, 2026 Defendant, Publication: September 10, 2026 1 and C EVANS CONSULTING LLC, Intervenor-Defendant. Craig A. Holman of Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP, Washington, D.C., argued for Plaintiff. With him on the briefs were Roee Talmor and Dustin Vesey of Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP, Washington, D.C. Blake W. Cowman of the United States Department of Justice, Civil Division, Washington, D.C., argued for Defendant. With him on the briefs were Douglas K. Mickle, Patricia M. McCarthy, and Brett A. Shumate of the United States Department of Justice, Civil Division, Washington, D.C., and James E. Hicks of the Drug Enforcement Administration. Ryan C. Bradel of Ward & Berry, PLLC, Washington, D.C., argued for Intervenor-Defendant. With him on the briefs were Nicholas L. Perry, P. Tyson Marx, and Steffanie Lee of Ward & Berry, PLLC, Washington, D.C. 1 This Memorandum and Order was filed under seal on August 24, 2026, in accordance with the Protective Order entered in this case. See ECF No. 7. On September 8, 2026, the parties filed a Final Consensus Proposed Redacted Version proposing redactions to the Memorandum and Order. The sealed and public versions of this Memorandum and Order are identical, except for redactions, this footnote, and the addition of the publication date.  MEMORANDUM AND ORDER This post-award bid protest involves the delayed receipt of a quoter’s email, a raft of alleged evaluation errors, and an agency best value tradeoff evaluation justifying payment of a 0.78% higher price for a higher-rated proposal. In June 2025, Plaintiff FYI-For Your Information, Inc. (Plaintiff or FYI) submitted a quote for a contract to provide Human Capital Support Services for the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), an agency within the United States Department of Justice (DOJ). FYI, the incumbent contractor for this service, and Intervenor-Defendant C Evans Consulting LLC (Intervenor or CEC) each received the highest adjectival ratings available in DEA’s evaluation. FYI proposed a slightly lower price than CEC—0.78% lower. However, the DEA determined that CEC’s quote provided benefits above and beyond what the adjectival ratings reflected, and that those benefits outweighed CEC’s slightly higher price. Accordingly, the DEA awarded CEC the contract under this Subpart 8.4 procurement. FYI, in turn, lodged this protest, challenging the award’s rationality and compliance with procurement law. FYI first argues that a delay in receipt caused by DEA’s email server should have disqualified CEC’s quotation as late. In response to a request from the Contracting Officer (CO), CEC clarified an obvious miscalculation in its quotation. To clarify and correct this miscalculation, CEC modified several tables in its quotation. The CO directed CEC to “[p]lease reply to this email confirming your original submission or by submitting a corrected copy not later than 1:30PM, ET, today, June 4, 2025, in order for your quote to be considered.” Tab 14c, Administrative Record (AR) 704. CEC’s president hit the send button on its email containing the modification at 1:01 p.m. on June 4, 2025. However, due to an email security software hold, CEC’s email did not arrive in the CO’s inbox until 1:48 p.m. that day. 2  FYI argues that DEA could not consider CEC’s modifications because the email arrived in the DEA CO’s inbox after the deadline. The Court agrees. Applicable law is clear and direct here. As explained further below, the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) classifies CEC’s reply to DEA as a modification since CEC changed its quotation to correct a mistake. The “late-is-late rule,” which applies to this procurement, mandates a strict lateness rule for the receipt of “[a]ny offer, modification, revision, or withdrawal of an offer.” FAR 52.212-1(f)(2)(i). The CO received CEC’s email, containing the modified quotation, after the 1:30 p.m. deadline. While exceptions to the “late-is-late rule” exist, at oral argument Defendant disavowed the government control exception, which potentially could have permitted DEA to consider CEC’s modified quotation. With Defendant’s unequivocal disavowal, however, no exception is available here; the late-is-late rule imposes a bright line rule, and FYI demonstrates success on the merits based on a violation of the rule. Simply put, under the facts in this record, DEA was not permitted to consider CEC’s modified quotation in making its award decision. Although FYI succeeds on the merits based on DEA’s violation of the late-is-late rule, for completeness the Court evaluates, and rejects, FYI’s other challenges to DEA’s evaluation. First, FYI challenges DEA’s assessment of each of the three non-price factors in the evaluation, through which DEA determined that CEC offered a superior proposal. FYI disagrees with DEA about which quote offered a superior technical solution; however, Congress has assigned DEA, not this Court, the power to decide what presents the most value to the Government. DEA’s Technical Evaluation Panel (TEP) and CO each analyzed the quotes in detail and explained why CEC provided a better technical solution across the non-price factors. As this Court will not disturb a rational and reasonably explained evaluation, FYI’s arguments challenging the evaluation of each 3 factor fail. This Court’s role is to ensure that the agency has rationally made and explained its decision in accordance with procurement law, and DEA did so here. Next, FYI challenges DEA’s best value tradeoff as irrational. FYI and CEC received the same adjectival scores, but FYI’s TEP and CO each determined that CEC presented a technically superior quote. FYI’s quoted price was 0.78% less than CEC’s quoted price. The CO determined that the technical advantages justified the higher price. The Court finds that DEA rationally, albeit briefly, explained that CEC’s technical advantages justified its slightly higher price. An agency’s discretion reaches its zenith in the best value determination, and the Court declines to disturb DEA’s rationally justified determination. Finally, injunctive relief is appropriate in this situation, where DEA contravened procurement law, FYI faces irreparable harm if the violation is not corrected, and the public interest favors proper compliance with procurement law. Accordingly, the Court enjoins the DEA from proceeding with its award to CEC under the present Request for Quotation to the extent the award is based on the unlawful consideration of CEC’s modified quotation. The DEA shall retain discretion to determine how it will otherwise proceed, if at all, with its procurement of Human Capital Support Services. For the reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on the Administrative Record (ECF No. 24). The Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Judgment on the Administrative Record (ECF No. 30) and GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Intervenor-Defendant CEC’s Cross-Motion for Judgment on the Administrative Record (ECF No. 28). 4  BACKGROUND I. The Request for Quotation DEA’s Human Resource Division is responsible for “providing human capital strategies and tools for recruiting, hiring, developing, retaining, and transitioning a highly skilled and high- performing workforce to support mission accomplishments.” Tab 11, Administrative Record (AR) 251. In support of that mission, DEA hires contractors to provide “Human Resources (HR) Operational Activities.” Id. On May 2, 2025, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) issued a Request for Quotation (RFQ) seeking “Human Capital Support Services.” 2 Tab 10, AR 99, Tab 11, AR 222. DEA subsequently issued three amendments to the RFQ. See AR Tabs 11–13. The RFQ aimed to award a single Time and Materials (T&M)/Labor Hour (LH) blanket purchase agreement under the streamlined acquisition procedures of FAR Subpart 8.4. Tab 11, AR 285. The procurement was designated as a set-aside for a Women-Owned Small Business with a General Services Administration (GSA) Federal Supply Schedule (FSS) contract. Tab 11, AR 245. Generally, the contractor’s responsibilities “include position classification, recruitment, internal placement, employee relations, benefits and services, collecting and processing data, and record keeping.” Tab 11, AR 251. The RFQ predicted that a contractor would need 10-35 employees across various labor categories to perform under the contract. Tab 11, AR 266. The RFQ anticipated award of a one-year contract with a one-year option period, so that performance “shall not exceed a maximum of twenty-four (24) consecutive months from date of award.” Tab 11, AR 240. The RFQ also incorporated FAR 52.212-1. Tab 11, AR 276, 317. 2 References to the “RFQ” are to the RFQ as originally published, see Tab 10, AR 99–221, and RFQ Amendment 1, see Tab 11, AR 222–347. Some documents in the Administrative Record also refer to the RFQ as the “Solicitation” or “solicitation.” See, e.g., Tab 18d, AR 1146. 5  The RFQ required quoters to submit two volumes in their quote: Volume I was the “Technical Quote,” and Volume II was the “Business Quote.” Tab 11, AR 277. Volume I addressed the requirements of the Statement of Work (SOW) and required each quoter to explain its “capabilities and the means to be used to satisfy the requirements.” Id. Specifically, Volume I covered three factors: Factor 1, Technical Capability (Factor 1); Factor 2, Transition Phase- in/Transition Phase-out (Factor 2); Factor 3, Past Performance (Factor 3). Tab 11, AR 278. For Factor 1, each quoter was required to “demonstrate its technical capability to accomplish or satisfy each of the tasks in the SOW.” Id. DEA instructed that each Factor 1 description must be “specific, detailed, and complete enough to clearly and fully demonstrate an understanding of the requirement.” Id. Among other requirements, each offeror had to “demonstrate the ability to provide high-volume recruitment and onboarding support under tight deadlines.” Id. For Factor 2, each offeror would “demonstrate its ability to implement a transition plan without impacting the operations of the program during the phase-in and phase-out periods during the contract performance.” Id. Factor 2 included two subfactors: Transition Phase-in and Transition Phase-out. Tab 11, AR 278–79. For Transition Phase-in, requirements included “Monitoring and Reporting of Transition Progress” at the start of the quoter’s performance. Tab 11, AR 279. For Transition Phase-out, the RFQ required quoters to present a plan for the transition-out period “in the event that the Quoter is not selected for a follow-on award.” Tab 11, AR 279. Finally, Factor 3 directed quoters to “provide examples of real work with actual results of the prime contractor and major subcontractor(s) to perform the requirements as described in the solicitation.” Tab 11, AR 279. Specifically, each quoter was directed to “provide a list of up to three (3) successful contracts with past performance history from the past three (3) years that are 6 representative of the Quoter’s capability to provide services with similar scope, magnitude, and complexity to that stated in the SOW.” Id. The RFQ stated that DEA could, but was not bound to, consider past performance information from a variety of sources: The Government will supplement the information provided by the Quoter with information the Government obtains through reference checks, its own knowledge/experience, and/or from other sources. These sources may include, but not necessarily be limited to, other Government contracting offices and Performance Assessment Reporting System (CPARS), FAPIIS, etc. Past performance will be a subjective assessment based upon all relevant facts and circumstances including contract past performance for smaller requirements. Tab 11, AR 280. Volume II, the Business Quote, included a price quote. Tab 11, AR 280. “Price quote shall include a price for each and every [Contract Line Item Number (CLIN)], on an all or none basis, multiplied by the estimated quantity per CLIN and sum of all CLINs per year in accordance with the Schedule of Supplies.” Id. The RFQ specified the pricing information that DEA would use to assess each bid: “[t]he Quoter shall propose a price per contract line item number (CLIN) and fill in the unit prices.” Id. Attached to the RFQ was a Schedule of Supplies/Services, which listed the 20 CLINs that each quote must include. Tab 11, AR 246–47. Each CLIN corresponded to a labor category within the RFQ; quotes had to provide a unit price (dollars per hour worked) for each labor category. Id. Notable to the present case, the RFQ specified the quantity (number of hours) that the quote had to include. See id. For example, for CLIN 0005, Classification Specialist, the RFQ mandated that quotes would propose 7,680 hours as the quantity, then each quoter had to fill in the unit price and the total amount, which would equal 7,680 hours multiplied by the contractor-supplied unit price. See Tab 11, AR 246. 7  DEA’s needs. Based on C. Evans explicitly detailed approach and lower labor costs, C. Evans, LLC offers the government value above and beyond. Tab 24, AR 1178. The CO offered a similarly detailed analysis of FYI’s quote: The TEP thoroughly reviewed and rated the technical quote submitted by FYI. The TEP designated FYI with a rating of High Confidence, indicating that little to no government intervention is anticipated for successful performance of the work. Consequently, FYI was determined to be Technically Acceptable. The TEP found that FYI has demonstrated proficiency performing core human capital support services. Their technical approach addressed all the aspects of the SOW, addressing each task and deliverable. FYI demonstrated experience in providing human resource staffing of similar size, scope, and complexity, including other large contracts. The evaluators rated the overall proposal as High, meeting the minimum requirement of the RFQ, noting that as the incumbent, there is no requirement for a transition period. Tab 24, AR 1180. After these individualized assessments of each quoter’s technical evaluation and a comparison of line-item prices offered by each quoter, the CO wrote one paragraph directly referencing the best value tradeoff: “[t]he High Confidence rating of C. [Evans] Consulting, LLC’s quote across all non-price factors along with their exceeding requirements offsets the higher price of their quote when compared to lower priced proposals which received equal or lower confidence level ratings across the non-price factors.” Tab 24, AR 1189. On July 17, 2025, DEA notified FYI that it had awarded CEC the contract. Tab 23a, AR 1168–69. VI. GAO Protest On July 28, 2025, FYI filed a post-award protest before the Government Accountability Office (GAO). Tab 29, AR 1286. The post-award protest challenged DEA’s technical evaluation of the three factors and the resulting best value tradeoff determination. Tab 29, AR 1287–88. On September 4, 2025, FYI filed a supplemental GAO protest which raised new challenges to DEA’s award. Tab 41, AR 2387. As the record available to FYI was more limited before the GAO, FYI’s 14 current late-is-late rule argument was not pertinent to the GAO proceeding. On December 12, 2025, GAO denied FYI’s protest. Tab 48, AR 2550–61. PROCEDURAL HISTORY On January 9, 2026, Plaintiff filed its Complaint, and on January 21, 2026, the Court issued a Scheduling Order that included a briefing schedule and an oral argument date. ECF Nos. 1 (Complaint); 20 (Scheduling Order). Defendant submitted the AR on February 9, 2026, consistent with the Scheduling Order. Scheduling Order at 1; ECF No. 22. On February 23, 2026, Plaintiff filed its Motion for Judgment on the Administrative Record and accompanying Memorandum of Law. ECF Nos. 24, 24-1 (Pl. MJAR). Plaintiff also filed an Amended Complaint on the same day as its MJAR. ECF No. 23 (Amended Complaint). Plaintiff argued that the AR revealed that CEC had submitted its June 4 email late and accordingly CEC should have been disqualified. Pl. MJAR at 175 (“The DEA’s failure to exclude CEC or even to consider CEC’s noncompliance prejudiced FYI, the rightful awardee.”). On March 7, 2026, Defendant filed a Motion for Leave to Correct and Supplement the Administrative Record, which Plaintiff opposed. ECF No. 27 at 1. On March 9, 2026, Defendant filed its Cross-Motion for Judgment on the Administrative Record and Response to Plaintiff’s MJAR. ECF No. 30 (Def. MJAR). On the same day, CEC filed its own Cross-Motion for Judgment on the Administrative Record and Response to Plaintiff’s MJAR. ECF No. 28 (CEC MJAR) (collectively, with Pl. MJAR and Def. MJAR, the MJARs). On March 10, 2026, the Court stayed further briefing on the MJARs to brief and resolve Defendant’s Motion for Leave to Correct and Supplement the Administrative Record. ECF No. 5 Citations throughout this Memorandum and Order correspond to the ECF-assigned page numbers, which do not always correspond to the pagination within the document. 15 32 at 3 (“The Court will consider the arguments concerning the supplementation of the record prior to ruling upon the Motions for Judgment on the Administrative Record, as Defendant and Intervenor-Defendant seek to rely upon documents subject to the Motion to Supplement.”). On March 12, 2026, Defendant filed a Corrected Motion for Leave to Correct and Supplement the Administrative Record. ECF No. 34 (Corrected Motion to Supplement). On March 19, 2026, Plaintiff filed its opposition to the Corrected Motion to Supplement. ECF No. 36. On March 25, 2026, Defendant and CEC submitted their respective Replies in support of the Corrected Motion to Supplement. ECF Nos. 40, 41. On March 24, 2026, Defendant filed a Motion for Voluntary Remand. ECF No. 39. On April 1, 2026, Plaintiff filed a Response in opposition to the Motion for Voluntary Remand, and on April 6, 2026, Defendant filed a Reply in support of the Motion for Voluntary Remand. ECF Nos. 42, 44. CEC did not file a brief related to Defendant’s Motion for Voluntary Remand. On May 19, 2026, the Court conducted oral argument on Defendant’s Corrected Motion for Leave to Correct and Supplement the Administrative Record and its Motion for Voluntary Remand. See Minute Entry, dated May 19, 2026. On May 20, 2026, the Court denied Defendant’s Motion for Voluntary Remand and granted in part and denied in part its Motion for Leave to Correct and Supplement the Administrative Record. See Minute Entry, dated May 20, 2026; ECF No. 47 at 1. The Court ordered the parties to propose a “schedule for any proposed Consent Motion to Supplement the Administrative Record with information about control over the Proofpoint email server at issue in this action.” Id. at 2. On May 27, 2026, the parties confirmed in a Joint Status Report that the DEA’s voluntary partial stay of the underlying award would extend “through August 24, 2026.” ECF No. 49 at 2. 16 The parties also proposed a schedule for further briefing, which the Court adopted. Id. at 1–2; ECF No. 50 at 1. On June 16, 2026, the Court granted Defendant’s Consent Motion for Leave to Supplement the Administrative Record, with information concerning control over the Proofpoint email server at issue in this action. ECF No. 52 (Consent Motion); Minute Order, dated June 16, 2026. On June 18, 2026, Defendant submitted the corrected AR. ECF No. 55. On June 26, 2026, Plaintiff filed its Reply in support of its MJAR and Response to Defendant and CEC’s MJARs. ECF No. 60 (Pl. Reply). On July 8, 2026, Defendant and CEC filed their Replies in support of their respective MJARs. ECF Nos. 61 (CEC Reply), 64 (Def. Reply). On August 4, 2026, the Court held oral argument on the parties’ MJARs. See Minute Entry, dated Aug. 4, 2026. The MJARs are now fully briefed and ripe for review. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS The Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1), as amended by the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1996, affords this Court with jurisdiction over bid protests. The Court analyzes the procurement under the Administrative Procedure Act’s (APA) standards to determine whether the Agency “acted without rational basis or contrary to law when evaluating the bids and awarding the contract.” Bannum, Inc. v. United States, 404 F.3d 1346, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2005); 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(4); see Oak Grove Techs., LLC v. United States, 116 F.4th 1364, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2024). The Court reviews the procurement under the standards set forth in the APA. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(4) (“In any action under this subsection, the courts shall review the agency’s decision pursuant to the standards set forth in section 706 of title 5.”); Harmonia Holdings Grp., LLC v. United States, 20 F.4th 759, 766 (Fed. Cir. 2021). The APA requires a reviewing court to 17 determine whether an agency’s action was “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); see Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 284 (1974). Thus, to prevail in a post-award bid protest, a plaintiff must demonstrate that “(1) ‘the procurement official’s decision lacked a rational basis’ or (2) ‘the procurement procedure involved a violation of regulation or procedure.’” DynCorp Int’l v. United States, 10 F.4th 1300, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (DynCorp I) (quoting WellPoint Mil. Care Corp. v. United States, 953 F.3d 1373, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2020)). When a bidder alleges that the procurement official’s decision lacked a rational basis, the Court reviews “whether the contracting agency provided a coherent and reasonable explanation of its exercise of discretion.” Dell Fed. Sys., L.P. v. United States, 906 F.3d 982, 992 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Banknote Corp. of Am., Inc. v. United States, 365 F.3d 1345, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). As the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) has explained, “the disappointed bidder bears a heavy burden of showing that the award decision had no rational basis.” Centech Grp., Inc. v. United States, 554 F.3d 1029, 1037 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting Impresa Construzioni Geom. Domenico Garufi v. United States, 238 F.3d 1324, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2001)); see also Impresa, 238 F.3d at 1333 (noting a similarly high burden for claims of a violation of regulation or procedure, which must involve “a clear . . . violation of applicable statutes or regulations” (quoting Kentron Hawaii, Ltd v. Warner, 480 F.2d 1166, 1169 (D.C. Cir. 1973))). Consistent with this heavy burden, agency decisions are “entitled to a presumption of regularity.” Impresa, 238 F.3d at 1338 (citing Bowen v. Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 476 U.S. 610, 626–27 (1986)). The Court’s “role in reviewing procurement decisions . . . is not to evaluate the offerors’ proposals anew or to substitute [its] judgment for that of the agency.” Harmonia Holdings Grp., LLC v. United States, 999 F.3d 1397, 1408 (Fed. Cir. 2021); see also Honeywell, Inc. v. United States, 18 870 F.2d 644, 648 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“If the court finds a reasonable basis for the agency’s action, the court should stay its hand even though it might, as an original proposition, have reached a different conclusion as to the proper administration and application of the procurement regulations.”) (quoting M. Steinthal & Co. v. Seamans, 455 F.2d 1289, 1301 (D.C. Cir. 1971)). Rather, courts “will uphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if the agency’s path may reasonably be discerned.” Bowman Transp., 419 U.S. at 286. Indeed, “[a]lthough the inquiry under the APA ‘is to be searching and careful, . . . [t]he court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.’” Insight Pub. Sector, Inc. v. United States, 161 Fed. Cl. 760, 786 (2022) (quoting Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416–20 (1971)). The decision lacks a rational basis when the agency “entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or . . . is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.” Ala. Aircraft Indus., Inc.-Birmingham v. United States, 586 F.3d 1372, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)). When a disappointed bidder alleges a violation of a regulation or procedure, the Court reviews whether there was “a clear and prejudicial violation of applicable statutes or regulations.” Impresa, 238 F.3d at 1333 (quoting Kentron, 480 F.2d at 1169.). Where the Court finds that an agency decision lacked a rational basis, the Court must also evaluate the factual question of prejudice. Sys. Stud. & Simulation, Inc. v. United States, 22 F.4th 994, 998 (Fed. Cir. 2021); WellPoint Mil. Care, 953 F.3d at 1377. A protestor establishes prejudice by showing “that there was a ‘substantial chance’ it would have received the contract award but for” that error. Sys. Stud. & Simulation, 22 F.4th at 998 (quoting Bannum, 404 F.3d at 1353). A protestor cannot prevail if it does not establish prejudice. DynCorp I, 10 F.4th at 1308 (“[T]o 19 prevail in a bid protest, a protestor must show a significant, prejudicial error in the procurement process.” (quoting WellPoint Mil. Car, 953 F.3d at 1377)); DevTech Sys., Inc. v. United States, 176 Fed. Cl. 297, 313 (2025). In the Court of Federal Claims, bid protests are adjudicated under Rule 52.1(c), which provides an expedited trial on a “paper record, allowing fact-finding by the trial court.” Bannum, 404 F.3d at 1356 (referencing Rule 56.1, which was replaced by Rule 52.1(c)); see Rule 52.1(c). Unlike at summary judgment, genuine disputes of material fact do not preclude a court from granting a motion for judgment on the administrative record. Bannum, 404 F.3d at 1357. This Court is also empowered to provide any relief, including declaratory or injunctive relief, that it deems proper. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(2); Oak Grove, 116 F.4th at 1375. “[T]he Court of Federal Claims has broad equitable powers to fashion an appropriate remedy” in bid protest cases. Turner Constr. Co. v. United States, 645 F.3d 1377, 1388 (Fed. Cir. 2011). To that end, this Court may remand the procurement decision back to an agency for further factual findings or reconsideration according to the Court’s directions. See Rule 52.2; 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(2) (“In any case within its jurisdiction, the [Court of Federal Claims] shall have the power to remand appropriate matters to any administrative or executive body or official with such direction as it may deem proper and just.”); see GovCIO, LLC v. United States, 177 Fed. Cl. 579, 596 (2025). DISCUSSION Plaintiff asserts that it has identified several errors in DEA’s evaluation and subsequent award to CEC that should justify overturning the award. Pl. MJAR at 6–9. Defendant and Intervenor argue, to the contrary, that Plaintiff has not identified any prejudicial errors in the evaluation and award, so that the Court should not disturb the award to CEC. Def. MJAR at 9; CEC MJAR at 9. 20  First, Plaintiff raises several arguments concerning CEC’s June 4 clarifications email. Pl. MJAR at 6–7. FYI contends that (i) the DEA could not have sought clarifications at all with CEC to correct the error in CEC’s bid, and (ii) it was improper for the DEA to seek clarifications from CEC but not FYI. Id. at 7. FYI additionally argues that the late-is-late rule applied a strict timeliness requirement to the CO’s receipt of a modified bid, and that CEC’s email’s lengthy journey through DOJ’s security software made the email late. Id. at 6–7. A violation of the late- is-late rule would lead to the disqualification of CEC’s bid, Plaintiff asserts. Id. Defendant and CEC contend, and the Court agrees, that DEA did not violate any fairness rules when it solicited the clarification. Def. MJAR at 19–27; CEC MJAR at 40–54. However, FYI is correct that the late-is-late rule squarely applied to CEC’s June 4 email because the correction to CEC’s quote contained within the email qualified as a modification under the FAR. Pl. MJAR at 7. As explained further below, DEA’s consideration of CEC’s June 4 email violated the late-is-late rule, and this violation constitutes prejudicial error. Second, FYI argues that it has identified three errors in DEA’s evaluation of non-price factors: one error for each non-price factor that the agency evaluated. Pl. MJAR at 7–9. Although Plaintiff prevails on the merits based on the violation of the late-is-late rule alone, the Court assesses the other issues raised in the MJARs for completeness. Plaintiff disputes the strengths assigned to CEC and the lack of strengths assessed for its own offer. See id. at 25–41. Defendant and CEC argue, and the Court agrees, that DEA’s evaluation of non-price factors was rational and properly documented. Def. MJAR at 27–43; CEC MJAR at 18–36. Third, FYI argues that DEA irrationally determined that CEC’s more expensive proposal offered the best value and that DEA insufficiently explained the tradeoff between price and technical quality that led to the award decision. Pl. MJAR at 40. Defendant and CEC argue, and 21 the Court agrees, that DEA properly explained that, in DEA’s discretion, CEC offered advantages that outweighed the less-than-one-percent price disparity. Def. MJAR at 43–46; CEC MJAR at 36–40. Finally, the Court addresses injunctive relief. As Plaintiff demonstrates success on the merits based on the violation of the late-is-late rule alone, the Court enjoins the DEA from proceeding with its award to CEC under the present Request for Quotation to the extent the award is based on DEA’s unlawful consideration of CEC’s late-received, modified quotation. The DEA retains discretion to determine how it will otherwise proceed, if at all, with its procurement of Human Capital Support Services. I. CEC’s Clarifications Email A. DEA’s Choice to Request Clarifications from CEC but Not FYI FYI asserts that DEA purportedly held discussions with CEC and thus “had to conduct discussions with all offerors.” Pl. MJAR at 25. Defendant counters that the requirement to conduct discussions with all offerors does not apply to this Subpart 8.4 procurement, which is instead governed by a requirement that “DEA treat[] all offerors fairly and impartially.” Def. MJAR at 24. The FAR Part 15 requirement to hold discussions equally with all offerors does not apply to this Subpart 8.4 procurement, and the RFQ does not incorporate FAR 15.306. See Tabs 10, 11. FAR Part 15 requirements (such as the discussions requirements in FAR 15.306(d)) do not apply in Subpart 8.4 procurements unless they are specifically incorporated into the procurement. FAR 8.404(a); see Integrated Fin. & Acct. Sols., LLC v. United States, 161 Fed. Cl. 475, 491 (2022); Unisys Corp. v. United States, 89 Fed. Cl. 126, 140 (2009). Plaintiff does not cite any precedent 22 or section of the RFQ 6 that would require DEA to communicate equally with all quoters. See Pl. MJAR at 22–25. Instead, in a FAR Subpart 8.4 procurement, all communications between the agency and quoters must reflect fairness, as the FAR requires for all procurement activities. Advantaged Sols., Inc. v. United States, 179 Fed. Cl. 801, 814 (2026) (upholding unequal discussions because agency “acted reasonably and fairly”); Unisys, 89 Fed. Cl. at 140 (applying “requirement of fundamental fairness”). Indeed, the FAR requires that “[a]ll contractors and prospective contractors shall be treated fairly and impartially but need not be treated the same.” FAR 1.102-2(c)(3) (emphasis added). FYI complains that if CEC had the chance to correct a minor typographical error in its quote, FYI also deserved a chance to communicate with DEA about “supposed past performance issues with FYI’s incumbent performance.” Pl. MJAR at 25. FYI argues that if it had the chance to hear about past performance concerns, it could have substantively modified its proposal “by providing a copy of the incumbent CPAR the evaluators claimed was missing” or by lowering its quoted price. Id. In Unisys, which also involved a Subpart 8.4 procurement, communications with the eventual awardee were deemed fair because they “simply allowed [the agency] to confirm” aspects of the offeror’s proposal and did not allow an offeror to make material changes to its proposal. Unisys, 89 Fed. Cl. at 141. It was fair that the disappointed offeror did not receive a 6 Plaintiff argues that the incorporation of FAR 52.212-1(g) in the RFQ “imports traditional discussions standards”; however, Plaintiff does not identify any specific language in the provision that would import discussions standards. Pl. MJAR at 22. FAR 52.212-1(g) states that “[t]he Government intends to evaluate offers and award a contract without discussions with offerors,” and that “the Government reserves the right to conduct discussions if later determined by the Contracting Officer to be necessary.” FAR 52.212-1(g). Such language does not invoke the FAR Part 15 discussion requirements or a requirement that discussions be held with all offerors. See Unisys, 89 Fed. Cl. at 139 (finding that RFQ statement that agency “may make award based on initial offers received, without discussion of such offers” did not incorporate FAR Part 15 discussion standards into Subpart 8.4 procurement). 23 chance to substantively amend its proposal because the agency’s “award decision was based on both [offerors’] initial prices and technical proposals.” Id. (emphasis in original). Similarly, here DEA’s clarification simply allowed CEC to correct typographical errors in the quote for mandated labor hours in one CLIN and for one price field where the multiplication was facially incorrect, without making any substantial changes, and FYI had not made equivalent typographical errors that could be corrected without substantively changing its quote. See Tab 14b, AR 367, 548, Tab 14c, AR 704–05. As DEA ultimately made its decision based on the information that CEC and FYI had each originally intended to submit to DEA, the complained of communications with CEC about correcting the typo were not unfair. See Unisys, 89 Fed. Cl. at 141. DEA acted “reasonably and fairly” when it requested CEC correct a minor typographical error but did not provide FYI with a chance to make substantive changes to its proposal. Advantaged Sols., 179 Fed. Cl. at 814. B. Clarifications or Discussions Additionally, even if the equal discussion requirement of FAR 15.306 applied, DEA still would not have violated that requirement. It is evident that DEA engaged in clarifications with CEC, not discussions. An agency that engages in clarifications, unlike discussions, need not engage equally with each offeror. Compare FAR 15.306(a) (containing no requirement that agencies conduct clarifications with all offerors), with FAR 15.306(d)(3) (requiring that discussions be conducted with “each offeror still being considered for award”); see ENGlobal Gov’t Servs., Inc. v. United States, 159 Fed. Cl. 744, 765 (2022) (“[U]nlike discussions, the government is permitted to engage in clarifications with fewer than all offerors.”). Thus, even if required to engage equally in discussions, DEA would not have violated that requirement. FYI contends that DEA engaged in discussions with CEC because DEA “allowed CEC to revise multiple parts of its quote.” Pl. MJAR at 24. Defendant argues, to the contrary, that “the 24 communications at issue here were clarifications, not discussions.” Def. MJAR at 25 (emphasis added). CEC similarly asserts that “the exchange between DEA and CEC concerning CEC’s corrected quotation constituted clarifications, not discussions.” CEC MJAR at 48 (emphasis added). It is well established that “[c]larifications are limited exchanges, between the Government and offerors, that may occur when award without discussions is contemplated.” FAR 15.306(a)(1). In contrast, the FAR also creates a category of exchanges before award called “[d]iscussions,” which “are tailored to each offeror’s proposal, and must be conducted by the contracting officer with each offeror within the competitive range.” FAR 15.306(d)(1). “[T]he term ‘discussions’ has a specific legal definition: ‘discussions involve negotiations’ and ‘are undertaken with the intent of allowing the offeror to revise its proposal.’” Galen Med. Assocs., Inc. v. United States, 369 F.3d 1324, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (quoting Info. Tech. & Applications Corp. v. United States, 316 F.3d 1312, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). “[T]he ‘acid test for deciding whether discussions have been held is whether it can be said that an offeror was provided the opportunit