Afiniti, Ltd. v. Chishti

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA AFINITI, INC., et al., Plaintiffs, Civil Action No. 23-303 (RDM) v. MUHAMMAD ZIAULLAH KHAN CHISHTI, et al., Defendants. MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER This case concerns an intellectual property dispute between Afiniti, Inc., a technology company, and its former Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”), Muhammad Ziaullah Khan Chishti. Following Chishti’s departure from the company, Afiniti alleges that he orchestrated the creation of several enterprises which used misappropriated Afiniti trade secrets to develop and sell software products to former Afiniti clients and other customers. Plaintiffs—Afiniti, Inc. and two related companies—bring this suit against Chishti, his wife Sarah Pobereskin, former Afiniti employee Yasir Zamir Ahmad, and four companies that, Plaintiffs allege, commercially exploit their stolen trade secrets under Chishti’s direction. Following jurisdictional discovery, Defendants have filed a renewed motion to dismiss and to strike, arguing that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over any Defendant other than Mr. Chishti himself, that the complaint fails to state a claim for relief, and that Plaintiffs have waived any right to a jury trial in this case. See Dkt. 78-1. After that motion was fully briefed, Plaintiffs filed their own motion to supplement the record and sought sanctions for asserted discovery abuses by Defendants during the jurisdictional discovery process. See Dkt. 122.  For the following reasons, the Court will GRANT in part and DENY in part Defendants’ motion to dismiss; will GRANT in part and DENY in part without prejudice Defendants’ motion to strike; will GRANT Plaintiffs’ motion to supplement; and will DENY Plaintiffs’ motion for sanctions. I. BACKGROUND A. Factual Background The following factual allegations giving rise to this suit are taken from Plaintiffs’ amended complaint, Dkt. 70-2 (Am. Compl.), which Plaintiffs filed following the completion of jurisdictional discovery. The Court also, where appropriate, refers to portions of the parties’ evidentiary submissions regarding personal jurisdiction. Plaintiffs Afiniti, Inc., Afiniti AI Holdings LLC, and Afiniti AI Limited (collectively, “Afiniti”) “provide applied artificial intelligence (‘AI’) services and other technologies to help their clients improve interactions in contact centers, such as call centers.” 1 Id. at 4 (Am. Compl. ¶ 2). Chishti founded Afiniti in 2005 and served as CEO until November 2021. Id. at 17 (Am. Compl. ¶ 44). For the majority of that time, Chishti worked and resided in Washinton, D.C. Id.; Dkt. 78-2 at 2 (Chishti Decl. ¶¶ 5–6). In 2016, Chishti signed an employment agreement (“Employment Agreement”) with Afiniti—which, at the time, also operated under the name SATMAP Incorporated. See Dkt. 78-7. Among other provisions, the Employment Agreement forbade the unauthorized disclosure of Afiniti’s confidential information, required that Chishti return any company property in his possession at the time of the termination of his employment, and prohibited him from soliciting Afiniti employees or customers for a two-year period 1 A further related entity, Afiniti Ltd., also brought claims in this case but voluntarily dismissed its claims in November 2025. See Dkt. 103. 2 following the termination of his employment. Id. at 7–8; Dkt. 70-2 at 17, 121–22 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 45, 348–51). In November 2020, while still employed by Afiniti, Chishti moved from Washington, D.C. to the British Overseas Territory of Bermuda. Dkt. 70-2 at 12–13 (Am. Compl. ¶ 30); Dkt. 78-2 at 2 (Chishti Decl. ¶ 6). Shortly afterwards, he married Sarah Pobereskin in Bermuda. Dkt. 78-2 at 2 (Chishti Decl. ¶ 8); Dkt. 78-3 at 2 (Pobereskin Decl. ¶ 7); Dkt. 70-2 at 12–13 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 30, 32). Pobereskin, an employee of the management consulting company ghSMART, had previously worked in the United States, where her employee biography described her as living in New York City and Washington, D.C. Dkt. 70-2 at 13 (Am. Compl. ¶ 31). Like Chishti, she moved to Bermuda in November 2020. Id. at 12 (Am. Compl. ¶ 30); Dkt. 78-3 at 2 (Pobereskin Decl. ¶ 5). Although both Chishti and Pobereskin attest that they intended for Bermuda to become their domicile at that time, Dkt. 78-2 at 2 (Chishti Decl. ¶ 6); Dkt. 78-3 at 2 (Pobereskin Decl. ¶ 5), they listed Chishti’s former Washington, D.C. address as their address in several subsequent documents, including their marriage certificate, Dkt. 70-2 at 12–13 (Am. Compl. ¶ 30). Chishti and Pobereskin attest that all such uses of the D.C. address, as well as other representations that they still resided in Washington, D.C. after November 2020, were outdated and erroneous. Dkt. 78-9 at 2 (Pobereskin Supp. Decl. ¶¶ 2–3); Dkt. 78-11 at 5–6 (Chishti Supp. Decl. ¶¶ 13–14). Chishti’s tenure as Afiniti CEO ended in November 2021, a year after he relocated to Bermuda, following reports of an alleged sexually abusive relationship between Chishti and a former Afiniti employee. Dkt. 70-2 at 4 & n.1 (Am. Compl. ¶ 3). Plaintiffs allege that Chishti retained Afiniti property following his resignation, including one or more computers that contained Afiniti trade secrets. Id. at 74–75 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 183–84). During negotiations over 3 a proposed separation agreement, Chishti requested that Afiniti limit his liability for failure to return one or more computers to the value of the computers themselves (excluding the value of their content, including trade secrets); allow him to maintain and use Afiniti confidential information already in his possession; and allow him to solicit Afiniti customers and employees. Id. at 74–75 (Am. Compl. ¶ 184). Afiniti refused those requests. Id. According to Plaintiffs, by January 2022 Chishti was nonetheless “solicit[ing] investment” for a proposed venture to license Afiniti’s intellectual property in China and to provide services to former Afiniti customers. Id. at 19, 124 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 51, 360). In February 2022, three months after his leaving Afiniti, Chishti and Pobereskin relocated once again, this time to Puerto Rico. Id. at 12 (Am. Compl. ¶ 30). Both Chishti and Pobereskin attest that they are currently residents of Puerto Rico. Dkt. 78-2 at 2 (Chishti Decl. ¶ 2); Dkt. 78- 3 at 2–3 (Pobereskin Decl. ¶¶ 2, 12). Plaintiffs allege that, shortly after moving to Puerto Rico, Chishti (and others working with him) began establishing a network of businesses to commercialize products developed using Afiniti’s intellectual property. Dkt. 70-2 at 74 (Am. Compl. ¶ 181). First, on March 21, 2022, the Qinhe company was incorporated in the People’s Republic of China. Id. at 14 (Am. Compl. ¶ 33). Qinhe, which means “affinity” in Chinese, id. at 80 (Am. Compl. ¶ 202), was initially established with a single shareholder, Xiaoxin “Yolanda” Liu, id. at 22, 43 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 59, 134). Liu had previously worked for an Afiniti-controlled company in China. Id. at 87, 96 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 225, 254). Qinhe’s current CEO and General Manager, Zhao Jian, also previously worked as an executive at one of Afiniti’s Chinese affiliates. Id. at 44, 87 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 135, 227). 4  Second, on March 28, 2022, Isbei Ltd. (“Isbei”) was formed in the Cayman Islands. Id. at 14 (Am. Compl. ¶ 34). Pobereskin is the sole listed director of Isbei. Id. at 19 (Am. Compl. ¶ 53); Dkt. 78-3 at 3 (Pobereskin Decl. ¶ 15). Chishti transferred millions of dollars of his own money to Isbei to fund its operations. Dkt. 70-2 at 27–28 (Am. Compl. ¶ 79). Although much (if not all) of that funding went directly from Chishti’s accounts to Isbei, id., Chishti claims that those transfers were part of “$15 million in gifts” that he had made to Pobereskin, Dkt. 78-11 at 5 (Chishti Supp. Decl. ¶ 12). According to Chishti, Pobereskin decided on her own accord to invest the gifted money in Isbei and requested that he “transfer the money [he] was gifting her to fund her investment in Isbei.” Id. Osman Ali Kahn Niazi, a friend of Chishti’s who had previously worked for Afiniti, was later named Isbei Chief Operating Officer (“COO”). Dkt. 70- 2 at 75–76 (Am. Compl. ¶ 188). Third, around April 6, 2022, Yasir Zamir Ahmad (“Zamir”) visited Chishti and Pobereskin in Puerto Rico. Dkt. 78-11 at 9 (Chishti Supp. Decl. ¶ 23); Dkt. 78-8 at 6 (Zamir Decl. ¶ 23). Zamir had worked for Afiniti in Washington, D.C. from August 2015 until February 2022, maintaining residences in Maryland and Virginia, and then left Afiniti to join Isbei around the time of his visit to Puerto Rico. 2 Dkt. 70-2 at 14 (Am. Compl. ¶ 36); Dkt. 78-8 at 2 (Zamir Decl. ¶¶ 5–6). During the visit on April 6, Chishti sent an email from his Isbei email address (zia.chishti@isbei.com) to Zamir’s Isbei email address (yasir.zamir@isbei.com) with the subject line “R scripts,” which included several attachments of computer code in the “R” programming 2 According to Zamir, he resigned from Afiniti in December 2021 but his employment with Afiniti did not officially end until February 15, 2022. Dkt. 78-8 at 2 (Zamir Decl. ¶ 5). Zamir attests that he began working as a “Freelance Service Provider” for Isbei on May 1, 2022. Id. at 5 (Zamir Decl. ¶ 15). Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges the same date. Dkt. 70-2 at 14 (Am. Compl. ¶ 36). As noted below, however, it appears that Zamir had a functioning Isbei email address several weeks before then. 5 language. Dkt. 70-2 at 20 (Am. Compl. ¶ 55); Dkt. 78-8 at 6 (Zamir Decl. ¶ 23); see Dkt. 78-11 at 20–38. Plaintiffs allege that those attachments contained “source code . . . which disclosed, used, or incorporated Afiniti Trade Secrets.” Dkt. 70-2 at 20 (Am. Compl. ¶ 55). Chishti and Zamir, in contrast, claim that the scripts were created when Chishti, while discussing “data analysis” and programming using R with Zamir, decided to “brush[] up on his coding skills by creating some short R scripts.” Dkt. 78-8 at 6 (Zamir Decl. ¶ 23); see also Dkt. 78-11 at 9 (Chishti Supp. Decl. ¶¶ 23–24). Chishti and Zamir deny that the scripts included Afiniti’s confidential information or trade secrets or that Isbei used the scripts afterwards, Dkt. 78-8 at 6– 7 (Zamir Decl. ¶¶ 25–27); Dkt. 78-11 at 8–9 (Chishti Supp. Decl. ¶ 22), although Chishti does admit that the scripts “embody portions of a method” used by Afiniti in its business—albeit a method that, Chishti attests, had already been “publicly disclosed,” Dkt. 78-11 at 9 (Chishti Supp. Decl. ¶ 25). Fourth, on April 11, 2022, Isbei established a wholly owned subsidiary, Isbei (Hainan) Technology Co., Ltd. (“Isbei Hainan”), in the People’s Republic of China. Dkt. 70-2 at 14 (Am. Compl. ¶ 35). Yolanda Liu, the sole shareholder of Qinhe, was Isbei Hainan’s founding executive director. Id. at 22 (Am. Compl. ¶ 59). One week later, Liu sent Chishti a draft master services agreement between Qinhe and Isbei for his review. Id. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 59–60). The final agreement between Isbei Hainan and Qinhe granted Qinhe an exclusive license to use Isbei’s technology, in return for which Qinhe agreed to pay Isbei Hainan 98% of all revenue Qinhe “generated from Isbei[-] Derived Business.” Id. at 82 (Am. Compl. ¶ 205). For its part, Isbei Hainan agreed to cover all of Qinhe’s expenses, including “personnel, marketing, management, deployment, and other operational costs.” Id. In May 2022, Pobereskin—who was Isbei’s “sole shareholder”—appointed Lalarukh Saud as the head of Isbei Hainan. Id. at 23 (Am. 6 Compl. ¶ 64). From May to September of 2022, both Isbei and Qinhe agreed to “pilot programs” to provide services to former Afiniti clients. Id. at 118–19 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 329–330). Fifth, in late 2023 Zamir “co-founded Dataquartz, a company that he leads and spun out of Isbei.” Id. at 8 (Am. Compl. ¶ 14). Beginning on November 1, 2023, Dataquartz provided technical services to Isbei under a “Manpower Service Provider contract.” Id. at 15 (Am. Compl. ¶ 38). As part of the agreement, Dataquartz pledged that “it would not work for any company other than [Isbei] so long as [Isbei] had sufficient work for Dataquartz.” Id. at 32 (Am. Compl. ¶ 99). In essence, Plaintiffs allege, Zamir continued to develop code for Isbei, only now through a separate corporate structure. Id. at 47 (Am. Compl. ¶ 145). It is undisputed that Dataquartz is incorporated in Canada. Id. at 15 (Am. Compl. ¶ 38); see Dkt. 78-8 at 5 (Zamir Decl. ¶ 16). Plaintiffs allege that, following his meeting with Chishti in Puerto Rico, Zamir moved from Maryland (where he most recently resided when working for Afiniti) to Texas, where he now works for Dataquartz. Dkt. 70-2 at 31, 52 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 97, 155). Zamir disputes this and attests that he actually moved from Maryland to Pakistan, where he has been domiciled since 2022, and that he has never resided in Texas. Dkt. 78-8 at 3 (Zamir Decl. ¶¶ 7– 8). Furthermore, although Plaintiffs allege that Dataquartz’s website listed a “local presence” in both Texas and Washington D.C., as well as a Texas phone number, Dkt. 70-2 at 15 (Am. Compl. ¶ 38), Zamir attests that Dataquartz has no offices or employees in the United States and that the Texas phone number listed on Dataquartz’s website “is a Google Voice number associated with [Zamir’s] Google account” that he continues to use in Pakistan, Dkt. 78-8 at 5–6 (Zamir Decl. ¶¶ 18, 20). Zamir does not explain why his Google Voice number has a Texas area code, when the only connection to Texas mentioned in his declaration is that his sister resides in Garland, Texas. See id. at 3 (Zamir Decl. ¶ 7). 7  Throughout this period, Plaintiffs allege that Chishti worked with Pobereskin and others in directing the “Isbei/Qinhe enterprise.” See Dkt. 70-2 at 36 (Am. Compl. ¶ 118). Beyond funding Isbei (and, indirectly, Qinhe), Chishti allegedly provided technical instructions to Isbei and Qinhe staff, oversaw the selection of Isbei’s COO, established payment mechanisms for Isbei employees, communicated with clients on behalf of both Isbei and Qinhe, and routinely approved expenditures for both Isbei and Qinhe (using Pobereskin’s email address to do so). Id. at 20–21, 23–24, 26, 31 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 57, 66–67, 73, 93). Plaintiffs also allege that Chishti worked with Zamir and others to prepare patent applications on behalf of Isbei. Id. at 28–29 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 81, 83). Isbei filed the first patent application in China on June 28, 2023, and the second application on November 30, 2023. Id. at 103, 110 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 293, 308). Both applications list Abdullah Asghar Sheikh, a former Afiniti employee who subsequently worked for Isbei and Dataquartz, as an inventor. Id.; see also id. at 42 (Am. Compl. ¶ 130). Chishti had previously sent draft patent applications to Sheikh, which also listed Sheikh as the named inventor. Id. at 29 (Am. Compl. ¶ 83). Plaintiffs allege that those patents both rely on and disclose Afiniti trade secrets. Id. at 42, 103 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 130, 292). Chishti denies making any “substantive contribution” to either Isbei patent application. Dkt. 78-11 at 17 (Chishti Supp. Decl. ¶ 61). Defendants also deny that Chishti has had any direct responsibility for Isbei or Qinhe’s operations. Dkt. 78-1 at 30 (“Chishti is not an officer, director, shareholder, or employee of Qinhe, Isbei Hainan, or Isbei Ltd.”). Chishti attests that he has only “offered occasional and uncompensated advice” to Defendants, “including to [his] wife, Sarah Pobereskin, who is the majority owner of Isbei Ltd., and to [his] long-time friend Osman Niazi, who is the Chief Operating Officer of Isbei Ltd.” Dkt. 78-11 at 2 (Chishti Supp. Decl. ¶ 4). Although Chishti 8 admits to “hav[ing] provided . . . business advice” to Isbei, Qinhe, and their officers and to “hav[ing] made suggestions to some of Isbei Ltd.’s and Qinhe’s technical people,” he claims that he did so only because “[w]hen a friend calls for business advice, I try to be helpful and to provide advice,” which is “not the same thing as running a company.” Id. at 3 (Chishti Supp. Decl. ¶ 6). B. Procedural History Plaintiffs filed their original complaint in this case in February 2023, naming Chishti, Pobereskin, Qinhe, Isbei, and Isbei Hainan as Defendants. 3 See Dkt. 1 (Compl.). Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing (among other things) that the Court lacked personal jurisdiction over any Defendant other than Chishti. Dkt. 35-1 at 9. At a hearing on the motion, the Court granted Plaintiffs’ request for jurisdictional discovery in light of the conflicts between the facts alleged in the complaint and the declarations accompanying Defendants’ first motion to dismiss. Dkt. 44 at 65–66. Following the completion of jurisdictional discovery, Plaintiffs filed the operative, amended complaint. See Dkt. 70-2 (Am. Compl.). The amended complaint names Chishti, Zamir, Pobereskin, Isbei, Isbei Hainan, Qinhe, and Dataquartz as Defendants, see generally id., and asserts the following claims: • Count I: Breach of contract claim against Chishti, alleging that Chishti violated the Employment Agreement. Id. at 121–23 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 343–56). • Count II: Misappropriation of trade secrets claim against all Defendants, brought under the Defend Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1836. Id. at 123–31 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 357–79). 3 Plaintiffs’ complaint also listed Isbei AI (Private) Ltd. (“Isbei Pakistan”) as a defendant. Dkt. 1 at 9 (Compl. ¶ 21). Isbei Pakistan is a Pakistani company of which Chishti owns 99 percent. Id. The claims against Isbei Pakistan have since been withdrawn. Dkt. 70-2 at 15 (Am. Compl. ¶ 39). 9  • Counts III, V, and VI: Misappropriation of trade secrets claims against all Defendants, brought under District of Columbia, Texas, and Puerto Rico law. Id. at 131–38, 140–46, 147–54 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 380–402, 10–31, 1–26). • Count IV: Claim against Chishti for unauthorized access of Afiniti’s computer network, brought under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”), 18 U.S.C. § 1030. Id. at 138–40 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 1–9). For relief, Plaintiffs request (among other things) an injunction prohibiting Defendants from operating the products alleged to rely on Afiniti trade secrets, the return or destruction of those trade secrets in Defendants’ possession, the specific performance of Chishti’s Employment Agreement, restitution, and damages. Id. at 154–56. (Am. Compl.). Plaintiffs “demand trial by jury in this action of all issues so triable.” Id. at 156 (Am. Compl.). In response, Defendants filed a renewed motion to dismiss and to strike. See Dkt. 78. That motion, once again, argues that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over all Defendants other than Chishti, Dkt. 78-1 at 17–40; that Plaintiffs have failed to comply with Rule 8 and Rule 12 as the complaint only contains vague, speculative, and conclusory allegations, id. at 42–48; that Plaintiffs’ claim under the CFAA fails as a matter of law, id. at 48–52; and that Chishti’s Employment Agreement waives Plaintiffs’ right to a jury trial, id. at 52. The Court scheduled a hearing on the motion to dismiss for Monday, January 12, 2026. Min. Order (Dec. 15, 2025). On the Friday evening before that hearing, Plaintiffs filed a motion asking for supplemental briefing because of what they characterized as Defendants “discovery omissions and untrue representations.” Dkt. 106-2 at 4. Specifically, Plaintiffs highlighted statements made by Chishti while testifying in separate litigation in Bermuda, as well as Chishti and Pobereskin’s testimony in a proceeding before Judge Rakoff in the Southern District of New 10 York, that, Plaintiffs claimed, contradicted Chishti and Pobereskin’s sworn statements during jurisdictional discovery in this case. See generally id. Because Plaintiffs’ original motion to supplement was filed entirely under seal, despite including many materials that were publicly available and non-confidential, the Court directed Plaintiffs to re-file the motion after reassessing which portions could and could not be filed on the public docket. Dkt. 108 at 45–46; see Min. Order (Jan. 14, 2026). The Court also directed Plaintiffs to include in their resubmission a more detailed explanation of the trade secrets that they alleged that Chishti had misappropriated. Dkt. 108 at 58. Plaintiffs then renewed their motion to supplement the record, see Dkt. 122, and also requested that the Court impose sanctions on Chishti and Pobereskin for their “material omissions, contradictions, obfuscations and misleading statements” during jurisdictional discovery, id. at 22, and Defendants opposed the motion, see Dkt. 127-2. After the motion to supplement was fully briefed, Plaintiffs filed two additional “notices of supplemental authority” raising for the Court’s attention further proceedings in the Southern District of New York case. See Dkt. 136; Dkt. 138. Defendants’ motion to dismiss and to strike, Dkt. 78, and Plaintiffs’ motion to supplement the record and for sanctions, Dkt. 122, are now before the Court. II. ANALYSIS A. Motion to Supplement Before turning to the merits of Defendants’ motion to dismiss, the Court must first decide whether it will consider that motion with the benefit of the additional material included in Plaintiffs’ motion to supplement the record. See Dkt. 106; Dkt. 109; Dkt. 122. The Court has “discretion to allow parties to supplement the record of a case,” Marsh v. Johnson, 263 F. Supp. 2d 49, 53 (D.D.C. 2003), when the additional evidence is helpful to the Court and was presented “in a timely manner,” Pao Tatneft v. Ukraine, No. 17-cv-582, 2020 WL 2476034, at *3 (D.D.C. 11 May 13, 2020), particularly if the evidence was not previously available to the moving party. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ motion to supplement should be rejected as untimely, because it rests on testimony given by Chishti and Pobereskin in separate proceedings in November and December 2025 but was not filed until early January 2026. Dkt. 127-2 at 9, see Dkt. 106. The Court agrees with Defendants that Plaintiffs could have moved with (slightly) greater dispatch and that Plaintiffs’ decision to file hundreds of pages of new exhibits the Friday evening before the long-scheduled Monday hearing on Defendants’ motion to dismiss at least potentially placed Defendants at an unfair disadvantage. It is safe to assume that, were the shoe on the other foot, Plaintiffs would raise equally vehement opposition to the last-minute filing. For several reasons, however, the Court will nevertheless grant Plaintiffs’ motion to supplement the record. First, the substance of the materials at issue could not have come as a surprise to Defendants. Chishti appeared and testified at the proceeding before the Supreme Court of Bermuda, see Dkt. 106-4, and Chishti and Pobereskin appeared and testified at the proceeding before the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, see Dkt. 106-5; Dkt. 106-6. Second, Plaintiffs’ brief delay in bringing this evidence to the Court’s attention has not interfered with the timely adjudication of the pending motions. Finally, and most importantly, Defendants have had ample opportunity to respond to Plaintiffs’ supplemental filing, see Dkt. 127-2, and they have suffered no undue prejudice resulting from Plaintiffs’ delay. That leaves the question whether Plaintiffs have, nonetheless, engaged in sandbagging with the purpose of obtaining a strategic advantage at the hearing that the Court held on January 12, 2026. That is a serious charge and one that the Court is not prepared to accept based on nothing more than the timing, which, while far from ideal, did permit defense counsel to prepare over the weekend and to file at least a preliminary response before the hearing. See Dkt. 107; 12 Dkt. 108 at 21. The Court cautions the parties, however, that it will not tolerate unfair gamesmanship or lack of professional courtesy as this case proceeds. The Court will, accordingly, grant Plaintiffs’ motion to supplement the record. B. Personal Jurisdiction Turning to the merits of the dispute, the primary question presented by Defendants’ motion to dismiss is which, if any, of the non-Chishti Defendants are properly subject to the Court’s personal jurisdiction. Defendants do not dispute that the Court may exercise personal jurisdiction over Chishti, see Dkt. 78-1 at 9, 17, who, in the Employment Agreement, agreed to “submit to the exclusive jurisdiction” of “[t]he federal or state courts of the District of Columbia” in the event of litigation arising out of or relating to the Employment Agreement, Dkt. 78-7 at 5; see also In re Sealed Case, 932 F.3d 915, 922 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (“Unlike subject- matter jurisdiction, however, personal jurisdiction ‘can . . . be waived,’ meaning a party may ‘consent’ to a court’s personal jurisdiction.” (alteration in original) (quoting Ins. Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703 (1982)). Defendants do, however, maintain that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Pobereskin, Zamir, or any of the corporate defendants: Isbei, Isbei Hainan, Qinhe, and Dataquartz. Dkt. 78-1 at 17. 1. Legal Standard Before turning to the parties’ respective arguments, the Court pauses to identify the appropriate legal standard. When the defense is timely raised, the plaintiff generally bears the burden of establishing personal jurisdiction as to each objecting defendant. See FC Inv. Grp. LC v. IFX Mkts., Ltd., 529 F.3d 1087, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 2008); see also Crane v. N.Y. Zoological Soc’y, 894 F.2d 454, 456 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (In opposing a Rule 12(b)(2) motion, “[t]he plaintiff has the burden of establishing a factual basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendant[s].”). “[T]he showing a plaintiff must make to defeat a defendant’s claim that the 13 court lacks personal jurisdiction,” however, “varies depending on the procedural posture of the litigation.” Dorchester Fin. Sec., Inc. v. Banco BRJ, S.A., 722 F.3d 81, 84 (2d Cir. 2013) (citation modified); see also Grayson v. Anderson, 816 F.3d 262, 268 (4th Cir. 2016). “[W]hen the court addresses the personal jurisdiction question by reviewing only the parties’ motion papers, affidavits attached to the motion, supporting legal memoranda, and the allegations in the complaint, a plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction to survive the jurisdictional challenge.” Grayson, 816 F.3d at 268; see also Mwani v. bin Laden, 417 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (same). At this stage of the proceeding, “plaintiffs are not limited to evidence that meets the standards of admissibility required by the district court” and, instead, “may rest their argument on their pleadings, bolstered by such affidavits and other written materials as they can otherwise obtain.” Mwani, 417 F.3d at 7. In this context, “[u]ncontroverted allegations in the complaint must be taken as true, and conflicts between parties over statements contained in affidavits must be resolved in the plaintiff’s favor.” Will Co. v. Lee, 47 F.4th 917, 921 (9th Cir. 2022). Alternatively, the Court may hold an evidentiary hearing, at which the plaintiff typically bears the burden of proving personal jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence, see IMAPizza, LLC v. At Pizza Ltd., 334 F. Supp. 3d 95, 108 (D.D.C. 2018), or may defer the question of personal jurisdiction to trial on the merits, Dorchester Fin. Sec., Inc., 722 F.3d at 85. Under either of these approaches, the Court no longer assumes the truth of the plaintiff’s jurisdictional allegations and no longer views the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. The plaintiff, instead, bears the burden of “establish[ing] facts supporting jurisdiction over the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence.” Grayson, 816 F.3d at 268; see also 14 Edmond v. U.S. Postal Serv. Gen. Counsel, 949 F.2d 415, 424 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (prima facie showing suffices, “unless the trial court holds an evidentiary hearing”). A further option lies between these poles: A defendant contesting personal jurisdiction may move for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. See 5B Federal Practice and Procedure § 1351 (4th ed. Apr. 2026 update) (“Wright & Miller”). If the defendant does so, the Court must assess the motion in the same manner as any other summary judgment motion. See Dorchester Fin. Sec., Inc., 722 F.3d at 85. The movant “bears the initial responsibility” of “identifying those portions” of the record that “demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). A fact is “material” if it could affect the outcome of the litigation under governing law, see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986), and a dispute is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party, see Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). Although the movant is entitled to prevail in the absence of any evidence supporting personal jurisdiction, the Court must view whatever evidence exists in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and must draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor. See Talavera v. Shah, 638 F.3d 303, 308 (D.C. Cir. 2011). Here, Defendants have not moved for summary judgment; they oppose holding an evidentiary hearing, Dkt. 100-2 at 31; and they oppose deferring resolution of the jurisdictional dispute until trial on the merits. Plaintiffs, for their part, have not cross-moved for summary judgment on personal jurisdiction and, instead, urge the Court to defer resolution of the jurisdictional issue for trial. Dkt. 89-2 at 9–10. Similarly, although Plaintiffs acknowledge in a footnote that an evidentiary hearing might be warranted “[i]f the Court requires a complete 15 evidentiary basis for every jurisdictional fact,” id. at 16 n.8, they do not affirmatively request an evidentiary hearing. There are good reasons, moreover, not to hold an evidentiary hearing at this time. To be sure, holding an early evidentiary hearing on disputed questions of fact relating to personal jurisdiction is often advisable. See Grayson, 816 F.3d at 268; 5B Wright & Miller § 1351(4th ed. Apr. 2026 update). Doing so permits the court to resolve the question of personal jurisdiction once and for all before the parties incur additional expense and, more importantly, before foreign parties are put to the burden of litigating in a jurisdiction with which they lack the requisite connection. Here, however, at least two considerations weigh against holding an early evidentiary hearing. First, Defendants—that is, those who have the greatest stake in obtaining an early and final resolution of the question whether they should be required to defend a suit brought against them in a foreign jurisdiction—oppose holding an evidentiary hearing. Dkt. 100-2 at 31. And, as explained above, Defendants have made the strategic decision to oppose an evidentiary hearing even though doing so would force Plaintiffs to overcome a higher burden to establish personal jurisdiction over the nonresident Defendants. The Court, of course, is not bound by Defendants’ opposition and could nonetheless order the parties to appear. That, however, leads to the second, and more substantial, reason not to attempt to reach a final resolution of the parties’ jurisdictional dispute at this stage of the proceeding. As the discussion below will illustrate, Plaintiffs have made a substantial showing that the Court has personal jurisdiction over most (although not all) of the Defendants; this is not a case, in other words, in which a plaintiff is dragging foreign defendants into a distant court without a substantial claim of personal jurisdiction. To be sure, material disputes of fact still 16 exist, but, for the most part, those disputes are intertwined with the merits of the case. It follows that an evidentiary hearing on personal jurisdiction would quickly devolve into a minitrial (and perhaps a full trial) on the merits, and it would do so without the benefit of full discovery and factual development. See Adams v. Bain, 697 F.2d 1213, 1219 (4th Cir. 1982) (if “the jurisdictional facts are intertwined with the facts central to the merits of the dispute,” “[i]t is the better view that . . . the entire factual dispute is appropriately resolved only by a proceeding on the merits”). Under these circumstances, conducting an early evidentiary hearing on personal jurisdiction would disserve the judicial interest in fairly and accurately adjudicating potentially dispositive questions of fact. See United States v. Swiss Am. Bank, Ltd., 274 F.3d 610, 638 (1st Cir. 2001) (Lipez, J., dissenting). It is true that at least two decisions from this Court assert that “where the parties are permitted to conduct discovery on the jurisdictional issue,” as has occurred here, “a plaintiff must prove that personal jurisdiction exists by a preponderance of the evidence.” Shapiro, Lifschitz & Schram, P.C. v. Hazard, 90 F. Supp. 2d 15, 20 (D.D.C. 2000); see also Alkanani v. Aegis Def. Servs., LLC, 976 F. Supp. 2d 13, 22 (D.D.C. 2014). Defendants, citing both those decisions, have correspondingly argued that Plaintiffs must satisfy that standard to overcome the motion to dismiss. Dkt. 78-1 at 18. On closer examination, however, neither decision requires holding Plaintiffs to their ultimate burden of proof—without a hearing or trial—merely because the court has authorized jurisdictional discovery. The first of these cases, the Hazard case, 90 F. Supp. 2d at 20, cites the Second Circuit’s decision in Landoil Resources Corporation v. Alexander & Alexander Services, Inc., which, in fact, says that the preponderance standard applies after a district court allows the parties to conduct discovery, 918 F.2d 1039, 1043 (2d Cir. 1990). But that same decision goes on to say 17 that because “the district court did not hold a hearing or a trial on the merits, all pleadings and affidavits must be construed in the light most favorable” to the plaintiff. Id. That qualification mirrors the prima facie showing requirement and is consistent with subsequent Second Circuit precedent, which recognizes that, “[a]fter discovery, the plaintiff’s prima facie showing, necessary to defeat a jurisdiction testing motion, must include an averment of facts that, if credited by the trier [of fact], would suffice to establish jurisdiction over the defendant,” and that the “prima facie showing must be factually supported,” Dorchester Fin. Sec., Inc., 722 F.3d at 85 (quoting Ball v. Metallurgie Hoboken-Overpelt, S.A., 902 F.2d 194, 197 (2d Cir. 1990)). The second decision from this Court, Alkanani, 976 F. Supp. 3d at 22, is to similar effect. Although it quotes Hazard for the proposition that the plaintiff bears the burden of proving “the existence of personal jurisdiction by the preponderance of the evidence” after “the parties have engaged in jurisdictional discovery,” it notes that the court may consider “the allegations in the complaint,” along with “declarations and evidence produced during the course of jurisdictional discovery,” and it stresses that “the court still must resolve any factual discrepancies in the plaintiff’s favor.” Id. That is, the court must apply the prima facie standard. In any event, the Court need not decide for present purposes whether it is ever appropriate to hold a plaintiff to its ultimate burden of proving the relevant jurisdictional facts by a preponderance of the evidence without first holding an evidentiary hearing or trial on the merits. Cf. Grayson, 816 F.3d at 267–69 (treating consideration of post-discovery evidentiary submissions as the equivalent of holding an evidentiary hearing). As discussed below, the parties dispute a variety of important factual premises, and the resolution of many of those disputes will turn, at least in part, on the factfinder’s assessment of the credibility of the witnesses. The Court would not resolve those disputes against the non-moving party at summary 18 judgment, and it certainly cannot do so in the context of a threshold Rule 12(b)(2) motion resolved on the bare record. See Alkanani, 976 F. Supp. 2d at 22 (observing that after “the parties have engaged in jurisdictional discovery, the plaintiff’s burden is to prove the existence of personal jurisdiction by the preponderance of the evidence,” but also noting that “the court still must resolve any factual discrepancies in the plaintiff’s favor”). At the same time, however, the Court is persuaded that the availability of jurisdictional discovery, and the development of a factual record in the context of a Rule 12(b)(2) motion, imposes a greater burden on a plaintiff than presented by a facial motion to dismiss. At this point, the plaintiff can no longer rest on the legal sufficiency of the allegations contained in its complaint and must, instead, make a prima facie showing that the court has personal jurisdiction over each defendant. See Swiss Am. Bank, Ltd., 274 F.3d at 618–19. This requires an affirmative showing, supported by declarations and other evidence and/or undisputed allegations, sufficient to support “every fact required to satisfy both the [relevant] long-arm statute and the Due Process Clause of the Constitution.” Id. at 618 (citation modified). Because Defendants have submitted declarations that dispute specific jurisdictional allegations contained in Plaintiffs’ amended complaint, see Dkt. 78-11 at 2–19 (Chishti Supp. Decl.); Dkt. 78-9 at 2–4 (Pobereskin Supp. Decl.), the Court cannot rely on those controverted allegations without requiring some evidentiary support. In this posture, the district court is not acting as the factfinder, see Swiss Am. Bank, Ltd., 274 F.3d at 619, and, instead, must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff, see Dorchester Fin. Sec., Inc., 722 F.3d at 85. But Plaintiffs must make a prima facie showing— based on either undisputed factual allegations or proffers of evidence—that the Court has personal jurisdiction over each Defendant. Notably, this standard presents a one-way r