Sallyport Global Services, Ltd. v. United States

In the United States Court of Federal Claims No. 25-1128 (Filed: May 22, 2026) (Reissued for Publication: July 22, 2026) 1 *************************************** SALLYPORT GLOBAL SERVICES, LTD., * * Plaintiff, * * v. * * THE UNITED STATES, * * Defendant, * * and * * VECTRUS SYSTEMS LLC, * * Defendant-Intervenor. * *************************************** Paul F. Khoury, Wiley Rein LLP, Washington, DC, counsel for Plaintiff. With whom were Gary S. Ward, W. Benjamin Phillips, III, Johnathan C. Clark, and Vaibhavi Patria, of counsel. Margaret J. Jantzen, U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division, Washington, DC, counsel of record for Defendant. With whom was Hector M. Riverahernandez, United States Department of the Air Force, of counsel. Michael F. Mason, Hogan Lovells US LLP, Washington, DC, counsel for Defendant-Intervenor. With whom were Thomas B. Hunt, Tysons, VA, and Ashley M. Ruhe, Washington, DC, of counsel. 1 The Court initially filed this opinion under seal on May 22, 2026, [ECF 69], pursuant to the amended protective order entered on July 21, 2025, [ECF 29]. The Court also ordered the parties to file a joint status report that “identifies information, if any, that the parties contend should be redacted; explains the basis for each proposed redaction; and includes an attachment of the proposed redactions for this Opinion and Order.” [ECF 69] at 31. The parties filed their joint status report on June 18, 2026, proposing redactions for consideration by the Court, but the parties did not agree on the proposed redactions. [ECF 73] at 1. Following a status conference on June 30, 2026, [ECF 74], the Court filed a proposed redacted version of the opinion on the docket under seal, [ECF 75-1], and invited the parties to request additional redactions with justifications for such redactions by July 17, 2026, [ECF 75]. The Court advised that the proposed redacted version would be issued on the public docket if no request for additional redactions is received. As of July 21, 2026, the parties have not requested any additional redactions. Accordingly, the Court issues the proposed redacted version shared with the parties on July 7, 2026. Redactions are denoted with three asterisks in brackets, e.g. [* * *], or by the use of the generic labels “Contractor A,” “Subcontractor A,” “Subcontractor B,” and “Owner A.” Separately, the Court edits citations to reflect the amended protective order and incorporates minor typographical and grammatical corrections.  OPINION AND ORDER DIETZ, Judge. Sallyport Global Services, Ltd. (“Sallyport”) alleges that the United States Department of the Air Force (“Air Force”) improperly awarded a sole source contract to Vectrus Systems LLC (“Vectrus”) for Base Operations Support, Base Life Support, and Security (“BBS”) services at the Martyr Brigadier General Ali Flaih Air Base (“AFAB”) in the Republic of Iraq (“Iraq”). Before the Court are the government’s and Vectrus’s respective motions to dismiss Sallyport’s protest for lack of standing pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims (“RCFC”) and the parties’ respective cross-motions for judgment on the administrative record pursuant to RCFC 52.1. For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that Sallyport has standing to bring its claims but that it fails to demonstrate that the Air Force’s sole source award to Vectrus was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise contrary to law. Accordingly, the Court DENIES the government’s and Vectrus’s motions to dismiss, DENIES Sallyport’s motion for judgment on the administrative record, and GRANTS the government’s and Vectrus’s motions for judgment on the administrative record. I. BACKGROUND Sallyport challenges the Air Force’s decision to award a sole source contract to Vectrus under the Foreign Military Sales (“FMS”) program. Compl. [ECF 1] ¶¶ 1-2. Before addressing the parties’ respective motions, the Court provides an overview of the statutory and regulatory framework underpinning the FMS program, the facts giving rise to Sallyport’s claims, and the procedural history of this case. A. FMS Program The FMS program is a form of security assistance authorized by the Arms Export Control Act (“AECA”). See 22 U.S.C. §§ 2761-68. Under the AECA, Congress “authorizes sales by the United States Government to friendly countries . . . in furtherance of the security objectives of the United States[.]” Id. § 2751. Congress authorizes the President of the United States to enter into contracts for the procurement of defense articles or defense services for sale . . . to any foreign country . . . if such country . . . provides . . . a dependable undertaking [] to pay the full amount of such contract . . . and [] to make funds available in such amounts and at such times as may be required to meet the payments required by the contract[.] Id. § 2762. In the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (“DFARS”), the U.S. Department of Defense (“DoD”) sets forth “policies and procedures for acquisitions for [FMS] under [the AECA].” DFARS 225.7300(a). Under these policies and procedures, “[t]he U.S. Government sells defense articles and services to foreign governments . . . through FMS agreements.” DFARS 225.7301(a). The underlying procurement between the United States and 2 the prospective contractor is conducted using “the same acquisition and contract management procedures used for other defense acquisitions.” DFARS 225.7301(b). The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (“DSCA”) “directs, administers, and provides DoD-wide guidance to the DoD Components and DoD representatives to U.S. missions abroad for the execution of DoD security assistance and security cooperation programs[.]” DoD, Directive No. 5105.65, Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) ¶ 3 (2023). This guidance is set forth in the Security Assistance Management Manual (“SAMM”). See id. ¶ 5.i. The SAMM “provides DoD-wide guidance to . . . the Military Departments . . . engaged in the management or implementation of [the FMS program]” and “is mandatory for use by all DoD [c]omponents,” though deviations may be permitted with prior approval of DSCA. DSCA, Authorization Letter (2012), https://samm.dsca.mil/listing/authorization-letter [https://perma.cc/B34G-LZ2L]. According to the SAMM, the FMS process “begins when an eligible foreign country . . . requests information on defense articles or services, including training, being considered for purchase.” DSCA, SAMM § C5.1.1. (2012), https://samm.dsca.mil/chapter/chapter-5# [https://perma.cc/NUH6-7TAC]. The eligible foreign country is referred to as the “FMS purchaser” or “FMS customer,” see generally § C5.1., and the U.S. military department or defense agency authorized to receive such request is referred to as the “implementing agency,” DCSA, SAMM § C1.3.2.6. (2012), https://samm.dsca.mil/chapter/chapter-1#C1.3. [https://perma.cc/AHT9-5JNF]. The FMS purchaser’s requests “are generally referred to as Letters of Request [(“LORs”)],” and may be “provided through formal correspondence, requests for proposals (RFPs), discussions, electronic mail (e-mail), letters, or messages.” Id. § C5.1.2.; see also id. § C5.1.3 (requiring a memorandum if LOR is received verbally). Once an implementing agency receives an LOR and deems it complete, see §§ C5.1.7.1.-.1.7.2., Tables C5.T3A-B, the FMS purchaser’s request is subject to an approval process that involves coordination between the DSCA, the U.S. Department of State, and the implementing agency, see id. § C5.4.17. If all relevant U.S. government stakeholders approve of the sale, the implementing agency and the DSCA develop a Letter of Offer and Acceptance (“LOA”), which is sent to the FMS purchaser. See id. Implementation of the LOA occurs once “an authorized representative of the [FMS purchaser] signs the LOA, any required initial deposit has been received by [the Defense Finance and Accounting Service] and deposited, and any required data system implementing transactions have occurred.” Id. § C5.4.20. Once implemented, the signed LOA, including amendments and modifications, acts as the legal instrument formalizing the FMS sale and is recognized as “a government-to-government agreement between the purchaser government . . . and the United States.” Id.; see id. § C5.4.1.; DFARS 225.7301(a). “Acquisition for [FMS] purchasers [under an executed LOA] must be in accordance with DoD regulations and other applicable [U.S. government] procedures,” including applicable Federal Acquisition Regulation (“FAR”) and DFARS clauses. DSCA, SAMM § C6.3.1. (2012), https://samm.dsca.mil/chapter/chapter-6#C6.3.1. [https://perma.cc/VA4C-F6NW]; see DFARS 225.7301(b). Additionally, consistent with CICA, 10 U.S.C. § 3201(a)(1), the SAMM requires that a “competitive procurement process [be] used to the maximum extent possible when procuring articles or services.” SAMM § C6.3.4. Nonetheless, the SAMM recognizes that “[a]n authorized official of the purchasing government may submit a written request . . . that the [i]mplementing [a]gency [] with procurement responsibility for the required item and/or service 3 procure a defense article(s) and/or service(s) from a specific organization or entity” and further instructs that, in such instances, “the FMS [purchaser] need not provide a rationale for the request.” Id. The SAMM states that “the contracting activity can consider FMS purchaser requests for [a] procurement using other than full and open competition” under the international agreement exception to CICA. Id. The international agreement exception to CICA permits agencies to use other than full and open competition where the terms of an international agreement or a treaty between the United States and a foreign government or international organization, or the written directions of a foreign government reimbursing the agency for the cost of the procurement of the property or services for such government, have the effect of requiring the use of procedures other than competitive procedures[.] 10 U.S.C. § 3204(a)(4); see FAR 6.302-4(a)(2); DFARS 206.302-4. With respect to invoking the international agreement exception, the SAMM states: Requests for other than full and open competition using the authority of 10 U.S.C. 3204(a)(4) should be to meet the objective requirements of the purchaser and not for improper or unethical considerations. [U.S. government] representatives must remain objective in providing options or recommendations to the partner and may not solicit requests for other than full and open competition. In general, the [U.S. government] does not investigate the circumstances behind a foreign purchaser’s request to use other than full and open competition, and DoD contracting agencies are encouraged to defer to a foreign purchaser’s requests under the [i]nternational [a]greement exception to the extent that they are not aware of any indication that such requests violate U.S. law or ethical business practices. The [implementing agency] must consult with its counsel on cases where facts indicate that granting a request to use other than full and open competition may violate U.S. law or ethical business practices. If the [implementing agency] determines that a request to use other than full and open competition should not be approved, the memorandum informing the purchaser must be coordinated with DSCA. SAMM § C6.3.4.3. Under an executed LOA, “the purchasing activities of defense components and prime contractors implement FMS requirements using normal procurement and contract management procedures in accordance with the FAR and other directives and contractual provisions.” SAMM § 6.3.5. “The degree of participation of the FMS purchaser during contract negotiations is left to the discretion of the contracting officer after consultation with the contractor.” Id. § 6.3.5.2. Further, the implementing agency “do[es] not accept directions from the FMS purchaser as to source selection decisions or contract terms,” except that the implementing agency “may honor 4 an FMS purchaser’s sole source request for the designation of a particular prime or subcontract source for defense articles or defense services.” Id. § 6.3.5.1. B. Factual Background The Air Force awarded Sallyport a sole source contract for the AFAB BBS services in 2014 and a follow-on sole source contract in 2022. [ECF 1] ¶ 3; AR 60. 2 These sole source awards were made under the international agreement exception to CICA based upon LORs from the Iraqi Ministry of Defense (“MoD”) and executed LOAs. [ECF 39-2] ¶¶ 2-3 (CO Decl., Aug. 22, 2025). The BBS contract is funded entirely by the Iraqi government. Id. ¶ 2. In mid-2023, the Iraqi MoD sought to replace Sallyport as the AFAB BBS contractor. [ECF 1] ¶ 18; see AR 60. Sallyport alleges that “[t]he Iraqi MoD began a tender process for the follow-on BBS contract at AFAB by [] sending tenders to seven contractors, but specifically excluded Sallyport[.]” [ECF 1] ¶ 18. Sallyport maintains that, throughout this process, “the Iraqi MoD was in contact with the [Air Force Security Assistance and Cooperation Directorate (‘AFSAC’)].” Id. ¶ 19. According to Sallyport, AFSAC worked with the Iraqi MoD and the MoD’s preferred vendor, Contractor A, to draft a performance work statement for the follow-on contract. Id. On November 27, 2023, AFSAC sent a letter to the Iraqi MoD regarding the procurement process for the follow-on AFAB BBS contract. [ECF 1] ¶ 20; AR 378. In the letter, AFSAC acknowledged the Iraqi MoD’s “desire to possibly change the BBS contractor and contract services.” AR 378. AFSAC explained that, while “[i]t is possible to direct changes relatively quickly to the contract services through the current contractor; [] pursuing a new BBS provider is a long process,” and that, “whether it is open competition or sole source, [the process] can take up to 2 years.” Id. AFSAC further explained that the U.S. government “follows a well- established and regulated contract award process with required actions reviewed by subject matter experts, to include defining the requirement, researching the market, developing an acquisition strategy, drafting the Request for Proposal, evaluating sources, selecting a source, and finally awarding the contract.” Id. Based on AFSAC’s “understand[ing of the Iraqi MoD’s] desire . . . to request a sole source award to a different contractor[,] . . . [AFSAC] provide[d] more details on how a sole source award works” and informed the Iraqi MoD that it required an LOR requesting a follow-on contract with a new sole source contractor by December 31, 2023, or an LOR requesting a follow-on contract with Sallyport by March 15, 2024. AR 378-79. In February 2024, the Iraqi MoD “allegedly sent another tender to the seven vendors, but not Sallyport, and requested proposals for a potential sole source.” [ECF 1] ¶ 21. However, two weeks later, “the Iraqi MoD notified all the vendors that it had selected a more ‘advanced’ company to whom it would sole source the work.” Id. Thereafter, the Iraqi MoD issued an LOR stating that it had “selected [Contractor A] [] as the new sole source provider.” AR 138. It also requested that Sallyport’s current contract be extended while the U.S. government “continue[d] to pursue a contract award with [Contractor A].” Id. Based on this direction, AFSAC requested a proposal from Contractor A and a plan on how it intended to fulfill the requirements for the AFAB BBS contract. AR 225. According to AFSAC, “[Contractor A’s] proposal stated that [it was] teaming with an[] Iraqi entity name[d] [Subcontractor A].” Id. 2 The Court cites to the Administrative Record filed by the government at [ECFs 33, 41, 65] as “AR ___.” 5  On May 10, 2024, Sallyport notified AFSAC “of potential violations tainting the . . . intended sole-source award of a follow-on contract for [AFAB BBS services] . . . to [Contractor A].” AR 323. Sallyport stated that, “[i]n early 2024, a member of the Iraqi [MoD] confidentially disclosed to Sallyport that seven of its employees were working closely with . . . the owner of the host nation vendor [Subcontractor A], to have the AFAB BBS follow-on contract awarded to [Contractor A] on a sole source basis.” [ECF 1] ¶ 24; AR 326. According to Sallyport, “[Subcontractor A] was once a significant subcontractor to Sallyport at AFAB,” AR 326, but Sallyport “terminated its relationship with [Subcontractor A] in 2024 based on credible allegations that [Subcontractor A] [was] affiliated with various Iranian-backed militias in Iraq,” [ECF 1] ¶ 24; see AR 326. Sallyport also alleged that the owner of Subcontractor A, Owner A, was “business partners” with the Deputy General Secretary of the Iraqi MoD, and that the “General . . . has been one of the driving forces, along with the Minister of Defense, behind the [Iraqi] MoD’s push to replace Sallyport as the prime AFAB BBS contractor.” [ECF 1] ¶ 25. Sallyport further stated that it “ha[d] confirmed through . . . credible sources, that [Owner A] actively supports Iranian-backed militias and uses [Subcontractor A]’s . . . contract profits” to do so. Id. ¶ 26; see AR 326. “On May 16, 2024, [AFSAC] notified Sallyport that it needed to submit a Withdrawal Plan detailing how Sallyport plan[ned] to ramp-down support towards the end of the contract and fully withdraw contractual support.” [ECF 1] ¶ 22 (internal quotation marks omitted). Sallyport sent AFSAC a follow-up letter on May 23, 2024, requesting “information and guidance on next steps because the sole-source award to [Contractor A] appeared to be moving forward despite Sallyport’s letter providing credible reports of a bribery and kickback scheme related to [the Iraqi] MoD’s selection of [Contractor A].” Id. ¶ 30. Sallyport sent AFSAC another letter on September 20, 2024, “disclos[ing] other instances of corruption associated with AFAB.” Id. ¶ 31. On October 2, 2024, Sallyport sent AFSAC yet another letter requesting “[U.S. Central Command] Vendor Threat Mitigation vetting for subcontractors at AFAB.” Id. ¶ 32. This third letter was specifically in response to Sallyport’s receiving information about an “approved vendor having ties to Iranian-backed militia, paying funds it receives from its subcontract to that militia, and paying bribes to steer the follow-on AFAB BBS contract to [Contractor A].” Id. On January 31, 2025, after an investigation “found the Director of Subcontractor A to be a threat to force protection, AFSAC determined that “no [vendor threat] mitigation plan [could] be conducted by Subcontractor A” and stated that “Subcontractor A should not be contracted or allowed to be subcontracted for any services provided to the [U.S. government] in Iraq.” AR 225, 322. Based on these findings, the contracting officer for the AFAB BBS contract determined that “Subcontractor A is not a responsible subcontractor” for the AFAB BBS follow- on contract. AR 223, 320. Shortly thereafter, on February 5, 2025, Contractor A withdrew its proposal because it depended on Subcontractor A to perform a significant portion of the BBS requirements. AR 1592. On February 13, 2025, AFSAC notified the Iraqi MoD of Contractor A’s withdrawal. AR 175. In its notice, AFSAC stated that, “[i]n order to move forward and continue efforts to transition from Sallyport, we need a new [LOR] from the Government of Iraq [] as soon as possible” and that “[t]he LOR should identify a new sole source provider or request the US government conduct an open competition.” Id. AFSAC explained that “[t]he sole source process is much faster than an open competition which typically takes a minimum of 2 years” 6 and that AFSAC “can work with the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq [(‘OSC-I’)] to develop an LOR which meets [Iraq’s] mission needs.” Id. On February 26, 2025, the Iraqi MoD issued an LOR requesting that Vectrus “be selected as the [s]ole [s]ource provider for the follow-on BBS contract as soon as possible.” AR 176, 178. On February 27, 2025, the Iraqi MoD issued an LOR requesting the removal of Contractor A as the sole source provider and requesting an extension of Sallyport’s period of performance to January 3, 2026. AR 25. On the same day, the Air Force contacted Vectrus and requested a draft performance work statement and proposal. AR 204-06. The Air Force also inquired into whether Vectrus planned to use subcontractors and the names of the subcontractors, if any. AR 204. In response, Vectrus provided a prospective subcontractor list that included Subcontractor A and Subcontractor A affiliates. See AR 203. Thereafter, the Air Force informed Vectrus that Subcontractor A had been “determined to be a non-responsible subcontractor . . . and therefore not eligible for a subcontract award in support of the Iraq BBS requirement.” AR 199-200. In response, Vectrus stated that it would “not use [Subcontractor A],” AR 199, and provided updated subcontractor lists, AR 881, 1174-75. Among the newly listed subcontractors was Subcontractor B. AR 881, 1174-75. AFSAC and Vectrus discussed the grounds for Subcontractor A’s non-responsibility determination [* * *]. AR 615. On May 8, 2025, Sallyport sent a letter notifying AFSAC and OSC-I of Owner A’s alleged involvement with the intended sole source award to Vectrus. AR 1547-48. Sallyport stated that it was “continuing to obtain intelligence and evidence of the alleged involvement of [Owner A] as well as other information indicating that [the Iraqi] MoD’s latest sole-source selection appears again to be tainted by conduct that would violate United States laws and regulations.” AR 1548. Sallyport also advised that “the best way to mitigate improper motivations behind a sole source selection of a contractor at [AFAB] is for AFSAC to conduct the selection of a new contractor according to full and open competition.” Id. Shortly thereafter, on May 13, 2025, Sallyport provided an additional letter including evidence of potential violations of U.S. law and regulations by Owner A. See AR 1553-55. On May 22, 2025, AFSAC executed an LOA with the Iraqi MoD identifying Vectrus as the sole source provider for the follow-on AFAB BBS contract. AR 502-04. The Air Force then completed an “International Agreement Competitive Restrictions” memorandum, which justified the use of the international agreement exception to full and open competition under CICA and FAR 6.302-4. AR 508-10. Prior to the LOA identifying Vectrus as the sole source provider, the U.S. government offered the Iraqi MoD an LOA, which would have extended Sallyport’s contract period of performance through December 31, 2025. AR 511, 593; [ECF 1] ¶ 34. However, the Iraqi MoD declined to implement the LOA granting such extension, and Sallyport’s contract expiration remained July 31, 2025. AR 511, 593; [ECF 1] ¶ 34. On June 17, 2025, Sallyport sent AFSAC another letter, alleging that “[Owner A] and . . . [Subcontractor A] were positioning themselves to be part of [Vectrus’s] transition team and were at the center of a scheme where 50% of all subcontract work would go to [Subcontractor A] and the other 50% would go to vendors on an Iraqi MoD approved list who had agreed to pay kickbacks to MoD officials.” [ECF 1] ¶ 37; see id. ¶¶ 40, 41. According to Sallyport, “[Subcontractor A] and [Owner A] have been included in transition-related activities at AFAB,” 7 such as attending meetings between Vectrus and the Iraqi MoD. Id. ¶ 38. In addition, Sallyport stated that two of its former employees, who now have ties with Subcontractor A and Owner A, “were recently seen by Sallyport personnel at [AFAB] engaging in [Vectrus] related transition activities.” Id. Sallyport requested that “AFSAC inform Sallyport no later than June 23, 2025[,] of its intent to investigate the potential violations.” Id. ¶ 43 (internal quotation marks omitted). On June 25, 2025, Sallyport sent another letter to AFSAC. [ECF 1] ¶ 44; AR 1565-66. This letter included “additional information about [Owner A]’s connections to, and support of, various Iranian-backed militias,” asked for the Air Force’s acknowledgement of receipt, and “requested information about the status of the intended sole source AFAB BBS contract, and any actions AFSAC ha[d], or intend[ed] to take, in response to the issues raised by Sallyport.” [ECF 1] ¶ 44; see AR 1567-89. AFSAC responded by email on the same day, confirming receipt of both the June 17th and June 25th letters and stating that the letters “have been . . . or will be . . . coordinate[d] with the appropriate security personnel.” [ECF 1] ¶ 45. The Air Force entered the AFAB BBS contract with Vectrus on June 25, 2025. AR 1276. According to Sallyport, it learned of the award to Vectrus from a DoD website on the following day. [ECF 1] ¶ 46. C. Procedural History Sallyport filed its complaint on July 3, 2025. [ECF 1]. It seeks a declaratory judgment that the Air Force’s decision to proceed with a sole source award to Vectrus is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise contrary to law. Id. at 26. 3 Sallyport also seeks a permanent injunction prohibiting the Air Force “from authorizing performance under the improper sole source contract” and “from awarding a[n] AFAB BBS contract on a sole source basis at the direction of the Iraqi MoD.” Id. After an initial status conference on July 9, 2025, see [ECF 11], the Court issued a scheduling order on July 17, 2025, [ECF 26], which was amended on July 25, 2025, [ECF 32]. Pursuant to the amended scheduling order, the government filed the administrative record on July 31, 2025. [ECF 33]. Thereafter, Sallyport filed a motion to complete the record, [ECF 34], to which the government filed a response, [ECF 39]. However, following a status conference on August 27, 2025, see [ECF 38], the parties agreed on the contents of the administrative record, and the Court issued a revised briefing schedule, [ECF 40]. On September 12, 2025, the government filed corrections and an addendum to the administrative record. [ECF 41]. On September 17, 2025, Sallyport filed its motion for judgment on the administrative record. Pl.’s Mot. J. Admin. R. [ECF 44]. In its motion, Sallyport argues that the Air Force’s sole source award to Vectrus violated CICA, as implemented through the SAMM; violated the Never Contract with the Enemy Act (“NCWE Act”); 4 and violated FAR Subpart 9.1. [ECF 44-2] at 10. On December 5, 2025, following an unopposed amendment to the briefing schedule, [ECF 48], and a stay in the case due to a lapse in appropriations, see [ECF 50], the government filed its 3 All page numbers cited from the filings on the docket refer to the page numbers generated by the CM/ECF system. 4 Never Contract with the Enemy Act, Carl Levin & Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization Act (“NDAA”) for Fiscal Year (“FY”) 2015, Pub. L. No. 113-291, §§ 841-43, 111 Stat. 3292, 3450-57 (2014) [hereinafter FY 2015 NDAA]. 8 motion to dismiss, cross-motion for judgment on the administrative record, and response to Sallyport’s motion, Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, Cross-Mot., & Resp. [ECF 55]. On the same day, Vectrus filed its motion to dismiss, cross-motion for judgment on the administrative record, and response to Sallyport’s motion. Def.-Intervenor’s Mot. to Dismiss, Cross-Mot., & Resp. [ECF 54]. The parties’ respective motions are fully briefed, see Pl.’s Reply & Resp [ECF 61]; Def.’s Reply [ECF 62]; Def.-Intervenor’s Reply [ECF 63], and the Court held oral argument on January 14, 2026, see [ECF 56]. 5 II. Motions to Dismiss for Lack of Standing In its motion to dismiss, the government contends that Sallyport lacks Article III standing. See [ECF 55] at 18-26. Specifically, the government asserts that Sallyport’s claims “challenge the LOA,” id. at 20, and that “this Court may not consider any challenges to the LOA because they arise from a treaty over which this Court lacks jurisdiction,” id. The government also argues that “Sallyport’s protest [] presents a nonjusticiable political question that this Court should abstain from adjudicating,” id. at 21. According to the government, “Sallyport asks the Court to set aside Iraq’s LOA for a sole-source procurement, and [] require the award to be made on a competitive basis.” Id. at 24. The government argues that, because this relief would exceed the Court’s authority, “there is no remedy that this Court can provide Sallyport consistent with its jurisdictional limits.” Id.; see also id. at 25 (stating that this Court “does not have the power to order an agency to alter the terms of an LOA or to inquire into a foreign nation’s reasons for an LOR or its terms”). Vectrus argues that “Sallyport does not have Tucker Act or Article III standing to bring this protest.” [ECF 54-1] at 23. Vectrus states that “Sallyport seeks relief the Court cannot grant—to order the Air Force to ignore international agreements and [CICA][.]” [ECF 54-1] at 9. Vectrus asserts that it is the Iraqi MoD’s actions, rather than the Air Force’s actions, that caused the alleged injury to Sallyport and that, therefore, Sallyport lacks Article III standing because its alleged injury will not be remedied by the relief it seeks. Id. at 27. According to Vectrus, “Sallyport lacks Tucker Act standing because it is neither an interested party nor prejudiced by any significant error.” Id. at 24 (emphasis omitted). 6 5 On January 9, 2026, Vectrus moved to supplement its cross-motion for judgment on the administrative record, seeking to include the results of an investigation by the Iraqi MoD on the grounds that “[such] documentation directly relates to the issue of Sallyport’s standing and the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction.” Def.-Intervenor’s Mot. [ECF 66] at 2. On January 21, 2026, Sallyport responded to Vectrus’s motion, arguing that it was “procedurally deficient,” that Vectrus’s arguments were “contrary to the [United States Court of Appeals for the] Federal Circuit’s standing inquiry,” and that “the information proffered by Vectrus [was] of questionable authenticity, relevance, and credibility.” Pl.’s Resp. [ECF 67] at 2. Vectrus replied on January 28, 2026. Def.- Intervenor’s Reply [ECF 68]. 6 Vectrus also contends that Sallyport was aware of the basis of its claims “well before the [AFAB BBS] contract [was] issued,” [ECF 54-1] at 29, and that “[p]ost-award protests that raise challenges [that] a protestor was aware of before the award are untimely and subject to dismissal,” id. (citing Blue & Gold Fleet, L.P. v. United States, 492 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). The Court finds Vectrus’s argument unavailing. The Federal Circuit has held that “a party who has the opportunity to object to the terms of a government solicitation containing a patent error and fails to do so prior to the close of the bidding process waives its ability to raise the same objection subsequently in a bid protest action in the Court of Federal Claims.” Blue & Gold Fleet, L.P., 492 F.3d at 1313. The “Blue & Gold waiver rule is predicated not only on the notion of avoiding delay that could benefit the delaying party, but also on the 9  Sallyport contends that “[n]one of the plethora of procedural arguments the [g]overnment and Vectrus conjure allows them to escape review of the merits[.]” [ECF 61] at 11. Sallyport posits that “[i]mplementing agencies are not required to unquestionably accept a foreign government’s demand for a sole source contract,” id. at 17, and that “[i]f a foreign government demands something that is contrary to U.S. law, the agency . . . must refuse the request,” id. In Sallyport’s view, it “is not asking the Court to direct Iraq to take any actions . . . it is asking the Court to decide whether the Air Force violated the law by awarding a sole source contract to Vectrus, and, if so, to require the Air Force to follow the law.” Id. at 18 (emphasis omitted). Sallyport further explains that its claims “are limited to whether the Air Force has complied with federal procurement law when negotiating and awarding a contract for BBS services to Vectrus,” id. at 15, and that “[t]he [AECA], federal procurement regulations, and this Court’s precedent all confirm these are not political issues,” id. According to Sallyport, its requested relief is “well within the Court’s power under the Tucker Act,” id. at 16, and “if the [g]overnment had properly held a lawful full and open competition, . . . Sallyport had at least a substantial chance at prevailing,” id. at 13. A. Sallyport has Article III Standing Article III standing relates to a court’s authority to adjudicate claims and “implicat[es] dismissal under RCFC 12(b)(1) or 12(h)(3).” Associated Energy Grp., LLC v. United States, 172 Fed. Cl. 799, 810 (2024) (citing CACI, Inc.-Fed. v. United States, 67 F.4th 1145, 1152 (Fed. Cir. 2023)). “The Court of Federal Claims, though an Article I court, . . . applies the same standing requirements enforced by other federal courts created under Article III,” Anderson v. United States, 344 F.3d 1343, 1350 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2003), and must address Article III challenges before adjudicating the claims on the merits, Myers Investigative & Sec. Servs., Inc. v. United States, 275 F.3d 1366, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 102-04 (1998)), abrogated on other grounds by CACI, Inc.-Fed., 67 F.4th 1145. “[T]o establish [Article III] standing, a plaintiff must show (i) that he suffered an injury in fact that is concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; (ii) that the injury was likely caused by the defendant; and (iii) that the injury would likely be redressed by judicial relief.” TransUnion LLC v. United States, 594 U.S. 413, 423 (2021) (citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)). “If the plaintiff does not claim to have suffered an injury that the defendant caused and the court can remedy, there is no case or controversy for the federal court to resolve.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). When reviewing a motion to dismiss under RCFC 12(b)(1), the “court must accept as true all undisputed facts asserted in the plaintiff’s complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in notion of preserving challenges and providing notice to interested parties.” Harmonia Holdings Grp., LLC v. United States, 20 F.4th 759, 767 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (citing Bannum, Inc. v. United States, 779 F.3d 1376, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). Here, Sallyport preserved its challenges by notifying the Air Force of the alleged procurement violations in advance of the Air Force issuing the sole source award to Vectrus. See AR 1550-52, 1553-55, 1556-58, 1565-66 (Sallyport’s letters notifying the Air Force of potential violations related to the AFAB BBS contract); see also Harmonia Holdings Grp., LLC, 20 F.4th at 767 (finding Blue & Gold waiver inapplicable when the protester files a timely, formal challenge with the agency); SEKRI, Inc. v. United States, 34 F.4th 1063, 1074 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (finding that a bidder did not waive its claims where the agency proceeded with the procurement despite notice of the alleged violation). 10 favor of the plaintiff.” Trusted Integration, Inc. v. United States, 659 F.3d 1159, 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing Henke v. United States, 60 F.3d 795, 797 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). If, however, the defendant challenges the factual basis of the court’s jurisdiction, disputed allegations in the complaint are not controlling, Cedars–Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Watkins, 11 F.3d 1573, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1993), and the Court may look to relevant evidence to determine the existence of jurisdiction, Reynolds v. Army & Air Force Exch. Serv., 846 F.2d 746, 747 (Fed. Cir. 1988). “The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing” its jurisdiction. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561. Further, the plaintiff’s Article III standing “must be supported in the same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the manner and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation.” Id. (citations omitted). If the court determines that a plaintiff lacks standing, then the court lacks jurisdiction and must dismiss the case. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006); RCFC 12(h)(3); see Crow Creek Sioux Tribe v. United States, 900 F.3d 1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Here, the Court finds that Sallyport has Article III standing to bring its claims. Sallyport alleges that “the [Air Force’s] decision to proceed with the sole source award requested by the Iraqi MoD, despite [] indications of violation of U.S. law and ethical business practices[,] was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, and in violation of the law.” [ECF 1] ¶ 59. Specifically, Sallyport contends that, “[b]y proceeding with the sole source AFAB BBS follow on contract without adequately addressing the allegations of fraud and corruption tainting the Iraqi MoD’s sole source decision,” id., the Air Force violated the SAMM, id.; the NCWE Act and its implementing regulations, id. ¶¶ 51-52; and the FAR, id. ¶¶ 55, 58. According to Sallyport, if not for the Air Force’s irrational decision not to investigate the allegations of fraud and corruption, Sallyport would have continued to perform under its AFAB BBS contract until a proper full and open competitive process could be conducted. Id. ¶ 15. Sallyport also alleges that “a full and open competition is the only procurement process that will avoid the taint of fraud and corruption that motivated the decision by the [Iraqi MoD] to issue a sole source award.” Id. Based on these allegations, the Court finds that Sallyport has established that it suffered an actual injury—the loss of its ability to compete for the follow-on AFAB BBS contract. Sallyport has also established that its injury was caused by the Air Force—namely, the Air Force’s allegedly irrational decision to accept the Iraqi MoD’s request for a sole source procurement and the Air Force’s alleged violation of law in making the sole source award to Vectrus. Lastly, if Sallyport were