Mercuria Energy Group Limited v. Republic of Poland
CourtCourt of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
Docket25-7152
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Argued September 30, 2026 Decided November 20, 2026
No. 25-7152
MERCURIA ENERGY GROUP LIMITED,
APPELLANT
v.
REPUBLIC OF POLAND,
APPELLEE
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
(No. 1:23-cv-03572)
James E. Berger argued the cause for appellant. With
him on the briefs was Charlene C. Sun.
Matthew D. McGill and Thomas C.C. Childs were on the
brief for amicus curiae Foresight Fund Managers Ltd. in
support of appellant.
Elliot Friedman, Ruth Montiel, and Carla Sung Ah Yoon
were on the brief for amicus curiae Professor George A.
Bermann in support of appellant.
2
Timothy G. Nelson, David Herlihy SC, Shay Dvoretzky,
Parker Rider-Longmaid, Bradley A. Klein, and Sylvia O.
Tsakos were on the brief for amici curiae NextEra Energy
Global Holdings B.V., et al. in support of appellant.
Csaba M. Rusznak argued the cause for appellee. With
him on the brief was Dorieke Overduin.
Sally L. Pei was on the brief for amicus curiae the
European Commission in support of appellee.
Before: MILLETT and WILKINS, Circuit Judges, and
RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judge.
Opinion for the court filed by Senior Circuit Judge
RANDOLPH.
Concurring opinion filed by Senior Circuit Judge
RANDOLPH.
RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judge: This is an appeal from the
judgment of the district court denying the petition of Mercuria
Energy Group, a Cyprian company, to enforce a Swedish
arbitration award against the Republic of Poland concerning the
interest on a fine Poland levied on Mercuria in 2008. A Swedish
appellate court annulled the arbitration award pursuant to
European Union law prohibiting the enforcement of arbitration
awards between member states. Neither the United States, nor
any federal or state agency, nor any private United States entity,
has any connection with those protracted proceedings.
Even so, the New York Convention entitled Mercuria to
bring this action. The United States, as a member of the
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, agreed that our federal courts would be open
3
to recognizing and enforcing foreign arbitration awards pursuant
to the Convention done at New York, June 10, 1958, T.I.A.S.
No. 6997 (Dec. 29, 1970). Congress implemented the New
York Convention in the Federal Arbitration Act. See 9 U.S.C.
§§ 201-08; Getma Int’l v. Republic of Guinea, 862 F.3d 45, 48
(D.C. Cir. 2017).
The Federal Arbitration Act requires a federal court to
confirm a foreign arbitration award from a signatory state, which
Sweden is, “unless it finds one of the grounds for refusal or
deferral of recognition or enforcement of the award specified in
the said Convention.” 9 U.S.C. § 207; see Venezuela US SLR v.
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 178 F.4th 679, 681 (D.C. Cir.
2026). One such “ground” is at issue in this case.
Article V(1)(e) of the Convention states that a court “may”
refuse to enforce an arbitration award that “has been set aside or
suspended by a competent authority of the country in which, or
under the law of which, that award was made.”1
Our court has indicated that the word “may” in Article
V(1)(e) signifies that federal courts have “discretion” whether
to enforce, or not to enforce, annulled arbitration awards.
TermoRio S.A. E.S.P. v. Electranta S.P., 487 F.3d 928, 937-38
(D.C. Cir. 2007). Discretion yes, but as the Great Chief Justice
stated: “This is said to be a motion to the discretion of the court.
This is true. But a motion to its discretion is a motion, not to its
inclination, but to its judgment; and its judgment is to be guided
by sound legal principles.” United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30,
35 (C.C.D.Va. 1807) (No. 14,692D) (Marshall, Circuit Justice).
What then are the guiding “legal principles”?
1
Mercuria does not dispute that Sweden’s appellate court is a
“competent” authority under the New York Convention empowered
by law to set aside arbitral awards according to its own domestic law.
4
We have held that “we will set aside an annulment only if it
violates this country’s ‘most basic notions of morality and
justice.’” Getma, 862 F.3d at 49 (quoting TermoRio, 487 F.3d
at 938). We have also held that a foreign court’s annulment
decision may be disregarded only if it is “repugnant to
fundamental notions of what is decent and just in the United
States.” Id. (quoting TermoRio, 487 F.3d at 939); accord Diag
Hum. S.E. v. Czech Republic-Ministry of Health, 907 F.3d 606,
612 (D.C. Cir. 2018). This standard is “high” and “infrequently
met,” and “we have declined to ‘second-guess’ a competent
authority’s annulment of an arbitral award absent ‘extraordinary
circumstances.’” Id. at 48 (quoting TermoRio, 487 F.3d at 936-
39).
The district court, McFadden, J., issued a comprehensive
opinion respecting the Swedish court’s decision and dismissing
Mercuria’s petition for enforcement. Mercuria Energy Grp. Ltd.
v. Republic of Poland, 805 F. Supp. 3d 174 (D.D.C. 2025). We
shall assume familiarity with that opinion.
Mercuria’s three arguments on appeal are basically those the
company presented in the district court. Appellant Br. 28-31.
For the reasons expressed in Judge McFadden’s thorough and
well-reasoned opinion, we agree with his rejection of each
argument.
Mercuria’s argument number one is that the district court
“misframed the Article V inquiry” to be whether the European
Union (EU) courts were “wrong” about European law.
Appellant Br. 29. Judge McFadden’s opinion did no such thing.
Quite the contrary. Judge McFadden wrote in the clearest
possible terms: “It is not this Court’s place to superintend EU
courts as they interpret their own laws. Basic principles of
comity shun such self-aggrandizement.” Mercuria Energy, 805
F. Supp. 3d at 183. Exactly so.
5
Mercuria’s second and third arguments offer another reason
why the district court should have disregarded the decision of
the Swedish court annulling the Swedish arbitration award.
Appellant Br. 30-31. Both arguments rely on a Second Circuit
decision holding that four “powerful considerations” justified
disregarding a foreign judgment that had annulled an arbitration
award. See Corporación Mexicana de Mantenimiento Integral,
S. de R.L. de C.V. v. Pemex-Exploración y Producción, 832 F.3d
92, 107-11 (2d Cir. 2016). Mercuria asks us to view its situation
“through the lens of Pemex,” which it claims shows just how
“repugnant” the Swedish court’s decision was to “U.S. policy
interests.” Appellant Br. 37.
This is the same “kitchen-sink approach” we rejected just
last term. See Venezuela US, 178 F.4th at 686. Judge
McFadden could see no substantive similarities between this
case and Pemex. Mercuria Energy, 805 F. Supp. 3d at 184-86.
He determined that the “‘powerful’ public policy considerations
that drove the Pemex court to disregard the award annulment are
largely absent here.” Id. at 184. We agree with his reasoning
and his conclusion that the Swedish annulment is not “repugnant
to fundamental notions of what is decent and just.”2 Id. at 186
(quoting TermoRio, 487 F.3d at 939).
Affirmed.
2
Our court has not determined whether the standard of review is
de novo or abuse of discretion in cases such as this. As in Getma, we
need not reach that issue here because we would affirm the district
court under either standard. See Getma, 862 F.2d at 48.
RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judge, concurring:
I write separately because I believe our court went astray in
using “basic notions of morality and justice” to evaluate the
validity of foreign judicial decisions setting aside foreign
arbitration awards. Getma Int’l v. Republic of Guinea, 862 F.3d
45, 49 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
Getma determined that our opinion in TermoRio S.A. E.S.P.
v. Electranta S.P., 487 F.3d 928, 938 (D.C. Cir. 2007), by
quoting this language from a Second Circuit opinion,1 adopted
it as some sort of test. But it seems clear to me that the
TermoRio opinion neither adopted nor endorsed any such
“morality and justice” standard. TermoRio concluded that the
foreign proceedings in that case were not “tainted” and that the
foreign judgment was nothing “other than authentic.” 487 F.3d
at 930 (citing Baker Marine (Nig.) Ltd. v. Chevron (Nig.) Ltd.,
191 F.3d 194 (2d Cir. 1999)). Based on that determination,
TermoRio announced its holding clearly: “Accordingly, we hold
that, because the arbitration award was lawfully nullified by the
country in which the award was made, appellants have no cause
of action in the United States to seek enforcement of the award
under the [Federal Arbitration Act] or the New York
Convention.” Id. That holding in no wise required the court to
consider “decency,” or “justice,” or “morality.” Nor did the
Second Circuit in Baker Marine, upon which TermoRio’s
holding relied, invoke any such standard.
The cause of Getma’s confusion may have been the
following sentence in TermoRio: “Accepting that there is a
narrow public policy gloss on Article V(1)(e) of the Convention
and that a foreign judgment is unenforceable as against public
policy to the extent that it is ‘repugnant to fundamental notions
of what is decent and just in the United States,’ Tahan, 662 F.2d
at 864 (internal quotation marks omitted), appellants’ claims still
1
Ackermann v. Levine, 788 F.2d 830, 841 (2d Cir. 1986).
2
fail.” 487 F.3d at 939. The dangling participle “Accepting” in
that sentence surely means “Even if the court accepted
arguendo . . ..” The immediately preceding sentence in
TermoRio makes this clear enough: “Given that Article V(1)(e)
contains no exception for public policy . . ..” Id. at 938.
While precedent requires adherence to Getma, these
formulations deserve reconsideration. None are specified in the
New York Convention or in the Federal Arbitration Act or in
any other federal law.2 And for good reason. How are federal
judges to determine “what is decent” or what are “basic notions
of morality”? The framers of the Constitution “might have made
the judge the mouthpiece of the common will, finding it out by
his contacts with people generally; but he would then have been
ruler, like the Judges of [ancient] Israel.” Learned Hand, How
Far Is a Judge Free in Rendering a Decision? (1933), reprinted
in The Spirit of Liberty 103, 109 (Irving Dilliard ed., 3d ed.
1960). Judges have no business deciding what is decent and
what is moral, and they should not be required to determine
whether a foreign court’s decision offends some notion of
“justice.”3
2
It appears the “test” is derived from the Restatement 2d Conflict
of Laws § 117, comment c (1971) (endorsing enforcement of a foreign
judgment that is not “repugnant to fundamental notions of what is
decent and just in the State where enforcement is sought”). See
TermoRio, 487 F.3d at 938.
3
Judge Learned Hand: “I remember once I was with [Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes]; it was a Saturday when the Court was to
confer. It was before we had a motor car, and we jogged along in an
old coupé. When we got down to the Capitol [where the Supreme
Court then resided], I wanted to provoke a response, so as he walked
off, I said to him: ‘Well, sir, goodbye. Do justice!’ He turned quite
sharply and he said: ‘Come here. Come here.’ I answered: ‘Oh, I
know, I know.’ He replied: ‘That is not my job. My job is to play the
3
game according to the rules.’” Learned Hand, A Personal Confession,
in The Spirit of Liberty 302, 306-07 (Irving Dilliard ed., 3d ed. 1960);
see Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America 6 (1990); Michael Herz,
“Do Justice!” Variations of Thrice-Told Tale, 82 Va. L. Rev. 111,
146-61(1996) (an addendum recounting many variations of this tale).