Full Opinion

United States Court of Appeals FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT Argued September 30, 2026 Decided November 20, 2026 No. 25-7152 MERCURIA ENERGY GROUP LIMITED, APPELLANT v. REPUBLIC OF POLAND, APPELLEE Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (No. 1:23-cv-03572) James E. Berger argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs was Charlene C. Sun. Matthew D. McGill and Thomas C.C. Childs were on the brief for amicus curiae Foresight Fund Managers Ltd. in support of appellant. Elliot Friedman, Ruth Montiel, and Carla Sung Ah Yoon were on the brief for amicus curiae Professor George A. Bermann in support of appellant. 2 Timothy G. Nelson, David Herlihy SC, Shay Dvoretzky, Parker Rider-Longmaid, Bradley A. Klein, and Sylvia O. Tsakos were on the brief for amici curiae NextEra Energy Global Holdings B.V., et al. in support of appellant. Csaba M. Rusznak argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief was Dorieke Overduin. Sally L. Pei was on the brief for amicus curiae the European Commission in support of appellee. Before: MILLETT and WILKINS, Circuit Judges, and RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judge. Opinion for the court filed by Senior Circuit Judge RANDOLPH. Concurring opinion filed by Senior Circuit Judge RANDOLPH. RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judge: This is an appeal from the judgment of the district court denying the petition of Mercuria Energy Group, a Cyprian company, to enforce a Swedish arbitration award against the Republic of Poland concerning the interest on a fine Poland levied on Mercuria in 2008. A Swedish appellate court annulled the arbitration award pursuant to European Union law prohibiting the enforcement of arbitration awards between member states. Neither the United States, nor any federal or state agency, nor any private United States entity, has any connection with those protracted proceedings. Even so, the New York Convention entitled Mercuria to bring this action. The United States, as a member of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, agreed that our federal courts would be open 3 to recognizing and enforcing foreign arbitration awards pursuant to the Convention done at New York, June 10, 1958, T.I.A.S. No. 6997 (Dec. 29, 1970). Congress implemented the New York Convention in the Federal Arbitration Act. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-08; Getma Int’l v. Republic of Guinea, 862 F.3d 45, 48 (D.C. Cir. 2017). The Federal Arbitration Act requires a federal court to confirm a foreign arbitration award from a signatory state, which Sweden is, “unless it finds one of the grounds for refusal or deferral of recognition or enforcement of the award specified in the said Convention.” 9 U.S.C. § 207; see Venezuela US SLR v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 178 F.4th 679, 681 (D.C. Cir. 2026). One such “ground” is at issue in this case. Article V(1)(e) of the Convention states that a court “may” refuse to enforce an arbitration award that “has been set aside or suspended by a competent authority of the country in which, or under the law of which, that award was made.”1 Our court has indicated that the word “may” in Article V(1)(e) signifies that federal courts have “discretion” whether to enforce, or not to enforce, annulled arbitration awards. TermoRio S.A. E.S.P. v. Electranta S.P., 487 F.3d 928, 937-38 (D.C. Cir. 2007). Discretion yes, but as the Great Chief Justice stated: “This is said to be a motion to the discretion of the court. This is true. But a motion to its discretion is a motion, not to its inclination, but to its judgment; and its judgment is to be guided by sound legal principles.” United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 35 (C.C.D.Va. 1807) (No. 14,692D) (Marshall, Circuit Justice). What then are the guiding “legal principles”? 1 Mercuria does not dispute that Sweden’s appellate court is a “competent” authority under the New York Convention empowered by law to set aside arbitral awards according to its own domestic law. 4 We have held that “we will set aside an annulment only if it violates this country’s ‘most basic notions of morality and justice.’” Getma, 862 F.3d at 49 (quoting TermoRio, 487 F.3d at 938). We have also held that a foreign court’s annulment decision may be disregarded only if it is “repugnant to fundamental notions of what is decent and just in the United States.” Id. (quoting TermoRio, 487 F.3d at 939); accord Diag Hum. S.E. v. Czech Republic-Ministry of Health, 907 F.3d 606, 612 (D.C. Cir. 2018). This standard is “high” and “infrequently met,” and “we have declined to ‘second-guess’ a competent authority’s annulment of an arbitral award absent ‘extraordinary circumstances.’” Id. at 48 (quoting TermoRio, 487 F.3d at 936- 39). The district court, McFadden, J., issued a comprehensive opinion respecting the Swedish court’s decision and dismissing Mercuria’s petition for enforcement. Mercuria Energy Grp. Ltd. v. Republic of Poland, 805 F. Supp. 3d 174 (D.D.C. 2025). We shall assume familiarity with that opinion. Mercuria’s three arguments on appeal are basically those the company presented in the district court. Appellant Br. 28-31. For the reasons expressed in Judge McFadden’s thorough and well-reasoned opinion, we agree with his rejection of each argument. Mercuria’s argument number one is that the district court “misframed the Article V inquiry” to be whether the European Union (EU) courts were “wrong” about European law. Appellant Br. 29. Judge McFadden’s opinion did no such thing. Quite the contrary. Judge McFadden wrote in the clearest possible terms: “It is not this Court’s place to superintend EU courts as they interpret their own laws. Basic principles of comity shun such self-aggrandizement.” Mercuria Energy, 805 F. Supp. 3d at 183. Exactly so. 5 Mercuria’s second and third arguments offer another reason why the district court should have disregarded the decision of the Swedish court annulling the Swedish arbitration award. Appellant Br. 30-31. Both arguments rely on a Second Circuit decision holding that four “powerful considerations” justified disregarding a foreign judgment that had annulled an arbitration award. See Corporación Mexicana de Mantenimiento Integral, S. de R.L. de C.V. v. Pemex-Exploración y Producción, 832 F.3d 92, 107-11 (2d Cir. 2016). Mercuria asks us to view its situation “through the lens of Pemex,” which it claims shows just how “repugnant” the Swedish court’s decision was to “U.S. policy interests.” Appellant Br. 37. This is the same “kitchen-sink approach” we rejected just last term. See Venezuela US, 178 F.4th at 686. Judge McFadden could see no substantive similarities between this case and Pemex. Mercuria Energy, 805 F. Supp. 3d at 184-86. He determined that the “‘powerful’ public policy considerations that drove the Pemex court to disregard the award annulment are largely absent here.” Id. at 184. We agree with his reasoning and his conclusion that the Swedish annulment is not “repugnant to fundamental notions of what is decent and just.”2 Id. at 186 (quoting TermoRio, 487 F.3d at 939). Affirmed. 2 Our court has not determined whether the standard of review is de novo or abuse of discretion in cases such as this. As in Getma, we need not reach that issue here because we would affirm the district court under either standard. See Getma, 862 F.2d at 48. RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judge, concurring: I write separately because I believe our court went astray in using “basic notions of morality and justice” to evaluate the validity of foreign judicial decisions setting aside foreign arbitration awards. Getma Int’l v. Republic of Guinea, 862 F.3d 45, 49 (D.C. Cir. 2017). Getma determined that our opinion in TermoRio S.A. E.S.P. v. Electranta S.P., 487 F.3d 928, 938 (D.C. Cir. 2007), by quoting this language from a Second Circuit opinion,1 adopted it as some sort of test. But it seems clear to me that the TermoRio opinion neither adopted nor endorsed any such “morality and justice” standard. TermoRio concluded that the foreign proceedings in that case were not “tainted” and that the foreign judgment was nothing “other than authentic.” 487 F.3d at 930 (citing Baker Marine (Nig.) Ltd. v. Chevron (Nig.) Ltd., 191 F.3d 194 (2d Cir. 1999)). Based on that determination, TermoRio announced its holding clearly: “Accordingly, we hold that, because the arbitration award was lawfully nullified by the country in which the award was made, appellants have no cause of action in the United States to seek enforcement of the award under the [Federal Arbitration Act] or the New York Convention.” Id. That holding in no wise required the court to consider “decency,” or “justice,” or “morality.” Nor did the Second Circuit in Baker Marine, upon which TermoRio’s holding relied, invoke any such standard. The cause of Getma’s confusion may have been the following sentence in TermoRio: “Accepting that there is a narrow public policy gloss on Article V(1)(e) of the Convention and that a foreign judgment is unenforceable as against public policy to the extent that it is ‘repugnant to fundamental notions of what is decent and just in the United States,’ Tahan, 662 F.2d at 864 (internal quotation marks omitted), appellants’ claims still 1 Ackermann v. Levine, 788 F.2d 830, 841 (2d Cir. 1986). 2 fail.” 487 F.3d at 939. The dangling participle “Accepting” in that sentence surely means “Even if the court accepted arguendo . . ..” The immediately preceding sentence in TermoRio makes this clear enough: “Given that Article V(1)(e) contains no exception for public policy . . ..” Id. at 938. While precedent requires adherence to Getma, these formulations deserve reconsideration. None are specified in the New York Convention or in the Federal Arbitration Act or in any other federal law.2 And for good reason. How are federal judges to determine “what is decent” or what are “basic notions of morality”? The framers of the Constitution “might have made the judge the mouthpiece of the common will, finding it out by his contacts with people generally; but he would then have been ruler, like the Judges of [ancient] Israel.” Learned Hand, How Far Is a Judge Free in Rendering a Decision? (1933), reprinted in The Spirit of Liberty 103, 109 (Irving Dilliard ed., 3d ed. 1960). Judges have no business deciding what is decent and what is moral, and they should not be required to determine whether a foreign court’s decision offends some notion of “justice.”3 2 It appears the “test” is derived from the Restatement 2d Conflict of Laws § 117, comment c (1971) (endorsing enforcement of a foreign judgment that is not “repugnant to fundamental notions of what is decent and just in the State where enforcement is sought”). See TermoRio, 487 F.3d at 938. 3 Judge Learned Hand: “I remember once I was with [Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes]; it was a Saturday when the Court was to confer. It was before we had a motor car, and we jogged along in an old coupé. When we got down to the Capitol [where the Supreme Court then resided], I wanted to provoke a response, so as he walked off, I said to him: ‘Well, sir, goodbye. Do justice!’ He turned quite sharply and he said: ‘Come here. Come here.’ I answered: ‘Oh, I know, I know.’ He replied: ‘That is not my job. My job is to play the 3 game according to the rules.’” Learned Hand, A Personal Confession, in The Spirit of Liberty 302, 306-07 (Irving Dilliard ed., 3d ed. 1960); see Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America 6 (1990); Michael Herz, “Do Justice!” Variations of Thrice-Told Tale, 82 Va. L. Rev. 111, 146-61(1996) (an addendum recounting many variations of this tale).