People of the State of Michigan v. DOE

United States Court of Appeals FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT Argued May 15, 2026 Decided September 11, 2026 No. 25-1159 PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AND CHRISTOPHER A. WRIGHT, SECRETARY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, RESPONDENTS MIDCONTINENT INDEPENDENT SYSTEM OPERATOR, INC. AND CONSUMERS ENERGY COMPANY, INTERVENORS Consolidated with 25-1160, 25-1162 On Petitions for Review of a Final Order of the Department of Energy Lucas Wollenzien, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Michigan, argued the cause for petitioners States of Illinois, Michigan, and Minnesota. With him on the briefs were Dana Nessel, Attorney  2 General, Michael E. Moody, Assistant Attorney General, Christopher Bzdok, Special Assistant Attorney General, Peter Surdo, Special Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Minnesota, and Jason E. James, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Illinois. Benjamin P. Chagnon argued the cause for the Public Interest Organization petitioners. With him on the briefs were Jennifer J. Yun, Michael Lenoff, Gregory E. Wannier, Sanjay Narayan, Elena Saxonhouse, Caroline Reiser, Gavin G. McCabe, Simi Bhat, Lauren Piette, Sameer H. Doshi, Christine A. Powell, Howard Learner, Danielle Fidler, Francis W. Sturges Jr., Veronica Saltzman, and Tomas Carbonell. Michael C. Soules and Ada Statler entered appearances. Jennifer Danis was on the brief for amicus curiae Institute for Policy Integrity at New York University School of Law in support of petitioners. Jonas Monast, James P. Duffy, Alexandra L. St. Romain, and Susannah Landes Weaver were on the brief for amici curiae Energy Law Scholars in support of petitioners. Nicholas M. Gladd, John B. Kenney, and Zachary Norris were on the brief for amici curiae The Niskanen Center, et al., in support of petitioners. Robert N. Stander, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Adam R. Gustafson, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Robert J. Lundman, Kyle Glynn, and Rebecca Jaffe, Attorneys, and Jonathan Brightbill, General Counsel, United States Department of Energy.  3 Zachary C. Schauf argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent-intervenor Consumers Energy Company. With him on the brief was Juliana Brint. Arjun R. Ramamurti entered an appearance. Adam S. Carlesco, Daniel C.W. Narvey, and John Liskey were on the brief for amici curiae Citizens Action Coalition of Indiana, et al., in support of respondent. Before: SRINIVASAN, Chief Judge, PILLARD and WILKINS, Circuit Judges. Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge PILLARD. PILLARD, Circuit Judge: Consumers Energy Company is a private business that owns and operates the J.H. Campbell Generating Plant, an aging coal-fired power plant in Michigan that was scheduled to shut down last year. The Company worked for several years to develop plans and secure regulatory approval to retire the old Campbell plant and replace it with a mix of expanded and new electricity-generation sources. Consumers Energy coordinated its planning with Michigan regulators and the Midwest Independent System Operator (MISO)—the 15-state regional transmission organization in which Michigan and Consumers Energy participate. The Company’s closure-and-replacement proposal received comprehensive scrutiny from the public, private industry, and expert regulators. Finding that Consumers Energy’s substitute sources would meet applicable reliability criteria, provide less polluting electricity at lower prices, and more than offset generation lost when the old plant closed, the Michigan Public Service Commission and MISO expressly approved the plan. Shortly before Campbell’s scheduled retirement, the Department of Energy (DOE or Department) unilaterally  4 commanded the unit’s continued operation. The Department invoked a rarely used, short-term, federal emergency authority conferred in section 202(c) of the Federal Power Act to order the Campbell coal unit to stay open. Michigan petitioned for review of DOE’s order. Illinois and Minnesota also petitioned, as did a group of environmental organizations, including the Sierra Club, Natural Resources Defense Council, Michigan Environmental Council, Environmental Defense Fund, Environmental Law and Policy Center, Vote Solar, the Ecology Center, Urban Core Collective, and the Union of Concerned Scientists. Consumers Energy intervened to “protect[] the company’s right to recover the costs associated with DOE’s order” from ratepayers, which is at issue in separate proceedings regarding recovery and allocation of costs currently pending before FERC. Resp.-Interv. Br. iv, 7. We evaluate Petitioners’ challenge to DOE’s interpretation of its emergency power under section 202(c) by reference to statutory text and structure. And we deploy those interpretive tools against the backdrop of states’ exclusive regulatory power over the generation of electricity. The plain meaning of the text limits section 202(c) emergency authority to address an identified risk of a substantial energy supply shortfall that calls for immediate action. Section 202(c) gives DOE limited authority to sidestep states’ jurisdiction over electricity generation to briefly compel generation or interconnection in times of war or other “emergency” situations. By its terms, section 202(c) allows DOE to command certain action “[d]uring the continuance of any war in which the United States is engaged,” or when the Secretary determines that “an emergency exists” due to “a sudden increase in the demand for electric energy, or a shortage of electric energy or of facilities for the generation or transmission of electric energy, or of fuel or water for  5 generating facilities, or other causes . . . .” 16 U.S.C. § 824a(c)(1). The structure of the Federal Power Act and the history of the respective regulatory roles of federal and state governments show that Congress intended to further limit DOE’s section 202(c) emergency power to circumstances necessitating action by DOE in particular, as opposed to action by states. Start with the Act’s structure: The statutory provisions immediately preceding section 202(c)—sections 202(a) and (b)—confirm the primacy of states and their utilities in planning to prevent and responding to emergency electricity shortfalls. First, section 202(a) facilitates states’ and utilities’ planning to generate and contract for adequate supplies of electrical power. It does so by enabling them to coordinate their efforts through voluntary participation in Regional Transmission Organizations (RTOs). Next, section 202(b) provides for coercive federal action to ensure adequate supply—but only at the request of states or their utilities. When “necessary or appropriate in the public interest,” a state or utility may request that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) order a generator to connect to and sell or exchange energy with other facilities. Lastly, section 202(c) authorizes DOE to intervene to temporarily order similar action—connection of facilities and provision of electricity— to avert an emergency. Congress’s placement of section 202(c) after subsections (a) and (b), which more broadly authorize state-level means of preventing and responding to emergency electricity shortages, strongly implies that it meant use of subsection (c) to be essentially the last alternative among the three. Consider next the history of states’ jurisdiction over generation of electricity: The last-resort character of section  6 202(c) is strongly supported by the respective regulatory powers of states and the federal government under the Federal Power Act. There is no dispute that for almost a century states have exercised authority, preserved by the Federal Power Act, to regulate in-state power plants for the economic and environmental benefit of their citizens. It is the states— informed by federal, regional, and load-serving entities’ assessments of available supply and reliability needs—that bear the responsibility to plan for and avert reliability risks on an ongoing basis. To that end, states decide which generation resources must be built, expanded, reduced, or shut down. The Act empowers the federal government, in contrast, to regulate wholesale marketing and interstate transmission of electricity. That demarcation of federal and state regulatory power is further reason to treat DOE intervention under section 202(c) as rare and authorized only when states, their utilities, and RTOs are unable or unwilling to respond. That is exactly how the federal government has used its section 202(c) authority until today—to address short-term crises, such as blackouts caused by war or extreme weather events, not as a substitute for the states’ long-term reliability planning. Our reading of the text, structure, and history leaves us unpersuaded by DOE’s sweeping conception of its “emergency” authority under section 202(c). The Department’s position would empower it to pick its preferred power sources in Michigan—or, presumably, any other state— and order them to operate without regard to the multiple procedural and substantive constraints built into state reliability planning processes. We hold that section 202(c) is best read to apply where the Department identifies a risk of substantial harm from inadequate electricity supply that calls for immediate action by DOE in particular, as opposed to by the states. Because the circumstances DOE identified in the challenged order do not warrant resort to section 202(c) as  7 correctly interpreted, we grant the petitions for review and vacate the Order. I. A. 1. Until 1935, the federal government had no regulatory authority over the nation’s electricity supply. Instead, “state and local agencies oversaw nearly all generation, transmission, and distribution of electricity.” FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 577 U.S. 260, 265-66 (2016); see Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 205 (1983). In 1935, after the Supreme Court held that the Dormant Commerce Clause prohibited state regulation of certain interstate electricity transactions, see Pub. Util. Comm’n of R.I. v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83, 89-90 (1927), Congress enacted the Federal Power Act (FPA or Act) to fill the resulting “regulatory void,” Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 577 U.S. at 266; see 16 U.S.C. §§ 824-824w. The FPA affords the federal government authority to regulate “the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce,” i.e., the movement of electric energy over long distances via high-voltage power lines. 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1). It also grants federal authority over “the sale of electric energy at wholesale in interstate commerce.” Id. But the Act denies federal authority “over facilities used for the generation of electric energy.” Id. Federal regulatory authority over the nation’s electrical supply is exercised by the Department of Energy (DOE), the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), and the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), each  8 of which plays a distinct role. The principal and substantial federal agency acting in the electricity sector is FERC, which is responsible for rules and practices directly affecting rates for wholesale electricity sales and interstate transmission. See generally 16 U.S.C. §§ 824(a), 824a(f), 824d(a), 824e(a); see also Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 577 U.S. at 266. NERC, which FERC designated in 2006 as an independent entity to “develop and enforce . . . reliability standards that provide for an adequate level of reliability of the bulk-power system,” conducts periodic reliability assessments of the electric grid and sets and modifies nationwide reliability standards that inform but do not control levels of energy generation within each state. 16 U.S.C. § 824o(c), (d), (g); see also NERC, 2025 Summer Reliability Assessment (“NERC Reliability Assessment”) (J.A. 103-56). For its part, the Department of Energy’s only direct authority over the generation of electricity is its temporary emergency power under section 202(c). Because the Federal Power Act extends federal authority “only to those matters which are not subject to regulation by the States,” 16 U.S.C. § 824(a), it “maintains a zone of exclusive state jurisdiction,” Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 577 U.S. at 266. The Act generally preserves states’ “control over in-state ‘facilities used for the generation of electric energy,’” Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 578 U.S. 150, 154 (2016) (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1)); it contemplates incidental federal control of only those generation practices that “directly affect” FERC’s exercise of its statutory authority over wholesale rates or interstate transmission. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 577 U.S. at 278. Accordingly, we have long and repeatedly recognized that the federal government “may regulate the transmission [interstate], but not the generation, of electricity.” NextEra Energy Res., LLC v. FERC, 118 F.4th 361, 365 (D.C. Cir. 2024); see La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FERC, 522 F.3d 378, 389-90 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (similar  9 regarding FERC authority over wholesale rates). States “retain the right to regulate the facilities responsible for the generation of electric energy,” New England Power Generators Ass’n, Inc. v. FERC, 757 F.3d 283, 285 (D.C. Cir. 2014), and they determine their own mix of electricity generation, see Citizens Action Coal. of Ind. v. FERC, 125 F.4th 229, 238 (D.C. Cir. 2025). States, as the regulators of electricity generation, are largely responsible for meeting the core policy goal of achieving “resource adequacy.” That means it is up to the states to make sure that enough electricity is generated to safely and reliably meet users’ needs. See Sacramento Mun. Util. Dist. v. FERC, 616 F.3d 520, 526 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (quoting Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp., 116 FERC ¶ 61,274, P 3 (2006)) (defining resource adequacy). Indeed, FERC itself expressly recognizes that “[r]esource adequacy is a matter that has traditionally rested with the states, and it should continue to rest there.” Devon Power, LLC, 109 FERC ¶ 61,154, P 47 (2004). The supply of reliable electricity to serve fluctuating demand and avoid blackouts is accordingly a key consideration of state regulators when they determine whether to permit generation sources to be added to the grid or existing sources to retire. In making those determinations, state regulators must meet additional legal obligations and policy priorities. Those obligations and priorities may include energy affordability, the environment and climate, and diversity of generation supply. See, e.g., Mich. Comp. Laws. Ann. § 460.6t(8)(a). To achieve long-term resource adequacy consistently, efficiently, and with optimal legal compliance and public support, states, load- serving entities, voluntary regional transmission organizations (RTOs), and various other stakeholders engage in extensive, coordinated planning.  10 Under Michigan law, the state’s public utility regulator, the Michigan Public Service Commission (Michigan Commission, Commission, or simply Michigan) is responsible for monitoring the supply and demand of electricity and ensuring resource adequacy. It reviews and approves applications to construct, expand, reduce, or retire generation resources as consistent with detailed and evolving projections of state and regional energy needs. See Mich. Comp. Laws. Ann. §§ 460.6a, 460.6s. As most directly relevant here, the Michigan Commission ensures that any retirement of a generation resource in Michigan is accomplished consistently with the adequacy of electrical supply to meet demands of electricity consumers. Because Michigan law makes load-serving utilities responsible for securing sufficient generating capacity to serve their customers, see Mich. Comp. Laws. Ann. §§ 460.6t, 460.6w, much of the Michigan Commission’s power over electrical supply is exercised by regulating those utilities’ investment decisions. “Load” generally refers to customers’ demand for electricity—the power that users draw from the grid—at a given time. A load-serving entity is a “a utility with an obligation created under law or contract to provide electricity service to end-use customers or to a distribution utility.” S. Car. Pub. Serv. Auth. v. FERC, 762 F.3d 41, 90 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 2014); see NRG Power Mktg., LLC v. FERC, 862 F.3d 108, 110 (D.C. Cir. 2017). Michigan’s State Reliability Mechanism requires load-serving utilities to demonstrate annually that they have sufficient generation capacity to meet projected demand four years in the future. See id. § 460.6w; State Reliability Mechanism, Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm’n (Nov. 21, 2017), https://perma.cc/CHH6-6NZ8. Separately, every five years, load-serving entities must file with the Michigan Commission longer-term “integrated resource plans” (IRPs) that report five-, ten-, and fifteen-year projections of the  11 capacity they will generate or procure to satisfy resource adequacy and reliability requirements calibrated by MISO to meet future capacity needs. See Mich. Comp. Laws. Ann. § 460.6t(3). Each load-serving entity’s integrated resource plan reports its forecasted capacity needs, the supply-side generating resources it will draw on, and available demand- side resources it will deploy (e.g., energy waste reduction measures and measures to reduce consumption). Id. § 460.6t(5). By exercising the state’s various regulatory powers over electrical supply as contemplated by the Federal Power Act, the Michigan Commission plays the leading role in ensuring sufficient generation to serve the state’s electricity needs. To approve an integrated resource plan, the state Commission must determine that the load-serving entity’s plan represents “the most reasonable and prudent means of meeting” that utility’s current and future commitments to supply electricity. See id. § 460.6t(8)(a). Michigan has authority to protect energy supply in the face of risks of imminent shortage. The Michigan Commission regularly monitors energy supply in the state and publishes a semiannual “energy appraisal” that highlights recent events affecting supply and prices, expected conditions, and changes over the upcoming six months. See Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Michigan Energy Supply Monitoring, https://perma.cc/MVF9- YGMU. In the event of an unexpected shortage, the Commission may issue a special update of its energy appraisal. Id. And, as explained below, state regulators can request that FERC order an interconnection and sale of energy to address a shortfall. If needed, Michigan’s governor can declare a state energy emergency and order various mitigation measures, including restrictions on energy use in non-residential buildings, restrictions on energy sales to consumers, and  12 directives to an energy supplier to provide energy to any facility that provides essential services to the state. Mich. Comp. Laws. Ann. §§ 10.83-10.84. States play the primary role in assuring resource adequacy, but they do not act alone. Regional entities are instrumental to Michigan’s planning for resource adequacy. Michigan and its electric utilities participate in the Midcontinent Independent System Operator (MISO), the 15-state RTO whose territory stretches from Montana to Louisiana and includes Michigan. RTOs are “independent organizations that manage the transmission of electricity over the electric grid and ensure electricity is reliably available for consumers.” Md. Off. of People’s Couns. v. FERC, 164 F.4th 920, 924 (D.C. Cir. 2026) (quotation omitted). Here, we focus on MISO’s role in ensuring reliable supplies of electric energy to serve expected load in member states. MISO—like other RTOs—works in tandem with state regulators, including the Michigan Commission, to help ensure resource adequacy. MISO recognizes that “the states have the primary responsibility to maintain resource adequacy, including overseeing the planning or securing of new resources by load-serving entities . . . to adequately meet demand.” Resource Adequacy Metrics and Criteria Roadmap, Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator 9 (Dec. 2024), https://perma.cc/8WNH-W33N. MISO supports the states to ensure resource adequacy in several ways. Id. For starters, MISO sets a regional resource-adequacy standard, i.e., it develops a mathematical model to estimate how much generation capacity the system will need to run reliably. Every year, MISO updates that model with new data, such as hourly load forecasts. Id. Next, MISO determines whether existing capacity can meet projected peak demand—  13 the highest projected level of energy consumption at any given time—under various conditions. In so doing, MISO builds in several time-tested reliability safeguards. Most importantly, MISO subjects the existing generation capacity to a process called “resource accreditation.” Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 189 FERC ¶ 61,065, PP 3-4 (2024) (tariff revisions establishing accreditation methodology). Rather than simply adding up all the available generation units’ nominal maximum-capacity figures, MISO assigns a realistic capacity value to each unit’s expected contribution to system adequacy during periods of high demand. See id. In the case of a coal plant, the assigned capacity value discounts its total “nameplate” capacity to account for historical limits on its actual generation due to forced outages, required maintenance, and the like. See Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., Resource Accreditation White Paper Version 2.1, at 10-11 (Mar. 2024), https://perma.cc/KP39-DKBX. In the case of solar- and wind- powered electrical generation units, their intermittent character is also accounted for. Id. at 11-12. On the demand side, MISO does not stop with seasonal projections of system-wide peak demand. It also establishes annual “reserve margin” requirements to prevent shortages even in the face of extraordinary disruptions like extreme weather or outages that defy ordinary projection. See Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 189 FERC ¶ 61,065, P 1; Energy Scholars Amicus Br. 15-16. States using MISO’s projections of peak demand thus require load-serving entities to procure enough capacity to cover the specified reserve margin increment above expected peak demand. By adding a reserve margin to projected peak demand, MISO builds a reliability buffer into the target load figures states use in planning for resource adequacy.  14 MISO’s resource adequacy standards provide an additional benchmark, not a substitute, for state reliability requirements such as integrated resource plans. See Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 170 FERC ¶ 61,215, P 13 (2020); see also Midwest Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 119 FERC ¶ 61,311, P 75 (2007) (“From the beginning . . . , [FERC] has recognized the role that state resource planning plays in managing the resource adequacy of [MISO].”). MISO coordinates with states by supplying determinations of the electric capacity needed and that which is available in the system so that state regulators, generators, and load-serving entities can incorporate those figures into their resource- adequacy planning. Energy Law Scholars Amicus Br. 14. MISO also administers its territory’s electric capacity market. “In a capacity market, in contrast to a [real-time] wholesale-energy market, [a load-serving entity] purchases from a generator an option to buy a quantity of energy, rather than purchasing the energy itself.” NRG Power Mktg., LLC v. Maine Pub. Utils Comm’n, 558 U.S. 165, 168 (2010). With those options contracts in hand, a load-serving entity “can meet high demands for electricity by calling on the generators to produce it when the need arises. Purchasing capacity, in other words, ensures that distributors can reliably meet predicted peak power demands in an upcoming month, season, or year.” Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. FERC, 7 F.4th 1177, 1186 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (citation omitted). Load-serving entities “generally purchase more capacity, i.e., rights to acquire energy, than necessary to meet their customers’ anticipated demand.” NRG Power Mktg., 558 U.S. at 169; see also Maine Pub. Utils Comm’n v. FERC, 520 F.3d 464, 467 (D.C. Cir. 2008). Concretely, MISO runs a competitive annual planning resource auction to enable load-serving entities to procure capacity to meet projected demand and satisfy their resource  15 adequacy requirements. See MISO, Planning Resource Auction Results for Planning Year 2025-26 (“MISO Planning Resource Auction”) (J.A. 58-101). In the auction, generators offer capacity and load-serving entities submit bids for the amount needed to meet their “reserve margin” requirements. A crucial benefit of a competitive capacity market over command-and-control capacity requirements (including the Campbell Order at issue here) is that rising capacity prices in the market facilitate efficient resource adequacy planning by signaling to generators and regulators when they should invest in new generation resources or retain existing ones to ensure reliable supply of electricity; low or falling prices prevent over- investment in generation at ratepayers’ expense. See Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 187 FERC ¶ 61,202, P 9 (2024) (MISO tariff revisions aimed at “improving investment and retirement decisions by using price signals to properly time resource entry and exit”); Niskanen Center Amicus Br. 26-27. If, despite states’ best efforts at planning for resource adequacy, MISO identifies an imminent generation-shortage risk, it has numerous tools, like energy alerts and emergency energy procurements, to ensure adequate supply. See MISO Market Capacity Emergency 1-3 (J.A. 676-78). And, like the Michigan Commission, MISO has some power to defer a load- serving entity’s decision to retire or suspend operations of a generation resource as needed to prevent a shortage. See MISO Tariff Section 38.2.7 (J.A. 887-893); Generator Interconnection and Retirement, Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, https://perma.cc/WSS9-9AY7. 2. The federal government, too, plays an important—albeit limited—role in the resource-adequacy scheme. Even as the  16 Federal Power Act generally preserves states’ jurisdiction over electricity generation, it vests certain powers in the federal government to help protect the coordinated resource-adequacy system. Section 202 of the Act authorizes three tiers of federal action. In the first tier, section 202(a), Congress called on FERC to “divide the country into regional districts for the voluntary interconnection and coordination of facilities for the generation, transmission, and sale of electric energy.” 16 U.S.C. § 824a(a). Acting under that provision, FERC encouraged the voluntary formation of RTOs to administer the transmission grid on a regional basis, and the formation of independent system operators (ISOs) that perform a similar function on a smaller scale. See Amaren Servs. Co. v. FERC, 880 F.3d 571, 574 (D.C. Cir. 2018); see also Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 577 U.S. at 267-68. Regional coordination promotes efficient interstate sales of power from a state with available capacity to another state that may find itself short, for example, and prevents free-riding whereby load-serving entities in one state might “count on the capacity they expect others to buy in order to support their own reliability.” Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Util. Control v. FERC, 569 F.3d 477, 479 (D.C. Cir. 2009). FERC oversees ISOs and RTOs, including MISO, and reviews their electric capacity requirements, rates, and other rules under the “just and reasonable” standard. 16 U.S.C. §§ 824d, 824e; see, e.g., Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Util. Control, 569 F.3d at 478-79, 485 (reviewing FERC order affecting ISO capacity requirements). The second tier, established by section 202(b), permits FERC to direct generators to connect to and sell or exchange energy with other facilities—a power afforded to FERC only upon “application of any State commission or of any person engaged in the transmission or sale of electric energy.”  17 16 U.S.C. § 824a(b). So, if a state energy regulator, transmission entity (e.g., an RTO or ISO), or load-serving entity requests FERC to do so, FERC may—“after notice to each State commission and public utility affected and after opportunity for hearing” and a finding that action is “necessary or appropriate in the public interest”—mandate a connection or sale. Id. Importantly, even as the Federal Power Act gives FERC narrow authority to respond to requests to order electricity sales or exchanges, the Act expressly denies FERC authority to regulate generation facilities directly. See 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1). It is the prerogative of states “to forbid new entrants from providing new capacity, to require retirement of existing generators, to limit new construction to more expensive, environmentally friendly units, or to take any other action in their role as regulators of generation facilities without direct interference from the Commission.” Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Util. Control, 569 F.3d at 481. The final tier of federal power, conferred by section 202(c), is the sole exception. The third tier falls outside of the coordinated resource- adequacy system altogether. Section 202(c) establishes a limited backstop mechanism empowering DOE to address certain electricity supply emergencies. That section authorizes the Secretary of Energy (Secretary) to compel generation of electricity only “[d]uring the continuance of any war in which the United States is engaged” or when the Secretary “determines that an emergency exists by reason of a sudden increase in the demand for electric energy, or a shortage of electric energy or of facilities for the generation or transmission of electric energy, or of fuel or water for generating facilities, or other causes.” 16 U.S.C. § 824a(c)(1).  18 Congress enacted section 202(c) in response to a “serious power shortage” during World War I and contemplated that its use would be limited to addressing wartime shocks and “similar crises” like “[d]rought and other natural emergencies.” S. Rep. No. 74-621, at 49 (1935). Until now, the Department has exercised its section 202(c) authority sparingly. During nearly a century of state responsibility for sufficient supply of electricity under the FPA, the federal government has rarely used section 202(c) authority outside of wartime. It “has never used its section 202(c) authority to require additional generation to address long-term resource-adequacy concerns; instead, it has always used that authority to address discrete and unexpected events that threaten immediate grid needs.” Energy Scholars Amicus Br. 21 (citing Benjamin Rolsma, The New Reliability Override, 57 Conn. L. Rev. 789 (2025)). The federal government has, until now, issued stopgap generation orders in response only to transitory emergencies caused by war, extreme weather events, market manipulation, or unplanned, short-term unavailability of specific generation units. See Rolsma, supra at 805-07, 839-46 tbls. 1 & 2. When a section 202(c) emergency arises, the Department can order generation that “in its judgment will best meet the emergency and serve the public interest.” 16 U.S.C. § 824a(c)(1). Congress amended the Federal Power Act in 2015 to provide that section 202(c) emergency orders may override federal, state, and local environmental laws and regulations. Such an override must be cabined to circumstances in which compliance is not “practicable,” any “adverse environmental impacts” are “minimize[d],” and the facility is ordered to operate only “during hours necessary to meet the emergency and serve the public interest.” Pub. L. 114-94 § 61002, 129 Stat. 1772 (2015) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 824a(c)(2)). Congress further specified that a section 202(c) order that “may  19 conflict” with environmental law “shall expire not later than 90 days after it is issued.” 16 U.S.C. § 824a(c)(4). As described above, Michigan’s resource-adequacy regulation entails continuous, complex planning processes with intensive coordination by the state and MISO. That planning starts years in advance to prepare for future needs as well as near-term demand. FERC has peripheral—and limited— oversight of those entities, but no power to directly regulate generation facilities. And DOE has no role whatsoever in the resource-adequacy planning process. Instead, Congress in section 202(c) gave DOE narrow authority to intervene that is triggered only in the face of an electricity emergency not otherwise addressable by states or their utilities. B. The J.H. Campbell Generating Plant (Campbell), an aging coal-fired power plant in Michigan, is owned and operated by Consumers Energy Company, a load-serving entity that is part of MISO. Given its decades-old units, Campbell has become increasingly inefficient, polluting, and expensive to maintain. When in operation, the Campbell facility produces dangerous emissions, including SO2, NOx, and PM2.5, that cause approximately thirty excess deaths every year. Order Approving Settlement Agreement 9 (J.A. 454); State Add. 213. In June 2021, Consumers Energy filed with the Michigan Commission an integrated resource plan that proposed to retire the Campbell plant. Once an integrated resource plan is filed, the Michigan Commission reviews the plan through a year- long “contested case” process. See Mich. Comp. Laws. Ann. § 460.6t(a)(7). Interested parties may intervene, take discovery, submit expert testimony, and present and cross-examine witnesses at an evidentiary hearing. See id. §§ 460.6t(7)(ii), 24.271-24.288.  20 Dozens of interested parties, including environmental groups, the Michigan Attorney General, and several power companies, intervened in the Consumers Energy proceedings. In April 2022, Consumers Energy entered a multi-party settlement agreement with the environmental groups, the Michigan Attorney General, and the Michigan Commission’s enforcement staff under which it memorialized its plan to retire the Campbell plant and obtain newer, cleaner, cheaper, and more reliable resources that would increase available generation capacity. See Settlement Agreement (J.A. 543-63). Specifically, the agreement provided that Consumers Energy would retire the Campbell plant on or before May 31, 2025. See id. 4-5 (J.A. 546-47). And it directed Consumers Energy to acquire a new gas plant, extend operations of two oil- and gas-fired units at one of its other plants, and add new solar energy generation and battery storage. See id. 3-9 (J.A. 545- 51). The parties sought approval of the settlement by the Michigan Public Service Commission, Order Approving Settlement Agreement 1 (J.A. 446), which ruled on objections and granted approval on June 23, 2022, id. 95-97 (J.A. 540-42); see also id. 45-95 (J.A. 490-540). In reviewing the settlement agreement, the Michigan Commission assessed whether the integrated resource plan Consumers Energy filed following the settlement met statutory requirements. See id. 4, 95 (J.A. 449, 540). By statute, the Michigan Commission must approve an integrated resource plan if it determines that “[t]he proposed integrated resource plan represents the most reasonable and prudent means of meeting the electric utility’s energy and capacity needs.” Mich. Comp. Laws. Ann. § 460.6t(8)(a). In making that determination about the post-settlement integrated resource plan, the Michigan Commission assessed its impact on resource adequacy and on Consumers Energy’s ability to serve  21 anticipated peak electric load. See Order Approving Settlement Agreement 88-95 (J.A. 533-40). Upon review of Consumers Energy’s expected procurements and operating adjustments, the Commission determined that “the approval of the settlement agreement will enhance resource adequacy in [the Campbell region] in both the near-term and long term.” Id. 93 (J.A. 538). Ultimately, the Commission concluded, Consumers Energy’s retirement plan was “the most reasonable and prudent means of meeting Consumers’ energy and capacity needs and otherwise meets the requirements of MCL 460.6t(8).” Id. 95 (J.A. 540). On appeal, the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the Michigan Commission’s order approving the settlement agreement and determined that there was substantial evidence that the agreement would improve resource adequacy. In re Consumers Energy, No. 3622954, 2023 WL 2620437, at *5-6 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 23, 2023). MISO, too, determined that Campbell’s retirement as planned—with substitute generation provided by cheaper, cleaner, and more reliable new and expanded generation— would support reliability. See Attachment Y Notice 156 (J.A. 322). That determination followed a technical evaluation of transmission system conditions that would result from the plant’s retirement. See MISO Tariff Section 38.2.7 2-3 (J.A. 888-89). MISO’s analysis confirmed that Consumers Energy did not need to operate Campbell to satisfy the RTO’s reliability criteria. As Campbell’s May 2025 retirement approached, Consumers Energy, the Michigan Commission, and MISO continued to prioritize resource adequacy. Consumers Energy had already begun winding down the Campbell unit, transitioning to new generation resources, and developing  22 additional capacity. In its annual capacity-demonstration filing with the Michigan Commission, see Mich. Comp. Laws. Ann. § 460.6w(8)(a), Consumers Energy documented that it had procured sufficient capacity to meet the projected demand of its customers in summer 2025 and beyond, see Motion to Intervene 24 (J.A. 357); Consumers Energy Capacity Demonstration 15 (J.A. 632). And MISO’s planning resource auction results for summer 2025 through spring 2026, published in April 2025, “demonstrated sufficient capacity at the regional, subregional and zonal levels.” MISO Planning Resource Auction 12 (J.A. 69); see also id. 5 (J.A. 62) (showing that MISO attained a reserve margin of 9.8% for summer 2025, nearly two percentage points above its target). The Michigan Commission, utilities in the state, and MISO saw no need to invoke 202(b) to request that FERC order provision of additional electricity. Neither did the governor of Michigan see any ground to declare an energy emergency in response to Campbell’s planned closure. See Mich. Comp. Laws. Ann. §§ 10.83-