Bridgestone Americas Tire Operations, LLC v. United States

Slip Op. 26- UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE BRIDGESTONE AMERICAS TIRE OPERATIONS, LLC, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES, Defendant, Before: Gary S. Katzmann, Judge Court No. 24-00263 and UNITED STEEL, PAPER AND FORESTRY, RUBBER, MANUFACTURING, ENERGY, ALLIED INDUSTRIAL AND SERVICE WORKERS INTERNATIONAL UNION, AFL CIO, CLC, Defendant-Intervenor. OPINION [ Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on the Agency Record is denied. ] Dated: July 22, 2026 Daniel J. Cannistra, Crowell & Moring LLP, of Washington, D.C., argued for Plaintiff Bridgestone Americas Tire Operations, LLC. Also on the brief were Pierce J. Lee and Valerie Ellis. Sosun Bae, Senior Trial Counsel, Commercial Litigation Branch, U.S. Department of Justice, of Washington, D.C. argued for Defendant United States. Also on the brief were Brett A. Shumate, Assistant Attorney General, Patricia M. McCarthy, Director, and Franklin E. White, Jr., Assistant Director. Of counsel on the brief were Ayat Mujais, Assistant Chief Counsel and Samuel Childerson, Attorney, Office of the Chief Counsel for Trade Enforcement & Compliance, U.S. Department of Commerce. Saad Y. Chalchal, Schagrin Associates, of Washington, D.C., argued for Defendant-Intervenor United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial and Service Court No. 24-00263 Page 2 Workers International Union, AFL-CIO, CLC. Also on the briefs were Roger B. Schagrin, Luke A. Meisner, and Elizabeth J. Drake. Katzmann, Judge: Plaintiff Bridgestone Americas Tire Operations, LLC (“Bridgestone”), a U.S. importer of truck and bus tires from Thailand, brings this action against Defendant the United States (“the Government”) to challenge the U.S. Department of Commerce’s (“Commerce”) final determination in the antidumping duty administrative investigation of truck and bus tires from Thailand. See Truck and Bus Tires From Thailand: Final Affirmative Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value and Final Affirmative Determination of Critical Circumstances, in Part, 89 Fed. Reg. 83636 (Dep’t Com. Oct. 17, 2024), P.R. 297 (“Final Determination”). This case raises two issues: (1) whether Commerce’s determination to apply total adverse facts available is supported by substantial evidence and in accordance with the law and (2) whether Commerce’s corroboration of Bridgestone’s dumping margin is supported by substantial evidence and in accordance with the law. Because the errors throughout Bridgestone’s reporting were pervasive and because Commerce lawfully corroborated Bridgestone’s dumping margin, the court denies Bridgestone’s motion and sustains Commerce’s Final Determination. LEGAL BACKGROUND I. Antidumping Duties “Dumping occurs when a foreign company sells a product in the United States at a lower price than” the company charges for the “same product in its home market.” Sioux Honey Ass’n v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 672 F.3d 1041, 1046 (Fed. Cir. 2012). This practice constitutes unfair competition because it enables foreign producers to undercut domestic companies by selling products below fair market value. Id. To address the impact of such unfair competition, Congress enacted the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, which empowers Commerce to investigate potential dumping and, if necessary, to issue orders instituting duties on subject merchandise. Id. at Court No. 24-00263 Page 3 1046–47. Under 19 U.S.C. § 1673, Commerce may impose antidumping duties on “foreign merchandise [that] is being, or is likely to be, sold in the United States at less than its fair value.” “Sales at less than fair value are those sales for which the ‘normal value’ (the price a producer charges in its home market) exceeds the ‘export price’ (the price of the product in the United States) . . . .” U.S. Steel Corp. v. United States, 621 F.3d 1351, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1677(35)(A)). “Commerce then calculates a ‘dumping margin’ for a particular product subject to review, equal to ‘the amount by which the normal value exceeds the export price or constructed export price.’ ” 1 Id. (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1677(35)(A)). Commerce makes various adjustments when calculating normal value and constructed export price. As relevant here, Commerce adjusts the normal value and/or constructed export price where the producer or exporter makes “a change in the price charged for subject merchandise or the foreign like product, such as a discount, rebate, or other adjustment.” 19 C.F.R. § 351.102(b)(38); see also id. § 351.401(c). Additionally, Commerce reduces the constructed export price by the amount “attributable to any additional costs, charges, or expenses, and United States import duties, which are incident to bringing the subject merchandise from the original place of shipment in the exporting country to the place of delivery 1 “The term ‘constructed export price’ means the price at which the subject merchandise is first sold (or agreed to be sold) in the United States . . . by a seller affiliated with the producer or exporter, to a purchaser not affiliated with the producer or exporter, as adjusted under [19 U.S.C. §§ 1677a(c), (d)].” 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(b) (emphasis added). By contrast, ‘export price’ is the “price at which the subject merchandise is first sold (or agreed to be sold) before the date of importation by the producer or exporter of the subject merchandise outside of the United States to an unaffiliated purchaser in the United States.” Id. § 1677a(a) (emphasis added). Here, Commerce calculated a constructed export price for Bridgestone because “the subject merchandise was first sold in the United States . . . by a U.S. seller affiliated with the producer or exporter, to a purchaser not affiliated with the producer or exporter.” See Mem. from J. Maeder to R. Majerus, re: Decision Memorandum for the Preliminary Affirmative Determination in the Less-Than-Fair-Value Investigation of Truck and Bus Tires from Thailand at 9 (Dep’t Com. May 14, 2024), P.R. 218 (“Prelim. IDM”). Court No. 24-00263 Page 4 in the United States,” including warehousing, freight, and packing expenses. 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(c)(2)(A). II. Verification and Use of Facts Otherwise Available In antidumping proceedings, Commerce “obtains most of its factual information . . . from submissions made by interested parties during the course of the proceeding.” 19 C.F.R. § 351.301(a). Verification is the process by which Commerce “verif[ies] all information relied upon in making . . . a final determination” in an antidumping investigation. 19 U.S.C. § 1677m(i). “The purpose of verification is to test information provided by a party for accuracy and completeness.” Goodluck India Ltd. v. United States, 11 F.4th 1335, 1343-44 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Under 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(a), Commerce relies on facts otherwise available to reach the applicable determination if: necessary information is not available on the record, or . . . an interested party or any other person—(A) withholds information that has been requested by [Commerce] . . . , (B) fails to provide such information by the deadlines for submission of the information or in the form and manner requested . . . (C) significantly impedes a proceeding under this subtitle, or (D) provides such information but the information cannot be verified as provided in [§] 1677m(i). 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(a). “The use of facts otherwise available . . . is only appropriate to fill gaps when Commerce must rely on other sources of information to complete the factual record.” Zhejiang Dunan Hetian Metal Co. v. United States, 652 F.3d 1333, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2011). If Commerce also finds that “an interested party has failed to cooperate by not acting to the best of its ability to comply with a request for information,” Commerce “may use an inference that is adverse to the interests of that party in selecting from among the facts otherwise available.” Id. (quoting § 1677e(b)). This is known as using “adverse facts available.” See Novolipetsk Steel Pub. Joint Stock Co. v. United States, 44 CIT __, __, 456 F. Supp. 3d 1300, 1303 n.4 (2020). Court No. 24-00263 Page 5 “Compliance with the ‘best of its ability’ standard is determined by assessing whether [the] respondent has put forth its maximum effort to provide Commerce with full and complete answers to all inquiries in an investigation.” Nippon Steel Corp. v. United States, 337 F.3d 1373, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(b)(1)); see also Deacero S.A.P.I. de C.V. v. United States, 996 F.3d 1283, 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2021). “[W]here there is useable information of record but the record is incomplete, Commerce applies partial [adverse facts available].” Qingdao Sea-Line Int’l Trading Co. v. United States, 45 CIT __, __, 503 F. Supp. 3d 1355, 1361 (2021) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In contrast, “use of partial facts available is not appropriate when the missing information is core to the antidumping analysis and leaves little room for the substitution of partial facts without undue difficulty.” Mukand, Ltd. v. United States, 767 F.3d 1300, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Instead, “Commerce applies total [adverse facts available] when none of the reported data is reliable or usable because, for example, the data contains pervasive and persistent deficiencies that cut across the entire record.” 2 Id. at 1305. Where Commerce determines that a party's response to a request for information is insufficient, it “shall promptly inform the person submitting the response of the nature of the deficiency and shall, to the extent practicable, provide that person with an opportunity to remedy or explain the deficiency.” 19 U.S.C. § 1677m(d). “If that person submits further information in 2 Though “ ‘[t]otal adverse facts available’ is not defined by statute or agency regulation[,] Commerce has used ‘total adverse facts available’ administratively ‘to refer to Commerce’s application of adverse facts available not only to the facts pertaining to specific sales for which information was not provided, but to the facts respecting all of [a] respondents’ sales encompassed by the relevant antidumping duty order.’ ” China Steel Corp. v. United States, 43 CIT __, __, 393 F. Supp. 3d 1322, 1332 (2019) (emphasis added) (quoting Mukand, Ltd. v. United States, 37 CIT 443, 452 (2013), aff’d, 767 F.3d 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2014)). “In other words, Commerce assigns an antidumping rate based entirely on facts selected using an adverse inference, ignoring all of a respondent’s information.” BlueScope Steel Ltd. v. United States, 45 CIT __, __, 548 F. Supp. 3d 1351, 1355 (2021). Court No. 24-00263 Page 6 response to such deficiency” and Commerce “finds that such response is not satisfactory” or was “not submitted within applicable time limits,” then Commerce may “disregard all or part of the original and subsequent responses.” Id. III. Corroboration When Commerce “relies on secondary information rather than on information obtained in the course of an investigation or review,” it “shall, to the extent practicable, corroborate that information from independent sources that are reasonably at [its] disposal.” 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(c); see also Deacero S.A.P.I. de C.V., 996 F.3d at 1288. “Independent sources may include, but are not limited to, published price lists, official import statistics and customs data, and information obtained from interested parties during the instant investigation or review.” 19 C.F.R. § 351.308(d). To “[c]orroborate” information, “[Commerce] will examine whether the secondary information to be used has probative value,” id., meaning the information is both reliable and relevant, Ad Hoc Shrimp Trade Action Comm. v. United States, 802 F.3d 1339, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2015). FACTUAL BACKGROUND On November 6, 2023, Commerce initiated an antidumping duty investigation of truck and bus tires from Thailand at the request of Petitioners and Defendant-Intervenor United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial and Service Workers International Union, AFL-CIO, CLC (“USW”). See Truck and Bus Tires from Thailand: Initiation of Less-Than-Fair-Value Investigation, 88 Fed. Reg. 77960 (Dep’t Com. Nov. 14, 2023), P.R. 56. Commerce selected Bridgestone and Prinx Chengshan Tire (Thailand) Co., Ltd. (“Prinx”) as mandatory respondents 3 in the investigation. Final Determination, 89 Fed. Reg. at 83637. 3 In cases where “[i]t is not practicable to make individual weighted average dumping margin determinations”—like where there are a “large number of exporters or producers involved in the Court No. 24-00263 Page 7 Throughout the course of the investigation, Commerce issued an initial questionnaire and several supplemental questionnaires to Bridgestone. See generally Letter from K. Marksberry to Bridgestone Corporation, re: Request for Information (Dep’t Com. Dec. 13, 2023), P.R. 75 (“Initial Questionnaire”); Letter from K. Marksberry to D. Cannistra, re: Section A Supplemental Questionnaire (Dep’t Com. Feb. 1, 2024), P.R. 124, C.R. 176 (“Sec. A Supp’l Questionnaire”); Letter from K. Marksberry to D. Cannistra, re: Sections A and B Supplemental Questionnaire (Dep’t Com. Mar. 21, 2024), P.R. 149, C.R. 329 (“Secs. A & B Supp’l Questionnaire”); Letter from K. Marksberry to D. Cannistra, re: Section C Supplemental Questionnaire, Case No. A-549-848, Bar Code: 4534532-01 (Dep’t Com. Mar. 28, 2024) (“Sec. C Supp’l Questionnaire”); Letter from K. Marksberry to D. Cannistra, re: 2nd Supplemental Sections B and C Questionnaire (Dep’t Com. May 13, 2024), P.R. 213, C.R. 443 (“Second Secs. B & C Supp’l Questionnaire”). Bridgestone timely responded to each of these questionnaires. See generally Letter from D. Cannistra to G. Raimondo, re: Bridgestone’s Section A Response to the Initial Questionnaire (Jan. 8, 2024), P.R. 94, 95, 97, 99, C.R. 28, 29, 31, 37, 38, 40 (“Section A Resp.”); Letter from D. Cannistra to G. Raimondo, re: Bridgestone’s Sections B-D Response to the Initial Questionnaire, Case No. A-549-848, Barcode: 4500023-01 (Jan. 29, 2024) P.R. 116–18, 221, C.R. 87–89, 91, 145 (“Secs. B–D Resp.”); Letter from D. Cannistra to G. Raimondo, re: Bridgestone’s Response to the Section A Supplemental Questionnaire (Feb. 20, 2024), P.R. 139, C.R. 224 (“Sec. A Supp’l Resp.”); Letter from D. Cannistra to G. Raimondo, re: Bridgestone’s Response to the Sections A-B Supplemental Questionnaire, Case No. A-549-848, Bar Code: 4544099-01 (Apr. 15, 2024) (“Secs. A & B Supp’l investigation or review”—Commerce “may determine the weighted average dumping margins for a reasonable number of exporters or producers.” Id. § 1677f-1(c)(2). Commerce may thus limit its examination to “a sample of exporters, producers, or types of products,” or to “exporters and producers accounting for the largest volume of the subject merchandise from the exporting country that can be reasonably examined.” Id. The respondents Commerce includes in this “reasonable number” of exporters are the mandatory respondents for the investigation or review. Id. Court No. 24-00263 Page 8 Resp.”); Letter from D. Cannistra to G. Raimondo, re: Bridgestone’s Response to the Section C Supplemental Questionnaire (Apr. 22, 2024), P.R. 188, C.R. 387–93, 395, 400, 407 (“Sec. C Supp’l Resp.”); Letter from D. Cannistra to G. Raimondo, re: Bridgestone’s Response to the 2nd Supplemental Sections B and C Questionnaire (May 22, 2024), P.R. 235–36, C.R. 474, 478 (“Second Secs. B & C Supp’l Resp.”). 4 I. Preliminary Determination Commerce published its Preliminary Determination on May 20, 2024, calculating a dumping margin of 2.35 percent for Bridgestone. Truck and Bus Tires from Thailand: Preliminary Affirmative Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value, Preliminary Negative Determination of Critical Circumstances, and Postponement of Final Determination, 89 Fed. Reg. 43806, 43806–07 (Dep’t Com. May 20, 2024), P.R. 233 (“Preliminary Determination”); Mem. from J. Maeder to R. Majerus, re: Decision Memorandum for the Preliminary Affirmative Determination in the Less-Than-Fair-Value Investigation of Truck and Bus Tires from Thailand (Dep’t Com. May 14, 2024), P.R. 218 (“Prelim. IDM”). In calculating Bridgestone’s margin, Commerce noted that “Bridgestone reported certain sales within its U.S. sales database to a U.S. purchaser that may have included sales to certain locations currently affiliated with Bridgestone rather than the first unaffiliated purchaser.” Prelim. IDM at 9. For the purposes of the preliminary results, Commerce excluded those sales from its calculations and indicated that it “intend[ed] to collect additional information regarding these sales for consideration in the final determination.” Id. Commerce also noted that it did not preliminarily make an adjustment to normal value for Bridgestone’s claimed rebates in its home market database “because it did not separately identify each rebate and discount included in that field, as requested by Commerce.” Id. at 15. 4 These citations include only the questionnaires and responses that are relevant here. Court No. 24-00263 Page 9 II. Verification In June and July of 2024, Commerce conducted several verifications of the information submitted by Bridgestone including, as relevant here, a verification of Bridgestone’s sales data. See Mem from F. Montgomery to The File, re: Verification of the Sales Response of Bridgestone Corporation in the Antidumping Duty Investigation of Truck and Bus Tires from Thailand (Dep’t Com. Aug. 22, 2024), P.R. 266, C.R. 558 (“Sales Verification Report”). Commerce identified four pieces of requested information that “Bridgestone failed to provide . . . prior to the end of verification”: (1) “a reconciliation of the reported [other discounts in the U.S. market] to [Bridgestone’s] accounting system”; (2) “a breakdown of the largest and smallest total values received by [Bridgestone’s] customers for each type of rebate”; (3) “documentation regarding a large credit balance in [Bridgestone’s] general ledger account . . . for volume bonus rebates for January–September 2023”; and (4) “a reconciliation of [Bridgestone’s] sales made to [GCR Tires & Service (“GCR”)] affiliate locations during the [period of investigation] to Bridgestone’s U.S. sales database.” Sales Verification Report at 2; see also IDM at 16–17. III. Final Results On October 17, 2024, Commerce issued its final determination, applying total adverse facts available to calculate a dumping margin for Bridgestone. Final Determination, 89 Fed. Reg. at 83636; Mem. from S. Fullerton to K. Marksberry, re: Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Final Affirmative Determination in the Less-Than-Fair-Value Investigation of Truck and Bus Tires from Thailand at 2 (Dep’t Com. Oct. 9, 2024), P.R. 290 (“IDM”). For each missing piece of information that Commerce identified during verification, “[Commerce found] that requested information is missing from the record and that Bridgestone did not comply with Commerce’s requests to the best of its ability . . . .” IDM at 16–17. In addition, Commerce “identified widespread inaccuracies in the reported data . . . including Court No. 24-00263 Page 10 significant, unresolved errors with respect to Bridgestone’s reporting of U.S. market rebate expenses, U.S. market destination, and certain missing or unverifiable sales expenses.” Id. at 7–8. Applying total facts available with an adverse inference, Commerce assigned Bridgestone a dumping margin of 48.39 percent, the highest dumping margin alleged in USW’s petition. Final Determination, 89 Fed. Reg. at 83637; IDM at 8–9. Commerce “corroborated the [48.39 percent rate] by comparing it to the individually calculated margins for Prinx . . . and found the [48.39 percent rate] to be within range of the highest individually calculated margins for Prinx.” IDM at 10. PROCEDURAL HISTORY On December 23, 2024, Bridgestone timely filed a complaint challenging Commerce’s Final Determination. 5 See Compl. ¶ 1. On February 25, 2025, Bridgestone filed a motion to complete the record in this case to include three documents that Commerce rejected during verification: (1) a list of account balances that Bridgestone reported it maintained during the period of investigation with certain locations of GCR (the “Accounts Receivable Report”); (2) a report relating to rebates that Bridgestone gave to customers in the U.S. market during the period of investigation (“Rebate Report”); and (3) a “pivot table” 6 summary that purportedly sorts the 5 USW separately challenged the Final Determination as it pertains to Prinx, another respondent in Commerce's antidumping investigation into imports of truck and bus tires from Thailand. See Compl., United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Mfg., Energy, Allied Indus. and Serv. Workers Int’l Union, AFL-CIO, CLC v. United States, Ct. No. 25-0004 (USCIT filed Feb. 7, 2025), Feb. 7, 2025, ECF No. 10. The Government, with the consent of USW, sought to consolidate that action with this one, see Mot. to Consolidate, Mar. 4, 2025, ECF No. 35, and Bridgestone opposed consolidation, see Pl.’s Resp. in Opp'n to Mot. to Consolidate, Mar. 25, 2025, ECF No. 38. The court denied the motion to consolidate. See Bridgestone Ams. Tire Operations, LLC v. United States, 49 CIT __, __, 790 F. Supp. 3d 1369, 1380–81 (July 3, 2025). The court subsequently denied USW’s motion for judgment on the agency record in United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Mfg., Energy, Allied Indus. and Serv. Workers Int’l Union, AFL-CIO, CLC v. United States, 50 CIT __, __, 2026 WL 2031835 (July 1, 2026). 6 “A pivot table is a type of data-summarization table that a user can . . . generate, based on a Court No. 24-00263 Page 11 information relating to Bridgestone’s U.S. rebates by customer and rebate type (“Rebate Pivot Table”). See Pl.’s Amended Mot. to Complete or Supplement the Record, Feb. 25, 2025, ECF No. 33, Ex. 2, Attach. 1–3 (“Mot. to Complete”). On July 3, 2025, the court granted Bridgestone’s motion to add the Accounts Receivable Report, Rebate Report, and Rebate Pivot Table to the judicial record, noting that it did not “pass on the ultimate issue of whether Commerce’s underlying rejections were lawful.” Bridgestone Americas Tire Operations, LLC v. United States, 49 CIT __, __, 790 F. Supp. 3d 1369, 1372, 1380 (2025). On September 5, 2025, Bridgestone filed a motion for judgment on the agency record. Pl.’s Mot. for J. on the Agency R., Sep. 5, 2025, ECF No. 63 (“Pl.’s Br.”). The Government and Defendant-Intervenor USW filed their respective responses on January 16, 2026. Gov’t Resp. to Pl.’ Mot. for J. on the Agency R., Jan. 16, 2026, ECF No. 71 (“Gov’t Br.”); Def.-Inter.’s Resp. to Pl.’ Mot. for J. on the Agency R., Jan. 16, 2026, ECF No. 73 (“Def.-Inter.’s Br.”). On February 27, 2026, Bridgestone filed its reply. See Pl.’s Reply in Supp. of Pl.’s Mot. for J. on Agency R., Feb. 27, 2026, ECF No. 77 (“Pl.’s Reply”). With all papers filed, the court held oral argument on April 9, 2026. See Order, Mar. 11, 2026, ECF No. 81. Prior to oral argument, the court issued, and the parties responded to, questions regarding the case. See Letter re: Qs. for Oral Arg., Mar. 19, 2026, ECF No. 85; Pl.’s Resp. to Qs. for Oral Arg., Apr. 2, 2026, ECF No. 94 (“Pl.’s OAQ Resp.”); Def.’s Resp. to Court’s Qs. for Oral Arg. Qs. for All Parties, Apr. 2, 2026, ECF No. 93 (“Gov’t OAQ Resp.”); Def.-Inter.’s Answers to Court’s Qs. in Advance of Oral Arg., Apr. 2, 2026, ECF No. 91 (“Def.-Inter.’s OAQ Resp.”). As directed by the court, the parties filed supplemental briefs following oral argument. See Pl.’s Post-Arg. Submission, Apr. 20, 2026, ECF No. 101; Def.’s Post-Arg. Submission, Apr. 20, 2026, preexisting table of raw data.” Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Court No. 24-00263 Page 12 ECF No. 100; Def.-Inter.’s Post-Arg. Submission, Apr. 20, 2026, ECF No. 99. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW The court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c) and 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) and (a)(2)(B)(ii). Under 19 U.S.C. § 1516a, “the court shall hold unlawful any [Commerce] determination, finding or conclusion found . . . to be unsupported by substantial evidence on the record, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i). A determination is supported by substantial evidence “if a reasonable mind might accept the evidence to support the finding.” PrimeSource Bldg. Prods., Inc. v. United States, 111 F.4th 1320, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2024) (citing Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). “Commerce’s finding may . . . be supported by substantial evidence even if two inconsistent conclusions can be drawn from the evidence.” SolarWorld Americas, Inc. v. United States, 910 F.3d 1216, 1222 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Commerce’s determinations, findings, and conclusions to be reviewed under this standard include those made during corroboration. Deacero S.A.P.I. de C.V., 996 F.3d at 1299–1300. The court “review[s] verification procedures employed by Commerce in an investigation for abuse of discretion,” Micron Tech., Inc. v. United States, 117 F.3d 1386, 1396 (Fed. Cir. 1997)); see also Pt. Asia Pac. Fibers TBK v. United States, 47 CIT __, __, 673 F. Supp. 3d 1320, 1327 (2023), including rejection of documents proffered during verification, see Heveafil Sdn. Bhd. v. United States, 58 F. App’x 843, 847 (Fed. Cir. 2003). “The applicable Commerce Department regulations do not specify any standards or procedures for verification, and the courts have accorded Commerce broad discretion with regard to the conduct and extent of such investigations.” Heveafil, 58 F. App’x at 847; see also Borusan Mannesmann Boru Sanayi Ve Ticaret A.S. v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 5 F.4th 1367, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (noting that the courts “afford tremendous deference to Commerce’s administration of” antidumping laws) (internal quotation marks and Court No. 24-00263 Page 13 citations omitted); ,oGDú&HOLN(QHUML7HUVDQHY8QLWHG6WDWHV, 45 CIT __, __, 498 F. Supp. 3d 1345, 1361 (2021) (“Commerce retains broad discretion when deciding whether to accept a respondent’s corrective information.”). DISCUSSION Bridgestone challenges Commerce’s Final Determination, arguing that (1) Commerce’s application of total adverse facts available is unsupported by substantial evidence and not in accordance with the law and (2) Commerce did not meet its requirements under 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(c) to corroborate the dumping margin it assigned to Bridgestone. For the reasons set forth below, the court denies Bridgestone’s motion for judgment on the agency record and sustains Commerce’s Final Determination. I. Commerce’s Application of Total Adverse Facts Available Is Supported by Substantial Evidence and in Accordance with Law During the investigation, Commerce determined that “necessary information is missing from the record, was not provided in a timely manner or in the form or manner requested, significantly impeded the proceeding, and could not be verified.” IDM at 7. Specifically, Commerce found that “certain sales information provided by Bridgestone was reported in a form and manner so inaccurate that Commerce was unable to either rely on the information as reported or successfully verify it.” Id. Additionally, Commerce found that it lacked “sufficient sales expense data to calculate a dumping margin with reliable accuracy and without undue difficulty.” Id. As a result, Commerce stated that it was “unable to calculate an accurate dumping margin using Bridgestone’s reported data.” Id. Commerce also determined that “Bridgestone has not acted to the best of its ability,” given its identification of “widespread inaccuracies in the reported data at verification.” Id. As described above, Commerce may apply facts available when necessary information is Court No. 24-00263 Page 14 missing from the record, when a party withholds information requested by Commerce, fails to provide information in the form and manner requested, or provides information that cannot be verified. 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(a). Recall also that Commerce may use an adverse inference when selecting among the facts otherwise available if the party fails to cooperate to the best of its ability, Nippon Steel Corp., 337 F.3d at 1382. Commerce applies total adverse facts available “when none of the reported data is reliable or usable because, for example, the data contains pervasive and persistent deficiencies that cut across the entire record.” Mukand, 767 F.3d at 1305. Commerce’s determination that Bridgestone’s data was unreliable and unverifiable and that Bridgestone did not cooperate to the best of its ability is supported by substantial evidence considering the numerous errors and missing information Commerce identified. Commerce identified errors with Bridgestone’s data that fall into several categories: (1) information about affiliation with GCR, (2) information about rebate programs, (3) information about discounts, (4) information about the destination of U.S. sales, and (5) information about expenses incident to bringing the merchandise to the place of delivery. See generally IDM at 16–34. Before verification began, Commerce had already issued several supplemental questionnaires regarding many of these errors. Once at the verification stage, Commerce discovered numerous additional errors including missing information, incorrect information, and information not provided in the form or manner requested. The court need not consider whether any individual error in Bridgestone’s reporting could independently support Commerce’s application of total adverse facts available. Instead, a finding that “the data contains pervasive and persistent deficiencies that cut across the entire record” supports a determination by Commerce to apply total adverse facts available. Mukand, 767 F.3d at 1305. In light of the numerous errors discovered during the investigation, Commerce reasonably concluded that necessary information was missing from the record, that Bridgestone Court No. 24-00263 Page 15 did not act to the best of its ability, and that the errors cut across the entire record. Commerce’s determination to apply total adverse facts available is, as a result, supported by substantial evidence and in accordance with law. Bridgestone’s arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive. A. Bridgestone’s Overarching Arguments Are Unpersuasive Before summarizing the individual categories of errors and responding to Bridgestone’s arguments specific to each one, the court considers Bridgestone’s more overarching arguments that apply to all or multiple of the categories of errors that Commerce identified. Bridgestone argues throughout that (1) Commerce verified the relevant information, that (2) information requested by Commerce was not relevant, that (3) Commerce should have accepted or made “minor corrections” to Bridgestone’s data, and that (4) Commerce should have looked elsewhere in the record for the relevant information or provided additional supplemental questionnaires. The court considers each of these more overarching arguments in turn. 1. Bridgestone’s Argument that Commerce Verified its Information Is Inaccurate First, Bridgestone suggests that much of the information Commerce found to be incomplete or inaccurate was verified by Commerce. For example, Bridgestone argues that “Commerce verified total quantity and total value of U.S. sales and completed numerous verification procedures without discrepancy.” Pl.’s Reply at 20. According to Bridgestone, “Commerce possessed and examined the U.S. sales database, store-level identifiers, rebate totals, expense data, and supporting accounting documentation.” Id. (citing Sales Verification Report at 2, 17–15, 34). However, Commerce’s Sales Verification Report indicates otherwise. See Sales Verification Report at 2–3. Commerce was unable to verify much of Bridgestone’s data because (1) “[Bridgestone] did not provide . . . information prior to the conclusion of verification proceedings,” (2) “[c]ompany officials were unable to provide a complete reconciliation [of sales Court No. 24-00263 Page 16 made to GCR affiliate locations] prior to the completion of verification, (3) “Bridgestone did not accurately report its U.S. market rebate expenses,” and more. Id. 2. Bridgestone’s Argument that Information Requested by Commerce Was Irrelevant Is Unavailing Bridgestone also argues that information requested by Commerce was irrelevant to the calculation of the dumping margin. This argument is unavailing because it is for Commerce, not the respondent, to decide whether information is relevant to Commerce’s determination. Under 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(a), Commerce “shall . . . use the facts otherwise available,” where a party “withholds information that has been requested by [Commerce].” 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(a). This mandate does not include an exception where a party deems information requested by Commerce to be irrelevant. It is Commerce’s task to request information it determines may be relevant, and a respondent’s role to “comply with such requests for information, regardless of the respondent’s perception or substituted judgment.” SeAH Steel Corp. v. United States, 47 CIT __, __, 659 F. Supp. 3d 1318, 1326 (2023). Additionally, without the ability to verify information, Commerce was, in many instances, unable to determine whether information was relevant or not. For example, Bridgestone argued before Commerce that a large credit balance in its general ledger account did not “represent a large balance considered in the context of the whole.” Letter from D. Cannistra to G. Raimondo, re: Resubmission of Bridgestone’s Rebuttal Brief at 21, Case No. A-549-848, Bar Code: 4636442-01 (Sep. 24, 2024). However, without any information on that large credit balance, Commerce could not ascertain whether it was relevant to the calculation of price adjustments or not. See IDM at 22. 3. Bridgestone’s Argument that its Errors Could be Rectified Using Minor Corrections Is Unavailing Bridgestone further avers that certain errors could be rectified using “minor corrections.” Pl.’s Br. at 21–22. However, Commerce reasonably determined that the changes Bridgestone Court No. 24-00263 Page 17 requested were not minor in nature. See, e.g., IDM at 24–25. As Commerce noted in its verification agenda, “[n]ew information [is] accepted at verification only” in certain circumstances including when “the information makes minor corrections to information already on the record.” See Letter from K. Marksberry to D. Cannistra, re: Verification of Questionnaire Responses at 2 (Dep’t Com. June 3, 2024), P.R. 241, C.R. 482 (“Verification Agenda”). Verification is not an opportunity to submit new factual information or corrections deemed not to be minor nor an opportunity to “fill . . . gap[s] caused by [a party’s] failure to provide a questionnaire response or evidence requested during verification.” Fischer S.A. Comercio v. United States, 34 CIT 334, 349, 700 F. Supp. 2d 1364, 1377 (2010); see also Goodluck India, 11 F.4th at 1343–55; SeAH Steel Corp., 659 F. Supp. 3d at 1324. Bridgestone’s attempts to submit corrections during verification did not constitute minor corrections but instead involved significant errors that were systemic in nature. See IDM at 25–27. For example, Commerce’s determination not to accept Bridgestone’s “minor correction” related to its rebate reporting is supported by substantial evidence and in accordance with law because “a failure to properly report three expense fields [is] an error that affects every reported U.S. sale.” See IDM at 25. Commerce noted that Bridgestone’s “rebates are . . . granted to specific customers and the price of the same merchandise between customers could potentially vary greatly depending on the rebates for which a customer qualifies.” IDM at 26. Additionally, as the Government explains, making Bridgestone’s requested “minor correction” to the rebate reporting that Bridgestone requested would have required Commerce to create new database fields, allow resubmission, or completely correct or replace an existing data field. Gov’t OAQ Resp. at 5. Though some of the corrections Bridgestone suggested could reasonably be considered “minor” when contemplated in isolation, see, e.g., Pl.’s Br. at 27 (describing “incorrect cell Court No. 24-00263 Page 18 references in Excel formulas or calculation mistakes due to misaligned numbers”), such a task can constitute “undue difficult[y],” 19 U.S.C. § 1677m(e), where, as here, there are “widespread inaccuracies in the reported data,” IDM at 7. Commerce is not required to consider information that cannot “be used without undue difficulties.” Id. § 1677m(e). 4. Bridgestone’s Argument that Commerce Should Have Found the Data Elsewhere or Issued Additional Questionnaires Is Unavailing Finally, Bridgestone argues that Commerce should have looked elsewhere in Bridgestone’s submissions to find requested information or that Commerce should have