320 Alemany LLC v. City & County of San Francisco CA1/5
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
DocketA173613
StatusUnpublished
📰 News Coverage: Read the LAWS.com news report on this case
Full Opinion
Filed 11/20/26 320 Alemany LLC v. City & County of San Francisco CA1/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
320 ALEMANY LLC,
Plaintiff and Appellant, A173613
v.
CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN (City & County of San Francisco
FRANCISCO, Super. Ct. No. CPF-24-518821)
Defendant and Respondent.
Plaintiff 320 Alemany LLC appeals from a judgment entered in favor of
the City and County of San Francisco (City) on its petition for writ of
administrative mandamus challenging the City’s determination that the
density bonus law (Gov. Code, § 65915)1 does not apply to plaintiff’s proposed
project. At issue is whether the density bonus law applies when a developer
builds excess unauthorized dwelling units without permits and then later
seeks to legalize the additional units. We find the density bonus law does not
apply under the circumstances of this case.
1 All statutory references are to the Government Code unless otherwise
stated.
1
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff owns four lots at 316–328 Alemany Boulevard. In 2002–2003,
plaintiff subdivided a single parcel into four separate lots. Between 2004 and
2006, plaintiff obtained four building permits to construct four separate
residential buildings, one on each lot. The permits authorized plaintiff to
construct a total of 15 dwelling units across the four lots as follows: five
dwelling units on 316–318 Alemany Boulevard, three dwelling units on 320
Alemany Boulevard, three dwelling units on 322 Alemany Boulevard, and
four dwelling units on 326–328 Alemany Boulevard. Plaintiff does not claim
that prior to construction it sought approval to build additional units under
the density bonus law. Plaintiff completed construction of the 15 permitted
units in 2008. Shortly thereafter, plaintiff divided the 15 units to add 17
additional, unpermitted dwelling units (UDU) across the properties, resulting
in the following total numbers of dwelling units: five permitted units and
seven UDU’s on 316–318 Alemany Boulevard, three permitted units and
three UDU’s on 320 Alemany Boulevard, three permitted units and four
UDU’s on 322 Alemany Boulevard, and four permitted units and three UDU’s
on 326–328 Alemany Boulevard.
In 2022, the City’s planning department (department), pursuant to a
task force inspection of the properties, determined that the permitted units
had been partitioned to create the additional 17 UDU’s. The City’s various
departments issued multiple notices of violation related to safety issues at
the properties, including inadequate fire escapes.
On May 30, 2023, the City filed an enforcement action against plaintiff,
alleging violations of various state and local codes. On April 15, 2024, the
parties stipulated to an injunction and order requiring plaintiff to bring the
properties into compliance with state and local codes, and to the extent the
2
abatement of certain violations required permits, plaintiff was required to
take all steps necessary to obtain the permits. The stipulated judgment also
required plaintiff to pay administrative penalties, attorneys fees, and costs
totaling approximately $1.5 million. The injunction also prohibits plaintiff
from accepting new tenants at the properties until all notices of violation are
abated and the City’s department of building inspection issues a final
certificate of completion.
Plaintiff communicated with the department regarding plaintiff’s
proposals for legalizing the UDU’s. On March 18, 2024, in response to the
department’s plan check letter No. 2, plaintiff’s architect submitted a
proposal to maximize the number of allowable legalized units using the state
density bonus law.2 (§ 65915.) According to plaintiff’s architect, the proposal
would allow for 31 residential units across the properties following
legalization. On April 24, 2024, the department responded that plaintiff’s
proposal was not eligible under the density bonus law because the proposal
did not result in an increase of five base units.3
Plaintiff requested a letter of determination from the zoning
administrator regarding the application of the density bonus law (§ 65915) to
the properties. The zoning administrator’s August 23, 2024, letter of
determination confirmed that the density bonus law did not apply to
plaintiff’s proposed project. It did not qualify as a housing development
under the statute. Plaintiff appealed the zoning administrator’s
2 Neither party provides a record citation to the March 18, 2024 letter
containing the proposal and it does not appear to be in the appellate record.
However, the letter is referenced in a declaration from plaintiff’s architect
and in subsequent correspondence from the City.
3 The department’s correspondence states that base units means
principally permitted units.
3
determination to the San Francisco Board of Appeals, which unanimously
found that the zoning administrator did not err or abuse his discretion in
issuing the letter of determination.
Plaintiff filed a petition for writ of administrative mandamus in the
trial court challenging the City’s determination that the density bonus law
did not apply to plaintiff’s project. The trial court denied the petition, finding
the City correctly interpreted section 65915. It explained that plaintiff’s
“project is not eligible under the statute because the legalization of unlawful
dwelling units does not constitute a ‘housing development.’ The statute’s
plain text supports [the City’s] argument that a ‘housing development’
requires construction of new units. For instance, Section 65915(b)(1) makes
clear that an applicant must ‘construct a housing development’ to receive the
Density Bonus Law’s benefits. Petitioner has also not shown that the units
are subdivisions or common interest developments as defined by Civil Code
Section 4100, nor that there would be a net increase in available units.
Petitioner also cites no cases where plans to legalize units were eligible under
the statute.”
DISCUSSION
I. Issues and Standard of Review
Plaintiff argues that (1) the density bonus law preempts local
regulations and (2) the City and the trial court erroneously interpreted the
density bonus law when they determined plaintiff’s project to legalize its
UDU’s is not a housing development under the statute. Plaintiff’s petition for
writ of administrative mandamus alleged the letter of determination was
legally erroneous in concluding that the density bonus law did not apply to
4
plaintiff’s project and thus was an abuse of discretion.4 “Abuse of discretion
is established if the [agency] has not proceeded in the manner required by
law, the order or decision is not supported by the findings, or the findings are
not supported by the evidence.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5, subd. (b).) On
appeal, our role is the same as the trial court. We “ ‘independently
determine[] whether the agency prejudicially abused its discretion by failing
to proceed in the manner required by law, such as by failing to comply with
required procedures, applying an incorrect legal standard, or committing
some other error of law.’ ” (Schreiber v. City of Los Angeles (2021) 69
Cal.App.5th 549, 554.)
“The fundamental rule of statutory construction is to ascertain the
Legislature’s intent in order to give effect to the purpose of the law.
[Citation.] We first examine the words of the statute and try to give effect to
the usual, ordinary import of the language while not rendering any language
surplusage. The words must be construed in context and in light of the
statute’s obvious nature and purpose. The terms of the statute must be given
a reasonable and commonsense interpretation that is consistent with the
Legislature’s apparent purpose and intention. [Citation.] Our interpretation
should be practical, not technical, and should also result in wise policy, not
mischief or absurdity. [Citation.] We do not interpret statutes in isolation.
Instead, we read every statute with reference to the entire scheme of law of
which it is a part in order to harmonize the whole. [Citation.]” (Kalnel
4 The petition also alleged the City exceeded its jurisdiction and/or
violated its ministerial duty in issuing the letter of determination and/or the
letter of determination is not supported by the findings and the findings are
not supported by the evidence. However, on appeal, plaintiff argues only
legal error.
5
Gardens, LLC v. City of Los Angeles (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 927, 938 (Kalnel
Gardens).)
If there is no ambiguity in the statutory language, the plain meaning of
the statute governs. (Reznitskiy v. County of Marin (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th
1016, 1025.) If the statutory language is ambiguous or susceptible of more
than one reasonable interpretation, we may also look to extrinsic aids,
including legislative history and public policy. (Id. at p. 1025.)
II. The Density Bonus Law
“In 1979, the Legislature enacted the density bonus law, section 65915,
which aims to address the shortage of affordable housing in California.
[Citation.] ‘Although application of the statute can be complicated, its aim is
fairly simple: When a developer agrees to construct a certain percentage of
the units in a housing development for low- or very-low-income households,
. . . the city or county must grant the developer one or more itemized
concessions and a “density bonus,” which allows the developer to increase the
density of the development by a certain percentage above the maximum
allowable limit under local zoning law. [Citation.] In other words, the
Density Bonus Law, “reward[s] a developer who agrees to build a certain
percentage of low-income housing with the opportunity to build more
residences than would otherwise be permitted by the applicable local
regulations.” ’ [Citation.]” (Latinos Unidos Del Valle De Napa Y Solano v.
County of Napa (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1160, 1164, 1st & 4th bracketed
insertions added (Latinos Unidos).)
Section 65915, subdivision (b)(1) requires a city, county, or city and
county to grant a density bonus “if an applicant for a housing development
seeks and agrees to construct a housing development, excluding any units
permitted by the density bonus awarded pursuant to this section,” that will
6
contain at least a certain percentage of units for lower income households or
other qualifying groups such as senior citizens, transitional foster youth, or
students. (§ 65915, subd. (b)(1), italics added.) At issue in this appeal is the
question of whether plaintiff’s proposal to legalize multiple existing UDU’s
qualifies as a housing development that is eligible for a density bonus under
the statute.
Section 65915, subdivision (i) states: “ ‘Housing development,’ as used
in this section, means a development project for five or more residential
units, including mixed-use developments. For the purposes of this section,
‘housing development’ also includes a subdivision or common interest
development, as defined in Section 4100 of the Civil Code,[5] approved by a
city, county, or city and county and consists of residential units or
unimproved residential lots and either a project to substantially rehabilitate
and convert an existing commercial building to residential use or the
substantial rehabilitation of an existing multifamily dwelling, as defined in
subdivision (d) of Section 65863.4,[6] where the result of the rehabilitation
would be a net increase in available residential units.”
III. Density Bonus Law Preemption
The first argument in plaintiff’s opening brief is that the density bonus
law preempts local laws that conflict with the state statute. Plaintiff cites
case law finding city laws preempted by the density bonus law because they
5 Civil Code section 4100 defines “ ‘[c]ommon interest development’ ” as
“any of the following: [¶] (a) A community apartment project. [¶] (b) A
condominium project. [¶] (c) A planned development. [¶] (d) A stock
cooperative.”
6 Section 65863.4, subdivision (d) states “ ‘multifamily dwelling’ means
any structure designed for human habitation that has been divided into two
or more legally created independent living quarters.”
7
conflicted with the state statute. (Bankers Hill 150 v. City of San Diego
(2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 755, 771; Schreiber v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 69
Cal.App.5th at p. 558; Latinos Unidos, supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at p. 1169;
Friends of Lagoon Valley v. City of Vacaville (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 807,
830–834 (Friends of Lagoon Valley); West Adams Heritage Assn. v. City of Los
Angeles (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 395, 438.) Plaintiff then concludes that the
City’s “refusal to apply the Density Bonus Law to legalize the Properties’
UDUs is a prime example of this type of preempted local action.” However,
the section of plaintiff’s opening brief arguing for preemption does not
identify any City ordinance that allegedly conflicts with the density bonus
law. Thus the cases he cites, which all involved local ordinances found to
conflict with the state statute, are inapposite. Moreover, as the City
acknowledges, the zoning administrator agreed with plaintiff that state law
preempts local law. At issue here is the City’s interpretation of a state
statute, not whether a local law conflicts with the state statute.7 We decline
7 To the extent plaintiff argues the City improperly applied planning
code provisions to argue that plaintiff’s project must be considered four
separate projects, one for each property, and therefore does not meet the five-
dwelling-unit threshold, we are unpersuaded the City erred. The letter of
determination found that even if the lots were permitted to be merged, it
would still not meet the requirements for the density bonus law because the
merged lot would only be permitted to add two units. Plaintiff does not
provide a reasoned analysis as to how this alternative determination was
erroneous. As explained post, we find the plain language of the statute
applies when a developer proposes a project to construct five or more dwelling
units, “excluding any units permitted by the density bonus awarded pursuant
to this section,” that will contain the required percentage of affordable
housing. (§ 65915, subd. (b)(1).) Plaintiff’s petition filed in the trial court
cites section 65915, subdivision (b)(1) and acknowledges that the statute
applies when a developer “choose[s] to [restrict] a certain percentage of the
project’s ‘base’ units to affordable [housing]” and that under subdivision (o)(6)
“ ‘base density’ ” or “ ‘maximum allowable residential density’ ” is “ ‘[t]he
8
to hold that the City is prohibited from ever determining that a project does
not meet the eligibility requirements under the density bonus law.
IV. The Density Bonus Law Does Not Apply to Plaintiff’s Proposal to
Legalize Its Already Existing UDU’s
Plaintiff argues that its project qualifies as a “housing development”
under the statute because it seeks to legalize 17 UDU’s across the properties
that are not presently available for residential occupancy.8 It claims that it
“seeks to legalize all UDUs through reconfiguration of the Properties to bring
them into compliance” and therefore this “is either a project for five (5) or
more units, or one to substantially rehabilitate an existing multifamily
building where the result is more ‘available’ units [under section 65915,
subdivision (i)].” Although plaintiff acknowledges that the case turns on the
interpretation of the density bonus law, the argument section of its opening
brief refers to select portions of the statute in isolation without analyzing the
complete statutory definitions it claims apply to its project.
The City argues plaintiff’s project does not qualify under the statute. It
explains that section 65915, subdivision (i)’s definition of “housing
development” includes: (1) “ ‘a development project for five or more
residential units’ ” and (2) “a ‘subdivision or common interest development’
that either converts an existing commercial building to residential use or
consists of ‘substantial rehabilitation of an existing multifamily dwelling, . . .
where the result of the rehabilitation would be a net increase in available
residential units.’ (§ 65915, subd. (i).)” The City contends plaintiff’s proposal
to legalize its existing UDU’s is neither a development of five or more units
greatest number of units allowed under the zoning ordinance . . . applicable
to the project.’ ” (Boldface omitted.)
8 Plaintiff’s density bonus application proposes to legalize only 16 of the
17 UDU’s.
9
nor a subdivision or common interest development that includes a substantial
rehabilitation of a multifamily dwelling unit that will increase the number of
units.9
Resolution of this appeal turns on both whether plaintiff’s proposal
comes within the definition of “housing development” under section 65915,
subdivision (i) and whether the City is required to grant a density bonus
based on the proposal under subdivision (b). The plain language of
subdivision (b) of the statute states the density bonus applies to applicants
that “seek[] and agree[] to construct a housing development” that “will
contain” a certain percentage of affordable housing. (§ 65915, subd. (b),
italics added.) Although neither party cites case authority directly deciding
the issue of whether the statute applies to an applicant’s proposal to legalize
existing UDU’s, multiple cases discussing the statute state it applies to new
construction. (See Friends of Lagoon Valley, supra, 154 Cal.App.4th at p. 824
[statute “offers incentives to developers to include low income housing in new
construction projects” and applies when developer “agrees to construct a
certain percentage of units in a housing development for low or very-low-
income households”]; Wollmer v. City of Berkeley (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th
1329, 1339 [“The state density bonus law is a powerful tool for enabling
developers to include [affordable] housing units in their new developments”];
Shea Homes Limited Partnership v. County of Alameda (2003) 110
Cal.App.4th 1246, 1263 [statute “reward[s] a developer who agrees to build a
certain percentage of low-income housing with the opportunity to build more
residences than would otherwise be permitted by the applicable local
regulations”].)
9 Plaintiff does not argue its project seeks to convert an existing
commercial building to residential use.
10
Thus, under the plain meaning of the statute, a project qualifies for a
density bonus if the developer applicant “seeks and agrees to construct a
housing development, [with the requisite percentage of affordable housing],”
which is a “project for five or more residential units . . . .” (§ 65915, subds.
(b), (i).) Alternatively, as discussed post, certain projects for “the substantial
rehabilitation of an existing multifamily dwelling . . . result[ing in] a net
increase in available residential units” also qualify as a housing development
under the statute. (Ibid.)
We agree with the City that plaintiff’s project to legalize existing
UDU’s does not qualify under either of the statutory definitions of housing
development.
A. Project Is Not to Construct Five or More Additional
Residential Dwelling Units
As an initial matter, plaintiff’s project does not propose any new
construction of dwelling units.10 The UDU’s it seeks to legalize were
constructed shortly after the 15 permitted units were completed in 2008. The
City determined that to qualify for the density bonus, the proposed project
had to provide at least five new units in the base portion of the project.
(§ 65915, subd. (b)(1).) This interpretation is consistent with section 65915,
subdivision (b), which states that the density bonus is only available when
“an applicant for a housing development seeks and agrees to construct a
housing development, excluding any units permitted by the density bonus
awarded pursuant to this section, that will contain [the required percentage
of affordable housing].” Thus, to be eligible for a density bonus, plaintiff’s
project would need to be for construction of five or more units in the base
10 The only building mentioned in plaintiff’s application is building a
roof deck with guard rails. Plaintiff does not contend that this qualifies as
construction of dwelling units.
11
portion of the project, where a certain percentage of those units are reserved
for low-income households.
Plaintiff’s project does not meet these requirements because it does not
propose to add five or more units to the base portion of the project and
instead only seeks to legalize already existing UDU’s. Plaintiff is not
agreeing “to construct” any units at all, and thus its proposal is not one by an
applicant who “seeks and agrees to construct a housing development,
excluding any new units permitted by the density bonus awarded pursuant to
this section, that will contain [the required percentage of affordable
housing].” (§ 65915, subd. (b)(1), italics added.) Although the purpose of the
statute is to encourage the development of affordable housing (Kalnel
Gardens, supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 939), nothing in the statute suggests that
it was intended to apply retroactively to developers who exceed density limits
by constructing UDU’s without permits and then belatedly apply for a
density bonus.
As the City argues, applying the statute as plaintiff proposes would
allow, and possibly even encourage, developers to sidestep the permitting
process. Plaintiff points to nothing in the statute that suggests it was
intended to apply retroactively to developers who exceed density limits
without permits and plaintiff’s position is not a reasonable interpretation of
the statute. (Reznitskiy v. Country of Marin, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 1036
[declining to construe housing statute to accomplish purpose that does not
appear on face of statute]; Kalnel Gardens, supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 938
[“Our [statutory] interpretation should be practical, not technical, and should
also result in wise policy, not mischief or absurdity”].)
12
B. Plaintiff’s Proposal Is Not a Substantial Rehabilitation
Resulting in Net New Residential Dwelling Units
Plaintiff claims that its project to “legalize all UDUs through
reconfiguration of the Properties to bring them into compliance” is a project
“to substantially rehabilitate an existing multifamily building where the
result is more ‘available’ units.” We disagree that plaintiff’s proposed project
to legalize its existing UDU’s falls within the statute’s alternative definition
of housing development as a substantial rehabilitation of a multifamily
building resulting in a net increase of residential dwelling units.
Although plaintiff cites subdivision (i) of section 65915 in support of its
argument, it does not fully analyze its language.11 As the City explains, the
second sentence of section 65915, subdivision (i) expands the definition of
housing development. It states: “For the purposes of this section, ‘housing
development’ also includes a subdivision or common interest development, as
defined in Section 4100 of the Civil Code, approved by a . . . city and county
and consists of residential units or unimproved lots and either a project to
substantially rehabilitate and convert an existing commercial building to
residential use or the substantial rehabilitation of an existing multifamily
dwelling, as defined in subdivision (d) of section 65863.4, where the result of
the rehabilitation would be a net increase in available residential units.”
(§ 65915, subd. (i), italics added.) The City argues the plain language of this
11 Plaintiff filed a request for judicial notice with its reply brief asking
that we take judicial notice of certain legislative bills and municipal codes
from other jurisdictions in California, which it acknowledges were not
presented to the trial court. We deny the request. (Vons Companies, Inc. v.
Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 444, fn. 3 [absent exceptional
circumstances, reviewing courts generally do not take judicial notice of
matters not presented to the trial court].) Further, the municipal codes of
other jurisdictions are not relevant to the statutory interpretation question
before us.
13
portion of the statute requires a qualifying project to be (1) a subdivision or
common interest development and (2) either a conversion of an existing
commercial building to residential use or a substantial rehabilitation of an
existing multifamily dwelling that would result in a net increase in available
residential units.
Plaintiff focuses only on the last portion of the sentence to argue that
its project qualifies as a substantial rehabilitation of an existing multifamily
dwelling that would result in a net increase of available residential units.
Plaintiff does not contend that the properties are part of a subdivision or
common interest development as defined in Civil Code section 4100. Instead,
it simply ignores this portion of the definition and skips to the last clause.12
We need not decide whether the statute’s alternative definition of housing
development applies only to subdivisions or common interest developments
seeking to substantially rehabilitate existing multifamily dwellings because
even assuming a broader application, we are unconvinced that plaintiff’s
proposed project fits within the statute’s definition of housing development.
As noted ante, the parties have not cited to, and we have not found in
the record, plaintiff’s March 18, 2024, response to the City’s plan check
letters in which plaintiff proposed that the density bonus law applied to its
project to legalize UDU’s. However, plaintiff’s request for a letter of
12 San Francisco Apartment Association, and California Housing
Defense Fund and Californians for Homeownership, Inc., filed amicus curiae
briefs arguing the City’s interpretation of the density bonus law is
inconsistent with the statutory language and the legislative history. They
also contain policy arguments in favor of applying the density bonus law to
maximize the total number of dwelling units. We read and considered their
briefs. As discussed ante, we need not resolve this issue of statutory
construction because we find that plaintiff’s proposed project is not a
substantial rehabilitation of a multifamily dwelling.
14
determination refers to the March 18, 2024 letter and defines its “project” as
“maximiz[ing] the number of units to be legalized under the State Density
Bonus Program . . . .” Its opening brief uses the same definition. Plaintiff’s
petition filed in the trial court similarly defines its “project” as its “effort to
maximize the number of UDUs to be legalized under the California State
Density Bonus Law.” On August 27, 2024 (after the issuance of the
August 23, 2024 letter of determination), plaintiff’s architect filed an
application describing the work to be performed as “[l]egalizing . . . dwellings
built without permits,” removing and replacing wallboard adding insultation,
“verifying electrical and plumbing,” replacing street-facing vinyl windows,
building a roof deck with guard rails, and removing a second kitchen in one
unit.
Plaintiff argues in its reply brief that a commonsense interpretation of
“substantial rehabilitation” must include addressing “the list of items in the
stipulated injunction . . . .” However, it fails to show where in the record the
“project” proposes to address the code violations listed in the injunction. The
injunction itself refers to various building, fire, plumbing, and electrical code
violations by reference to notices of violation. However, plaintiff does not cite
to the notices themselves; nor does plaintiff cite to where in its application it
proposes to correct any specific code violations. As the City explains, the
injunction dated April 9, 2024, required plaintiff to abate within 30 days all
violations that can be abated without obtaining a permit and the density
bonus application was not filed until August 27, 2024. Plaintiff’s bonus
density application expressly seeks to “[l]egaliz[e] . . . dwellings built without
permits”; “verify[] electrical and plumbing”; and replace wallboard,
15
insulation, and street-facing windows.13 Based on this record, we agree with
the zoning administrator’s determination that plaintiff has not claimed the
“existing buildings are in despair or otherwise in need of rehabilitation” and
that its “proposal is only to legalize unauthorized units constructed without
the necessary approvals.”
In sum, the plaintiff has not demonstrated the City erred in
determining that the density bonus law does not apply to plaintiff’s project to
legalize existing UDU’s. Thus, we need not consider plaintiff’s final
argument regarding whether it may use a density bonus study to calculate
the density bonus.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The City is entitled to its costs on appeal.
Jackson, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
Simons, J.
Chou, J.
A173613/320 Alemany LLC v. City and County of San Francisco
13 Plaintiff does not argue that the portions of its application stating it
will remove a kitchen in one unit and build a roof deck constitute substantial
rehabilitation that will result in a net increase in available residential units.
16