Full Opinion

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT No. 25-2112 ENVOY TECHNOLOGIES, INC., Appellant v. CUBIC CORP. _____________________________ On Appeal from the United States District Court, D.N.J. Judge Stanley R. Chesler, No. 2:24-cv-00220 Before: SHWARTZ, BIBAS, and PHIPPS, Circuit Judges Argued: Mar. 2, 2026; Filed: Nov. 18, 2026 _____________________________ NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION* PHIPPS, Circuit Judge. A software company licensed one of its computer programs to another company for use on single-CPU computers. On allegations that the licensee used the program on multi- CPU computers and permitted its customers to use the program on multi-CPU computers, the software company sued the licensee for breach of contract and direct copyright infringement as well as two forms of secondary copyright liability – contributory infringement through inducement and vicarious infringement. In response to the licensee’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the District Court dismissed the claims on the grounds that the software company’s factual allegations were too conclusory – the software company did not identify the computers that used the program, when the licensee or its customers used the program, or which of the licensee’s customers used the program. As an additional basis for dismissing the vicarious infringement claim, the District Court determined that the * This is not an opinion of the full Court and, under 3d Cir. IOP 5.7, is not binding precedent. complaint’s allegations as to the licensee’s supervision and control over its customers’ infringing use of the program were also too conclusory. Instead of amending the complaint to provide greater detail, as permitted by the District Court’s order, the software company stood on its complaint, and through a timely notice of appeal, invoked this Court’s jurisdiction. On de novo review, we will vacate the order dismissing the claims, save for the dismissal of the claim for vicarious copyright infringement, and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. FACTUAL BACKGROUND (AS ALLEGED IN THE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT) Envoy Technologies, Inc., a software company incorporated in Delaware with a principal place of business in Edison, New Jersey, owns registered copyrights in XIPC, a computer program that provides “an advanced software toolset for the development of multitasking and distributed enterprise applications.” 2d Am. Compl. ¶¶ 7, 13 (JA246– 48). Envoy licenses XIPC for use on single-CPU computers, and for significantly more money, it licenses XIPC for use on multi-CPU computers. Cubic Corporation, which is incorporated in Delaware1 and has a principal place of business in San Diego, California, uses XIPC to develop applications. Through an agreement initially between Cubic’s predecessor in interest and Envoy, which was renewed annually since 2004, Cubic had a license to use XIPC on single-CPU computers and to deploy XIPC on single-CPU computers of its customers. 1 The second amended complaint did not allege Cubic’s state of incorporation; the parties provided that information in response to a jurisdictional inquiry from this Court. Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1653 (permitting amendment of defective allegations of jurisdiction “upon terms” in the trial or appellate courts). 2 By 2021, Envoy came to believe that Cubic was using and deploying XIPC on multi- CPU computers despite the license being limited to only single-CPU computers. Envoy unsuccessfully attempted to resolve its infringing-use concerns with Cubic. PROCEDURAL HISTORY On January 12, 2024, Envoy sued Cubic in the District Court. After two amendments, Envoy’s operative complaint consisted of four claims – all related to Cubic’s use and deployment of XIPC on multi-CPU computers. The first two claims, for breach of contract under New Jersey law and for direct copyright infringement, related to Cubic’s own use of XIPC on multi-CPU computers. In support of those claims, Envoy alleged that it owned “registered copyrights in XIPC software,” 2d Am. Compl. ¶ 13 (JA247–48), and that the licensing agreement permitted Cubic to use XIPC on single-CPU computers but that Cubic “installed and used XIPC on multi-[CPU] computers in its development environment.” Id. ¶ 43 (JA256). The other two claims, for contributory copyright infringement through inducement and for vicarious copyright infringement, depended on Cubic’s customers’ use of XIPC on multi-CPU computers. In support of those claims, Envoy alleged that “Cubic installed XIPC on multi-[CPU] computers for its customers[] and . . . trained these customers on how to use XIPC on the multi-[CPU] computers.” Id. ¶ 60 (JA259). The District Court had subject-matter jurisdiction over the claims, see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1338(a), 1367(a), and Cubic moved to dismiss them for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). As the District Court saw it, to survive a motion to dismiss on its breach-of-contract and direct infringement claims, Envoy would have to “describe the computers [Cubic] used that infringed [Envoy]’s copyright” and “explain when or how the allegedly infringing computers were used.” 3 Envoy Techs., Inc. v. Cubic Corp., 2025 WL 1413514, at *7 (D.N.J. May 15, 2025). And because the complaint did not contain any such statements, the District Court dismissed those counts. Id. The District Court also dismissed the claims of induced and vicarious copyright infringement because Envoy’s allegations were too conclusory as to the direct infringement by a third party (needed for both contributory and vicarious liability), Cubic’s knowledge and inducement of its customers’ infringement (needed for contributory liability), and Cubic’s supervision and control over its customers’ infringing uses (needed for vicarious liability). See id. at *7–9. DISCUSSION A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of the allegations in a complaint, and to survive such a challenge, a complaint must plausibly allege each element of the claims that it brings. This Court uses a three-part process for evaluating such a motion. First is the identification of the elements, or at least the challenged elements, of the disputed claim. See Lutz v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, 49 F.4th 323, 327 (3d Cir. 2022). Second, any allegations that are conclusions of law or speculative are ignored. See id. at 327–28. Third, the remaining allegations are taken as true and are evaluated for whether they plausibly allege the challenged elements of the claim with all reasonable inferences drawn in favor of the plaintiff. See id. at 328. Because the allegations in the breach-of-contract claim and the direct infringement claim focus on Cubic’s use of XIPC beyond the terms of the licensing agreement, there may be a temptation to analyze those claims identically. But they are fundamentally different. There are only two elements to a direct infringement claim: “(1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of constituent elements of the work that are original.” Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991). Neither of those 4 elements depends on the presence or absence of a licensing agreement. See In re McGraw- Hill Glob. Educ. Holdings LLC, 909 F.3d 48, 66–67 (3d Cir. 2018) (declaring that prior precedent injecting an ‘unauthorized’ component into the copying element was erroneous). A license, however, is an affirmative defense to a claim of direct copyright infringement. See Worldwide Church of God v. Phila. Church of God, Inc., 227 F.3d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir. 2000) (“The existence of a license creates an affirmative defense to a claim of copyright infringement.” (citing I.A.E., Inc. v. Shaver, 74 F.3d 768, 775 (7th Cir. 1996))); 4 Nimmer on Copyright § 13D.02[C][2] (2026) (explaining that “although authorization may defeat liability, it constitutes an affirmative defense rather than an element of the tort of copyright infringement”); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c)(1) (identifying “license” as an affirmative defense). And because a complaint is evaluated based on its factual allegations in support of the elements of a claim, not on whether a claim can survive an affirmative defense,2 a licensing agreement is generally irrelevant to the plausibility of a claim for direct copyright infringement. By contrast, a breach-of-contract claim necessarily depends on the terms of a contract, and thus allegations about the terms of a licensing agreement and their breach are essential to stating a claim for breach of a licensing agreement.3 2 See 5 Wright & Miller’s Federal Practice & Procedure § 1276 (4th ed. Apr. 2026 update) (allegations designed to preemptively rebut an affirmative defense “are not an integral part of the plaintiff’s claim for relief and lie outside his or her burden of pleading”). 3 Judge Shwartz is of the view that, because the allegations in the breach-of-contract claim and the direct infringement claim focus on Cubic’s use of XIPC beyond the terms of the licensing agreement, the Court should analyze them together and, as to the direct copyright infringement claim, “a plaintiff must show that (1) it owns a valid copyright; (2) another party copied elements of its work without authorization; and (3) that party engaged in volitional conduct.” Leonard v. Stemtech Int’l Inc., 834 F.3d 376, 386–87 (3d Cir. 2016); see MacLean Assocs., Inc. v. Wm. M. Mercer-Meidinger-Hansen, Inc., 952 F.2d 769, 779 (3d Cir. 1991) (“Since a nonexclusive license does not transfer ownership of the copyright from the licensor to the licensee, the licensor can still bring suit for copyright infringement if the licensee’s use goes beyond the scope of the nonexclusive license.”). 5 The complaint contains allegations as to both elements of direct copyright infringement. It alleges that Envoy owned registered copyrights for XIPC. The complaint also alleges that Cubic installed and used XIPC in its internal development environment. Those are factual allegations – not conclusions of law – and when assumed true, they suffice to allege a plausible claim of direct copyright infringement. The District Court was mistaken to demand that Envoy provide additional details. See Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 789 (3d Cir. 2016) (“[A]llegations of historical fact . . . are assumed to be true even if ‘unrealistic or nonsensical,’ ‘chimerical,’ or ‘extravagantly fanciful.’” (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 681 (2009))); see also Doe v. Princeton Univ., 30 F.4th 335, 342 (3d Cir. 2022) (explaining that courts must accept “factual assertions” as true “even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts alleged is improbable and that a recovery is very remote and unlikely” (citation omitted)). But cf. Lutz, 49 F.4th at 328 (explaining that some factual allegations may be “so threadbare or speculative that they fail to cross the line between the conclusory and the factual” (citation omitted)). Moreover, since a license is an affirmative defense in copyright law, the District Court was incorrect to insist that Envoy overcome that defense in its complaint. See Envoy Techs., 2025 WL 1413514, at *6 (concluding in error that “[Envoy]’s claim fails because [Envoy] never explains what computers [Cubic] used that violate the terms of the License nor how or when [Cubic] violate[d] the license”).4 For these reasons, Envoy sufficiently alleged the elements of a claim of direct infringement, and the District Court’s order dismissing the direct infringement claim will be vacated. 4 Although Envoy’s complaint explicitly raised equitable tolling and the discovery rule, a motion to dismiss is generally an inappropriate vehicle for evaluating the merits of a statute-of-limitations defense in a case like this where it is not apparent from the face of the complaint that Envoy’s claims are time-barred. See In re Tower Air, Inc., 416 F.3d 229, 238 (3d Cir. 2005). 6 Also, contrary to the District Court’s assessment, see id. at *4–6, Envoy adequately pleaded a breach of the licensing agreement. See generally Goldfarb v. Solimine, 245 A.3d 570, 577 (N.J. 2021) (identifying breach as an essential element of a breach-of-contract claim under New Jersey law). Envoy alleged that Cubic’s license permitted use and deployment of XIPC on only single-CPU computers but that Cubic used and deployed XIPC on multi-CPU computers. When taken as true, as factual allegations in a complaint must be in response to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, see Connelly, 809 F.3d at 787, those statements plausibly allege a breach of the licensing agreement, and so the District Court’s order dismissing the breach-of-contract claim will be vacated. The remaining claims for secondary copyright liability depend in part on a third party’s direct infringement, and the District Court dismissed them both for failure to make non-conclusory allegations in that respect. See Envoy Techs., 2025 WL 1413514, at *7–9. But the complaint contains statements that Envoy owned copyrights in XIPC and that XIPC was installed on Cubic’s customers’ computers. At this stage, that suffices for alleging direct infringement by a third party. See Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Fung, 710 F.3d 1020, 1034 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that “[b]oth uploading and downloading copyrighted material are infringing acts” since “[t]he former violates the copyright holder’s right to distribution [and] the latter the right to reproduction”); Stenograph L.L.C. v. Bossard Assocs., Inc., 144 F.3d 96, 100 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“[T]he installation of software onto a computer results in ‘copying’ within the meaning of the Copyright Act.”). Thus, the District Court erred in dismissing the secondary copyright liability claims on that basis. The District Court also provided alternative grounds for dismissing the claims for secondary copyright liability. As to the induced infringement claim, the District Court correctly identified the additional elements of such a claim as knowledge of the third 7 party’s direct copyright infringement and material contribution to or inducement of the third party’s infringement. See Leonard v. Stemtech Int’l Inc., 834 F.3d 376, 387 (3d Cir. 2016); see also Cox Commc’ns, Inc. v. Sony Music Ent., 607 U.S. 583, 593 (2026) (explaining that a contributory infringement claim predicated on inducement must show “active[] encourage[ment] [of] infringement through specific acts”). But the District Court then rejected the allegations that Cubic knew it supplied XIPC to its customers and that the customers used XIPC as too conclusory. Those allegations, however, are taken as true at this stage, and treated as such, they suffice to allege a plausible claim for contributory infringement. Accordingly, the District Court erred in dismissing the contributory infringement claim on that basis. As to the claim for vicarious infringement, one of the additional elements of that claim is “the right and ability to supervise or control the infringing activity.” Leonard, 834 F.3d at 388. Applied here, that would require allegations that Cubic had the right and ability to supervise or control its customers’ use of XIPC. For that element, the complaint alleges that Cubic trained its customers on XIPC. It may be that some forms of training constitute supervision of or even control over the infringing activity, but not every form of training involves supervision or control of the infringing activity. Even taken as true, Envoy’s allegation that Cubic trained its customers on XIPC does not, without more, suffice to plausibly allege the requisite supervision or control over the infringing activity. Envoy also alleges that its agreement with Cubic contractually obligated Cubic to refrain from deploying XIPC on Cubic’s customers’ multi-CPU computers. But the relevant legal relationship for the vicarious infringement claim is not the one between Cubic and Envoy but rather those between Cubic and its customers. Thus, Envoy does not plausibly allege Cubic’s right and ability to supervise or control its customers as needed for a claim of 8 vicarious infringement. Consequently, the District Court did not err in dismissing the claim for vicarious liability, and because Envoy stood on its complaint as a means of securing appellate jurisdiction, the District Court should not permit any curative amendment of the vicarious liability claim on remand. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order in part, vacate it in part, and remand the case for further proceedings. Counsel for Appellant Michael R. Gilman Jeffrey I. Kaplan [Argued] KAPLAN BREYER SCHWARZ Counsel for Appellee Thomas R. Curtin Kathleen N. Fennelly MCELROY DEUTSCH MULVANEY & CARPENTER Stuart E. Pollack [Argued] SUSMAN GODFREY 9