Dte Electric Company v. St Clair County
CourtMichigan Court of Appeals
Date FiledNovember 17, 2026
Docket379632
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
DTE ELECTRIC COMPANY, FOR PUBLICATION
November 17, 2026
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant-Appellee, 9:34 AM
and
PORTSIDE SOLAR, LLC,
Intervening Plaintiff-Appellee,
v No. 379632
St. Clair Circuit Court
ST. CLAIR COUNTY, ST. CLAIR COUNTY LC No. 25-001332-CZ
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, and ST. CLAIR
COUNTY HEALTH DEPARTMENT,
Defendants/Counterplaintiffs-
Appellants.
Before: MURRAY, P.J., and PATEL and FEENEY, JJ.
MURRAY, P.J.
This appeal involves a St. Clair County Health Department regulation, approved by the
county board of commissioners, which attempts to regulate many details regarding the construction
and operation of solar and energy facilities. Although it recognizes it has no authority to enact
zoning regulations, the Health Department and its aligned parties1 argue that because the issue is
one of public health, the regulation was validly enacted under its authority to protect the health
and welfare of county residents. The trial court did not buy that argument, and neither do we.
Under governing Michigan law, the Health Department regulation is invalid as it is a de facto
zoning ordinance, which the Health Department has no power to enact. And even if the Health
Department had the power to enact the regulation, it would be preempted by state law. Regulation
25-01 is therefore invalid and unenforceable. As a result, we affirm the trial court’s order granting
1
Defendants/counterplaintiffs St. Clair County and the St. Clair Board of Commissioners (BOC).
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summary disposition in favor of plaintiff/counterdefendant, DTE Electric Company, and
intervening plaintiff, Portside Solar, LLC, pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(9) and (10).
I. BACKGROUND
In September 2023, Portside submitted an application to Fort Gratiot Township for a
special land use permit to develop a large solar energy system. Litigation over the initial denial of
the application ensued. The following year, Portside, Fort Gratiot Township, and the Fort Gratiot
Township Planning Commission entered into a consent judgment permitting Portside to develop
and construct a large solar energy system in accordance with the consent judgment and the terms
outlined in an amended site plan. The trial court ordered that the consent judgment constituted an
approved special use permit and site plan approval required under the township’s zoning
ordinance.
During Portside’s building process, the Legislature passed 2023 PA 233 that added Part 8,
Wind, Solar, and Storage Certification, to the Clean, Renewable, and Efficient Energy Act, MCL
460.1001 et seq, In re Implementing Provisions of Public Act 233 of 2023, ___ Mich App ___,
___; ___ NW3d ___ (2026) (Docket No. 373259); slip op at 2, the purpose of which was to
promote the development and use of clean and renewable energy resources, MCL 460.1001(2).
At the same time, the Legislature amended MCL 125.3205(1)(d) of the Michigan Zoning Enabling
Act (MZEA), MCL 125.3101 et seq., to provide that a zoning ordinance is subject to “Part 8 of the
clean and renewable energy and energy waste reduction act, 2008 PA 295, MCL 460.1221 to
460.1232.”
In response to this legislative action, the BOC adopted regulations recommended by the
Health Department, and Regulation 25-01 went into effect on May 1, 2025. The regulation
requires any company planning on constructing an energy facility2 in a rural area of St. Clair
County to obtain prior authorization to do so from the Health Department. The regulation further
requires energy developers and owners of all energy facilities to maintain and operate them
pursuant to all applicable laws and “at least the minimum standards required in this Regulation.”
With respect to the requirement that the owner, operator, or developer of an energy facility
request authorization from the Health Department before beginning construction, Regulation 25-
01, §7, requires, in part, the following to be included in the authorization request:
(c) A description of the Energy Facility, including a detailed site plan, which
depicts, at a minimum: (i) the layout of all proposed and existing structures; (ii)
property boundaries and dimensions; (iii) existing and proposed landscaping and
fencing; (iv) the location of all existing and proposed utilities; (v) all existing and
proposed drainage systems; (vi) the topography of the property; (vii) all existing
and proposed roads and means of access; (viii) all existing and proposed easements;
2
Regulation 25-01 defines an energy facility as “[a] Solar Energy Facility and/or a Battery Energy
Storage Facility which is: (i) located or proposed to be located all or in part in St. Clair County;
and (ii) which is located or proposed to be located, in whole or in part, in or adjacent to a Rural
Area.”
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(ix) a scale and legend; and (x) distances to the nearest structures located on all
adjacent properties.
* * *
(k) A soil and economic survey report under section 60303 of the natural
resources and environmental protection act, 1994 PA 451, § MCL 324.60303.
(l) If the proposed site of the Energy Facility is undeveloped land, a
description of feasible alternative developed locations, including, but not limited
to, vacant industrial property and brownfields, and an explanation of why such sites
were not selected.
(m) A stormwater assessment and a plan to minimize, mitigate, and repair
any drainage impacts at the expense of the owner or operator.
(n) A fire response plan and an emergency response plan.
(o) A decommissioning plan that is consistent with agreements reached
between the applicant and other landowners of participating properties and that
ensures the return of all participating properties to their useful natural condition
similar to that which existed before construction, including removal of all above-
surface and below-surface facilities and infrastructure. The decommissioning plan
shall include, but is not limited to, financial assurance in the form of a surety bond
or an irrevocable standby letter of credit, in the amount of at least $100,000 per
megawatt nameplate capacity of the Energy Facility, as adjusted annually for
inflation based upon the CPI-U from the date of this Regulation. To be acceptable,
a surety bond must be posted and maintained by a surety authorized to do business
in Michigan and which is rate A+ or better by A.M. Best. To be acceptable, an
irrevocable standby letter of credit must be issued and maintained by a bank
authorized to do business in Michigan with a 1 rating pursuant to the CAMELS
rating system. St. Clair County shall be identified as named beneficiary on such
surety bond or irrevocable letter of credit.
* * *
(s) All agreements with the owner(s) of the premises where the Energy
Facility is proposed to be located.
The regulation also contains requirements and standards once an energy facility is granted
authorization to build and operate:
Section 8: Health Department Review of Request for Authorization
* * *
After completing its review, the Health Department shall issue a written
determination as follows: (i) granting Authorization to construct the proposed
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Energy Facility, with or without conditions; or (ii) denying Authorization to
construct or operate the proposed Energy Facility with specified reasons supporting
the denial. If the Authorization is granted, all conditions detailed in the
Authorization, if any must be fully complied with and all other required permits
and permissions must be obtained prior to construction and operation of the Energy
Facility. . . .
* * *
Section 9: Minimum Standards Applicable to Energy Facilities
To be eligible to receive an Authorization, Energy Facilities must meet or
exceed the following Minimum Standards. Regardless of whether the
Authorization was received, all Energy Facilities are required to operate and be
maintained in such manner which meets or exceeds the below Minimum Standards.
(a) Noise Mitigation. An Energy Facility shall be designed, operated and
maintained such that when operating at full power output, as measured at any point
at or beyond a nonparticipating property line of a parcel with an existing residential
dwelling, it does not produce measurable Tonal Noise, and the broadband noise
level from the Energy Facility does not exceed 45 decibels A-weighted averaged
over a 10 minute period (dB(A) Leq).
(b) Visual Pollution Mitigation. An Energy Facility shall be designed,
operated and maintained such that it is obscured from view from adjacent roadways
and from all points on adjacent non-participating properties including from all
occupied stories of included buildings, including use of opaque gating or fencing
at points of vehicular access, perimeter berms, or a buffer of at least 25’ in ground
depth consisting of sufficiently dense natural healthy vegetation including
deciduous trees, or a combination, thereof, which is sufficient to obscure the Energy
Facility from view.
(c) Decommissioning. An Energy Facility shall enter into a
decommissioning agreement that ensures the return of all participating properties
to their useful natural condition similar to that which existed before construction,
including removal of all above-surface and below-surface facilities and
infrastructure. The decommissioning plan shall include, but is not limited to,
financial assurance in the form of a surety bond or an irrevocable standby letter of
credit, in the amount of at least $100,000 per megawatt nameplate capacity of the
Energy Facility, as adjusted annually for inflation based upon the CPI-U from the
date of this Regulation. To be acceptable, a surety bond must be posted and
maintained by a surety authorized to do business in Michigan and which is rate A+
or better by A.M. Best. To be acceptable, an irrevocable standby letter of credit
must be issued and maintained by a bank authorized to do business in Michigan
with a 1 rating pursuant to the CAMELS rating system. St. Clair County shall be
identified as named beneficiary on such surety bond or irrevocable letter of credit.
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Two months later DTE filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that Regulation
25-01 is a zoning ordinance that the Health Department had no power to adopt or enforce. DTE
asserted that, as a leading producer of and investor in renewable energy, it was developing plans
for solar and energy storage projects in St. Clair County. In particular, DTE intended to apply for
a permit for a solar energy project in Greenwood Township, located in St. Clair County, and if left
undisturbed, Regulation 25-01 would have a direct impact on its plans. Portside later filed an
intervening complaint. Defendants filed a counterclaim against DTE, asking the trial court to
declare that Regulation 25-01 was properly adopted as a health and safety regulation by the Health
Department within its authority granted by the Public Health Code, MCL 333.1101 et seq., and
that Regulation 25-01 was neither a zoning ordinance nor preempted by the MZEA. The trial court
granted DTE’s and Portside’s motions for summary disposition, concluding that Regulation 25-01
was a de facto zoning ordinance that exceeded the Health Department’s authority.
II. ANALYSIS
A. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition.
El-Khalil v Oakwood Healthcare, Inc, 504 Mich 152, 159; 934 NW2d 665 (2019). A motion under
MCR 2.116(C)(9) tests the sufficiency of a defendant’s pleadings. Slater v Ann Arbor Pub Sch Bd
of Ed, 250 Mich App 419, 425; 648 NW2d 205 (2002). “[T]he trial court must accept as true all
well-pleaded allegations and properly grants summary disposition where a defendant fails to plead
a valid defense to a claim.” Id.
Summary disposition is appropriate under MCR 2.116(C)(10) if, “[e]xcept as to the amount
of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to
judgment or partial judgment as a matter of law.” A court reviewing a motion under MCR
2.116(C)(10) must consider the substantively admissible evidence offered in opposition to the
motion. Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 121; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). “If, after careful review
of the evidence, it appears to the trial court that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the
opposing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, then summary disposition is properly
granted under MCR 2.116(I)(2).” Cadillac Rubber & Plastics, Inc v Tubular Metal Sys, LLC, 331
Mich App 416, 422; 952 NW2d 576 (2020).
Whether a state law has preempted a local regulation is a question of statutory
interpretation that we review de novo. Mich Gun Owners, Inc v Ann Arbor Pub Sch, 502 Mich
695, 702; 918 NW2d 756 (2018).
B. REGULATION 25-01
As noted earlier, the principal question on appeal is whether Regulation 25-01 can be
enforced by the Health Department. Because Regulation 25-01 is nothing short of an attempt to
create a zoning ordinance to regulate the construction and operation of solar and energy facilities
by an entity that is not empowered to do so, we hold that the regulation is invalid and
unenforceable. And, even if the Health Department had the authority to enforce Regulation 25-
01, it is preempted by 2023 PA 233.
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Turning first to the Health Department’s authority to act in this field, we begin with a
proposition not contested by any party: The Health Department is not authorized to enact a zoning
ordinance. This holds true because “[l]ocal governments have no inherent power to regulate land
use;” instead, the Legislature must grant local governments the power to zone for any of the broad
purposes identified in the MZEA, MCL 125.3201(1). Saugatuck Dunes Coastal Alliance v
Saugatuck Twp, 509 Mich 561, 577; 983 NW2d 798 (2022). The problem for the Health
Department is that the MZEA defines a “local unit of government” as a county, township, city, or
village, MCL 125.3102(o), and a county health department is none of those.
Recognizing its inability to create a zoning ordinance, defendants argue that Regulation
25-01 is not a zoning ordinance, but is rather a health and safety regulation that the department is
allowed to enact under the public health code. To resolve this issue, we must consider what a
zoning ordinance entails, and what powers the public health code grants to health departments.
We first look to what constitutes a zoning ordinance. A zoning ordinance is “an ordinance
which regulates the use of land and buildings according to districts, areas, or locations.” Square
Lake Hills Condo Ass’n v Bloomfield Twp, 437 Mich 310, 323; 471 NW2d 321 (1991). Whether
“a particular ordinance is a zoning ordinance may be determined by a consideration of the
substance of its provisions and terms, and its relation to the general plan of zoning in the city.” Id.
The MZEA provides the sole authority for a local government to exercise zoning authority. Maple
BPA, Inc v Bloomfield Twp, 302 Mich App 505, 515; 838 NW2d 915 (2013).
Looking at the substance of Regulation 25-01, we readily conclude that it is for all intents
and purposes a zoning ordinance. Much like the Fort Gratiot solar energy system ordinance under
which Polstar obtained approval to construct its facility, Regulation 25-01 regulates the use of land
and buildings according to the area. See Square Lake Hills Condo Ass’n, 437 Mich at 323.
Regulation 25-01 states that it regulates renewable energy facilities in rural areas. 3 As already
detailed, the regulation also requires any energy facility to submit to the health department,
amongst other things: (1) a detailed site plan covering drainage systems, landscaping, roads,
easements, scales and legends, and the layout of proposed and existing structures; (2) a soil and
economic survey report; (3) feasible alternative locations; (4) a stormwater assessment; (5) a fire
and emergency response plan; and (6) a decommissioning plan. The regulation also contains
minimum standards covering noise mitigation and visual pollution mitigation for energy facilities.
The Fort Gratiot Township Ordinances that Portside complied with contain many similar
requirements for applications and standards for operation of these same facilities. See Fort Gratiot
Ordinances, § § 38-46(4) (detailed site plan requirements), 38-636(d)(4) (screening and
3
Regulation 25-01 defines an energy facility as “[a] Solar Energy Facility and/or a Battery Energy
Storage Facility which is: (i) located or proposed to be located all or in part in St. Clair County;
and (ii) which is located or proposed to be located, in whole or in part, in or adjacent to a Rural
Area.” The regulation defines a rural area as “[a] 2020 US Census tract which has a population
density of 500 people or less per square mile.” Although defendants argue that “rural area” was
only included because people that live in rural areas were more vulnerable to potential dangers
posed by the energy facilities, the simple fact is that Regulation 25-01 only applies to rural areas
of the county.
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landscaping standards), (12) (sound pressure level standards) and (14) (decommissioning plan
requirements). Ironically, St. Clair County’s existing zoning ordinance also covers many of these
same matters. See St. Clair Co Code of Ordinances, § 5.6 (visual screening requirements) and
§ 10.6 (imposing certain noise restrictions).
The requirements and standards contained within Regulation 25-01 regulate the use of
property, not the activities on the property. Each criteria relates to how the property can be used—
such as the extent of setbacks, the layout of any facility on the property, the type of landscape,
whether there are other locations for this type of use, how to decommission the property, etc. These
requirements and standards go to the heart of traditional zoning concerns, a fact recognized by Fort
Gratiot Township, the entity granted the power to enact zoning ordinances for this exact type of
facility. See MCL 460.1223 and MCL 125.3201.
As DTE argues, the Health Department explicitly acknowledged that it was attempting to
place more stringent requirements on energy facilities to remedy the perceived failures of the
standards contained within PA 233. See BOC Finding No. 3. And that purpose, coupled with the
subject matter, content, and geographic area covered by Regulation 25-01, compel the conclusion
that Regulation 25-01 is a de facto zoning ordinance.
Now to the asserted authority under the public health code. Defendants argue that the
Health Department was empowered to create and enforce the regulation under the public health
code, which allows county health departments to “adopt regulations to properly safeguard the
public health and to prevent the spread of diseases and sources of contamination.” MCL
333.2435(d). In addressing this issue, it is important to recall that the distinction between a zoning
ordinance and a regulatory ordinance cannot depend on whether the purpose is to promote the
public good, because both types of ordinances may have that purpose. Natural Aggregates Corp
v Brighton Twp, 213 Mich App 287, 298-299; 539 NW2d 761 (1995). Although the powers
granted under the public health code are to be liberally construed, we cannot conclude that MCL
333.2435(d) authorizes the Health Department to enact Regulation 25-01.
No party disputes the authority of public health departments to issue regulations that are
designed to protect the public health, as the Legislature has granted them that exact power. MCL
333.2435(d). See generally McNeil v Charlevoix Co, 484 Mich 69, 77-78; 772 NW2d 18 (2009).
But despite this general provision, none of the powers or duties bestowed upon a public health
department relate to issuing broad-based zoning requirements. In fact, when addressing a
department’s involvement with physical facilities, the Legislature granted departments the power
to “[a]dvise other local agencies and persons as to the location, drainage, water supply, disposal of
solid waste, heating, and ventilation of buildings.” MCL 333.2435(b). We take this to mean that
when it comes to addressing “the location, drainage, water supply, disposal of solid waste, heating,
and ventilation of buildings,” and other similar matters, public health departments should provide
advice to the responsible entity on what is best for the public health, and then that entity can utilize
that advice to enact proper ordinances. Here, that is clearly the township, which has been given
the undisputed power to enact zoning regulations, MCL 125.3102(o), and to enact compatible
renewable energy ordinances under 2023 PA 233. MCL 460.1221(a), (f), and (n). And, once Fort
Gratiot Township enacted a zoning ordinance addressing solar and energy facilities, the county
could not delve into the area. See In re Implementing Provisions of Public Act 233 of 2023, ___
Mich App at ___; slip op at 13 n 6, citing MCL 125.3209 and MCL 125.3102(x). In light of this,
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we cannot conclude that the general authority granted under MCL 333.2435(d) allows a public
health department to circumvent the long-standing power of local units of government to enact
zoning regulations on the use of property within their jurisdiction. The duties delegated to public
health departments support this conclusion, as none pertain to regulating the use of land. See MCL
333.2433.4
In the end, because Regulation 25-01 regulates the “use” of land, not just isolated
“activities” on the land, it is not a proper regulation enacted by the public health department.
Instead, it is properly classified as a zoning law. See Natural Aggregates, 213 Mich App at 300-
301. In more plain terms, when Regulation 25-01 looks and acts like a zoning ordinance, calling
it something else does not make it so. Boyd v Layher, 170 Mich App 93, 99; 427 NW2d 593
(1988) (“We wholeheartedly agree with the circuit court’s conclusion that ‘[l]anguage is not
dispositive of the issue. If something walks like a duck, quacks like a duck and swims, covering
it with chicken feathers will not make it into a chicken.’ ”) (alteration in original).5
Defendants have agreed that the Health Department is not a local unit of government
empowered to regulate land use. MCL 125.3201(1); MCL 125.3102(o). Accordingly, the trial
court properly ruled that Regulation 25-01 is a de facto zoning ordinance impermissibly attempting
to regulate the use of land and buildings.6 Furthermore, the BOC and St. Clair County did not
have jurisdiction to adopt a zoning ordinance regulating solar energy systems because “[a]
county’s zoning jurisdiction does not include areas subject to a township ordinance” pursuant to
MCL 125.3209. In re Implementing Provisions of Public Act 233 of 2023, ___ Mich App at ___;
4
For examples of public health department regulations that impact activities on the land, not the
use of the land, see McNeil, 484 Mich at 75-78 (regulation addressed smoking in buildings) and
OAG, 1989-1990, No. 6665 (November 15, 1990) (addressing public health department’s
regulation of tobacco sales to minors, and the placement of tobacco vending machines in certain
buildings).
5
“The ‘duck test’ has received wide support from the courts.” BMC Indus, Inc v Barth Indus, Inc,
160 F3d 1322, 1337 n 28 (CA 11, 1998). See also Lane v United States, 286 F3d 723, 730 (CA 4,
2002) (“If something looks like a duck, walks like a duck, and talks like a duck, and the district
court determines it to be a duck, it is not our place on review to call it something else.”); In re
Sorah, 163 F3d 397, 401 (CA 6, 1998); Quave v Progress Marine, 912 F2d 798, 800 n 4 (CA 5,
1990); and Dole v Williams Enterprises, Inc, 278 US App DC 1, 3 n 2; 876 F2d 186 (1989)
(embracing “the now-infamous ‘duck test,’ dressed up in appropriate judicial garb . . .”). We don’t
endorse this as a “test” to be used for statutory interpretation, but invoke it only to make the simple
point that the Health Department’s attempt at distancing the regulation from a zoning ordinance
was poorly disguised. See Gun Owners of America, Inc v Bondi, 168 F4th 813, 823 (CA 6, 2026).
6
For these same reasons, the MZEA preempts Regulation 25-01 because the Health Department
attempted to regulate land use without the authority granted by the MZEA. Through MCL
125.3210, the Legislature expressly provided that the authority to regulate land-use development
that the MZEA extended to local units of government is exclusive. Mich Gun Owners, Inc, 502
Mich at 702.
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slip op at 13 n 6. Defendants therefore engaged in an ultra vires activity, Richardson v Jackson
Co, 432 Mich 377, 387; 443 NW2d 105 (1989), and exceeded their authority by adopting and
enacting Regulation 25-01. The trial court properly granted DTE’s and Portside’s motions for
summary disposition and denied defendants’ motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR
2.116(I)(2).
C. PREEMPTION BY 2023 PA 233
Our conclusion above resolves this appeal. However, should a higher court conclude that
the Health Department had the power to implement Regulation 25-01, we would still affirm the
trial court order because that court did not err by ruling that Regulation 25-01 is preempted by
2023 PA 233. Indeed, through 2023 PA 233 the Legislature has occupied the field of energy
facility regulation by setting controlling standards and conclusively stating that any local ordinance
attempting to regulate these facilities must not be more restrictive than what is provided by state
law. And, as discussed briefly below, Regulation 25-01 clearly is more restrictive, a fact admitted
to by the BOC.
“Field preemption applies if the state statutory scheme pre-empts the ordinance by
occupying the field of regulation which the municipality seeks to enter, to the exclusion of the
ordinance, even where there is no direct conflict between the two schemes of regulation.” Mich
Gun Owners, Inc, 502 Mich at 703; (quotation marks and citation omitted). The state can preempt
a local regulation “expressly or by implicaton[.]” Id. at 702. A court must first determine “whether
state law expressly provides that the state’s authority to regulate in a specified area of the law is to
be exclusive . . . .” Id. at 703 (quotation marks and citation omitted). If the statute does not
expressly preempt local regulations, a court must consider certain factors to determine whether the
Legislature impliedly occupied the field. Id. at 704-705.
Implied preemption can occur when the state has occupied the entire field
of regulation in a certain area (field preemption) or when a local regulation directly
conflicts with the state law (conflict preemption). In the context of conflict
preemption, a direct conflict exists when the ordinance permits what the statute
prohibits or the ordinance prohibits what the statute permits. [DeRuiter v Byron
Twp, 505 Mich 130, 140; 949 NW2d 91 (2020) (quotation marks and citations
omitted).]
Preemption may also be implied by a statute’s legislative history. Mich Gun Owners, Inc, 502
Mich at 704. However, “[o]nly where the statutory language is ambiguous may a court properly
go beyond the words of the statute to determine legislative intent.” Id. at 706 (quotation marks
and citation omitted).
“Conflict preemption applies if the ordinance is in direct conflict with the state statutory
scheme.” DeRuiter, 505 Mich at 140 (quotation marks, citation, and alteration omitted). To
determine whether the ordinance conflicts with the statutory scheme, a court must examine the
relevant sections of both. Id. at 140-141.
In Part 8, the Legislature provides that a “proposed energy facility does not present an
unreasonable threat to public health or safety,” MCL 460.1226(7)(g), if it complies with the
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standards set forth in MCL 460.1226(8). MCL 460.1226(8)(a)(i), (ii), and (iii) provide setback
requirements, fencing requirements, and a 25-foot above-ground maximum height for solar panels.
MCL 460.1226(8)(a)(iv) dictates that a solar energy facility “not generate a maximum sound in
excess of 55 average hourly decibels as modeled at the nearest outer wall of the nearest dwelling
located on an adjacent nonparticipating property.” The statute also requires “dark sky-friendly
lighting solutions.” MCL 460.1226(8)(a)(v). Finally, a solar energy facility is required to comply
with “any more stringent requirements adopted by the commission.” MCL 460.1226(8)(a)(vi).
In Resolution No. 25-13, the BOC specifically stated:
The restrictions/requirements detailed in PA 233 related to noise, Visual
Pollution and decommissioning do not adequately protect the public from risks and
dangers to the public health created by Energy Facilities that are granted state
certification under PA 233. Further, PA 233 does not restrict, limit or measure
Tonal Noise created by Facilities.
Regulation 25-01, § 9(a), requires that a solar energy facility
be designed, operated, and maintained such that when operating at full power
output, as measured at any point at or beyond a non-participating property line of a
parcel with an exisiting residential dwelling, it does not produce measurable Tonal
Noise, and the broadband noise level from the Energy Facility does not exceed 45
decibels A-weighted averaged over a 10 minute period (dB(A) Leq).
Regulation 25-01, § 9(b) also provides for visual pollution mitigation:
(b) Visual Pollution Mitigation. An Energy Facility shall be designed,
operated and maintained such that it is obscured from view from adjacent roadways
and from all points on adjacent non-participating properties including from all
occupied stories of included buildings, including use of opaque gating or fencing
at points of vehicular access, perimeter berms, or a buffer of at least 25’ in ground
depth consisting of sufficiently dense natural healthy vegetation including
deciduous trees, or a combination, thereof, which is insufficient to obscure the
Energy Facility from view.
Regulation 25-01 is in direct conflict with Part 8, and the inconsistent regulation must fall
to the controlling state law. MCL 460.1230(3). In its resolution, the BOC concluded that Part 8
does not adequately protect the public from the health risks associated with energy facilities, yet
in stark contrast, the Legislature determined that a “proposed energy facility does not present an
unreasonable threat to public health or safety,” if it complies with the standards set forth in MCL
460.1226(8). MCL 460.1226(7)(g) (emphasis added). Additionally, Regulation 25-01, § 9(a),
regulates tonal noise, in addition to providing a more restrictive noise level than MCL
460.1226(8)(a)(iv). Regulation 25-01 also requires visual pollution mitigation not required by
MCL 460.1226(8). In the case of noise mitigation, Regulation 25-01 impermissibly attempts to
prohibit what the statute permits. DeRuiter, 505 Mich at 140. Upon examining MCL
460.1226(7)(g) and (8) in comparison to Regulation 25-01 and Resolution 25-13, it is clear that a
direct conflict exists because Regulation 25-01 and Resolution 25-13 restrict what Part 8 permits.
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The Legislature determined that if a local unit of government7 creates a compatible
renewable energy ordinance, that ordinance can be no more restrictive than what is contained in
PA 233. See In re Implementing Provisions of Public Act 233 of 2023, ___ Mich App at ___; slip
op at 3, quoting MCL 460.1221(f). Clearly the Legislature has made the policy choice that energy
facilities can function, consistent with the health and safety of Michigan residents, so long as the
statutory standards are met, and that no local unit of government can impose stricter or additional
restrictions on these facilities. Because Regulation 25-01’s conflicting provisions do exactly that,
the regulation is invalid. DeRuiter, 505 Mich at 140. The trial court properly granted summary
disposition to DTE and Portside.
Affirmed.
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
/s/ Sima G. Patel
/s/ Kathleen A. Feeney
7
A local unit of government does not include a county health department. See MCL 460.1221(f).
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