Full Opinion

24-479 NLRB v. Local 282 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 12th day of November, two thousand twenty-six. Present: JOHN M. WALKER, JR., PIERRE N. LEVAL, EUNICE C. LEE, Circuit Judges. __________________________________________ NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Petitioner, v. Docket No. 24-479 Docket No. 96-4080 LOCAL 282, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, AFL-CIO, Respondent. __________________________________________ For Petitioner: Helene D. Lerner, Aaron Samsel, Kwame Samuda, Phillip H. Melton, National Labor Relations Board, Washington, DC. For Respondent: Hanan B. Kolko, K. Jeff Wang, Cohen, Weiss and Simon LLP, New York, NY. Respondent Local 282, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, AFL-CIO (“Local 282”) moves for relief from the prospective operation of this Court’s August 18, 1998 consent order (the “1998 Consent Order” or “Consent Order”), and, to the extent necessary, for recall of this Court’s May 30, 1996 mandate enforcing an order of the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB” or the “Board”). UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the motion to recall the mandate is DENIED as unnecessary and the motion to abrogate the prospective effect of the 1998 Consent Order is GRANTED. This matter arises from two related proceedings before this Court. In May 1996, we granted the Board’s application to enforce an order issued under Section 8(b)(4) of the National Labor Relations Act and directed issuance of our mandate. Thereafter, in July 1998, following additional disputes concerning Local 282’s compliance with prior judgments and contempt adjudications, the parties jointly requested entry of a consent order, which this Court approved on August 18, 1998, and which resolved all outstanding issues. The Consent Order required Local 282, among other things, to refrain from unlawful secondary picketing activity and to implement training, monitoring, and recordkeeping measures designed to ensure future compliance with federal labor law. Local 282 seeks relief from the prospective operation of the Consent Order after more than a quarter century of undisputed compliance. Local 282 contends that the objectives of the Consent Order have been achieved, that its leadership and institutional practices have materially changed, and that continued judicial supervision is no longer equitable. The NLRB opposes the motion, arguing principally that Local 282 has failed to demonstrate the sort of changed 2 circumstances contemplated by Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367 (1992) for vacatur of a consent decree and that continued compliance alone does not justify dissolution. As an initial matter, we conclude that it is not necessary to recall this Court’s May 1996 mandate insofar as Local 282 seeks relief from the prospective operation of the 1998 Consent Order. The Consent Order was entered pursuant to this Court’s original enforcement jurisdiction and was not itself the subject of a separate mandate. As the Supreme Court explained in Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States, an “appellate mandate relates to the record and issues then before the court, and does not purport to deal with possible later events.” 429 U.S. 17, 18 (1976) (per curium). Accordingly, a court does not contravene an earlier mandate by considering a later request for prospective relief from an injunction. Id.; see also DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 38 F.3d 1266, 1270 (2d Cir. 1994). Because Local 282 seeks only relief from the prospective operation of the 1998 Consent Order, and not reconsideration of the 1996 enforcement judgment itself, recall of the mandate is unnecessary. A federal court has authority to modify or terminate prospective injunctive relief when changed circumstances or substantial attainment of a decree’s objectives render continued prospective enforcement inequitable. See Rufo, 502 U.S. at 383–84 (holding modification appropriate upon a significant change in factual conditions or law); Bd. of Educ. of Oklahoma City Pub. Schs. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 247–50 (1991) (finding termination appropriate where the purposes of the decree have been achieved in part through good-faith compliance); Patterson v. Newspaper & Mail Deliverers’ Union of N.Y. & Vicinity, 13 F.3d 33, 37–39 (2d Cir. 1993) (applying the flexible standard of Rufo and Dowell to a union consent decree); Horne v. Flores, 3 557 U.S. 433, 450 (2009) (“[A] critical question . . . is whether the objective of the . . . order . . . has been achieved.”). Our precedents therefore require a flexible inquiry that considers, among other things: (1) the circumstances giving rise to the decree, (2) the length of time since its entry, (3) whether the party subject to the decree has complied in good faith, (4) whether the decree’s principal objectives have been substantially attained, and (5) whether there remains a meaningful likelihood that the conduct sought to be prevented will recur absent continued judicial supervision. See Patterson, 13 F.3d at 38–39; Dowell, 498 U.S. at 249–50; Horne, 557 U.S. at 450. Applying those principles, and considering the record as a whole, we conclude that the prospective operation of the Consent Order is no longer necessary or equitable. First, Local 282 has demonstrated an extraordinary and undisputed record of compliance, which weighs heavily in favor of terminating prospective relief because “[c]ompliance with previous court orders is obviously relevant” to determining whether continued judicial supervision remains necessary. Dowell, 498 U.S. at 249. For more than twenty-six years following entry of the Consent Order, the union has engaged in numerous strikes and picketing campaigns without any finding that it engaged in unlawful secondary activity or violated the Consent Order. The Board has not initiated contempt proceedings during that period. Nor has the Board identified any adjudicated violation of Section 8(b)(4) occurring after entry of the decree. This lengthy record of compliance is highly probative of the union’s good faith and bears directly on whether continued supervision remains necessary. See Dowell, 498 U.S. at 249 (explaining that the 4 passage of time permits a court “to observe the good faith of the school board in complying with the decree”). Second, the record reflects substantial institutional change, which further supports dissolution of the Consent Order because equitable relief is directed toward present conditions rather than historical misconduct alone. See id. The individuals who led Local 282 during the decades that gave rise to the judgments, contempt adjudications, and eventual consent order are no longer responsible for the union’s affairs. The present leadership has governed throughout a substantial period of compliance that followed entry of the decree. The passage of time, coupled with demonstrated lawful conduct under new leadership, permits the Court to assess whether the decree’s objectives have been internalized rather than merely obeyed under threat of sanction. Third, the dominant objective of the Consent Order has been achieved. A “critical question” in determining whether prospective relief should continue is “whether the objective of the . . . order . . . has been achieved.” Horne, 557 U.S. at 450. The decree was entered to ensure that future picketing and labor activity by Local 282 would comply with federal law and, in particular, with the prohibition on unlawful secondary activity under Section 8(b)(4). The union’s decades-long record of lawful conduct demonstrates substantial attainment of that objective. Patterson instructs that a court of equity may terminate a decree once its dominant objective has been reached. 13 F.3d at 39 (“[W]e agree . . . that the decree has served its purpose, and that all of its provisions may be ended.”). Fourth, the Board has not identified evidence establishing a meaningful likelihood that unlawful conduct will recur if the decree is dissolved. This has been considered both in our 5 precedent and in closely analogous cases involving Section 8(b)(4) consent decrees. See Patterson, 13 F.3d at 38–39; Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council of Phila. & Vicinity v. NLRB, 64 F.3d 880, 888 (3d Cir. 1995). Local 282 points to more than a quarter century of demonstrated compliance. We note that the Board’s supplemental submission filed at this Court’s direction following oral argument relied heavily on a pending charge filed against Local 282 in January 2025 as evidence of an ongoing need for judicial supervision. However, subsequent submissions establish that the charging party sought withdrawal of that charge and that NLRB Region 29 approved the withdrawal request. The withdrawn charge therefore provides no basis for concluding that unlawful secondary activity is likely to recur or that continued enforcement of the consent order remains necessary. Nor has the Board identified any other adjudicated violation occurring after entry of the Consent Order. We acknowledge the Board’s argument that compliance with the consent order was anticipated when the decree was entered and that compliance alone does not automatically warrant dissolution. We agree that the mere passage of time is insufficient to justify dissolution of the Consent Order. But our conclusion follows not from the passage of time alone, but from the combined force of the factors recognized in Rufo, Dowell, Patterson, and Horne: sustained good- faith compliance, substantial institutional reform, attainment of the decree’s principal objectives, and the absence of evidence demonstrating a realistic likelihood of recurrence. See Patterson, 13 F.3d at 38–39. Continued prospective enforcement under these circumstances would transform what was intended as equitable remedial relief into effectively permanent judicial supervision. 6 Dowell rejected such a result, explaining that the principles governing dissolution of injunctions do not require federal oversight to continue “for the indefinite future.” 498 U.S. at 249. Accordingly, we conclude that prospective application of the August 18, 1998 consent order is no longer equitable. The motion to recall the mandate is DENIED as unnecessary. The motion to abrogate the prospective effect of the 1998 Consent Order is GRANTED. Nothing in this order vacates or otherwise disturbs the historical judgments, findings, or contempt adjudications previously entered by this Court, which remain part of the public record. * * * FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court 7