PECO Energy Co. v. Marple Twp. ZHB ~ Appeal of: Twp. of Marple
CourtCommonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
Date FiledOctober 28, 2026
Docket419 C.D. 2025
JudgeWallace
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
PECO Energy Company :
:
v. : No. 419 C.D. 2025
: Submitted: October 13, 2026
Marple Township Zoning :
Hearing Board, Township :
of Marple, and Julia Baker :
:
Appeal of: Township of Marple :
BEFORE: HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge
HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Senior Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION
BY JUDGE WALLACE FILED: October 28, 2026
The Township of Marple (Township) appeals from the March 20, 2025 Order
of the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas (Common Pleas), which denied its
petition for a preliminary injunction barring PECO Energy Company (PECO) from
constructing a natural gas “reliability station” (Station). PECO appealed to Common
Pleas from the November 18, 2020 Order of the Township’s Zoning Hearing Board
(Board), which denied its application for zoning relief relating to the Station. PECO
then obtained relief from Township zoning requirements through the Public Utility
Commission (Commission). After careful review, we dismiss the appeal as moot.
BACKGROUND
On approximately August 26, 2020, PECO filed an application with the Board
requesting a special exception to construct the Station, a public utility facility, in the
Neighborhood Center zoning district. Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 20a-21a. PECO
also applied for a dimensional variance permitting the fence that would surround the
Station to be eight feet high. Id. at 22a. The Board held a hearing on the application
on October 21, 2020, and denied both the special exception and variance requests by
Order dated November 18, 2020. PECO appealed to Common Pleas.1
On February 26, 2021, while the appeal was pending, PECO filed a petition in
the Commission requesting a finding that the situation of the Station’s buildings was
reasonably necessary for the convenience or welfare of the public, and a finding that
the fence that would surround the Station was a public utility facility.2 Critically, our
case law directs that a municipality may not regulate the operations of a public utility
without statutory authorization. Twp. of Marple v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 294 A.3d
965, 972 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2023) (en banc) (Marple I). Rather, it is the Commission that
maintains “preeminent authority to regulate utilities on a statewide basis.” Id. Such
a statutory authorization exists regarding public utility buildings. Id. Section 619 of
the Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code3 provides:
1
The Township filed a notice of intervention. Julia Baker, representing herself, also filed what she
described as a petition to intervene, which Common Pleas granted.
2
This Court takes much of the background regarding the proceedings before the Commission from
our prior decisions on appeal in that case. See Lycoming Cnty. v. Pa. Lab. Rels. Bd., 943 A.2d 333,
335 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007) (noting “this Court may take judicial notice of pleadings and judgments in
other proceedings where appropriate,” particularly “where, as here, the other proceedings involve
the same parties”) (citations omitted).
3
Act of July 31, 1968, P.L. 805, as amended.
2
This article shall not apply to any existing or proposed building, or
extension thereof, used or to be used by a public utility corporation, if,
upon petition of the corporation, the . . . Commission shall, after a
public hearing, decide that the present or proposed situation of the
building in question is reasonably necessary for the convenience or
welfare of the public. It shall be the responsibility of the . . .
Commission to ensure that both the corporation and the municipality in
which the building or proposed building is located have notice of the
hearing and are granted an opportunity to appear, present witnesses,
cross-examine witnesses presented by other parties and otherwise
exercise the rights of a party to the proceedings.
53 P.S. § 10619. See also Del. Riverkeeper Network v. Sunoco Pipeline L.P., 179
A.3d 670, 695 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018) (en banc) (explaining “[o]ur Supreme Court holds
that this provision does not grant municipalities an implied right to zone with regard
to public utility facilities other than described buildings”).
Administrative Law Judges (ALJ) held hearings and issued an Initial Decision
on December 8, 2021, finding in PECO’s favor. The Commission issued an Opinion
and Order ruling on the parties’ exceptions and adopting the ALJs’ Initial Decision
as modified and clarified on March 10, 2022. The Commission concluded the fence
that would surround the Station was a public utility facility and exempt from zoning
requirements, and the Station’s proposed buildings were reasonably necessary. The
Township petitioned this Court for review.
Meanwhile, PECO’s appeal from the Board’s decision remained ongoing. On
June 30, 2021, the Township filed a motion requesting a remand to the Board for the
presentation of further evidence relating to “the characterization of PECO’s Zoning
Application as well as . . . the nature of working of the facilities proposed for the . . .
Station.” Mot. for Remand, 6/30/21, ¶ 9. Common Pleas granted the motion and
3
remanded the matter to the Board while retaining jurisdiction on August 27, 2021.4
However, Common Pleas stayed the matter “together with the . . . remanded hearing
and related proceedings” before the Board, on January 4, 2022. R.R. at 284a.
On August 18, 2022, PECO and the Township submitted a Joint Stipulation to
Common Pleas. The Joint Stipulation provided PECO would forgo construction of
the Station pending this Court’s ruling on the Township’s petition for review:
1. . . . Provided that the Opinion and Order of the . . . Commission dated
March 10, 2022 with respect to the Property and the Project . . . is
upheld by the Commonwealth Court in the appeal captioned as
Township of Marple v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, No.
319 C.D. 2022 (the “Commonwealth Appeal”), or upheld in any
Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision, if allocat[u]r is filed, PECO will
not be required to comply with any of [the] Township’s subdivision and
land development ordinances . . . or obtain any permits or approvals of
any nature . . . .
2. Subject to the following paragraphs of this Stipulation, PECO hereby
agrees not to begin construction of the “building” portion of the Project
(which PECO agrees includes the construction and/or installation of
any and all fixtures, equipment, structures and improvements of any
kind) at, upon, under or on the Property until after the Commonwealth
Court renders its decision in the Commonwealth Appeal. . . .
....
4. Both PECO and [the] Township will be permitted to file for allocatur
to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court as a result of any Commonwealth
Court decision in the Commonwealth Appeal. In the event the
Commonwealth Court renders a decision in PECO’s favor with respect
to the Commonwealth Appeal and [the] Township elects to file
allocatur to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the Township hereby
agrees not to take any other action(s) or require any approvals to delay,
4
PECO filed a motion for reconsideration or, in the alternative, a stay of the remand proceedings
and certification of Common Pleas’ order for interlocutory appeal. Common Pleas did not rule on
the motion. PECO then filed a petition for permission to appeal in this Court on October 20, 2021,
at docket number 1155 C.D. 2021. We granted PECO’s application for a stay pending disposition
of the petition. On December 16, 2021, we denied PECO’s petition.
4
halt, or oppose PECO from commencing the “building” portion . . . on
the Property (except for the filing of any allocatur petition), including,
but not limited to, initiating litigation and/or requiring PECO comply
with any Township SALDO or permit or approval requirements as to
the construction . . . during the pendency of the Township’s request for
allocat[u]r. . . .
5. In the event the Commonwealth Court renders a decision in PECO’s
favor and [the] Township declines to file for allocatur, or the Supreme
Court ultimately renders a decision in PECO’s favor or denies
allocat[u]r if filed by the Township, [the] Township hereby agrees that
PECO will not be required to adhere to any Township SALDO, permit,
or approval requirements and PECO will continue and complete the
construction on the Property . . . free of any Township interference. . . .
Id. at 28a-31a (emphasis omitted).
On March 9, 2023, this Court issued a decision on the Township’s petition for
review in Marple I, agreeing with the Commission that the Station’s proposed fence
was exempt from zoning requirements as a public utility facility. The Court vacated
the Opinion and Order, however, and remanded for an amended decision regarding
the Station’s buildings that “must incorporate the results of a constitutionally sound
environmental impact review.”5 Marple I, 294 A.3d at 975. An ALJ held additional
hearings and issued an Amended Initial Decision on April 3, 2024, again finding in
PECO’s favor. The Commission issued an Opinion and Order ruling on the parties’
5
We relied on article I, section 27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, known as the Environmental
Rights Amendment:
The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the preservation of the
natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environment. Pennsylvania’s
public natural resources are the common property of all the people, including
generations yet to come. As trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth shall
conserve and maintain them for the benefit of all the people.
Pa. Const. art. I, § 27.
5
exceptions and adopting the ALJ’s Amended Initial Decision with a modification on
September 26, 2024. The Commission concluded:
Based upon the ALJ’s identification of the alleged environmental
impacts and careful consideration of the environmental, safety, and
additional evidence, as discussed, supra, we agree that the ALJ’s
Amended Initial Decision adequately addressed the environmental
impacts of the . . . Station, consistent with the Commonwealth Court's
directive . . . , and properly concluded that the proposed . . . Station and
related buildings will enhance reliability and availability of supply
service to PECO’s customers, and that the buildings should be exempt
from the Township’s zoning ordinance because the situation of the
buildings is reasonably necessary for the public convenience or
welfare. . . .
Twp. of Marple v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 352 A.3d 1144, 1148 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2026)
(en banc) (Marple II) (quoting the reproduced record).
The Township and intervenors6 petitioned this Court for review. On October
23, 2024, the Township filed an application to stay the Commission’s Opinion and
Order. Specifically, the Township requested that we “continue the stay” in the Joint
Stipulation “and enjoin PECO from construction of the [S]tation.” R.R. at 44a. The
Township asserted, “[c]onsidering the health, safety and environmental issues raised
by this appeal,” that it was “in the best interest of the residents of [the] Township for
construction to be stayed pending a decision.” Id. This Court denied the application
on January 30, 2025, explaining the Township failed to address each of the requisite
factors for granting a stay.7 Id. at 271a.
Returning to PECO’s appeal to Common Pleas, the Township filed a petition
for a preliminary injunction on March 12, 2025. The Township asserted PECO was
6
The petitioning intervenors included Julia Baker and Theodore Uhlman.
7
See Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n v. Process Gas Consumers Grp., 467 A.2d 805 (Pa. 1983).
6
beginning construction of the Station in violation of the Joint Stipulation and asked
that Common Pleas preliminarily enjoin PECO’s activities and award the Township
attorney’s fees. R.R. at 277a-79a. Common Pleas entered a Temporary Emergency
Order on that same day, enjoining construction of the Station “until a hearing can be
scheduled in this matter and upon further notice from” Common Pleas. Id. at 301a.
PECO filed a response in opposition to the petition on March 17, 2025, asserting the
stay provision in the Joint Stipulation applied to the appeal in Marple I but not to the
appeal in Marple II. Id. at 305a-06a, 309a-15a. PECO also argued the Township did
not satisfy the requisite factors for granting a preliminary injunction,8 and this Court
in its January 30, 2025 Order had already denied the relief the Township requested.9
Id. at 304a, 310a-15a.
On March 20, 2025, Common Pleas vacated its Temporary Emergency Order
and denied the petition for a preliminary injunction. Common Pleas explained in its
Order “that jurisdiction is vested with the Commonwealth Court[, which] denied this
request” on January 30, 2025. R.R. at 384a. Common Pleas presented an alternative
rationale in its subsequent Opinion, reasoning the Township did not show immediate
and irreparable harm. Id. at 389a. The Township timely appealed to this Court.
Subsequently, on February 2, 2026, this Court issued a decision in Marple II,
affirming the Commission’s September 26, 2024 Opinion and Order. We reasoned,
in relevant part:
In [Marple I], this Court concluded the Commission erred by
failing to consider concerns, including potential explosions, noise, and
emissions from the Station’s buildings. The ALJ heard extensive
evidence regarding these concerns on remand and issued her findings
8
See Summit Towne Ctr., Inc. v. Shoe Show of Rocky Mount, Inc., 828 A.2d 995 (Pa. 2003).
9
The Township then filed a reply, and PECO filed a response to the Township’s reply.
7
of fact. The Commission reviewed the ALJ’s findings on exceptions
and adopted them with only minimal clarification, concluding the
Station would not pose an unreasonable impact to the environment, and
the situation of the Station’s buildings was reasonably necessary for the
public convenience or welfare. Our review of the record supports the
Commission’s necessary findings of fact and its conclusion.
Marple II, 352 A.3d at 1157-58 (citations and quotation marks omitted). Thereafter,
the Township and the intervenors filed petitions for allowance of appeal, which our
Supreme Court denied. See Twp. of Marple v. Pa Pub. Util. Comm’n (Pa., Nos. 125
MAL 2026 & 126 MAL 2026, filed Aug. 17, 2026).
DISCUSSION
As a preliminary matter, we consider whether this Court’s decision in Marple
II renders the Township’s appeal moot. Although no party raises this issue, the Court
may do so sua sponte because we “cannot decide moot or abstract questions, nor can
we enter a judgment or decree to which effect cannot be given.” Battiste v. Borough
of E. McKeesport, 94 A.3d 418, 424 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014) (quoting Orfield v. Weindel,
52 A.3d 275, 277 (Pa. Super. 2012)). An actual case or controversy must exist at all
stages of a judicial process. Kupershmidt v. Wild Acres Lakes Prop. Owners’ Ass’n,
143 A.3d 1057, 1061 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016). A question before the Court is moot if, by
ruling on that question, we “cannot enter an order that has any legal force or effect.”
Burns v. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 190 A.3d 758, 761 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018).
On appeal, the Township asserts Common Pleas erred by denying its request
for a preliminary injunction. According to the Township, the Joint Stipulation bars
PECO from constructing the Station unless this Court resolves the appeal in Marple
II in PECO’s favor:
It is [the Township’s] position that, given the numerous
references to a decision by the Commonwealth Court “in PECO’s
favor,” as well as the clear intent of the Parties at the time of entering
8
the agreement, that the Joint Stipulation remains in effect. Therefore,
PECO is prohibited from beginning and/or continuing construction of
the “building” portion of the Project (which PECO agrees includes the
construction and/or installation of any and all fixtures, equipment,
structures and improvements of any kind) at, upon, under or on the
Property until after the Commonwealth Court renders a decision in its
favor. Despite the long history of this overall project and litigation,
PECO has yet to receive a decision from any higher court in its favor.
....
. . . . The appeal of the [Commission] decision is scheduled for
argument October 8, 2025. A decision in that matter is forthcoming.
Furthermore, as [the Township] intends to abide by its promises, should
the decision be in PECO’s favor in the Commonwealth Court, the
Township stands by its agreement that it would not seek to halt
construction even if it were to seek allocat[u]r.
Township’s Br. at 11-12, 15 (citation to the reproduced record omitted).
This Court issued a decision resolving Marple II in PECO’s favor on February
2, 2026. Our Supreme Court then denied petitions for allowance of appeal on August
17, 2026. Because of this, the Station is exempt from Township zoning requirements
under our case law and the Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code. Even if the
Court were to agree with the Township’s interpretation of the Joint Stipulation, the
Township would not be entitled to a preliminary injunction. Accordingly, there is no
longer any case or controversy for the Court to consider, and any opinion we would
issue would be purely advisory.10
10
Exceptions to the mootness doctrine are available “where the conduct complained of is capable
of repetition yet likely to evade review, where the case involves issues important to the public
interest or where a party will suffer some detriment without the court’s decision.” Burns, 190 A.3d
at 761-62 (quoting Sierra Club v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 702 A.2d 1131, 1134 (Pa. Cmwlth.
1997) (en banc)). We discern no basis to conclude that any of these exceptions should apply here.
9
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we dismiss the Township’s appeal of Common Pleas’
March 20, 2025 order as moot.
______________________________
STACY WALLACE, Judge
10
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
PECO Energy Company :
:
v. : No. 419 C.D. 2025
:
Marple Township Zoning :
Hearing Board, Township :
of Marple, and Julia Baker :
:
Appeal of: Township of Marple :
ORDER
AND NOW, this 28th day of October 2026, the Township of Marple’s appeal
from the March 20, 2025 order of the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas is
DISMISSED as moot. Further, the Township of Marple’s “Application for Leave
of Court to Discontinue Appeal Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. [ ] 1973” is DISMISSED as
moot.
______________________________
STACY WALLACE, Judge