American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers v. Regan
CourtDistrict Court, District of Columbia
Date FiledNovember 16, 2026
DocketCivil Action No. 2024-2361
JudgeJudge Reggie B. Walton
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
____________________________________
)
AMERICAN FUEL & )
PETROCHEMICAL )
MANUFACTURERS, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 24-2361 (RBW)
)
LEE M. ZELDIN, 1 )
in his official capacity as )
Administrator of the United States )
Environmental Protection Agency, et al., )
)
Defendants, )
)
COALITION FOR RENEWABLE )
NATURAL GAS, )
)
Defendant-Intervenor. )
)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
The plaintiff, the American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers (“AFPM”), brings this
action against the defendants, the United States Environmental Protection Agency and Lee
Zeldin, in his official capacity as Administrator of the United States Environmental Protection
Agency (collectively “the EPA” or the “EPA Defendants”), pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 7604,
alleging that the EPA failed “to partially waive Renewable Fuel Standard (‘RFS’) program
requirements for cellulosic biofuel for 2023, and to make cellulosic biofuel credits available for
that year, as required by Clean Air Act (‘CAA’) Section 211(o), 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o).”
1
Pursuant to Federal Rule Civil Procedure 25(d), Lee Zeldin, in his official capacity, is automatically substituted for
former United States Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) Administrator Michael S. Regan, as a defendant in
this case.
Complaint For Declaratory And Injunctive Relief (“Compl.”) at 1, ECF No. 1. According to the
plaintiff, “[the] EPA has a nondiscretionary duty to take those actions when projected annual
cellulosic biofuel volumes exceed the actual volumes produced for that year.” Id. The Coalition
for Renewable Natural Gas (the “defendant-intervenor” or the “Coalition”) has intervened as a
defendant pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b). See Order (Feb. 19, 2025) at 8,
ECF No. 12 (granting the Coalition’s motion to intervene).
Currently pending before the Court are the Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment,
ECF No. 16 (“Pl.’s Mot.”), the Defendants’ Cross-Motion to Dismiss Or, In The Alternative, For
Summary Judgment on Remedy, ECF No. 18 (“EPA’s Mot.”), and the Cross-Motion Of
Defendant-Intervenor Coalition For Renewable Natural Gas To Dismiss For Lack of Jurisdiction
Or, In The Alternative, For Summary Judgment, ECF No. 23 (“Coalition’s Mot.”). Upon careful
consideration of the parties’ submissions 2 and the applicable legal authority, the Court concludes
2
In addition to the filings already identified, the Court considered the following submissions in rendering its
decision: (1) the Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (“Pl.’s Mem.”), ECF No. 16-1; (2) the Plaintiff’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts in Support of
Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (“Pl.’s Facts”), ECF No. 16-2; (3) the Declaration of Susan W. Grissom
(“Grissom Decl.”), ECF No. 16-3; (4) Grissom Decl., Exhibit (“Ex.”) 2 (“Petition for Partial Waiver of 2023
Cellulosic Biofuel Volumetric Requirements”) at 1–2, ECF No. 16-3; (5) Grissom Decl., Ex. 3 (“AFPM’s Petition
for Partial Waiver of the 2023 Cellulosic Biofuel Volumetric Requirements – Update”) at 1, ECF No. 16-3; (6)
Grissom Decl., Ex. 4 (“Denial of AFPM Petition for Partial Waiver of 2023 Cellulosic Biofuel Standard”) at 1, ECF
No. 16-3; (7) the Defendants’ Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Its Cross-Motion to Dismiss for
Lack of Jurisdiction or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment on Remedy and Response to Plaintiff’s Motion
for Summary Judgment (“EPA’s Mem.”), ECF No. 18-1; (8) the Defendants’ Response to Plaintiff’s Statement of
Undisputed Material Facts and Defendants’ Statement of Material Facts in Support of Their Own Cross-Motion for
Summary Judgment (“EPA’s Resp. to Pl.’s Facts”), ECF No. 18-2; (9) EPA’s Resp. to Pl.’s Facts, Ex. 1 (“Final
Opening Brief of American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufactures; REH Company; The Small Refineries Coalition;
Countrymark Refining and Logistics, LLC; The San Antonio Refinery LLC; and Wynnewood Refining Co., LLC”),
ECF No. 18-3; (10) the Defendants’ Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Its Cross-Motion to
Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment on Remedy and Response to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (“EPA’s Opp’n”), ECF No. 19; (11) the Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to
Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and in Support of Defendant-Intervenor’s Cross-Motion to Dismiss or, in
the Alternative, for Summary Judgment (“Coalition’s Mem.”), ECF No. 23-1; (12) the Defendant-Intervenor’s
Response to Plaintiff’s and Defendants’ Statements of Undisputed Material Facts and Defendant-Intervenor’s
Statement of Additional Undisputed Material Facts (“Coalition’s Resp. to Pl.’s Facts”), ECF No. 23-2; (13) the
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and in Support
of Defendant-Intervenor’s Cross-Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment (“Coalition’s
Opp’n”), ECF No. 24; (14) the Plaintiff’s Combined Response to Defendants’ and Defendant-Intervenor’s Cross-
(continued . . .)
2
that the plaintiff’s motion must be denied because the plaintiff has failed to demonstrate Article
III associational standing, and even if the Court could find that the plaintiff has standing, its
claims are precluded from proceeding pursuant to the citizen suits provision of the CAA, 42
U.S.C. § 7604(a)(2). The Court’s analysis, detailed below, is guided by the District of Columbia
Circuit’s decision in Center for Biological Diversity v. United States Environmental Protection
Agency, 141 F.4th 153 (D.C. Cir. 2025) (“CBD”), which considered the EPA’s RFS program
standards for 2023. Accordingly, for the reasons set forth below, the Court grants in part the
Coalition’s cross-motion to dismiss, grants in part the EPA’s cross-motion to dismiss, and denies
the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Statutory Framework
The Renewable Fuel Standard program under the Clean Air Act requires that a certain
volume of renewable fuel be used to replace or reduce the quantity of fossil fuel in commerce.
See Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110–140, § 202, 121 Stat.
1492, 1521–24 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)). This goal is accomplished by “requir[ing]
[that] an increasing amount of renewable fuel [ ] be introduced into the Nation’s transportation
fuel supply each year . . . and tasks the EPA Administrator with ‘ensuring that those targets are
met.’” Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, 141 F.4th 153, 163 (D.C. Cir.
2025) (quoting Ams. For Clean Energy v. Env’t Prot. Agency, 864 F.3d 691, 696 (D.C. Cir.
(. . . continued)
Motions to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment (“Pl.’s Opp’n”), ECF No. 25; (15) the Plaintiff’s
Combined Response to Defendants’ and Defendant-Intervenor’s Cross-Motions to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, for
Summary Judgment and Reply in Support of Its Motion for Summary Judgment (“Pl.’s Reply”), ECF No. 26; (16)
the Defendants’ Reply Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Its Cross-Motion to Dismiss or, in the
Alternative, for Summary Judgment on Remedy (“EPA’s Reply”), ECF No. 29; (17) the Errata in Defendants’ Reply
in Support of Its Cross-Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment on Remedy, ECF No. 30;
and (18) the Reply in Support of Cross-Motion of Coalition for Renewable Natural Gas to Dismiss or, in the
Alternative, for Summary Judgment (“Coalition’s Reply”), ECF No. 33.
3
2017) and Am. Fuel & Petrochemical Mfrs. v. Env’t Prot. Agency, 937 F.3d 559, 568 (D.C. Cir.
2019)).
The CAA explicitly lists the applicable required gallons of four different types of
renewable fuel through the years 2012 or 2022, depending on the type of fuel. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 7545(o)(2)(B)). The four categories of renewable fuel are: (1) advanced biofuel, (2) biomass-
based diesel, (3) cellulosic biofuel, and (4) renewable fuel. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7545(o)(1)(B), (D),
(E), (J). This case concerns only one of those categories—cellulosic biofuel. See generally
Compl. ¶¶ 22–28. Cellulosic biofuel “means renewable fuel derived from cellulose,
hemicellulose, or lignin that is derived from renewable biomass and that has lifecycle greenhouse
gas emissions . . . that are at least 60 percent less than the baseline lifecycle greenhouse gas
emissions.” 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(1)(E). And, the CAA includes the applicable amount of
cellulosic biofuel that should be introduced into commerce through the year 2022. 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7545(o)(2)(B)(i)(III).
After 2022, however, the CAA tasks the EPA Administrator with the responsibility of
determining the annual volume of cellulosic biofuel “in coordination with the Secretary of
Energy and the Secretary of Agriculture, based on a review of the implementation of the [RFS]
program during calendar years [2010 through 2022], and an analysis of” specific factors set forth
in the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(2)(B)(ii). The CAA provides that the Administrator “shall
promulgate rules establishing [such] volumes . . . no later than 14 months before the first year for
which such applicable volume will apply.” Id. Thus, for 2023, the “EPA was required to
promulgate [cellulosic biofuel] requirements by the end of October 2021.” CBD, 141 F.4th at
183–84. And, for cellulosic biofuel specifically, the EPA Administrator is to set the applicable
4
annual volume “based on the assumption that the Administrator will not need to issue a waiver
for” that specific year. Id. § 7545(o)(2)(B)(iv).
Subsequently, the EPA uses the annual volume requirements to set percentage standards
that obligated parties 3 use to determine the amount of renewable fuel they “must introduce into
U.S. commerce based on the volumes of fossil-based gasoline or diesel [the obligated party]
imports or produces.” CBD, 141 F.4th at 163 (citing Ams. for Clean Energy, 864 F.3d at 699);
see 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(3)(B)(ii)(II). 4 The purpose of setting a percentage is that “if every
obligated party incorporates the required percentage of renewable fuel into the gasoline and
diesel it sells, the transportation fuel industry as a whole will achieve the established applicable
volumes.” Sinclair Wyo. Refin. Co. v. Env’t Prot. Agency, 101 F.4th 871, 878 (D.C. Cir. 2024)
(quoting Am. Fuel & Petrochemical Mfr., 937 F.3d at 587). Historically, “[t]he volumes [set] for
3
The EPA defines an “obligated party” as “any refiner that produces gasoline or diesel fuel within the covered
location, or any importer that imports gasoline or diesel fuel into the covered location, during a compliance period.”
40 C.F.R. § 80.2. A refiner is defined as “any person who owns, leases, operates, controls, or supervises a refinery.”
Id.
4
Although the District of Columbia Circuit did not address the statutory provisions which allegedly directs the EPA
Administrator to express volumes of renewable fuel in percentages for obligated parties’ use in its 2025 CBD
opinion, and the parties do not raise an issue regarding these specific provisions in this case, these specific
provisions provide that:
[n]ot later than November 30 of each of calendar years 2005 through 2021, based on the estimate
provided under subparagraph (A), the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency shall
determine and publish in the Federal Register, with respect to the following calendar year, the
renewable fuel obligation that ensures that the requirements of paragraph (2) are met.
42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(2)(B)(i); see id. § 7545(o)(2)(B)(ii) (providing that “[t]he renewable fuel obligation determined
for a calendar year under clause (i) shall– . . . (II) be expressed in terms of a volume percentage of transportation
fuel sold or introduced into commerce in the United States. . . .”). Based on the plain text of this section of the
statute, it appears that the statute does not explicitly address whether the EPA is also required to express volumes of
renewable fuel in percentages for obligated parties’ use after 2021, i.e., in 2023. It appears that the EPA has
interpreted this silence in the statute to mean that it “can establish percentage standards for any number of years at
the same time that it establishes the volume targets for those years[,]” see Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) Program:
Standards for 2023-2025 and Other Changes, 87 Fed. Reg. 80582-1, 80584 (Dec. 30, 2022), and the Circuit did not
explicitly disagree with the EPA’s interpretation. See CBD, 141 F.4th at 163, 165; see also Renewable Fuel
Standard (RFS) Program: Standards for 2023-2025 and Other Changes, 88 Fed. Reg. 44468-01, 44470 (July 12,
2023). Therefore, because this Court is bound by the Circuit’s precedent and reasoning, it adheres to the Circuit’s
interpretation of the CAA and therefore assumes that the volume of cellulosic biofuel was to be listed as a
percentage for year 2023.
5
cellulosic biofuel . . . has not kept pace with the growth the [RFS] [p]rogram projected.” Sinclair
Wyo. Refin. Co., 101 F.4th at 878. Therefore, the CAA allows the EPA to make adjustments to
the cellulosic biofuel volume under certain circumstances. See 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(7); see also
Sinclair Wyo. Refin. Co., 101 F.4th at 878. Accordingly, if “the projected [annual] volume of
cellulosic biofuel production is less than the minimum applicable volume” the EPA
Administrator set, then “not later than November 30 of the preceding calendar year, the
Administrator shall reduce the applicable volume of cellulosic biofuel required . . . to the
projected volume available during that calendar year.” 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(7)(D)(i). This is
referred to as the “cellulosic waiver provision.”
Although refiners are typically obligated parties under the CAA, they “need not
themselves produce or import renewable fuel.” Sinclair Wyo. Refin. Co., 101 F.4th at 879.
Instead, refiners “can acquire and trade credits,” called Renewable Identification Numbers
(“RINs”), to comply with their renewable fuel obligations. See id. RINs “are generated when
renewable fuel is produced in or imported to the United States, and they are valid for twelve
months from the date of generation.” Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(5)). The EPA tracks the
generation, transfer, and retirement of RINs through its Moderated Transaction System
(“EMTS”), which serves as “a publicly-accessible database from which the quantity of available
RINs in any given year can be determined.” Compl. ¶ 21.
If an obligated party accumulates more RINs than they need for a particular year, the
obligated party may sell them “or carry them over to be used to satisfy a portion of the following
year’s obligations.” Sinclair Wyo. Refin. Co., 101 F.4th at 879 (citing 42 U.S.C.
§ 7545(o)(5)(C)). An obligated party may also use its cellulosic biofuel and biomass-based
diesel RINs to satisfy either its cellulosic biofuel, biomass-based diesel, advanced biofuel, or
6
total renewable fuel obligations. 40 C.F.R § 80.1427. On the other hand, if an obligated party
does not have enough RINs in a given year, they can purchase more or “carry forward
a . . . deficit on [the] condition that the [obligated party], in the [following] year . . . —(i)
achieves compliance with the renewable fuel requirement . . . ; and (ii) [accumulates] additional
renewable fuel credits to offset the . . . deficit of the previous year.” 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(5)(D).
Additionally, if the “EPA invokes the cellulosic waiver provision, it must ‘make available for
sale cellulosic biofuel credits,’ which obligated parties may use, alongside or instead of RINs, to
meet their cellulosic biofuel obligations.” Sinclair Wyo. Refin. Co., 101 F.4th at 879.
B. Factual Background
On December 30, 2022, pursuant to its authority to establish post-2022 renewable fuel
volumes, the EPA “proposed an applicable volume for cellulosic biofuel of 720 million ethanol-
equivalent gallons” for the 2023 compliance year. Pl.’s Facts ¶ 2; EPA’s Resp. to Pl.’s Facts ¶ 2;
Coalition’s Resp. to Pl.’s Facts ¶ 2; Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) Program: Standards for
2023-2025 and Other Changes, 87 Fed. Reg. 80582-1, 80584 (Dec. 30, 2022). Subsequently, the
EPA issued a final rule on July 12, 2023, “establish[ing] an applicable volume for cellulosic
biofuel of 840 million ethanol-equivalent gallons for the year 2023.” Pl.’s Facts ¶ 3; EPA’s
Resp. to Pl.’s Facts ¶ 3; Coalition’s Resp. to Pl.’s Facts ¶ 3; see also Renewable Fuel Standard
Program: Standards for 2023–2025 and Other Changes, 88 Fed. Reg. 44468, 44470 (July 12,
2023). In issuing the final rule, the EPA neither invoked the cellulosic waiver provision, nor did
it make cellulosic waiver credits available for the 2023 compliance year. Pl.’s Facts ¶¶ 4–5;
EPA’s Resp. to Pl.’s Facts ¶¶ 4–5; Coalition’s Resp. to Pl.’s Facts ¶¶ 4–5.
On December 22, 2023, several months after the EPA issued its final rule, “[the p]laintiff
petitioned [the EPA] to invoke the cellulosic biofuel waiver provision of the RFS, 42 U.S.C.
7
§ 7545(o)(7)(D), to reduce the applicable volume to the projected volume available and to issue
cellulosic biofuel credits.” Pl.’s Facts ¶ 6; EPA’s Resp. to Pl.’s Facts ¶ 6; see Coalition’s Resp.
to Pl.’s Facts ¶ 6 (contending that the plaintiff “provided a letter to EPA . . . asking EPA to waive
a portion of the 2023 cellulosic biofuel volume requirement[,]” but not admitting that the
plaintiff filed a “petition”). In support of its request, the plaintiff argued that “[a]t [the] current
rates of cellulosic biofuel production, . . . cellulosic production w[ould] fall short of the 2023
cellulosic mandate by approximately 81 million gallons[.]” Petition for Partial Waiver of 2023
Cellulosic Biofuel Volumetric Requirements at 1–2. The plaintiff also argued that there was a
“depleted supply of cellulosic carryover RINs” that may result in “significant compliance and
liquidity problems in the cellulosic RIN market from an undersupplied RIN bank.” Id. at 2.
Subsequently, on March 4, 2024, the plaintiff updated its request to the EPA by providing
updated “biofuel production information for 2023.” See AFPM’s Petition for Partial Waiver of
the 2023 Cellulosic Biofuel Volumetric Requirements – Update at 1.
On March 15, 2024, for several reasons, the EPA denied the plaintiff’s petition because it
“determined that a partial waiver of the 2023 cellulosic biofuel standard [wa]s not warranted.”
Denial of AFPM Petition for Partial Waiver of 2023 Cellulosic Biofuel Standard at 1; Notice of
Denial of Petition for Partial Waiver of 2023 Cellulosic Biofuel Standard Under the Renewable
Fuel Standard Program, 89 Fed. Reg. 20961-2, 20962 (Mar. 26, 2024). First, the EPA declined
to consider the plaintiff’s request to waive the cellulosic volume requirement pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 7545(o)(7)(D) 5 because that subsection “does not specify that it authorizes petitions to
5
42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(7)(D) states, in part:
(i) For any calendar year for which the projected volume of cellulosic biofuel production is less than
the minimum applicable volume established under paragraph (2)(B), as determined by the
Administrator based on the estimate provided under paragraph (3)(A), not later than November 30
of the preceding calendar year, the Administrator shall reduce the applicable volume of cellulosic
(continued . . .)
8
waive cellulosic biofuel volumes.” Id. at 4. Second, the EPA explained that because
§ 7545(o)(7)(A) “authorizes waiver petitions based only on severe economic harm and
inadequate domestic supply[,]” it would “would evaluate the AFPM Petition as having been
submitted under CAA section [7545](o)(7)(A).” Id. 6
The EPA further explained that the plaintiff’s petition was denied because when
considering the approximate amount of RINs that were generated at that time and the carryover
RINs that were available from 2022, “the total number of RINs available to comply with the
2023 cellulosic biofuel standard [was] approximately 850 million RINs[,]” which was
“approximately equivalent to [the EPA’s] current estimate of the total volume necessary to
comply with the 2023 cellulosic biofuel standard.” Id. at 5. Additionally, the EPA continued,
“[i]f the number of available cellulosic RINs ultimately falls short of the number of RINs needed
for obligated parties to satisfy their” 2023 obligations, “the shortfall would [not] be of such a
magnitude that obligated parties would be forced into non-compliance with their RFS
(. . . continued)
biofuel required under paragraph (2)(B) to the projected volume available during that calendar
year. For any calendar year in which the Administrator makes such a reduction, the Administrator
may also reduce the applicable volume of renewable fuel and advanced biofuels requirement
established under paragraph (2)(B) by the same or a lesser volume.
(ii) Whenever the Administrator reduces the minimum cellulosic biofuel volume under this
subparagraph, the Administrator shall make available for sale cellulosic biofuel credits at the
higher of $0.25 per gallon or the amount by which $3.00 per gallon exceeds the average wholesale
price of a gallon of gasoline in the United States. Such amounts shall be adjusted for inflation by
the Administrator for years after 2008.
6
42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(7)(A) states, in part:
The Administrator, in consultation with the Secretary of Agriculture and the Secretary of Energy,
may waive the requirements of paragraph (2) in whole or in part on petition by one or more States,
by any person subject to the requirements of this subsection, or by the Administrator on his own
motion by reducing the national quantity of renewable fuel required under paragraph (2)—
(i) based on a determination by the Administrator, after public notice and opportunity for
comment, that implementation of the requirement would severely harm the economy or
environment of a State, a region, or the United States[.]
9
obligations.” Id. at 5–6. Instead, an obligated party could “carry forward a cellulosic RIN
deficit . . . into 2024.” Id. at 6. The EPA also disagreed with the plaintiff’s claim that some
obligated parties who carried a cellulosic RIN deficit into 2023 and therefore would be
prohibited from carrying a deficit into 2024[,] “may choose to limit their production to the
number of RINs they can acquire.” Id. at 8. To the contrary, the EPA stated that “historical
evidence” suggests that “[o]bligated parties have carried cellulosic RIN deficits every year since
2013, and [the EPA] ha[d] seen no evidence that these RIN deficits have caused obligated parties
to limit their production.” Id. Finally, the EPA concluded that “a partial waiver of the 2023
cellulosic biofuel standard would be injurious to the RFS program because it would be disruptive
to program participants and could result in reduced future demand for cellulosic biofuel
production.” Id. at 10. Subsequently, on May 28, 2024, the plaintiff notified the EPA that
because of its position, it intended to sue under the Clean Air Act’s citizen-suit provision, 42
U.S.C. § 7604(a)(2). Pl.’s Facts ¶ 21; EPA’s Resp. to Pl.’s Facts ¶ 21; Coalition’s Resp. to Pl.’s
Facts ¶ 21.
While the plaintiff was participating in the above described proceedings before the EPA,
it also intervened in a case challenging the EPA’s RFS Program standards for years 2023, 2024,
and 2025 pending before the District of Columbia Circuit. See generally CBD, 141 F.4th at 153;
see also, Am. Fuel & Petrochemical Mfrs.’ Mot. To Intervene In Support Of Respondent (Oct.
10, 2023), CBD, 141 F.4th at 162, Dkt. 2021091; Order at 1 (Nov. 16, 2023), CBD, 141 F.4th at
162, Dkt. 2027447. In the case pending before the District of Columbia Circuit, the plaintiff,
along with refinery companies and organizations, argued, inter alia, that the “2023 and 2024
volume requirements were impermissibly late[,]” i.e., the “EPA missed the statutory deadlines
for promulgating” the 2023 and 2024 volume requirements. CBD, 141 F.4th at 183. The Circuit
10
disagreed with the plaintiff, finding that its “precedent foreclose[d]” the plaintiff’s argument. Id.
The Circuit explained that it has “repeatedly held that [the] EPA may promulgate late, and even
retroactive, volume requirements so long as it ‘reasonably considers and mitigates any hardship
caused to obligated parties by reason of the lateness.’” Id. at 184 (quoting Sinclair Wyo. Refin.
Co., 101 F.4th at 887). In regards to the volume requirements the EPA set in 2023, the Circuit
found that the “EPA reasonably considered the requisite factors[,]” such as: (1) “explain[ing]
that the market would produce enough renewable fuel to enable obligated parties to satisfy the
requirements”; (2) “obligated parties would have at least nine months to bring themselves into
compliance with the 2023 requirements”; and (3) “any remaining hardship would be minimal
because, if an obligated party could not acquire sufficient RINs within [nine months], it could
still achieve compliance by using carryover RINS or carrying forward RIN deficits.” Id.
C. Procedural History
The plaintiff filed its Complaint on August 15, 2024, alleging that the EPA failed to
perform nondiscretionary duties under the CAA by failing to reduce the 2023 cellulosic biofuel
volume requirement and by failing to make cellulosic waiver credits available. Compl. ¶¶ 79,
86. Subsequently, the Court granted the Coalition’s motion to intervene as a defendant. See
Order (Feb. 19, 2025) at 1–2, ECF No. 12.
On May 5, 2025, the plaintiff filed its motion for summary judgment. See generally Pl.’s
Mot. The EPA Defendants filed their cross-motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction or, in the
alternative, for summary judgment on the remedy component of the plaintiff’s case on August 4,
2025. See generally EPA’s Mot. And, on August 19, 2025, the Coalition filed its cross motion to
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. See generally
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Coalition’s Mot. On December 22, 2025, the parties’ briefing on their respective motions
became ripe for the Court’s resolution.
On April 23, 2026, the EPA moved to stay the proceedings in this case pending the
District of Columbia Circuit’s decision in Coalition for Renewable Natural Gas v. Environmental
Protection Agency, 25-1183. See Motion to Abate Proceedings During Pendency D.C. Circuit
Review of Related Cases and Statement of Points and Authorities (“Mot. to Stay”), ECF No. 35.
The defendant-intervenor and the plaintiff opposed the motion, see Opposition of Coalition for
Renewable Natural Gas to Defendants’ Motion to Abate Proceedings During Pendency of D.C.
Circuit Review of Related Case, ECF Nos. 36; Plaintiff’s Opposition to EPA’s Motion to Abate
Proceedings, ECF No. 37, and the Court denied the EPA’s motion, concluding that a stay was
not warranted, see Order (May 27, 2026) at 4–5, ECF No. 41.
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and therefore “possess only that power
authorized by Constitution and statute,” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S.
375, 377 (1994), “which is not to be expanded by judicial decree,” id. Moreover, “[it] is to be
presumed that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction,” and “the burden of establishing the
contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction.” Id.
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) challenges the
Court’s subject matter jurisdiction. And, a challenge to the plaintiff’s standing, is ultimately a
challenge to the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction because standing is “an essential and
unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III[,]” and the plaintiff bears
the burden of establishing it. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). In evaluating
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a motion under Rule 12(b)(1), the Court must “assume the truth of all material factual allegations
in the complaint” and “construe the complaint liberally, granting [the] plaintiff the benefit of all
inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.” Am. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. FDIC, 642 F.3d
1137, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
“[W]here necessary, the court may consider the complaint supplemented by undisputed
facts evidenced in the record, or the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court’s
resolution of disputed facts.” Coal. for Underground Expansion v. Mineta, 333 F.3d 193, 198
(D.C. Cir. 2003) (internal citation omitted). If the Court determines at any time that it lacks
subject matter jurisdiction, the Court must dismiss the action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56
Summary judgment is appropriate when “the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is material if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing
law,” and a dispute is genuine if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
In resolving a motion for summary judgment, “[t]he evidence of the nonmovant is to be
believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S.
650, 651 (2014) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255). The moving party bears the initial burden
of showing the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact, and summary judgment is
warranted where the nonmoving party “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the
existence of an element essential to that party’s case[.]” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
322 (1986). When parties submit cross-motions for summary judgment, “the court must review
each motion separately on its own merits ‘to determine whether either of the parties deserves
13
judgment as a matter of law’.” Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Meta Platforms, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 3d 16,
33 (D.D.C. 2024) (quoting Fam. Tr. of Mass., Inc. v. United States, 892 F. Supp. 2d 149, 154
(D.D.C. 2012)).
III. ANALYSIS
A. Whether the Plaintiff Has Established It Has Standing
Because Article III standing is a threshold jurisdictional requirement, the Court must
address that issue before considering the merits of the plaintiff’s statutory claims. See Lujan v.
Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). Accordingly, the Court first addresses whether
the plaintiff has established that it has standing to bring this action on behalf of its members.
An organization may sue on behalf of its members only when “(a) its members would
otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane
to the organization’s purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires
the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.” Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert.
Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977). The first prong of Hunt requires the plaintiff to establish
that at least one of its members has suffered an injury in fact that is concrete, particularized, and
actual or imminent. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61; Am. Chemistry Council v. Dep’t of Transp.,
468 F.3d 810, 815 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (holding that trade associations lacked associational standing
because they failed to show that at least one member suffered a concrete and particularized
injury sufficient to establish standing). And, although an association need not always publicly
identify an injured member by name, it must “identify” or otherwise establish with specific facts,
that “at least one identified member ha[s] suffered or would suffer harm.” Summers v. Earth
Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 498 (2009) (holding that environmental organizations lacked
associational standing where they relied on the statistical probability that some unidentified
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members would be harmed by Forest Service regulations rather than identifying a member with
concrete plans to visit an affected site); see also Chamber of Com. of U.S. v. Env’t Prot. Agency,
642 F.3d 192, 200–01 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (holding that an association claiming associational
standing must identify a member who suffered the requisite injury, and that allegations of
injuries to unidentified members are insufficient).
As explained above, the plaintiff brings this suit against the EPA pursuant to the “citizen
suits” section of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(2), and alleges that the EPA failed to take actions
that it was statutorily mandated to take. Specifically, the plaintiff alleges that the EPA failed to
waive the 2023 cellulosic biofuel applicable volumes, see Compl. at 14–15, and failed to issue
cellulosic biofuel credits for 2023, see id. at 15–16. The plaintiff argues that “[b]ecause [the]
EPA failed to . . . partially waive 2023 RFS standards for cellulosic biofuel, [its] members were
required to comply with a . . . cellulosic biofuel standard that far exceeded the standard that
would have applied if [the] EPA had reduced the [2023] applicable volume of cellulosic
biofuel . . . to the projected volume available during [2023].” Pl.’s Mem. at 11. Additionally,
the plaintiff alleges that because the 2023 cellulosic biofuel RINs “were priced [ ] between $2.01
to $3.24 per RIN . . . [the plaintiff’s] members . . . incur[red] tens of millions of dollars in costs
to purchase RINs they should not have been required to purchase.” Id. Further, the plaintiff
alleges that some of its members have been forced to carry forward RIN obligations into 2024
because of the EPA’s alleged failure to act. Id. at 11–12.
The Coalition challenges the plaintiff’s position that it has standing. It does not dispute
that the interests the plaintiff seeks to protect are germane to its purpose or that the claims
asserted requires the participation of individual members, but argues that the plaintiff has failed
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to demonstrate that at least one of its members suffered an injury-in fact. See Coalition Mem. at
13–14. The Court agrees with the Coalition.
In order for the plaintiff to sufficiently allege that one of its members has suffered an
injury-in-fact from the EPA’s alleged failure to act, the plaintiff must show that one of its
members was injured because (1) the EPA failed to waive the 2023 cellulosic biofuel volume
requirement or (2) the EPA failed to issue cellulosic biofuel credits for 2023. The plaintiff
principally relies on the Declaration of Susan W. Grissom, AFPM’s Chief Industry Analyst, to
establish that its members were in fact injured by EPA’s alleged inactions. See generally
Grissom Decl. However, the current record before the Court, including Grissom’s declaration,
does not identify the plaintiff’s members or any specific allegation that one of the plaintiff’s
members actually suffered an injury-in-fact from the EPA’s alleged failure to act. Instead,
Grissom refers to the plaintiff’s alleged members in broad, general, statements. Grissom’s
declaration begins by merely stating that the plaintiff represents “nearly all refining and
petrochemical companies located in the United States” who collectively “own and operate about
88% of U.S. domestic petroleum refining capacity and produce . . . fuel products used by our
nation’s transportation system” and are therefore obligated parties under the RFS. Grissom Decl.
¶¶ 3 (emphasis added); see id. ¶ 10 (“AFPM members are obligated parties who must comply
with the RFS”). However, she does not attest that the plaintiff represents all obligated parties
under the RFS. See Summers, 555 U.S. at 498–99 (explaining that the “requirement of naming
the affected members has . . . only [been dispensed with] where all the members of the
organization are affected by the challenged activity.”).
Additionally, Grissom declares that the plaintiff’s members “incurr[ed] RIN obligations
significantly higher than” they would have incurred had EPA waived the 2023 cellulosic biofuel
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requirement to the purported projected volume available in 2023, id. ¶ 27(a); see id. ¶ 29
(declaring that the plaintiff’s members were subjected to inflated cellulosic biofuel requirements
and therefore needed to acquire additional RINs (or carry forward deficits), but failing to identify
any actual member who experienced this alleged harm); see Chamber of Com., 642 F.3d at 199–
200 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“When a petitioner claims associational standing, it is not enough to aver
that unidentified members have been injured[, r]ather, the petitioner must specifically ‘identify
members who have suffered the requisite harm’”) (quoting Summers, 555 U.S. at 499). Then,
instead of identifying a concrete harm, Grissom speculates that because of the EPA’s alleged
failure to act, “refiners may be forced to ‘carry over’ a RIN obligation (deficit) from one year to
the next.” Grissom Decl. ¶ 27(b). However, the Court is “[w]ithout [any] individual affidavit[],
Summers, 555 U.S. at 499, that this actually occurred, which could have been provided
considering that the plaintiff filed its Complaint on August 15, 2024, several months after the
2023 reporting deadline of March 31,