Full Opinion

USCA11 Case: 26-11566 Document: 45-1 Date Filed: 11/10/2026 Page: 1 of 5 NOT FOR PUBLICATION In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 26-11566 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________ JANET PHILLIPS, et al., Plaintiffs, JAMES MULLIS, JEREMY KEEL, DON GIBSON, DANIEL UMPA, Interested Parties-Appellants, versus THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF REALTORS, HAMILTON DORSEY ALSTON COMPANY, INC., WEICHERT OF NORTH AMERICA, INC., EXP WORLD HOLDINGS, INC., BEACHAM & COMPANY, LLC, et al., Defendants-Appellees, HOMESERVICES OF AMERICA, INC, et al., USCA11 Case: 26-11566 Document: 45-1 Date Filed: 11/10/2026 Page: 2 of 5 2 Opinion of the Court 26-11566 Defendants. ____________________ Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia D.C. Docket No. 1:23-cv-05392-MHC ____________________ Before NEWSOM, LUCK, and KIDD, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Home sellers brought this class action alleging that more than two dozen nationwide real estate brokerages had violated Georgia state law and the Sherman Antitrust Act by conspiring to illegally increase broker compensation at the sellers’ expense. This is one of many such class actions filed in Arizona, Illinois, and, mainly, Missouri against nationwide real estate brokerages alleging the same claims. After various stays due to pending settlement approvals in the other parallel class actions that would affect the defendants here, the district court, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), entered partial final judgment approving settlements for four defendants. Non-named class members who timely objected to the preliminary approval of these settlements seek review of that judg- ment. We issued a jurisdictional question asking the parties to ad- dress whether the district court’s Rule 54(b) certification was proper. See Ebrahimi v. City of Huntsville Bd. of Educ., 114 F.3d 162, 165 (11th Cir. 1997) (requiring us to review the propriety of a Rule USCA11 Case: 26-11566 Document: 45-1 Date Filed: 11/10/2026 Page: 3 of 5 26-11566 Opinion of the Court 3 54(b) certification because it implicates appellate jurisdiction). The plaintiffs and two defendants jointly respond that the certification was proper, arguing that there was no just reason for delay because the remaining defendants are due to be dismissed because of a bind- ing settlement in a parallel class action. They argue that the “rea- sons for entry of judgment are obvious from the district court’s ex- press reference to and granting of final approval of the class action settlement agreements,” so no additional explanation was neces- sary. The appellants also respond that the certification was proper. They agree with the plaintiffs that the remaining defendants are subject to the parallel class action settlement agreement, which re- solved the plaintiffs’ claims against the remaining defendants. They conclude by requesting, in the alternative, that we remand to allow the district court to dismiss the remaining defendants, such that the Rule 54(b) certification would become unnecessary. After careful review of the record, we conclude that the dis- trict court did not properly certify its order for immediate review under Rule 54(b). Specifically, the court abused its discretion in determining that there was no just reason for delay. See Lloyd No- land Found., Inc. v. Tenet Health Care Corp., 483 F.3d 773, 777 (11th Cir. 2007) (holding that to certify a case for immediate appeal under Rule 54(b), a district court must determine, inter alia, that there is no just reason for delay). As a preliminary matter, the district court did not provide any reasoning or explanation for its certification decision such that we accord no deference to the certification. See Scott v. Advanced USCA11 Case: 26-11566 Document: 45-1 Date Filed: 11/10/2026 Page: 4 of 5 4 Opinion of the Court 26-11566 Pharm. Consultants, Inc., 84 F.4th 952, 962 (11th Cir. 2023) (noting that mere recitation of the legal standard and a conclusion that the standard has been met is sufficient reason to find the Rule 54(b) certification improper); Ebrahimi, 114 F.3d at 166-67. Here, the “special circumstances” we have identified as war- ranting departure from the federal policy against piecemeal appeals are largely absent. See Peden v. Stephens, 50 F.4th 972, 978-79 (11th Cir. 2022); Doe #1 v. Red Roof Inns, Inc., 21 F.4th 714, 723 (11th Cir. 2021); Ebrahimi, 114 F.3d at 168; Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Mestre, 701 F.2d 1365, 1369-70 (11th Cir. 1983); Chapman v. Dunn, 129 F.4th 1307, 1314 (11th Cir. 2025). Although it is true that 13 defendants re- mained after the court entered its Rule 54(b) certification, the pend- ing claims against these remaining defendants are not “practically and logically distinct” from the certified claims as they all involve the same operative set of facts. See Doe #1, 21 F.4th at 723 (noting one such “special circumstance” as a high number of defendants); Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Mestre, 701 F.2d 1365, 1369-70 (11th Cir. 1983) (explaining that a finding of no just reason for delay can be proper where the pending claims are “practically and logically distinct” from the certified claims and an attempt to try the pending claims would maximize the likelihood of separate trials and be unduly ex- pensive to all parties). Additionally, although the district court had entered a tem- porary stay pending resolution of appeals in the Eighth Circuit of the settlement purportedly binding the remaining defendants, the Eighth Circuit has now issued opinions affirming the settlements USCA11 Case: 26-11566 Document: 45-1 Date Filed: 11/10/2026 Page: 5 of 5 26-11566 Opinion of the Court 5 as well as its corresponding mandates. Cf. Chapman, 129 F.4th at 1314 (recognizing another such circumstance when a bankruptcy stay posed an “infinite delay” diminishing the plaintiff’s ability to recover). Not only does no party dispute or object to the district court dismissing with prejudice all claims against these remaining defendants, but the plaintiffs specifically requested dismissal before the instant appeals were filed. Thus, equitable considerations did not support an immedi- ate appeal from the district court’s order. See Ebrahimi, 114 F.3d at 165-67 (explaining that Rule 54(b) should be limited to instances in which immediate appeal would alleviate some particular danger of hardship or injustice associated with delay and emphasizing that district courts must balance judicial administrative interests with relevant equitable concerns). Upon dismissal of this interlocutory appeal, the district court may dismiss the remaining defendants with prejudice, creating a final, appealable judgment. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291; CSX Transp., Inc. v. City of Garden City, 235 F.3d 1325, 1327 (11th Cir. 2000) (explaining that, generally, “[a] final decision is one which ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment”). For these reasons, the district court’s Rule 54(b) certification was improper. Accordingly, this appeal is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.