The Toota Group, LLC v. United States

In the United States Court of Federal Claims No. 25-1956 Filed: June 24, 2026 Reissued: July 6, 2026 † THE TOOTA GROUP, LLC, Plaintiff, v. THE UNITED STATES, Defendant. David P.J. Timm, Burr & Forman LLP, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff. Patrick S. Angulo, Trial Attorney, William J. Grimaldi, Assistant Director, Patricia M. McCarthy, Director, and Brett A. Shumate, Assistant Attorney General, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Defendant. MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER TAPP, Judge. Friction is a predator that feeds on motion; ambiguous contract requirements are similar, preying on a contractor’s time and resources before work begins. This protest arises from a series of Requests for Quotations (“RFQs”) for runflat lubricant used by military vehicles. The case reaches the Court in an unusually convoluted posture, complicated by the absence of an active solicitation and actions by separate but connected agencies, as well as the parties’ disagreement on nearly every issue. Plaintiff, The Toota Group, LLC (“Toota”), challenges several unsuccessful attempts to supply runflat lubricant, alleging that unclear testing requirements, delayed or denied qualification efforts, and the cancellation or restructuring of multiple procurements prevented it from equal competition. Because Toota failed to provide an adequate proposal, and for additional reasons supported by the record, the Court DENIES Toota’s Motion for Judgment on the Administrative Record, (Pl.’s MJAR, ECF No. 18), and GRANTS the United States’ Cross-Motion, (Def.’s xMJAR, ECF No. 19). † This Opinion was originally issued under seal, (ECF No. 33), and the parties were directed to file a notice of redactions consistent with the Court’s instructions. That Notice was filed on July 2, 2026. (ECF No. 35). The Court accepts all jointly proposed redactions. The sealed and public versions of this Opinion differ only to the extent of those redactions, the publication date, and this footnote. heat, the material allows the vehicle to continue operating long enough for personnel to evacuate or reach safety. (Am. Compl. at 12, ECF No. 12; Pl.’s MJAR at 14; Def.’s xMJAR at 3–4). The military issued the initial procurement for runflat lubricant in 1995. 3 (AR 1). Around that time, AM General, an automotive manufacturer that builds military and commercial vehicles using runflat technology, created Drawing 12460308 (“the Drawing”). (AR 1, 75); AM General, https://www.amgeneral.com/ (last visited June 8, 2026) [https://perma.cc/U69V-5Z6C]. This is not a conventional drawing but rather a specification sheet setting out the product’s required characteristics and performance criteria: (AR 1). The Drawing identifies two approved forms of the lubricant (tube and drum) and includes six notes describing the characteristics of the approved product. (AR 1). The Drawing references “ATPD 2099C,” which is the military’s technical standard for Humvee requirements, and the lubricant’s Quality Assurance Provisions (“QAP”). (Id.). The QAP describes the inspections required to verify conformance with the Drawing. (AR 2–3). Notes 1, 2A, and 2B set out the physical properties of the lubricant, including its composition, appearance, solubility, pH level, 3 Runflat Lubricant National Stock Numbers (“NSN”) 2640-01-419-6200 and 2640-01-457-5552 (the “Lubricant”). 3 history. Beginning in late 2024, DLA issued two related RFQs that incorporated the DLA Master Solicitation for Automated Simplified Acquisitions and the mandatory FAR clause for simplified acquisitions involving non-commercial products or services. 4 (AR 68, 83, 95, 115); FAR 52.213-4. Each RFQ referenced the Drawing and the QAP, required conformance with those documents, and permitted unapproved sources to submit alternate offers. (AR 75, 102). The RFQs also required first article testing within sixty days of award. 5 (AR 70, 97). Toota submitted its initial SAR package in October 2024, reflecting its intention to supply lubricant manufactured by Run Flat International, an English company. (AR 905). DLA’s guidance informs unapproved offerors that they could seek approval from the design activity, the U.S. Army Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command (“TACOM”). 6 (AR 44). In February of 2025, DLA notified Toota that TACOM’s engineering support activity (“ESA”) had preliminarily rejected Toota’s submission, explaining that it had not demonstrated compliance with Notes 2 (material) or 6 (performance) of the Drawing and had not provided sufficient performance data. (AR 1239, 1247). In the months that followed, Toota and TACOM engaged in extended discussions about potential resubmission and testing. (AR 1239–454). During those conversations, TACOM determined that the lubricant was used on additional weapons systems beyond the Humvee platform identified in Toota’s original submission and advised that the SAR would require review by the ESAs for those systems. (AR 686–93, 1976– 77). TACOM invited Toota to resubmit while the Army evaluated that issue, and Toota did so. (AR 1854). In the same month that it resubmitted its proposal, Toota questioned solicitation language identifying the lubricant as a commercial-off-the-shelf (“COTS”) item. (AR 131). DLA clarified that the COTS designation did not alter the item’s source-controlled nature. (AR 129). DLA subsequently canceled the pending RFQs to remove the COTS designation. (Id.). Internal DLA correspondence reflected uncertainty regarding whether the lubricant was properly designated as a commercial item. (AR 1481). Around the same time, DLA issued another RFQ invoking Special Emergency Procurement Authority (“SEPA”) and FAR 6.302-2. 7 (AR 134–35). Aside from invoking these 4 RFQ SPE7L7-25-T-1655; RFQ SPE7L7-25-T-3802. 5 “First article testing” is a pre-production evaluation in which the Government requires a contractor to furnish an initial unit for testing to ensure the contractor can produce an item that conforms to all contract requirements before authorizing full-rate production. FAR 9.302–303. 6 The term “design activity” refers to the Government or contractor entity charged with the design and configuration control of an item, including preparing and maintaining the associated design documents. FAR 46.101. This role may be performed by the original developer or by any organization to which design responsibility has subsequently been assigned. Id. 7 RFQ SPE7L4-25-Q-0165. This RFQ is discussed in greater detail below (“RFQ No. 0165”) because it was the subject of Toota’s Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) protest and led DLA to acknowledge error. After the post-award protest was filed, the contracting officer issued a memorandum stating that DLA would cancel the underlying contract and concluding 5 distinct statutory authorities, the reissued RFQs again referenced the Drawing, required conformance with the Drawing and QAP, and permitted alternate offers. (AR 138). After receiving bids from Toota and Hutchinson, DLA identified Hutchinson’s bid as the best value, noting that Toota’s bid was an alternate part from a non-approved source. (AR 157). DLA awarded the contract to Hutchinson. (AR 309 (awarding RFQ SPE7L4-25-Q-0165)). Toota filed both pre-award and post-award protests at the Government Accountability Office (“GAO”), asserting, among other things, that the agency had not provided the requisite justification. (AR 435, 452). DLA moved to dismiss, maintaining that no justification was required because the procurement was conducted under SEPA. (AR 714–17). After Toota’s response, the contracting officer issued a memorandum concluding that it was in DLA’s best interests to cancel the RFQ and the award to Hutchinson. (AR 759). The memorandum acknowledged that DLA had invoked conflicting authorities—FAR 6.302-2 and SEPA—without adequate documentation, that the justification for awarding the contract to Hutchinson was insufficient, that a threshold eligibility requirement had not been considered, and that Toota’s alternate offer had neither been evaluated nor the failure to evaluate it explained. (Id.). DLA filed a second request for dismissal, noting that although Toota’s protest was “not clearly meritorious,” it raised questions about the drafting of the RFQ and the evaluation. (AR 760). DLA canceled the solicitation and award, and GAO dismissed the protest as academic the same week. (AR 783). Upon Toota’s request for a status update, TACOM learned that the DLA employee assigned to the resubmission had neither forwarded the package nor taken any action on it before resignation, resulting in Toota’s submission remaining dormant. (AR 1989, 2010, 2016, 2021). TACOM relayed this information to Toota and began its review in early August. (AR 2379). In October, TACOM reported that the evaluation remained underway but had been delayed by the governmental lapse in appropriations. (AR 2095). In the absence of any definitive action by the agency, Toota filed this protest three days after appropriations had been restored. (Compl.); U.S. House of Representatives, HISTORY, ART & ARCHIVES, FUNDING GAPS AND SHUTDOWNS IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, https://history.house.gov/Institution/Shutdown/Government-Shutdowns (last visited June 3, 2026) [https://perma.cc/S72Z-WM24]. The following week, after the United States represented that DLA was actively working to complete the review, the Court granted the Government’s request to stay this litigation so that DLA could finalize its evaluation of Toota’s SAR package. (ECF No. 8 at 3). During that stay, DLA issued a document titled “Runflat Lubricant Qualification Requirements.” (AR 2353–56). The document sets out testing requirements for the lubricant and states that any qualification testing must be conducted at the vendor’s expense. (AR 2353). It converts the physical characteristics listed in Drawing Note 2A into a chemical-analysis test and reiterates the centrifugal-force test contained in Note 2C and the QAP. (Id.). The document also introduces new testing obligations, including “Testing and Certification of Compatibility of Runflat Lubricant,” which requires vendors to obtain certifications that the proposed lubricant is that RFQ No. 0165 had invoked SEPA without adequately documenting the basis for doing so. (AR 759). The memorandum further noted that DLA had not properly considered the Enhanced Joint Certification Program access-eligibility requirement and had not evaluated Toota’s alternate offer. (Id.). Following issuance of the memorandum and the canceled contract, the GAO dismissed the protest as academic. (AR 783). 6 compatible with all rubbers used in the tire, wheel, and runflat systems, supported by letters from Michelin, Goodyear, and Bridgestone confirming that the lubricant does not degrade tire performance or void warranties. (Id.). In addition, without expressly referencing Note 6, the Qualification Requirements impose performance testing on multiple vehicles—including the Humvee, JLTV, MATV, and MaxxPro Dash—to verify the performance of the total runflat system. (Id.). In late 2025, TACOM informed Toota that it denied Toota’s resubmission, identifying deficiencies across multiple SAR elements and concluding that the submission satisfied only two of the nine required components. (AR 2365–66, 2343). TACOM cited issues with the technical data package, verification plan, and comparative analysis; noted that the International Organization for Standardization (“ISO”) certification submitted was for the incorrect vendor and did not cover runflat lubricant; and observed that the accompanying quality manual and manufacturing plan did not address lubricant or include required process sheets. (AR 1501, 1503–52, 1564–66). TACOM further found that the part drawing lacked specification-level detail, that the comparative analysis omitted necessary quantitative data, and that Toota’s statement that its lubricant was compatible with “some rubbers” conflicted with the requirement for compatibility with “all military grade rubbers.” (AR 2345, 1583, 1561). Important to Toota’s claims in this protest, TACOM also noted that required testing remained incomplete and referenced the testing requirements associated with Notes 2A, 2B, 2C, and 6 of the Drawing. (AR 2346, 2353). The denial additionally relied on the new expectations imposed by the issuance of “Runflat Lubricant Qualification Requirements,” including performance testing on the other military vehicles, certification letters from tire companies confirming lubricant compatibility with all rubber types, and affirmation that the lubricant would not degrade tire performance or void warranties. (AR 2353–56). Notably, although DLA had previously instructed Toota not to conduct the Note 6 performance test, the agency cited the absence of that testing as a deficiency of its package. (AR 1347, 2093). Given this final denial, Toota persisted with this protest and immediately amended its Complaint. (Am. Compl.). Therein, Toota asserts claims that DLA unlawfully restricted full and open competition, imposed unreasonable and unequal qualification requirements while failing to timely evaluate and approve Toota’s SAR, disregarded guidance governing procurement practices, improperly canceled and bundled lubricant procurements in a manner that disadvantaged potential offerors, and, in the alternative, was required to solicit the lubricant as a commercial product but failed to do so. (Id. at 25–29). II. Analysis In its Motion for Judgment on the Administrative Record, Toota advances two main arguments. First, Toota contends that DLA violated the Competition in Contracting Act (“CICA”) by unlawfully restricting competition, doing so in several ways: by imposing limits on competition without the justification CICA requires, by failing to articulate any valid basis for those restrictions, and by attempting to use SEPA to circumvent CICA’s independent justification obligations. (Pl.’s MJAR at 27–29). Second, Toota argues that DLA violated statutes and acquisition regulations through a series of related failures in establishing and administering qualification requirements. (Id. at 29 (citing 10 U.S.C. § 3243, 41 U.S.C. § 3311, and FAR Part 9)). According to Toota, DLA never created a valid original qualification requirement, did not 7 promptly evaluate Toota’s SAR or its alternate offers, failed to solicit additional sources or bear the required testing costs, and then issued an invalid, arbitrary, and capricious qualification requirement that was applied unequally. (Id. at 30–39). For its part, the United States first contends that Toota’s claims should be dismissed in substantial part because: the Court lacks jurisdiction over Count II which alleges that “DLA Impermissibly Imposed Unreasonable and Unequal Qualification Requirements and Failed to Promptly Approve Toota’s SAR,” (Am. Compl. at 26), and all qualification-related challenges; several claims have become moot; and Toota cannot establish standing. (Def.’s xMJAR at 14– 28). According to the United States, Toota is neither an actual nor a prospective offeror and lacks the direct economic interest necessary to pursue a bid protest; alternatively, the United States also argues that Toota has waived any challenge to the lubricant solicitations. (Id. at 19–28 (citing 31 U.S.C. § 3351)). As to the merits, the United States argues that DLA’s procurement actions were neither arbitrary nor capricious. (Id. at 29–45). It maintains that DLA complied with CICA, properly invoked a statutory exception to full and open competition, and lawfully relied on SEPA. (Id. at 29–34). The United States further asserts that the qualification requirements are not actually qualification requirements in practice, but were lawful nonetheless; that, even if 10 U.S.C. § 3243 applied, the Army satisfied its obligations; that Toota’s SAR was reasonably evaluated; that the testing requirements were rational; and that DLA handled Toota’s alternate offers in full accordance with governing law and regulation. (Id. at 35–45). The Court addresses any potential jurisdictional defects first. A. Jurisdictional Challenges and Waiver 1. DLA’s evaluation was in connection with a procurement. The United States first argues that the Court lacks jurisdiction because DLA’s evaluation of Toota’s SAR package was not an action taken “in connection with a procurement or proposed procurement” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1). (Def.’s xMJAR at 15–16). In the United States’ view, the SAR process is a technical review conducted by the Army, separate from DLA’s procurement activities, and therefore outside the Tucker Act’s reach. (Id. at 16). To support this position, the United States relies primarily on Geiler/Schrudde & Zimmerman v. United States, where the Federal Circuit declined jurisdiction over a challenge to agency actions that only might affect unidentified future procurements. (Id. (citing 743 F. App’x 974, 977 (Fed. Cir. 2018))). Toota responds that the United States’ characterization of the SAR process is inconsistent with both the record and governing case law. (Pl.’s Resp. at 8, ECF No. 22). Toota argues that DLA’s evaluation of its SAR is “in connection” with the seven lubricant solicitations (and future lubricant procurements) because the SAR process constitutes a stage of the Government’s acquisition of supplies, during which the agency determines whether to add an offeror to the approved source list and thereby permit it to compete for lubricant procurements. (Id. at 11 (citing Rotair Aerospace Corp. v. United States, 173 Fed. Cl. 187, 195 (2024))). Each of the seven solicitations Toota identifies in its Amended Complaint was awarded to Hutchinson, and Toota alleges that each denial of its SAR package directly determined whether it could compete for those procurements and for future lubricant procurements that regularly recur. (Id. (citing AR 2366, 2343)). The Court agrees with Toota. 8  Determining whether the Court possesses subject-matter jurisdiction is a threshold inquiry, and in making that determination, the Court accepts as true the well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 88–89 (1998); Henke v. United States, 60 F.3d 795, 797 (Fed. Cir. 1995). The Tucker Act grants this Court jurisdiction over actions brought by an “interested party” objecting to “the award of a contract or any alleged violation of statute or regulation in connection with a procurement or a proposed procurement.” 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1); OTI Am., Inc. v. United States, 68 Fed. Cl. 108, 113 (2005). Procurement “includes all stages of the process of acquiring property or services, beginning with the process for determining a need for property or services and ending with contract completion and closeout.” Sys. Application & Tech., Inc. v United States, 691 F.3d 1374, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2012). In LAX Electronics, Inc. v. United States, the Circuit emphasized that § 1491(b)(1)’s “in connection with” language is “very sweeping in scope” and held that jurisdiction exists where the Government has taken a “definitive position” that renders a protestor ineligible for future procurements for which it is likely to bid. 835 F. App’x 553, 558– 59 (Fed. Cir. 2020). Similarly, in Acetris Health, LLC v. United States, the Circuit held that the Tucker Act confers jurisdiction where an agency’s interpretation of law effectively excludes a protestor from future competitions. 949 F.3d 719, 728 (Fed. Cir. 2020). Toota argues that DLA has taken two definitive positions here: its assertion that 10 U.S.C. § 3243 does not apply to lubricant procurements, and its rejection of Toota’s SAR package in December 2025. (Pl.’s Resp. at 11). Both positions, Toota contends, foreclosed its ability to compete. (Id.). The Court agrees and finds that its own precedent reinforces that qualification-requirement disputes fall within Tucker Act jurisdiction. In Rotair, the Court exercised jurisdiction over a challenge to DLA’s handling of qualification requirements under § 3243, even though the protestor had not submitted a SAR package. 173 Fed. Cl. at 187; see also SAI Industries Corp. v. United States, 60 Fed. Cl. 731, 733–734 (2004) (the Court reviewed DLA’s SAR evaluation under the Tucker Act). Against this backdrop, Geiler is distinguishable. 743 F. App’x at 977. The protestor in Geiler did not identify any specific procurement or allege an intent to bid on one. Id. Here, by contrast, Toota identifies seven procurements and alleges that it was actively attempting to qualify for each of them. 8 The factual posture is therefore materially different. There appears to be a consistent understanding that qualification requirements and SAR evaluations form an integral part of the procurement process. Furthermore, SAR packages need not be tied to any particular solicitation; DLA’s guidance explains that a Source Approval Request may be submitted “at any time” and is the package of information a prospective supplier provides to become an approved source for procurement. (AR 44). By the United States’ logic, the Court would categorically lack jurisdiction over SAR evaluations. The Court accordingly finds that, in this case, the SAR process is sufficiently intertwined with a procurement to satisfy the connective requirement of § 1491(b)(1). 8 (Am. Compl. at 2 (listing RFQs SPE7L725T1655, SPE7L725T3802, SPE7L725Q1768, SPE7L425Q0165, SPE7L25Q2178, SPE7L725Q2060, and SPE7L726T1105)). 9  2. Toota’s core claims are not moot because the wrongs are likely to recur. The United States further argues that Toota’s claims are moot because all solicitations identified in the amended complaint have been canceled and because TACOM completed its SAR review on December 12, 2025. (Def.’s Mot. at 16 (citing AR 2342)). The United States suggests that the cancellation of the solicitations extinguishes any live controversy regarding those procurements, and the completion of the SAR review eliminates any basis for Toota’s challenge. (Id. at 17). But mootness is not assessed in the abstract; it turns on whether the Court can still grant meaningful relief and whether the alleged violations are reasonably likely to recur. DexCom, Inc. v. Abbott Diabetes Care, Inc., 89 F.4th 1370, 1372 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2024) (“[T]he party asserting mootness, bears the burden of demonstrating that (1) ‘there is no reasonable expectation that the alleged violation will recur, and (2) interim relief or events have completely and irrevocably eradicated the effects of the alleged violation.’” (internal citations omitted)). As explained below, the record demonstrates that Toota’s core claims continue to present a controversy likely to recur. Mootness is a threshold jurisdictional issue. Myers Investigative & Sec. Servs., Inc. v. United States, 275 F.3d 1366, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2002); see Gulley v. United States, 150 Fed. Cl. 405, 413 (2020). A case becomes moot only when “the relief sought has been granted or [when] the questions originally in controversy between the parties are no longer at issue.” Chapman L. Firm Co. v. Greenleaf Constr. Co., 490 F.3d 934, 939 (Fed. Cir. 2007). It would be a strained result for the Court to conclude that no live case or controversy remains while a plaintiff continues to press for relief that is plainly redressable. In the bid protest context, cancellation of the challenged solicitation often moots the protest because the procurement at issue no longer exists. See, e.g., Madison Servs., Inc. v. United States, 90 Fed. Cl. 673, 680 (2010); CW Gov’t Travel, Inc. v. United States, 46 Fed. Cl. 554, 558–59 (2000); CCL Serv. Corp. v. United States, 43 Fed. Cl. 680, 689–90 (1999). However, this principle is not absolute. Under the voluntary-cessation doctrine, a case is not moot if the defendant halts the challenged conduct but fails to show that the violation cannot reasonably be expected to recur. Chapman L. Firm Co., 490 F.3d at 939–40 (citing Los Angeles Cnty. v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979)). The Government bears a “formidable burden” to make that showing. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’l Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 190 (2000). Toota asserts that its claims are live. (Pl.’s Resp. at 11). Toota argues that DLA’s challenged conduct is likely to recur, and the record supports this concern. (Id. at 12). DLA declined to evaluate Toota’s alternate offers under the most recent RFQ because Toota lacked a workable test under Notes 2 and 6. (Id. at 13 (citing AR 2083, 1347, 2093)). While DLA has conceded error in the earlier, now-canceled procurement, Toota asserts that the underlying testing deficiency persists and is poised to influence future procurements in the same manner. (Id. (citing AR 783)). As Toota argues, the problems enumerated in this lawsuit are not limited to a single solicitation; they instead reflect a systemic gap in DLA’s qualification framework. (Id.). Moreover, DLA instructed Toota not to conduct Note 6 performance testing—the very testing DLA now cites as missing. (Id. (citing AR 1347, 2093)). The Court finds that this inconsistency underscores that the alleged violation has not been fully remedied and may recur in subsequent procurements. 10  Next, Toota argues that the parties’ dispute over the applicability of 10 U.S.C. § 3243 remains unresolved. (Pl.’s Resp. at 11). DLA maintains that the statute does not apply to lubricant procurements, while Toota asserts that the “Runflat Lubricant Qualification Requirements” document constitutes a qualification requirement under § 3243(a). (Id. at 14). Such a disagreement is not academic. 10 U.S.C. § 3243 is a federal acquisition statute titled “Encouragement of new competitors: qualification requirement.” Its purpose is to prevent agencies from using qualification requirements to exclude potential offerors and to ensure that any such requirements are transparent, justified, and minimally restrictive. 10 U.S.C. § 3243. Thus, even though TACOM issued a SAR decision in December 2025, the statutory dispute continues to govern the parties’ rights and obligations in future procurements. A live controversy regarding this interpretation therefore persists. Taken together, these considerations demonstrate that the United States has not met its burden to show that the alleged violations cannot reasonably be expected to recur or that the Court is unable to grant effective relief. Lubricant procurements recur regularly, DLA continues to apply the same qualification framework, and the statutory dispute under § 3243 remains active. Although the cancellation of individual solicitations may be relevant to whether a protester can show prejudice as to particular procurement actions, such cancellations do not automatically moot broader claims that the agency is unlawfully structuring or issuing procurements in the first place. While claims tied exclusively to the canceled solicitations may be dismissed as moot, Toota’s broader challenges to DLA’s qualification requirements and statutory compliance remain justiciable. Accordingly, the Court finds that Toota’s core claims are not moot. However, the Court agrees that Toota’s delay-based component of Count II has been mooted by the agency’s corrective action in December. (Def.’s xMJAR at 18; Am. Compl. at 26 (alleging, in part, that DLA failed “to [p]romptly [a]pprove Toota’s SAR”)). To the extent Toota advances an independent claim premised on DLA’s delay in reviewing its SAR, that theory no longer presents a live controversy because no further judicial relief could redress the alleged injury. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968) (a case becomes moot when “the question sought to be adjudicated has been mooted by subsequent developments”). The record establishes that DLA has now completed its evaluation, issued a written rejection, and closed the SAR review process. (AR 2353–56). Once an agency has taken the very action a plaintiff seeks to compel, a delay-based challenge is moot because a court cannot order the agency to do what it has already done. See Kingdomware Techs., Inc. v. United States, 579 U.S. 162, 169 (2016). Because Toota’s SAR has been fully reviewed and no further process remains to be compelled, there is no effectual relief the Court could provide, and the delay claim is therefore moot. This conclusion does not extend to the portion of Count II alleging that DLA imposed unreasonable or unequal qualification requirements; the factual circumstances surrounding the delay may remain relevant to that surviving theory. 3. Toota possesses standing. The United States next argues that Toota lacks standing because it is neither an actual nor a prospective offeror and because it cannot demonstrate the direct economic interest required under 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1). (Def.’s xMJAR at 19–26). According to the United States, no 11 active solicitation exists, Toota’s remaining claims are not tied to any specific procurement, and Toota cannot show a substantial chance of award. (Id. at 22). In support, the United States broadly contends that Toota is not presently capable of satisfying the agency’s qualification requirements. It cites record evidence indicating that Toota has not demonstrated compliance with the technical specifications in the Drawing, (AR 1562; AR 1564–66), lacks a valid Joint Certification Program (“JCP”) code, (AR 2344), does not hold an ISO certification that covers lubricant production, (AR 1501), and cannot rely on its manufacturer because it allegedly lacks access to export-controlled data. (Def.’s xMJAR at 24–25). In the United States’ view, these deficiencies foreclose any possibility of redress and therefore defeat standing. (Id.). The Court disagrees. Standing is a threshold inquiry governed by well-established principles. “The ‘irreducible constitutional minimum of standing’ contains three requirements.” Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 102 (citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). A plaintiff must show: (1) a concrete and particularized injury in fact that is actual or imminent; (2) a causal connection between that injury and the challenged conduct; and (3) an injury likely to be redressed by a favorable decision. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61. Because standing is claim-specific, “a plaintiff’s burden extends to ‘demonstrating that it has standing for each claim.’” BCG Fed. Corp. v. United States, 172 Fed. Cl. 543, 551 (2023) (quoting Owl Creek Asia I, L.P. v. United States, 148 Fed. Cl. 614, 641 (2020), aff’d sub nom. Fairholme Funds, Inc. v. United States, 26 F.4th 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2022)). Redressability is the primary point of contention. An injury is redressable when it is “‘likely,’ as opposed to merely ‘speculative,’” that a favorable decision could remedy it. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (quoting Simon v. E. Kentucky Welfare Rts. Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38, 43 (1976)). Conversely, if “after the undoing of the government action the status quo remains in place, the alleged injury is not redressable.” Acuity Edge, Inc. v. United States, 174 Fed. Cl. 46, 54 (2024). Thus, the Court must determine whether Toota remains capable of receiving meaningful relief and whether the alleged procurement-related harm continues to affect its competitive position. To proceed under § 1491(b)(1), a protestor must also qualify as an “interested party,” meaning an actual or prospective bidder with a direct economic interest in the procurement. Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps., AFL-CIO v. United States, 258 F.3d 1294, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Digitalis Educ. Sols., Inc. v. United States, 664 F.3d 1380, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2012). As a general matter, a protestor demonstrates a direct economic interest by showing that, but for the alleged procurement error, it had a substantial chance of receiving the award. Rex Serv. Corp. v. United States, 448 F.3d 1305, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Prejudice is a factual question. Bannum, Inc. v. United States, 404 F.3d 1346, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2005). In pre-award protests, the Federal Circuit has recognized that a “but-for” analysis may be impossible because no award decision has yet occurred. Weeks Marine, Inc. v. United States, 575 F.3d 1352, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2009). In that posture, a protestor need only show a non-trivial competitive injury that can be redressed by judicial relief. Id. at 1362. But when the record provides an “adequate factual predicate” to assess whether the protestor would have had a substantial chance of award, the traditional prejudice standard applies even before award. Orion Tech., Inc. v. United States, 704 F.3d 1344, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2013); see Oracle Am., Inc. v. United States, 975 F.3d 1279, 1291 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2020). 12  Toota responds that it satisfies the “prospective offeror” standard articulated in Acetris, which recognizes standing where future procurements are virtually certain to occur and the protestor is very likely to bid. (Pl.’s Resp. at 16 (citing 949 F.3d at 728)). Toota alleges both elements, and the United States does not dispute them. Toota further argues that the United States cannot rely on obstacles of its own making to defeat standing. (Id. at 18–19). The record reflects that DLA expressly instructed Toota not to conduct the Note 6 test. (AR 1347; AR 2093). Toota contends it would be improper for the United States to now cite the absence of that same testing as evidence that Toota cannot qualify. (Pl.’s Resp. at 18). Toota correctly notes that decisions such as Cubic Defense Systems, Inc. v. United States and Rotair caution against allowing an agency to manufacture standing defects through its own conduct. (Id. (citing 45 Fed. Cl. 239 (1999), 173 Fed. Cl. at 197)). Toota also challenges the United States’ factual assertions. It notes that it is JCP certified, that its manufacturer does not require technical data, and that any ISO scope issue is clerical. (Id. at 19–20 (citing AR 260–61)). Toota further asserts that it completed Note 2 testing and was prepared to conduct Note 6 testing until DLA instructed it not to proceed. (Id. at 13 (citing Compl. Ex. R; AR 1347; AR 2093)). Whether Toota can ultimately meet the technical requirements is, in Toota’s view, a merits question—not a jurisdictional one. It is the Court’s role to determine whether the findings that foreclosed Toota from further consideration were based on lawful criteria and whether those determinations were arbitrary and capricious. Allowing the United States to rely on the very same disputed findings to defeat standing at the dismissal stage would be circular: it would assume the validity of the agency’s actions to avoid judicial review of those actions. Such an approach would permit an agency to insulate potentially unlawful conduct from scrutiny and would contravene the public policy underlying § 1491(b), which ensures that disappointed offerors have a meaningful avenue to challenge procurement decisions alleged to be improper. By the United States’ actions, Toota was “deprived of the opportunity to compete for the provision of” the services that were sought in the canceled procurement. Distributed Sols., Inc. v. United States, 539 F.3d 1340, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (finding that loss of “the opportunity to compete” affected potential offerors’ direct economic interest). At the dismissal stage, the Court must resolve factual disputes in Toota’s favor. The United States’ arguments largely go to the merits of whether Toota can qualify, not to whether it is an “interested party.” Federal Circuit precedent suggests that a protestor excluded from future procurements by an agency’s definitive position may qualify as a prospective offeror even without an active solicitation. See LAX Elecs., 835 F. App’x at 558–59; Acetris Health, 949 F.3d at 727. The Court therefore concludes that Toota has adequately alleged injury, causation, and redressability, and that it qualifies as an interested party with standing to pursue its claims. 4. Blue & Gold does not foreclose Toota’s claims. The United States also argues that, even if Toota has standing, many of its claims are barred under Blue & Gold Fleet, L.P. v. United States. (Def.’s xMJAR at 26 (citing 492 F.3d 1308, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2007))). Under Blue & Gold, when a bidder declines to challenge a patent error in a solicitation before the close of bidding, it waives any later attempt to assert that objection in a protest before this Court. Blue & Gold Fleet, 492 F.3d at 1313. According to the United States, each of the lubricant solicitations contained the same patent features Toota challenges here: identification of Hutchinson as the lone approved source; reliance on the Drawing; use of simplified acquisition procedures and, where applicable, SEPA; and the 13 invitation for alternate offers through the SAR process. (Def.’s xMJAR at 27). Because Toota did not protest six of the seven solicitations before the close of bidding, the government contends that Toota waived its objections. (Id.). The United States further argues that Toota’s GAO protests of RFQ 0165 did not preserve the claims asserted in this action, and that case law supports a finding of waiver where a protester raises different arguments at GAO and in the Court of Federal Claims. (Id. at 28 (citing Synergy Sols., Inc. v. United States, 133 Fed. Cl. 716, 739–40 (2017))). Toota counters that the United States is overstating the reach of Blue & Gold. Toota notes that the doctrine does not require a “formal protest” to avoid waiver. (Pl.’s Resp. at 21 (citing Lab’y Corp. of Am. v. United States, 108 Fed. Cl. 549, 566 (2012))). Toota asserts that it has engaged DLA continuously since 2024 regarding its SAR, alternate offers, and related disputes, and that these communications put the agency on notice of the same concerns raised here. (Id.). Toota also disputes the premise that six solicitations reached a “close of the bidding process,” asserting that only two of the protested RFQs ever reached a bid-closing date. (Id.). Toota filed a pre-award protest of one, and another was open for only eleven days before DLA canceled it without evaluation. (Id.). As to Synergy, Toota argues that the case does not stand for the proposition that arguments not raised at GAO are waived at this Court; rather, Synergy involved a protester who waited months to challenge solicitation terms and raised them only after learning it would not receive the award. (Id. at 22 (citing 133 Fed. Cl. 716)). Toota maintains that it has not “sat on its hands.” (Id.). Finally, Toota argues that the United States’ position is contradictory—criticizing Toota both for not protesting canceled solicitations and for not waiting to protest an active one—and that its core challenge, focusing on