Genentech, Inc. v. Fink
CourtDistrict Court, District of Columbia
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
DocketCivil Action No. 2025-0290
JudgeChief Judge James E. Boasberg
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
AMGEN INC., et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v. Civil Action No. 24-3571 (JEB)
XAVIER BECERRA, et al.,
Defendants.
GENENTECH, INC.,
Plaintiff,
v. Civil Action No. 25-290 (JEB)
DOROTHY FINK, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Litigation is not a spectator sport. If an interested party wishes to call the plays, the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require him to seek intervention in a timely manner. He may
not sit on the sidelines, watching as he believes his interests are not being adequately vindicated,
and then demand to be subbed in for a rematch after the final whistle has been blown. Yet
proposed intervenor Sagebrush Health Services seeks to do just that following entry of final
judgment in these complex Administrative Procedure Act cases in favor of Plaintiff
pharmaceutical companies. Those companies had challenged the Health Resources and Services
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Administration’s certification of Sagebrush’s affiliate sites under a provision of the Public Health
Service Act. As Sagebrush’s Motions are plainly untimely, the Court must deny them.
I. Background
Section 340B of the PHSA offers certain “covered entities” the ability to purchase drugs
at steep discounts from pharmaceutical companies. See 42 U.S.C. § 256b(a)(1); Astra USA, Inc.
v. Santa Clara Cnty., 563 U.S. 110, 113 (2011). One type of statutorily “covered” entity is one
that receives funds for treating sexually transmitted diseases “through a State or unit of local
government.” See 42 U.S.C. § 256b(a)(4)(K).
By dint of such qualifying state STD funding, Sagebrush, a non-profit healthcare
organization, has become a “prolific participant in the 340B program.” Amgen Inc. v. Becerra,
2026 WL 2364336, at *2 (D.D.C. Aug. 14, 2026). As the Court summarized most recently,
however, Sagebrush does not “provide individuals with services arising from that funding[] and
order discounted drugs on their behalf.” Id. Instead, its purported affiliates — distinct
healthcare clinics focused on specialties that appear to have little to do with STDs, such as
oncology and rheumatology — do. Id. Under a “master affiliate agreement,” Sagebrush
arranges for these clinics to be listed as Sagebrush STD clinic “locations” on Sagebrush’s
qualifying state award, and each clinic sends Sagebrush the net collections of all claims for 340B
drugs used at their clinics. Id. Many of those clinics receive their own 340B certification as
covered entities. Id.
Believing this arrangement unlawful, four drug manufacturers — Amgen, Inc., Eli Lilly
and Company, UCB, Inc., and Genentech, Inc. — brought two related suits in December 2024
and January 2025 challenging the Government’s certification of nine of these Sagebrush
affiliates as “covered entities” under 340B. See Amgen, No. 24-3571, ECF No. 1 (Amgen
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Compl.), ¶¶ 4–8; Genentech, No. 25-290, ECF No. 1 (Genentech Compl.), ¶ 19. Plaintiffs
contended that the affiliates were ineligible for certification on multiple statutory grounds,
including, as relevant here, that they received no grant funds “through a State or unit of local
government.” Amgen Compl., ¶¶ 146–51; Genentech Compl., ¶¶ 145–50.
Sagebrush was well aware that Plaintiffs were making this argument. Not long after
Plaintiffs filed the suits at issue here, Sagebrush itself sued HRSA over its decision to deem
some of its sites ineligible for 340B funding. See Sagebrush Health Servs. v. Becerra, No. 25-
127, ECF No. 1 (Compl.), ¶ 48 (filed Jan. 16, 2025) (Sagebrush I); Sagebrush Health Servs. v.
Kennedy, No. 25-915, ECF No. 1 (Compl.), ¶¶ 61–74 (filed Mar. 27, 2025) (Sagebrush II).
Several Plaintiffs here sought and obtained leave to participate as amici in Sagebrush II. See No.
25-915, ECF No. 21 (Am. Mot.); Minute Order of May 20, 2025 (granting motion). In their
amicus brief, the drug companies explained that their “pending APA challenge” in the instant
litigation teed up the question of whether “[a]n entity qualifies as an STD subgrantee entitled to
the 340B discount only if it is ‘receiving funds . . . through a State or unit of local government.’”
ECF No. 31 (Am. Br.) at 1 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 256b(a)(4)(K) and adding emphasis). In
opposing their request to participate as amici, Sagebrush directly wrestled with their position on
the merits, contending that it “ignores the plain language of the statute by substituting the
preposition ‘from’ for the statute’s plain language ‘through.’” Sagebrush II, No. 25-915, ECF
No. 23 (Am. Opp.) at 1–2. The Government also filed a notice in Sagebrush I, attempting to link
that suit to this litigation, see No. 25-127, ECF No. 14 (Not. Related Cases), as did the Plaintiffs
in Sagebrush II. See No. 25-915, ECF No. 57 (Not. Related Cases). Sagebrush thus plainly
knew that Plaintiffs were advancing the source-of-aid argument in this litigation.
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Despite its disagreement with that position, Sagebrush did not seek to intervene in these
cases. Instead, it sat by as this Court granted another covered entity whose certification was not
at issue leave to intervene. See Amgen, No. 24-3571, ECF Nos. 27 (Mot. to Intervene), 32
(Mem. Op.); Genentech, No. 25-290, ECF No. 23 (Mot. to Intervene); Minute Order of Apr. 10,
2026 (granting Motion). It sat by as Plaintiffs made the source-of-aid argument one of their
main themes in the litigation. See Amgen, No. 24-3571, ECF No. 35-1 (Amgen MSJ) at 2–3,
29–34; Genentech, No. 25-290, ECF No. 21-1 (Genentech MSJ) at 2–3, 32–37. It sat by as the
Government filed its Opposition and Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, even though the
brief “only devoted a single paragraph” to the source-of-aid issue, see Amgen, No. 24-3571, ECF
No. 49-1 (Mot.) at 8 (citing No. 24-3571, ECF No. 37 (Gov’t MSJ) at 19); did not adopt
Sagebrush’s position that covered entities need not receive funds directly “from” the state; and
indeed explicitly argued that the Government “does not certify subgrantees” that do not
“individually” appear on the state’s award notice. See Gov’t MSJ at 19 (formatting altered).
And it sat by as briefing wrapped up and this case hurtled toward final judgment.
On August 14, the Court granted summary judgment in both cases for the drug
companies based on their source-of-aid argument. See Amgen, 2026 WL 2364336, at *1. It
found that the record made plain that “only one entity received grant funding from the . . . state”
— Sagebrush — and that “the clinics received their qualifying funding through Sagebrush, not
through the states.” Id. at *4. The Court thus ordered that the certifications be set aside and that
the Government “not recertify any of the clinics based on funds received through Sagebrush or
another private entity.” Id. at *5. Twenty-eight days later, on September 11, Sagebrush filed
these Motions to Intervene in order to seek reconsideration of the Court’s judgment, or, in the
alternative, to request that the judgment be altered or amended, and/or to appeal. See Mot. at 2–
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3, 12, 17; Genentech, No. 25-290, ECF No. 37-1 (Motion to Intervene) at 2–3, 12, 17. Not
surprisingly, Plaintiffs and the Government both oppose. See Amgen, No. 24-3571, ECF Nos.
54 (Amgen Opp.), 58 (Gov’t Opp.); Genentech, No. 25-290, ECF Nos. 42 (Genentech Opp.), 46
(Gov’t Opp.).
While these Motions were being briefed, Sagebrush, though a non-party, filed a notice of
appeal from the Court’s Order granting Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment. See No.
Amgen, 24-3571, ECF No. 56 (NOA); Genentech, No. 25-290, ECF No. 44 (NOA); but see
Campaign Legal Ctr. v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 68 F.4th 607, 611–12 (D.C. Cir. 2023)
(dismissing merits appeal by proposed intervenor who was denied right to intervene, as there was
no “proper appellant”). Two weeks later, the Government also appealed. See Amgen, No. 24-
3571, ECF No. 61 (Gov’t NOA); Genentech, No. 25-290, ECF No. 49 (Gov’t NOA).
II. Legal Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24 governs intervention as of right and permissive
intervention. Both types of intervention have the same “threshold” requirement: the motion must
be timely. United States v. Brit. Am. Tobacco Austl. Servs., Ltd., 437 F.3d 1235, 1238 (D.C. Cir.
2006); see Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 24(a), (b); Hodgson v. United Mine Workers of Am., 473 F.2d 118,
129 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (“[T]imeliness is a prerequisite to any claim for intervention under Rule
24.”). “The timeliness requirement forces interested non-parties to seek to intervene promptly so
as not to upset the progress made toward resolving a dispute.” Grochocinski v. Mayer Brown
Rowe & Maw, LLP, 719 F.3d 785, 797 (7th Cir. 2013). “If the motion is untimely, the explicit
language of the rule dictates that ‘intervention must be denied.’” Amador Cnty. v. U.S. Dep’t of
the Interior, 772 F.3d 901, 903 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (quoting NAACP v. New York, 413 U.S. 345,
365 (1973)).
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Whether a motion is timely is committed to the “sound discretion” of the district court,
which must judge timeliness by considering “all the circumstances.” NAACP, 413 U.S. at 366.
“‘The most important circumstance relating to timeliness’ is whether a party ‘sought to intervene
as soon as it became clear’ that its ‘interests would no longer be protected by the parties in the
case.’” Campaign Legal Ctr., 68 F.4th at 610 (quoting Cameron v. EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr.,
P.S.C., 595 U.S. 267, 279–80 (2022)) (cleaned up). Courts also weigh “the purpose for which
intervention is sought, the need for intervention as a means of preserving the applicant’s rights,
and the probability of prejudice to those already parties in the case” if the motion were to be
granted. Id. (citation omitted). There is a “strong presumption against post-judgment
intervention.” Id. at 611; see also Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. Herman, 166 F.3d
1248, 1257 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (“A motion for intervention after judgment will usually be denied
where a clear opportunity for pre-judgment intervention was not taken.”) (cleaned up).
III. Analysis
Before it can reach the merits of the Motions to Intervene, the Court has an “obligation to
satisfy itself of its own jurisdiction” to decide them. Dominguez v. UAL Corp., 666 F.3d 1359,
1362 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
A. Jurisdiction
Generally, when a party files a notice of appeal, it “confers jurisdiction on the court of
appeals and divests the district court of its control over those aspects of the case involved in the
appeal.” Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982). Does the Griggs
principle divest this Court of jurisdiction to adjudicate the Motions to Intervene, given that at
least the Government has effectuated a proper notice of appeal? To date, the D.C. Circuit has yet
to answer that question. Herman, 166 F.3d at 1256–57 (reserving question). Some of its sister
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circuits have, however, and have generally adopted the broad rule that courts may not entertain
requests to intervene once an appeal has been filed. Amarin Pharms. Ireland Ltd. v. FDA, 139 F.
Supp. 3d 437, 440–41 (D.D.C. 2015) (collecting cases).
The Court need not definitively decide whether the Griggs principle applies to such a
motion, however. Even if it does, the rule has numerous exceptions — one of which is
applicable here. District courts in this circuit have long held that, although courts lack
“jurisdiction to grant relief while a case is pending on appeal,” they may “deny such relief
without a remand from the appellate court.” Humane Soc’y of U.S. v. Johanns, 2007 WL
1810103, at *3 (D.D.C. June 21, 2007) (first emphasis added); see also West v. Holder, 309
F.R.D. 54, 56 (D.D.C. 2015) (same); cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 62.1(a) (“If a timely motion is made for
relief that the court lacks authority to grant because of an appeal that has been docketed and is
pending, the court may . . . deny the motion.”). That exception has logical force to it, especially
as applied to intervention motions. Where a court is prepared to deny the intervention motion
anyway, there is little concern that such denial would risk altering the case as it stands before the
court of appeals — the original concern animating the Griggs principle. See In re Jones, 768
F.2d 923, 931 (7th Cir. 1985) (explaining that Griggs is designed “to keep the district court and
the court of appeals out of each other’s hair”) (Posner, J., concurring). Perhaps for that reason, at
least one district court here has concluded that it had the authority to deny a motion to intervene
while an appeal was pending. Campaign Legal Ctr. v. FEC, 2022 WL 1978727, at *1 n.1
(D.D.C. June 6, 2022) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 62.1(a)), aff’d, 68 F.4th 607 (D.C. Cir. 2023)
(affirming without questioning district court’s jurisdiction); cf. Ali v. City of Chicago, 34 F.4th
594, 598–599 (7th Cir. 2022) (not questioning district court’s jurisdiction to “den[y] . . . motion
to intervene” while “appeal was pending” and affirming denial on timeliness ground).
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The Court follows that wise course here. For the reasons explained below, it concludes
that it must deny the Motions as untimely. The Court therefore has jurisdiction to consider the
requested relief and deny it.
B. Merits
The Court assesses each of the timeliness considerations, beginning with the most
important — the amount of time that elapsed between when it became apparent that the proposed
intervenor’s interests were imperiled and when Sagebrush filed its Motions.
1. Time Elapsed
First and most importantly, Sagebrush did not seek to intervene as soon as it became clear
that the Government was not (allegedly) adequately representing its interests. See Cameron, 595
U.S. at 280. That is manifest from Sagebrush’s own theory of intervention. It seeks to intervene
on the ground that the Government diverged from Sagebrush when it opted not to “meaningfully
address [Plaintiffs’] ‘source-of-aid’ argument” in its “opposition brief and cross-motion” for
summary judgment. See Mot. at 12. In particular, Sagebrush takes issue with the fact that the
Government did not challenge the key assumption underlying Plaintiffs’ argument — “as
Sagebrush would have and does now” — about how to interpret the word “through” in 42 U.S.C.
§ 256b(a)(4)(K). See Mot. at 12; ECF No. 55 (Reply) at 3–4.
At the risk of stating the obvious, that apparent cleavage between Sagebrush and the
Government was laid bare by the Government’s combined opposition and cross-motion for
summary judgment, which was filed on April 24. See Amgen, No. 24-3571, Gov’t MSJ; Mot. at
12 (citing Gov’t MSJ at 19 as source of divergence). In other words, accepting Sagebrush’s
theory of divergence as true, such split was evident to any reasonable observer about four months
before the Court ruled on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment. Sagebrush’s failure to act
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on such a “clear opportunity for pre-judgment intervention” therefore weighs heavily against
timeliness. Herman, 166 F.3d at 1257 (citation omitted); see, e.g., United States v. Google LLC,
2025 WL 880552, at *3 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 21, 2025) (concluding that motion to intervene filed 76
days after divergence of interests became clear was untimely).
Sagebrush sees things differently. It insists that its Motions are timely because it became
clear that the Government’s interests had diverged from its own only “after the Court’s Order.”
Reply at 8; see Mot. at 2 (“[U]ntil the Court’s decision, its interests appeared aligned with, and
adequately represented by, the Government.”). Specifically, Sagebrush contends that it realized
only in “hindsight” that “HRSA’s arguments on the source-of-aid issue” were “inadequate,” as
the Court’s Order made those deficiencies “apparent.” Reply at 8.
That argument does not persuade. Even if the Court credits Sagebrush’s assertions, the
relevant question is not when it in fact became clear to Sagebrush that the Government’s interests
had diverged from its own, but rather when the company “should have known” that its interests
might be imperiled by the Government’s litigating positions. Amador Cnty., 772 F.3d at 904
(citation omitted); see also id. at 905 (affirming denial of intervention as untimely where movant
claimed “that its suspicion of inadequate representation became a reality” only after conclusion
of merits). Put another way, the inquiry is an objective one, not a subjective one. See, e.g.,
Google, 2025 WL 880552, at *3 (evaluating when divergence in interests was “clear” by asking
what interested party should have “reasonably expected” given litigation developments); In re
Efron, 746 F.3d 30, 35 (1st Cir. 2014) (“[T]he most important factor is the length of time that the
putative intervenor knew or reasonably should have known that his interest was imperilled [sic]
before he deigned to seek intervention.”); Smith v. Marsh, 194 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th Cir. 1999)
(“The crucial date for assessing the timeliness of a motion to intervene is when proposed
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intervenors should have been aware that their interests would not be adequately protected by the
existing parties.”).
Even if Sagebrush did not clock the inadequacy of the Government’s briefing on the
source-of-aid issue until after the Court’s Order, it should have done so the moment that the brief
was filed. The Government’s briefing made it abundantly clear that it was not advancing
Sagebrush’s statutory argument and that it had chosen to devote only limited space to Plaintiffs’
source-of-aid argument. No reasonable observer “could have missed the implications” for
Sagebrush’s position on the source-of-aid argument. Grochocinski, 719 F.3d at 798 (rejecting
proposed intervenor’s argument that he did not realize his interests were undermined until district
court granted summary judgment as one rooted in “willful[] blind[ness]”). Sagebrush cannot
now claim subjective ignorance of the effect that the Government’s briefing would have on its
interest in seeing its statutory-interpretation stance vindicated. Cf. United States v. Taylor, 54
F.3d 967, 972 (1st Cir. 1995) (“[T]he law ministers to the vigilant, not to those who sleep upon
perceptible rights.”).
Sagebrush also insists that it could not have anticipated that the Court would choose to go
off on the “narrow” source-of-aid ground when the parties “heavily briefed” more sweeping
challenges to the 340B program. See Mot. at 2. Claiming ignorance on that score is also of no
help to the company. The source-of-aid argument was no mere undercard in the litigation.
Plaintiffs gave it pride of place in their introduction to their summary-judgment briefing and
devoted distinct real estate to it on the merits. See Amgen MSJ at 2–3, 29–34; Genentech MSJ at
2–3, 32–37. And it should have hardly come as a surprise that this Court would want to resolve a
case on narrow, rather than sweeping, grounds. See, e.g., Damus v. Nielsen, 2019 WL 1003440,
at *1 (D.D.C. Feb. 28, 2019) (“The ‘cardinal principle of judicial restraint’ is that ‘if it is not
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necessary to decide more, it is necessary not to decide more.’”) (quoting PDK Labs., Inc. v.
DEA, 362 F.3d 786, 799 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (concurring opinion of Roberts, J.)); Cortes v. Nat’l
Lab. Rels. Bd., 2024 WL 1555877, at *7 (D.D.C. Apr. 10, 2024) (same).
Sagebrush argues in the alternative that the alleged divergence of interests did not
manifest until “it became apparent that HRSA was not seeking reconsideration or appeal” of the
Court’s Order. See Reply at 8; see also Mot. at 2 (“Only after the Order was issued, and the
prospect arose that the Government would not appeal, did it become apparent that Sagebrush’s
interests were not adequately represented.”). In so maintaining, it invokes Smoke v. Norton, 252
F.3d 468 (D.C. Cir. 2001), where the D.C. Circuit recognized that “a post-judgment motion to
intervene” can be “timely” where it is motivated by the “prospect that the [party] might not
appeal”; in such circumstances, “the potential inadequacy of representation came into existence
only at the appellate stage.” Id. at 471. Yet the Government has appealed the Court’s order. See
Amgen, No. 24-3571, Gov’t NOA; Genentech, No. 25-290, Gov’t NOA.
Sagebrush suggests that the Government still may not adequately advance the company’s
interests on appeal because it may “adhere to its previously briefed position.” Reply at 3–4; see
also id. at 6. That argument reveals how much “[t]his is not a case in which” the alleged
deficiency in representation became apparent only at the appellate stage, but rather one in which
such deficiency should have been apparent to any reasonably fastidious bystander at the
summary-judgment-briefing stage. Campaign Legal Ctr., 68 F.4th at 610. Indeed, Sagebrush
admits as much. In its own words, it is the “Government’s prior positions” on Plaintiff’s source-
of-aid argument — reflected in its summary-judgment briefing — that are the problem. See
Reply at 6. Considering that this purported deficiency came to light more than six months before
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Sagebrush sought to intervene, the time elapsed cuts substantially against the timeliness of its
current Motions.
2. Remaining Considerations
The remaining timeliness considerations — namely, the purpose of intervention, need to
preserve rights, and prejudice to the original parties — also do not favor intervention. The Court
does not dispute that Sagebrush’s interest in its affiliates having 340B certification is implicated
by this litigation. See Mot. at 9–12. In other words, it has a legitimate purpose for intervention.
Whether intervention is necessary, however, is less clear. Sagebrush says that it needs to
intervene to be able to seek appellate review of the Court’s Order. See Mot. at 13. As discussed
above, however, appeal “is precisely what” the Government has done “at this point.” Ctr. for
Biological Diversity v. Raimondo, 2021 WL 2823102, at *3 (D.D.C. July 7, 2021). Sagebrush
protests that the Government will not be able to make the arguments on appeal that Sagebrush
wishes it to make, given the Government’s “waiver.” Reply at 6; but see Keepseagle v. Perdue,
856 F.3d 1039, 1053 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (describing distinction between “forfeiture,” which entails
failure to timely assert a right, and “waiver,” which requires intentional abandonment of known
right). But it is not clear how Sagebrush’s own intervention would remedy any such limitation,
considering “any argument not raised by a party would not be preserved on appeal.” Broidy
Cap. Mgmt. LLC v. Muzin, 61 F.4th 984, 998 (D.C. Cir. 2023).
The company also contends that it needs to be able to intervene so that it can seek
reconsideration of the Court’s Order, thus protecting its “operational and financial interests” in
“preserving the eligibility of [its affiliates] to participate in the 340B program.” Mot. at 9; see
Amgen, No. 24-3571, ECF No. 49-5 (Proposed Motion for Reconsideration); Genentech, No. 25-
290, ECF No. 37-5 (Proposed Motion for Reconsideration). As an initial matter, it is doubtful
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that the Court could even entertain Sagebrush’s motion, given that the Government has filed a
notice of appeal from the Order, thereby divesting the Court of jurisdiction over it. See
LaRouche v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 112 F. Supp. 2d 48, 52 (D.D.C. 2000). In any event, it is
not clear why intervention is needed to vindicate Sagebrush’s interest, given that the company
could simply reach an “agreement with its clinics” by which they would “receive funding
directly from a state or local unit of government,” rather than through Sagebrush’s award. See
Gov’t Opp. at 10.
In any case, Sagebrush’s need to intervene must be balanced against potential prejudice to
the original parties, who have worked to carry this litigation through to final judgment. Amador
Cnty., 772 F.3d at 904 (finding undue delay in seeking to intervene and prejudice outweighed
plaintiff tribe’s “need to intervene to maintain its sovereign immunity,” despite being “significant
factor” cutting in favor of intervention); Google, 2025 WL 880552, at *5 (finding “no error in the
district court’s [need] analysis” given “other, more important timeliness factors: [proposed
intervenor]’s delay in filing its motion and the prejudice to the parties that would result”);
Campaign Legal Center, 68 F.4th at 611 (weighing “purpose for which intervention was sought”
against “prejudice” to parties).
Here, the prejudice to the parties would be both substantial and “unfair[].” Amador
Cnty., 772 F.3d at 905 (emphasis omitted). Even assuming that the Court could consider the
motions for reconsideration, doing so would require it to “revisit issues that ha[ve] already been
decided.” Roane v. Leonhart, 741 F.3d 147, 152 (D.C. Cir. 2014). Intervention in such
circumstances is strongly disfavored because it would upset the parties’ legitimate expectations
in the finality of the judgment that they worked to secure. Campaign Legal Ctr., 68 F.4th at 611;
see also Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Costle, 561 F.2d 904, 908 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (concluding
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intervention was permissible in part because proposed intervenor “did not seek to reopen the
settled issues”); 7C Wright & Miller’s Federal Practice and Procedure § 1916 (“There is
considerable reluctance on the part of the courts to allow intervention after the action has gone to
judgment and a strong showing will be required of the applicant.”); Campaign Legal Ctr. v. Fed.
Election Comm’n, 2022 WL 2111560, at *5 (D.D.C. May 13, 2022) (“Parties deserve some level
of finality and cannot be expected to litigate cases indefinitely.”).
Adjudicating the motions would also require new factfinding and new briefing because
Sagebrush seeks to “correct the factual record,” Mot. at 15, and advance new legal arguments
that the Government allegedly neglected to make. See Reply at 12. The “delay” and “extra cost”
involved in both briefing and deciding the issues raised on reconsideration would itself prejudice
both the Government and Plaintiffs. Mass. Sch. of L. at Andover, Inc. v. United States, 118 F.3d
776, 782 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Put simply, allowing Sagebrush to intervene “would serve only to
return the parties to a stage of this litigation they thought was long over,” “unduly interfer[ing]
with the parties’ right to a timely resolution of this matter.” Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 2021
WL 2823102, at *3–4.
IV. Analysis
After considering all the circumstances, the Court concludes that there is no reason to
stray from the usual course here. Given Sagebrush’s decision to pass on a clear opportunity to
intervene before this case went to judgment, and the extent to which such intervention would
prejudice the parties, its Motions are untimely and must be denied. Orders so stating will issue
this day.
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/s/ James E. Boasberg
JAMES E. BOASBERG
Chief Judge
Date: November 19, 2026
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