Full Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ____________________________________ ) AMSURG EC WASHINGTON, INC., ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 23-2416 (RBW) ) MGG GROUP COMPANY, INC., et al., ) ) Defendant. ) ) MEMORANDUM OPINION The plaintiff, AmSurg EC Washington, Inc. (“AmSurg”), brings this civil action against the defendants, MGG Group Company, Inc. (“MGG”), District Endoscopy Center, LLC (“District Endoscopy”), Michael L. Weinstein, M.D. (“Dr. Weinstein”), Dominique Howard, M.D. (“Dr. Howard”), and Ramsey Daher, M.D. (“Dr. Daher”), alleging breach of contract, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, breach of fiduciary duty, wrongful withdrawal, civil conspiracy, aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty, and tortious interference with contract/inducement of breach of contract. See Complaint (“Compl.”) at 1, 30, ECF No. 1. Currently pending before the Court is the defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of subject- matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. See Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (“Defs.’ Mot.), ECF No. 9. Upon careful consideration of the parties’ submissions, 1 the Court concludes for the following reasons that it must deny the defendants’ motion to the extent it seeks dismissal 1 In addition to the filings already identified, the Court considered the following submissions in rendering its decision: (1) the Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Complaint (“Pl.’s Opp’n”), ECF No. 11; and (2) the Defendants’ Reply to Opposition to Motion to Dismiss (“Defs.’ Reply”), ECF No. 12. for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and deny in part and grant in part the defendants’ motion to the extent it seeks dismissal for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted. I. BACKGROUND A. Partnership Agreement The plaintiff, AmSurg, is a Tennessee corporation engaged in the business of “developing and managing ambulatory surgery centers in partnership with physicians.” Compl. ¶ 1–2. Defendant MGG is a Maryland corporation registered to do business in the District of Columbia that is “owned by several physicians who specialize in gastroenterology.” Id. ¶ 2. These physicians include defendants Drs. Howard and Weinstein. Id. ¶¶ 11–12. In 1993, the plaintiff and MGG entered into an Agreement of Limited Partnership (the “Partnership Agreement”) to form the Endoscopy Center of Washington (“ECW”), a Tennessee limited partnership. Partnership Agreement (“Partnership Agreement”), Compl., Ex. A, ECF No. 1-1. The Partnership Agreement provides that “[t]he business to be conducted by the Partnership shall be to own and operate [an ambulatory surgery center in Washington, D.C.] and to carry on any and all activities necessary, proper, convenient, or advisable in connection therewith.” Id. § 4. The Partnership Agreement was signed on May 28, 1993, and was amended twice on July 1, 2002. Partnership Agreement at 18 (“First Amendment”) and 23 (“Second Amendment”). The Partnership Agreement designates the plaintiff as the general partner and MGG as the sole limited partner in the partnership. Id. at 17. The Agreement also creates an Advisory Board “consisting of four (4) persons, two (2) of whom shall be appointed by the General Partner and two (2) of whom are appointed by the Limited Partner.” Id. § 10. Prior to taking any of the enumerated eighteen actions listed in the Partnership Agreement, the General Partner must first receive the Advisory Board’s approval, which is obtained by a majority vote of three out of four 2 members. Id. Most relevant here, the Advisory Board’s approval was required prior to ECW’s acquisition of “any land or real property interest including any lease[.]” Id. Additionally, the Partnership Agreement states that the partnership shall last until December 31, 2043, unless certain conditions are met permitting early termination. Id. § 5. It also contains a choice-of-law provision requiring that “[t]he laws of the State of Tennessee shall govern the validity of this Agreement, the construction of its terms and the interpretation of the rights and duties of the parties hereto.” Id. § 20.5; see also id. at First Amendment § 11, Second Amendment § 7 (applying similar choice-of-law provisions to the amendments to the Partnership Agreement). Notably, the Partnership Agreement subjects MGG and its shareholders to a non- compete provision in § 9.3, which forbids them from “competing with the [ECW] Partnership within the District of Columbia, or Chevy Chase or Bethesda, Maryland, until the later of (i) five years from the date of this Agreement, or (ii) one year after the Limited Partner ceases to be a Partner.” 2 Id. § 9.3. The General Partner was responsible for managing and controlling the ECW Partnership. Id. § 11.3. Conversely, MGG, as the Limited Partner, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in [the] Agreement[,] . . . [has] no right or authority to act for or bind the Partnership.” Id. § 9.4. The plaintiff alleges that Dr. Weinstein and Dr. Howard were part-owners, directors, and lead decision-makers for MGG, and that both were “members of [the ECW Partnership’s] Advisory Board from at least 2016 to the [date of the filing of the Complaint].” Compl. ¶¶ 11–12. 2 The General Partner, the plaintiff, is held to a different non-compete restriction, id., not alleged to have been breached by any of the parties. 3 B. The ECW Partnership and Emergence of the Dispute The ECW partnership began operating its ambulatory surgery center in leased offices located at 2021 K Street, Washington, D.C. in 1993. Compl. ¶ 43. The plaintiff alleges that the clinic’s “lease was set to expire on February 28, 2023[,]” and that “by early 2022, MGG Group . . . determined that the time had come to find an alternative [location for the center.]” Id. The plaintiff further alleges that MGG, “at their request, and given their familiarity with the local real estate market” in Washington, D.C., “took [the] lead in [the] search process on behalf of ECW.” Compl. ¶ 44. MGG “identified a suitable new location for [the] ECW [Partnership] and its [new ambulatory surgery center] at 2000 Pennsylvania Avenue, Washington, D.C.[,]” and in March 2022, with AmSurg’s consent, “entered into lease negotiations on behalf of [the] ECW Partnership.” Compl. ¶ 45. However, relations between the partners deteriorated. See generally Compl. The plaintiff alleges that the defendants “were scheming to exploit the expiration of the existing lease” and their position as lead negotiators for the new lease to either force a change in the partnership’s revenue split or to independently secure the lease to “develop a competing surgery center without AmSurg.” Compl. ¶ 48. According to the plaintiff, the defendants elected to open a competing surgery center and registered District Endoscopy, one of the defendants and a subsidiary of MGG, as a new entity in Washington D.C. on August 5, 2022, to operate the planned competing center. Compl. ¶ 50. Eight weeks after the alleged registration of District Endoscopy as a new entity, on September 30, 2022, defendant MGG’s counsel informed the plaintiff’s counsel that “[t]he status quo has not been fair and is no longer tenable for MGG, and therefore several issues, as well as contractual provisions, justif[ied] the wind down [of] the business relationship.” Compl., Ex. B at 2, ECF No. 1-2. Defendant MGG’s counsel again on 4 October 10, 2022, informed the plaintiff’s counsel that “one or more of those affiliated with [MGG] have been planning to establish a new center in the District of Columbia.” Compl., Ex. D. at 2, ECF No. 1-4. The plaintiff, reacting to the defendants’ stated intent to operate a separate business after the 2021 K Street lease expired, obtained a short-term lease extension for the current location beyond the original February 2023 expiration date, although the plaintiff alleges that “the [physicians] ha[d] not scheduled any procedures at the 2021 K Street center after May 1, 2023,” Compl. ¶ 68, after which the physicians associated with MGG, through District Endoscopy, were supposedly “planning to schedule . . . procedures at the new competing surgery center,” Compl. ¶ 68. On May 15, 2023, the plaintiff declared Chapter 11 Bankruptcy. Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (“Defs.’ Mem.”) at 2; see also Voluntary Petition for Non- Individuals Filing for Bankruptcy Form 201 at 5, ECF No. 9-2. The plaintiff alleges that the defendants shortly thereafter took “steps to develop the new competing surgery center” at 2000 Pennsylvania Avenue. Compl. ¶ 69. These efforts allegedly included publishing a notice on June 12, 2023, in The Washington Post that District Endoscopy “would be applying for a certificate of need for [the] new surgery center[,]” Compl. ¶ 69, filing “a letter of intent with the Washington, D.C., State Health Planning and Development Agency to apply for a certificate of need to establish the new competing center[,]” Compl. ¶ 70, and engaging “an architecture, interior designer, and engineering firm for the new center[,]” Compl. ¶ 72. Finally, the plaintiff alleges that in August of 2023, the new center at 2000 Pennsylvania Avenue was scheduled to “commence operations in or about September 2023[,]” Compl. ¶ 73, and that another ambulatory surgery center developed by “one or more of MGG Group[’s] affiliates” was going to “commence operations imminently” in 5 Chevy Chase, Maryland, in violation of the Partnership Agreement’s noncompete provisions, Compl. ¶ 74. C. Procedural Background The plaintiff initially brought suit in the Tennessee Chancery Court on February 10, 2023. Compl. ¶ 66. On July 14, 2023, the Chancery Court ruled that “it does not have personal jurisdiction over any of the [d]efendants in this dispute[,]” and dismissed the case. Final Order and Memorandum at 19–21, ECF No. 9-1. The plaintiff subsequently filed its Complaint in this Court on August 18, 2023. The plaintiff’s Complaint asserts eight claims against the various defendants. The plaintiff seeks compensatory damages “believed to be not less than $5,000,000.00[,]” Compl. ¶ 8, as well as “punitive or statutory damages,” Compl. ¶ 9, and an injunction against “violating and/or tortiously interfering with the Partnership Agreement[.]” Compl. ¶ 10. The defendants subsequently filed their motion to dismiss on September 22, 2023, seeking to dismiss “all claims” pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure arguing, that the plaintiff does not have standing to bring their claims, and alternatively arguing under Rule 12(b)(6), that the plaintiff has failed to state a claim for all eight of their claims. Defs.’ Mem. at 1. The plaintiff then filed its response in opposition to the defendants’ motion to dismiss on October 16, 2023, see generally Pl.’s Opp’n, and the defendants submitted their reply brief on October 23, 2023, see generally Defs.’ Reply. 3 3 Additionally, on April 8, 2024, the plaintiff filed a motion for preliminary injunction, seeking to have the Court prohibit the defendants “from directly or indirectly owning or engaging in any further efforts to develop, build, license, or operate any ambulatory surgery center (“ASC”) within the District of Columbia or Chevy Chase or Bethesda, Maryland, and from any other action that is contrary to their contractual obligations to AmSurg.” Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 1, ECF No. 16. The Court denied the motion, holding that the plaintiff failed to meet its burden to demonstrate irreparable harm because “the plaintiff has provided no reason for this Court to depart from the established rule that ‘economic harm does not constitute irreparable injury.’” Order (Apr. 26, 2024) at 6, ECF No. 30 (citing to Sterling Com. Credit Mich., LLC v. Phoenix Indus. I, LLC, 762 F. Supp. (continued . . .) 6 II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) “Federal district courts are courts of limited jurisdiction[,]” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994), and therefore, “[a] motion for dismissal under [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 12(b)(1) ‘presents a threshold challenge to the [C]ourt’s jurisdiction[,]’” Morrow v. United States, 723 F. Supp. 2d 71, 75 (D.D.C. 2010) (Walton, J.) (quoting Haase v. Sessions, 835 F.2d 902, 906 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). Thus, the Court is obligated to dismiss a claim if it “lack[s] ... subject matter jurisdiction[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). And, because “it is to be presumed that a cause lies outside [the Court’s] limited jurisdiction,” Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that a district court has subject matter jurisdiction, see Nurse v. Sec’y of Air Force, 231 F. Supp. 2d 323, 326 (D.D.C. 2002) (Walton, J.) (citations omitted). In deciding a motion to dismiss based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the Court “need not limit itself to the allegations of the complaint.” Grand Lodge of the Fraternal Ord. of Police v. Ashcroft, 185 F. Supp. 2d 9, 14 (D.D.C. 2001). Rather, the “[C]ourt may consider such materials outside the pleadings as it deems appropriate to resolve the question [of] whether it has jurisdiction to hear the case.” Scolaro v. D.C. Bd. of Elections & Ethics, 104 F. Supp. 2d 18, 22 (D.D.C. 2000); see also Jerome Stevens Pharms., Inc. v. Food & Drug Admin., 402 F.3d 1249, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Additionally, the Court must “assume the truth of all material factual allegations in the complaint and ‘construe the complaint liberally, granting [the] plaintiff the (. . . continued) 2d 8, 16 (D.D.C. 2011) (quoting Davis v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 571 F.3d 1288, 1291, 1295 (D.C. Cir. 2009)). The Court did not reach the merits of any of the plaintiff’s claims in its Order denying the plaintiff’s preliminary injunction motion. See generally id. 7 benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged[.]’” Am. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 642 F.3d 1137, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Thomas v. Principi, 394 F.3d 970, 972 (D.C. Cir. 2005)). However, “the [p]laintiff’s factual allegations in the complaint . . . will bear closer scrutiny in resolving a 12(b)(1) motion than in resolving a 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim.” Grand Lodge, 185 F. Supp. 2d at 13–14 (alterations in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). And, the Court “need not accept bare legal conclusions nor unsupported inferences.” Campaign Legal Ctr. v. Fed. Election Comm’n, No. 22-cv-3319 (CRC), 2024 WL 4263853, at *5 (D.D.C. Sept. 23, 2024) (citing Browning v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C. Cir. 2002)). B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests whether a complaint “state[s] a claim upon which relief can be granted[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “To survive a motion to dismiss [under Rule 12(b)(6)], a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff plead[s] factual content that allows the court to draw [a] reasonable inference that the defendant[s] [are] liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). In evaluating a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “the Court must construe the complaint in favor of the plaintiff, who must be granted the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.” Hettinga v. United States, 677 F.3d 471, 476 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Schuler v. United States, 617 F.2d 605, 608 (D.C. Cir. 1979)). While the Court must “assume [the] veracity” of any “well-pleaded factual allegations” in a complaint, conclusory allegations “are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” 8 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Thus, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Also, the Court need not “accept legal conclusions cast as factual allegations[,]” or “inferences drawn by [the] plaintiff if those inferences are not supported by the facts set out in the complaint[.]” Hettinga, 677 F.3d at 476. Finally, the Court “may consider only the facts alleged in the complaint, any documents either attached to or incorporated in the complaint[,] and matters of which [the Court] may take judicial notice.” Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n v. St. Francis Xavier Parochial Sch., 117 F.3d 621, 624 (D.C. Cir. 1997). III. ANALYSIS The defendants first move for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) for a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, under the theory that the plaintiff’s bankruptcy petition resulted in the automatic dissolution of the ECW Partnership and thus the Court is deprived of jurisdiction to review the plaintiff’s claims. See Defs.’ Mot. at 22. The defendants alternatively move for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) of all eight claims asserted by the plaintiff for failure to state a claim. The Court will first address the defendants’ Rule 12(b)(1) argument, then provide an overview of its conflict of law analysis as it pertains to each of the eight counts, and will conclude its analysis by addressing the Rule 12(b)(6) motions as to each of these counts. A. The Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(1) Challenge The defendants first move for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1), alleging that because the plaintiff filed a petition for relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, “that voluntary action caused AmSurg to become ‘dissociated’ from ECW.” Defs.’ Mem. at 12 (citing to Tenn. Code Ann. § 61-1-601(6)(A)). Thus, according to the defendants, since the general partner of ECW, which had the exclusive authority to operate the Partnership, vacated the business, “the 9 [P]artnership [was] effectively terminated prior to any alleged injury, which deprives AmSurg of standing to bring this action,” id., due to the fact that “Am[S]urg simply has not suffered any injury that could be redressed by a decision of this Court[,]” id. at 14. And, as stated by the defendant, “[s]tanding is an essential component of the case-or-controversy requirement in federal court[,]” id. at 12 (citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). As support for its position, the defendants claim that the Tennessee Revised Uniform Partnership Act (“RUPA”) provides that “[a] partner is dissociated from a partnership upon the occurrence of . . . [t]he partner’s [b]ecoming a debtor in bankruptcy . . . .” Id. at 13 (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 61-1-601(6)(A)). Thus, according to the defendants, “AmSurg’s dissociation—and the resulting end of ECW’s business—deprives AmSurg of any redressable injury in fact [, and therefore[,] AmSurg’s only cognizable injury in this case is prospective . . . [, which is not an] injury that could be redressed by a decision of this Court.” Id. at 13–14. In response, the plaintiff contends that the RUPA is not the applicable law that governs the Partnership Agreement, but instead the Partnership Agreement was formed under the Tennessee Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act (“RULPA”), Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 61-2- 101, et seq. Pl.’s Opp’n at 12–13 (“Limited partnerships formed before 2018 are governed by the Tennessee Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act (“RULPA”), Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 61-2- 101, et seq.”). And, under the RULPA, the plaintiff argues that “‘[u]nless otherwise provided in the partnership agreement,’ ‘[a] person ceases to be a general partner of the limited partnership’ if it files a voluntary bankruptcy petition, is adjudged bankrupt or insolvent, or files a petition or answer seeking reorganization or similar relief.” Id. at 13 (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 61-2- 402(a)(4)(B)-(D)). Here, the Partnership Agreement states that ‘“[f]iling a petition seeking for the General Partner any reorganization’ ‘shall not constitute a withdrawal of the General 10 Partner[,]’” id. (citing Partnership Agreement § 13.5.2), and “[i]f an order for relief is entered in behalf of or against the General Partner under Chapter 11 of Title 11, United States Code, the General Partner shall continue to serve as the General Partner of the Partnership and such order for relief shall not be deemed an event of withdrawal of the General Partner[,]” id. (citing Partnership Agreement § 13.3). As noted above, Tennessee law allows for partnerships to be formed under multiple different acts, most relevant here the RUPA and the RULPA. Partnerships formed under the RULPA may not be construed as partnerships under the RUPA, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 61-1- 102(b) (“An association formed under a statute other than this chapter, a predecessor statute, or a comparable statute of another jurisdiction is not a partnership under this chapter.”), although elements of the RUPA may still govern the RULPA where the RULPA is silent on an issue, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 61-2-1205 (“In any case not provided for in this chapter [of the RULPA], the Tennessee Uniform Partnership Law [the RUPA], compiled in chapter 1 of this title, and the rules of law and equity shall govern.”). Here, the Partnership Agreement clearly established the Partnership under the RULPA, not the RUPA. See Partnership Agreement § 2.1 (“The parties hereby form a Limited Partnership under and pursuant to the Act[,]”); Partnership Agreement § 1.1 (“‘Act’ means the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act [the RULPA], as adopted in the State of Tennessee . . . .”). When faced with an unambiguous contract, interpretation of the contract is a question of law that is appropriately resolved by a motion to dismiss. See, e.g., 731 Real Est. Grp., LLC v. Fuzzell, No. W2024-01053-COA-R3-CV, 2025 WL 2977085, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 22, 2025); Weng v. Walsh, 30 F.4th 1132, 1136 (D.C. Cir. 2022). And, the Court finds that the Partnership Agreement is clearly formed under the RULPA as a matter of law. 11 Partnerships established under the RULPA, rather than the RUPA, enable the parties to contract around the default rule under Tennessee law that a bankruptcy petition results in an automatic withdrawal from a partnership. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 61-2-402(a) (“[A] person ceases to be a general partner of a limited partnership . . . [u]nless otherwise provided in the partnership agreement.”). And, this is precisely what the parties agreed to when they entered into the Partnership Agreement. See Partnership Agreement § 13.5 (“Filing a petition seeking for the General Partner any reorganization . . . shall not constitute a withdrawal of a General Partner.”). In response, the defendants in their reply brief, argue that while the Partnership Agreement prevents the plaintiff’s bankruptcy from constituting a “withdrawal” from the partnership, the plaintiff’s bankruptcy resulted in the plaintiff “ceasing to be a general partner[,]” Defs.’ Reply at 4, thus causing the plaintiff to be “disassociate[d]” from the partnership. The defendants ask this Court to find that a general partner’s “withdrawal is different from ceasing to be a general partner—[as] a party can lose its status as general partner but still remain in the partnership.” Id. However, the Court does not find this distinction meaningful, and the defendants have failed to present any authority under Tennessee law that supports their position. Regarding the phrase “ceasing to be a general partner[,]” while the defendants note that “[t]he term ‘withdrawal’ is not defined in either [the RUPA or the RULPA,]” the RULPA defines “[e]vent of withdrawal of a general partner” 4 as equivalent to “an event that causes a person to cease to be a general partner as provided in § 61-2-402.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 61-2- 4 Indeed, § 13.5 of the Partnership Agreement uses language nearly identical to the phrase “[e]vent of withdrawal of a general partner.” Compare Partnership Agreement § 13.5 (“Occurrences Which Are Not Events of Withdrawal by a General Partner”) (emphasis added) with Tenn. Code Ann. § 61-2-101(5). 12 101(5). The statute that this definition references—which the defendants argue triggers the automatic withdrawal—also treats these terms equivalently as § 61-2-402 is titled “[w]ithdrawal or removal of general partner[,]” and is entirely focused on defining which events cause “[a] person [to] cease[] to be a general partner of a limited partnership.” Tenn. Code. Ann. § 61-2- 402(a). The defendants argue that withdrawal necessarily entails ceasing to be a general partner, but a party may cease to be a general partner without withdrawing from the partnership. By doing the latter, the general partner could remain in the partnership and “still retain[] the right to share in the partnership’s profits.” Defs.’ Reply at 3. But the defendants identify no provision in Tennessee statute that provides a pathway for the general partner to do so, nor do they cite any authority indicating how this process of a general partner ceasing to be a general partner without withdrawing from the partnership would occur. Instead, the statute speaks only to withdrawal and is silent on whether and how a general partner could lose its position as a general partner and be transformed into a different kind of partner. Thus, the Court finds that withdrawal and “ceasing to be a general partner” under the RULPA are one and the same. The defendants argue alternatively that the provision in the RUPA listing events that cause the “dissociation” of a partner from a partnership applies to the ECW Partnership under § 61-2-1205 (“In any case not provided for in this chapter [of the RULPA], the Tennessee Uniform Partnership Law [the RUPA], compiled in chapter 1 of this title, and the rules of law and equity shall govern.”). Tenn. Code Ann. § 61-2-1205. “Dissociation” is a term that appears in the RUPA, but not in the RULPA. The term is not defined in the RUPA; however, its meaning is clarified by the Editors’ Notes to the statue which state that “‘dissociation,’ is used . . . to denote the change in the relationship caused by a partner’s ceasing to be associated in the 13 carrying on of the business.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 61-1-601 (Editors’ Notes / Uniform Law Comment Number 1). The RULPA also addresses this situation for general partners, which it terms as a “withdrawal.” The Court therefore has no reason to suspect that “dissociation” in the RUPA is intended to govern the RULPA via § 61-2-1205, as the RULPA already defines how a general partner “ceas[es] to be associated in the carrying on of the business[,]” which a party does so by withdrawing from the partnership. In summary, the Partnership Agreement here states, in relevant part, that the general partner’s filing for Chapter 11 bankruptcy is “Not [an] Event[] of Withdrawal by a General Partner[,]” Partnership Agreement § 13.5; see also § 13.5.2, and accordingly § 61-2-402(a)(4)(B) has no applicability here, since the parties properly contracted to avoid its requirements. 5 Therefore, the plaintiff’s bankruptcy filing has neither resulted in withdrawal from, nor caused it to “cease to be a general partner” of, or dissociated from, the ECW partnership. Accordingly, it remains a general partner of the ECW partnership and retains standing to pursue a lawsuit for injuries it contends it sustained after its bankruptcy petition was filed in May 2023. Thus, the Court will deny the defendants’ motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s Complaint based on lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. B. The Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) Challenges Having considered and denied the Rule 12(b)(1) component of the defendants’ motion to dismiss, the Court now turns to the defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) challenges in response to the plaintiff’s claims alleging breach of contract, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, 5 Because the Court has determined that § 13.5.2 of the Partnership Agreement did not result in AmSurg withdrawing from or ceasing to be a general partner of ECW, the Court need not determine whether under § 13.3 of the Partnership Agreement there is a difference between “an order for relief” under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code or a “voluntary petition” under Chapter 11. Defs.’ Reply at 4–5. 14 breach of fiduciary duty, wrongful withdrawal, civil conspiracy, aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty, and tortious contract interference. 1. Choice of Law A threshold issue regarding the defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motions requires a determination of the governing law for each of the plaintiff’s claims. The defendants argue that although “the choice-of-law provision in the Partnership Agreement is enforceable as to the agreement’s signatories, which include AmSurg, MGG and Dr. Weinstein[,]” it should not apply to “AmSurg’s claims involving District Endoscopy and Drs. Howard and Daher, who are not signatories to the Partnership Agreement” and instead the Court should apply District of Columbia law to those claims because “the District has the most significant relationship with those disputes.” Defs.’ Mem. at 8–9 (citing Washkoviak v. Student Loan Mktg. Ass’n, 900 A.2d 168, 180 (D.C. 2006)). The plaintiff agrees with the defendants that the Court must apply Tennessee law to the plaintiff’s claims brought against MGG and Drs. Howard and Weinstein. Pl.’s Opp’n at 14. However, the plaintiff argues that “[the d]efendants overlook a threshold step in the choice-of law analysis” that being that “‘[u]nder District of Columbia law, the court must first determine if there is a conflict between the laws of the relevant jurisdiction[s].’” Id. at 14 (citing Young Women’s Christian Ass’n of the Nat’l Capital Area, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co. of Canada, 275 F.3d 1145, 1150 (D.C. Cir. 2002)). The plaintiff then notes that the defendants “spend several pages arguing which jurisdiction has the most significant relationship to the claims asserted in the Complaint, [but they] do not identify any relevant conflict between Tennessee and District of Columbia laws on the issues raised . . . .” Id. at 14 (citing Defs.’ Mem. at 8–12). Furthermore, 15 the plaintiff states that “[the d]efendants cite Tennessee and District of Columbia law interchangeably throughout their substantive arguments. Id. at 14 (citing Defs.’ Mem.). “A federal court sitting in diversity must apply the choice-of-law rules of the forum state[,]” and therefore the Court must apply the District of Columbia’s choice-of-law rules. In re APA Assessment Fee Litig., 766 F.3d 39, 51 (D.C. Cir. 2014). The Partnership Agreement provides that “[t]he laws of the State of Tennessee shall govern the validity of this Agreement, the construction of its terms and the interpretation of the rights and duties of the parties hereto.” Partnership Agreement § 20.5. Under D.C.’s choice-of-law rules, courts enforce this type of express contractual choice of law provision “‘as long as there is some reasonable relationship with the state specified.’” Ekstrom v. Value Health, Inc., 68 F.3d 1391, 1394 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (quoting Norris v. Norris, 419 A.2d 982, 984 (D.C. 1980)). This requirement has been satisfied, as the plaintiff is incorporated in the state of Tennessee. See Whiting v. AARP, 637 F.3d 355, 361 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (concluding that a “reasonable relationship” with the District of Columbia existed because one contractual party (the insurer) was “based in the District of Columbia” even though the other party (the insured) was a resident of Arizona). Accordingly, the Court will apply Tennessee law to the claims that are based on the contract and brought against contractual parties. These claims are Counts I through V brought against MGG, Drs. Howard and Weinstein. For the remaining claims (Counts VI through VIII), the Court will apply the District of Columbia’s “modified governmental interests analysis” approach to choice of law. APA Assessment Fee Litig., 766 F.3d at 51 (quoting Washkoviak, 900 A.2d at 180). Under this approach, the Court will “first determine if there is a conflict between the laws of the relevant jurisdictions.” Young Women’s Christian Ass’n of the Nat’l Cap. Area, Inc., 275 F.3d at 1150. 16 If a conflict exists, the Court will “determine, pursuant to District of Columbia choice of law rules, which jurisdiction has the ‘more substantial interest’ in the resolution of the issues.” Id. 2. Count I 6 a. The Claims Against MGG and Dr. Weinstein The parties agree that the “Partnership Agreement is enforceable against . . . MGG [Group] and Dr. Weinstein[,]” as parties to the contract, and therefore, the plaintiff’s breach of contract claim against these parties must be resolved under Tennessee law. Defs.’ Mem. at 8; see Pl.’s Opp’n at 14. These defendants argue in their motion to dismiss that the plaintiff’s claim fails because the Partnership Agreement ceased to bind the defendants prior to the alleged breach. This is allegedly because “each party’s veto power over lease decisions gave [MGG] a mutually agreed ‘escape hatch’ from the partnership.” Defs.’ Mem. at 30. The defendants contend they leveraged this escape hatch by allowing the lease to expire, which resulted in the automatic termination of the Partnership and consequently the Partnership Agreement. See, e.g., Compl., Ex. B at 1, ECF No. 1-2 (“Without a functional ASC, the Partnership’s business will cease, thus having the effect of ending the Partnership.”). To succeed in a breach of contract claim under Tennessee law, “claimants must prove [1] the existence of a valid and enforceable contract, [2] a deficiency in the performance amounting to a breach, and [3] damages caused by the breach.” Fed. Ins. Co. v. Winters, 354 S.W.3d 287, 291 (Tenn. 2011). When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion in a breach of contract claim context brought under similar substantive state law, such a claim should survive so long as the 6 While the Complaint did not specify which defendants Count I was brought against, the plaintiff’s opposition clarifies that it “does not intend to pursue its claim under Count I against District Endoscopy or Dr. Daher” and brings Count I only against “MGG Group, Dr. Weinstein, and Dr. Howard.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 24. To the extent the Complaint appears to bring Count I against Dr. Daher or District Endoscopy, those claims are dismissed based on the plaintiff’s concession. Moreover, neither Dr. Daher nor District Endoscopy are parties to the Partnership Agreement, nor does the plaintiff allege that they are bound by it. 17 plaintiff has described the terms of the alleged contract and the nature of the defendant’s breach. 7 Nattah v. Bush, 605 F.3d 1052, 1058 (D.C. Cir. 2010). Breach of contract claims “that meet these requirements will survive a motion to dismiss even if they are ‘imprecise or vague.’” Hilltop Consultants, Inc. v. Cervino, No. 21-cv-2488 (RCL), 2022 WL 306361, at *2 (D.D.C. Feb. 2, 2022) (quoting Burnett v. Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps., 102 F. Supp. 3d 183, 193 (D.D.C. 2015)). The Court agrees with the plaintiff that it has met this burden as it submitted the Partnership Agreement with its Complaint, which contains the signatures of Dr. Weinstein, both on behalf of himself and on behalf of MGG, and terms therein stating that the contract “is [ ] valid and enforceable” against these parties. Compl. ¶ 76; see also CopyWatch, Inc. v. Am. Nat’l Red Cross, 299 F. Supp. 3d 189, 196 (D.D.C. 2018) (finding that the Court could properly consider the text of a contract submitted with a complaint in the absence of any challenge by any party at the motion to dismiss stage). The plaintiff identifies § 9.3 of the Partnership Agreement as the term that it believes was violated in Count I, which states in relevant part that MGG and Dr. Weinstein would not “have any direct or indirect ownership interest in, or manage, lease, develop or otherwise have a financial interest in, or receive compensation from any business or entity competing with [ECW] within the District of Columbia, or Chevy Chase or Bethesda, Maryland” for a period of at least one year. Compl. ¶¶ 77–78 (citing Partnership Agreement § 9.3). 7 Although this statement was describing the dismissal standard for a breach of contract claim under District of Columbia law, its logic extends to breach of contract claims under Tennessee law, as the elements of such claims are essentially the same in both jurisdictions. See, e.g., Tsintolas Realty Co. v. Mendez, 984 A.2d 181, 187 (D.C. 2009) (“To prevail on a claim of breach of contract [in the District of Columbia], a party must establish (1) a valid contract between the parties; (2) an obligation or duty arising out of the contract; (3) a breach of that duty; and (4) damages caused by breach.”). 18 The Complaint has alleged with specificity facts tending to show that § 9.3 was breached, including assertions made by the defendants’ counsel that its clients were “planning to establish a new center in the District of Columbia[,]” Compl., Ex. D at 2, ECF No. 1-4, and has further alleged specific preparatory steps taken by affiliates of MGG and Dr. Weinstein to violate § 9.3, including the publication of notices in The Washington Post and the filing of a letter of intent with the District of Columbia State Health Planning and Development Agency to establish a new surgery center. Compl. ¶¶ 69–74. These are actions that appear to be in direct violation of § 9.3’s requirement that MGG and Dr. Weinstein not have any involvement with “any business or entity competing with [ECW] within the District of Columbia, or Chevy Chase or Bethesda,