Full Opinion

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida Opinion filed June 3, 2020. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing. ________________ No. 3D19-2361 Lower Tribunal No. 19-33, Resolution No. CZAB-8-34-18 ________________ Lake Sana Developments, LLC, Petitioner, vs. Miami-Dade County, Florida, Respondent. On Petition for Writ of Certiorari from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Appellate Division, Spencer Multack, Marcia del Rey, and Lisa S. Walsh, Judges. Michael R. Seward, P.A., and Michael R. Seward, for petitioner. Abigail Price-Williams, Miami-Dade County Attorney, and James Edwin Kirtley, Jr., Assistant County Attorney, for respondent. Before SALTER, LINDSEY, and MILLER, JJ. MILLER, J. Petitioner, Lake Sana Developments, LLC, (“Lake Sana”) seeks second-tier certiorari review of an opinion rendered by the Eleventh Judicial Circuit Court, acting in its appellate capacity, upholding the denial of its unusual use application. Finding no departure from the essential requirements of law, we deny relief. Lake Sana is the owner of 57.14 acres of submerged land located beneath an artificial lake known as Silver Blue Lake. The lake, surrounded by single and multi- family residences, vacant lots, and retail establishments, by some accounts, serves to define the character and ambiance of the abutting community. Through its unusual use application, Lake Sana sought to fill 29.5 acres of the 85-acre lake in order to effectuate additional residential development. Following a duly noticed public hearing, the Miami-Dade County Community Zoning Appeals Board 8 (the “Board”) unanimously adopted Resolution CZAB8-34-18 (the “Resolution”), denying the application. Lake Sana subsequently sought first-tier certiorari relief in the circuit court for Miami-Dade County, maintaining that the Resolution was wholly unsupported by competent, substantial evidence.1 Considering “the showing of the adverse 1 Lake Sana argues, for the first time in this proceeding, that the decision of the Board deprives it of any other economically beneficial use of the property. This confiscatory allegation is, as of yet, unripe. See Miami-Dade, Fla. Code 2-114.1 (f) (2019) (“A developmental order or action shall not be deemed a final order in any court or quasi-judicial proceeding challenging the denial of the developmental order or action as a . . . permanent taking of private property or an abrogation of vested rights unless the remedies set forth in . . . section [2-114.1] have been exhausted.”); 2 impact of the proposed project” upon the adjacent community, the circuit court held that the evidence adduced in the quasi-judicial proceeding below sustained the denial of the application. Hasam Realty Corp. v. Dade Cty., 486 So. 2d 9, 9 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986) (citing Allapattah Cmty. Ass’n v. City of Miami, 379 So. 2d 387 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)); see Metro. Dade Cty. v. Blumenthal, 675 So. 2d 598, 607 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996) (“[C]itizen testimony in a zoning matter is perfectly permissible and constitutes substantial competent evidence, so long as it is fact-based.”) (citation omitted). On second-tier certiorari, it is axiomatic our “‘inquiry is limited to whether the circuit court afforded procedural due process and whether the circuit court applied the correct law,’ or, as otherwise stated, departed from the essential requirements of law.” Custer Med. Ctr. v. United Auto. Ins. Co., 62 So. 3d 1086, 1092 (Fla. 2010) (citation omitted). “A ruling constitutes a departure from the essential requirements of law when it amounts to ‘a violation of a clearly established principle of law resulting in a miscarriage of justice.’” Miami-Dade Cty. v. Omnipoint Holdings, Inc., 863 So. 2d 195, 199 (Fla. 2003) (citation omitted). Bauknight v. Monroe Cty., 994 So. 2d 362, 365 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) (“[A] landowner may not establish a taking before a land-use authority has the opportunity, using its own reasonable procedures, to decide and explain the reach of the challenged regulation.”) (citations omitted); see also Perez v. Winn-Dixie, 639 So. 2d 109, 112 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) (“[T]he failure to object or argue a specific point before the lower tribunal will preclude appellate review of that particular point.”) (citation omitted). 3 “Therefore, as a practical matter, the circuit court’s final ruling in most first-tier cases is conclusive because second-tier review is so extraordinarily limited.” Id. (citation omitted) Here, the lower tribunal recited the proposition that “an unusual use, like a special exception, is subject only to the test enunciated in section 33-311[] of the [Miami-Dade County] Code, which is essentially whether the proposal serves the public interest.” Metro. Dade Cty. v. Fuller, 497 So. 2d 1322, 1322 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986) (citing Carlos Estates, Inc. v. Dade Cty., 426 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); Grefkowicz v. Metro. Dade Cty., 389 So. 2d 1041 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Dade Cty. v. First Free Will Baptist Church, 374 So. 2d 1055 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979); Dade Cty. v. Fla. Mining & Materials Corp., 364 So. 2d 31 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978); B.S. Enters., Inc. v. Dade Cty., 342 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)). Nonetheless, in the instant petition, Lake Sana contends the court improperly conflated the law by relying upon evidence regarding the desirability of the existing use to demonstrate the incompatibility of the proposed use. The circuit court’s order contains no facial derogation from clearly established legal principles. For us “to make a determination as to competency and sufficiency of the evidence presented at the hearing would be an impermissible reevaluation of the evidence and outside the scope of our review.” Blumenthal, 675 So. 2d at 601; see Strananhan House, Inc. v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 967 So. 2d 1121, 1128 (Fla. 4 4th DCA 2007) (“[S]econd-tier review does not include a determination of whether competent substantial evidence supported the circuit court’s decision.”). Hence, under the circumstances presented, we are constrained to conclude that “the circuit court’s affirmance of the commission’s action was in full compliance with the essential requirements of the law.” Hasam Realty Corp., 486 So. 2d at 10. Accordingly, we deny the petition. Petition denied. 5