Doelger v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.
CourtCourt of Appeals for the First Circuit
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
Docket24-2000
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 24-2000
YOON DOELGER; PETER DOELGER,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.; CHICKASAW CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, LLC,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Angel Kelley, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Montecalvo, Kayatta, and Rikelman,
Circuit Judges.
James R. Serritella, with whom Mario J. Cacciola, Mark
Keurian, Hannah R. Freiman, Kim & Serritella LLP, Joshua W.
Gardner, and Gardner & Rosenberg PC were on brief, for appellants.
John E. Sutherland and Brickley/Sears, P.A., on brief for the
Institute for the Fiduciary Standard as amicus curiae supporting
appellants.
R. Walker Humphrey, II and Willoughby Humphrey & D'Antoni,
PA, on brief for Public Investors Advocate Bar Association as
amicus curiae supporting appellants.
Tracy O. Appleton, with whom Tibor L. Nagy, Jr., Jacob
Goldenberg, David Moosmann, Nagy Wolfe Appleton LLP, Joan A. Lukey,
Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, LLP, Ryan Robert Baker, Bass Berry &
Sims PLC, David John Freniere, and Freniere Law Group PLLC were on
brief, for appellees.
Evan Bianchi, Joseph M. Esposito, and Spiro Harrison & Nelson
on brief for Professor Allen Ferrell as amicus curiae supporting
appellees.
Eben P. Colby, Marley Ann Brumme, Nicole D. Pacheco, and
Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP on brief for Securities
Industry and Financial Markets Association as amicus curiae
supporting appellees.
Janet Galeria, Audrey Dos Santos, U.S. Chamber Litigation
Center, Samuel Larson, Stephanie Swanson, Associated Industries of
Massachusetts, Jaime A. Santos, Christopher J.C. Herbert, and
Goodwin Procter LLP on brief for the Chamber of Commerce of the
United States of America and Associated Industries of
Massachusetts as amici curiae supporting appellees.
James Tierney on brief as amicus curiae supporting neither
party.
November 19, 2026
MONTECALVO, Circuit Judge. Plaintiffs-Appellants Yoon
and Peter Doelger (the "Doelgers") appeal the district court's
order granting summary judgment to Defendants-Appellees JPMorgan
Chase Bank, N.A. ("JPMC") and Chickasaw Capital Management, LLC
("Chickasaw") (collectively "Defendants") on all of the Doelgers'
claims, orders on the parties' motions to strike, and order denying
the Doelgers' motion for leave to amend their complaint. The
Doelgers claim that the actions Defendants took in providing them
with investment advisory services caused them to lose their life
savings. Thus, the Doelgers seek to recoup those losses, asserting
claims of breach of fiduciary duty; breach of contract; breach of
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing; negligence (or gross
negligence); negligent misrepresentation; and violations of
Massachusetts's consumer protection statute, Mass. Gen. Laws
ch. 93A ("Chapter 93A"), and the Florida Adult Protective Services
Act, Fla. Stat. § 415.1111 ("FAPSA"). The Doelgers also bring
declaratory judgment and rescission claims related to a contract
they entered with JPMC. While this appeal was pending, Peter
Doelger passed away, prompting Yoon Doelger to file a motion for
substitution pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure
("FRAP") 43(a), which remains pending.
Because we find that the Doelgers have failed to create
a genuine dispute of material fact sufficient to defeat summary
judgment, and we find that the district court did not abuse its
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discretion when denying the Doelgers' motion to amend their
complaint, we affirm the district court's orders on those motions.
Accordingly, we dismiss the Doelgers' motion for substitution and
their challenges to the motions to strike orders as moot.
I. Background
A. Factual Background
The Doelgers, until Peter's1 death in 2026, were a
married couple and partners for over forty years. Yoon was a
full-time parent, and Peter co-founded an energy audit company.
In 1995, Peter retired after selling his interest in that company.
After retiring, Peter focused on his investment portfolio, and, in
the 2000s, began investing in master limited partnerships
("MLPs").2
In 2009, Peter opened a line of credit with JPMC -- which
had a banking relationship with Peter since at least the
1990s -- that was secured by, among other things, Peter's MLP
investments.3 Between 2009 and 2014, Peter's MLP investments
increased in value by over $25 million and were generating an
average of $1.5 million in annual distributions and millions of
1When referring to the Doelgers individually, we use their
first names for clarity.
2 MLPs are publicly traded entities that trade on the major
U.S. stock exchanges and must derive at least 90% of their income
from sources, such as energy and natural resource activities, real
estate income, and/or income from commodity investments.
3 Through the line of credit, Peter borrowed millions of
dollars, with a peak balance of almost $18 million in mid-2014.
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dollars in total gain. But in late 2014, the value of MLPs began
to decline.
Sometime in 2013 or 2014, the Doelgers were introduced
to JPMC Investor Associate James Baker. And in spring 2015, Peter
and Baker discussed switching Peter's MLP manager from Atlantic
Trust Private Wealth Management to Chickasaw, which managed the
Master Limited Partnership Energy and Infrastructure portfolio
strategy ("MLPEI Program") that JPMC offered. This discussion
culminated in a meeting on August 10, 2015, at which Baker,
Chickasaw representatives, and the Doelgers were in attendance.
By the end of the meeting, Peter expressed interest in working
with Chickasaw, signing a personal account application ("2015
Advisory Agreement" or the "Agreement") to open the MLP account
("Advisory Account") at JPMC.4
Under the 2015 Advisory Agreement, Peter agreed to
appoint JPMC as "investment manager" for the portfolio he selected
and to allow JPMC to manage such portfolio "following its own
judgment and discretion," but "subject to the annexed [p]ortfolio
[s]chedule." The portfolio schedule annexed to the Agreement
4 Chickasaw was not a signatory to the 2015 Advisory
Agreement. Instead, JPMC and Chickasaw signed an Agreement for
Investment Management Services ("AIMS") and a term sheet ("Term
Sheet") associated with the Advisory Account. While the Doelgers
were not signatories to the AIMS and Term Sheet, these documents
set forth Chickasaw's duties and obligations with respect to the
investment management services it provided to the Doelgers.
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indicated that Peter selected the MLPEI Program, which "intend[ed]
to invest in publicly traded partnerships, limited liability
companies and corporations, predominantly in the energy sector."
Additionally, the Agreement was "subject to and incorporate[d] the
J.P. Morgan General Terms for Accounts and Services" (the "General
Terms"), which, in turn, provided that the Agreement would be
governed by New York law. Lastly, the Agreement indicated that
Peter's net worth was $100 million.
After Peter signed the 2015 Advisory Agreement, but
before JPMC could open the Advisory Account, Baker had to clear
some "operational hurdles," including JPMC's "internal
suitability" policies. At around that time, Peter had given JPMC
the "green light" to use $33 million of his MLP investments to
fund the Chickasaw-managed MLPEI Program. But JPMC had an internal
suitability policy for the MLPEI Program that limited investment
into that Program to 5% of the client's liquid net worth. A
client's investment could exceed the 5% limitation only if an
exception were granted. Thus, Baker pursued an exception given
that Peter's $33 million investment would be 33% of his purported
$100 million net worth and therefore well above the 5% limitation.
Ultimately, JPMC's approval of the exception was made
contingent on Peter signing a letter ("MLPEI Letter") confirming
his prior representations to JPMC and acknowledging that his
requested investment amount in the MLPEI Program was larger and
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more concentrated than JPMC recommended. After Peter signed the
MLPEI Letter, JPMC agreed to open the Advisory Account.5
From 2014 to 2019, MLPs generally declined in value and
underperformed the S&P 500. And during the early 2020 COVID-19
outbreak, the Doelgers' MLP investments declined sharply. The
Doelgers sold a portion of those investments in March 2020, and
then, about a week later, faced with their MLP investments'
continued decline, sold off the remainder of those investments.
The Doelgers thereafter paid the balance of their line of credit
they had opened with JPMC.
B. Procedural Background
Over a year after divesting from the MLPs, the Doelgers
commenced a nine-count action against Defendants JPMC and
Chickasaw in June 2021. In February 2023, the district court
referred the case to a magistrate judge for full pretrial
proceedings and report and recommendation ("R&R") on dispositive
motions.
1. Motion to Amend
On August 2, 2023, the Doelgers filed a motion for leave
to amend their complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure ("Rule") 15(a), seeking to add JPMC's affiliate J.P.
5 Chickasaw was not a signatory to the MLPEI Letter.
Additionally, Yoon was not added to the Advisory Account until
June 2019, when the Doelgers signed an advisory agreement that was
substantively identical to the 2015 Advisory Agreement.
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Morgan Securities, LLC ("JPMS") as a defendant, and new claims and
allegations against Defendants and JPMS, including "causes of
action for breach of contract/third-party beneficiary claims,
alter ego liability, aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty,
and civil conspiracy." The magistrate judge denied the motion.
In doing so, she acknowledged that under Rule 15(a)(2), a "court
should freely give leave [to amend a pleading] when justice so
requires." But, as to the Doelgers' request to add JPMS as a
party, she remarked that, under the U.S. District Court for the
District of Massachusetts Local Rule 15.1(a), "[a]mendments adding
parties shall be sought as soon as an attorney reasonably can be
expected to have become aware of the identity of the proposed new
party" and that violating that rule is "a basis to deny a motion
to amend to add a new party." Pointing to the portions of the
original complaint in which the Doelgers made specific allegations
of misconduct against JPMS, the magistrate judge determined that
the Doelgers were aware of JPMS and its purported malfeasance from
the outset of the case. Thus, she denied the Doelgers'
"eleventh-hour attempt to add JPMS" as a party.
As to the new claims and allegations the Doelgers sought
to add, the magistrate judge determined that their undue delay in
raising the proposed amendments despite having "much of the
information . . . available to [them] prior to filing the
complaint" and the prejudice to Defendants from the additional
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discovery they would need to conduct in response to those
amendments justified denying their motion to amend. She also
noted, in relevant part, that the claims against JPMS "may well be
subject to an arbitration clause." Thus, after rejecting the
Doelgers' proposed additions, the magistrate judge denied the
motion to amend.
The Doelgers filed objections to the magistrate judge's
denial of their motion to amend, requesting that the district court
set it aside. In a text order, the district court adopted and
affirmed the magistrate judge's order denying the motion to amend,
discerning no clear error or determination contrary to law and
finding the order "consistent with . . . First Circuit
jurisprudence."
2. Motion for Summary Judgment and Motions to Strike
On September 28, 2023, Defendants filed a consolidated
motion for summary judgment on all of the Doelgers' claims, and
subsequently filed, among other things, a declaration from James
Baker in further support of their motion. The Doelgers filed their
opposition to Defendants' motion, attaching, in relevant part, a
declaration from Yoon Doelger in support. That declaration
prompted Defendants to file a motion to strike all or parts of
Yoon's declaration. In response, the Doelgers filed an opposition
to the motion to strike and raised their own motion to strike, in
relevant part, Baker's declaration.
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On March 25, 2024, the magistrate judge issued an R&R
(1) denying the Doelgers' motion to strike; (2) granting in part
and denying in part Defendants' motion to strike; and
(3) recommending that the district court grant Defendants' motion
for summary judgment. The Doelgers filed an objection to the R&R,
but the district court -- adopting the R&R in its
entirety -- issued an order granting Defendants' summary judgment
motion and affirming the R&R as to the Doelgers' motion to strike
and Defendants' motion to strike. The Doelgers' timely appeal
followed.
3. Motion for Substitution
While this appeal was pending, Peter passed away. Yoon,
who was appointed as the representative of Peter's estate, filed
a motion to substitute herself in Peter's place pursuant to
FRAP 43(a).6 In the motion, Yoon contended that under
Massachusetts law, which she asserted governs this appeal, all of
Peter's claims survive his death. In doing so, she acknowledged
that, under Massachusetts law, only claims based in contract
survived death. But, citing relevant cases, Yoon argued that
Peter's tort claims survived his death because they "derive from
6In relevant part, FRAP 43(a) provides that "[i]f a party
dies after a notice of appeal has been filed or while a proceeding
is pending in the court of appeals, the decedent's personal
representative may be substituted as a party on motion filed with
the circuit clerk by the representative or by any party."
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the contractual relationship between him and his professional
investment advisers." Defendants agreed that, for substitution
purposes, Peter's contract and contract-based tort claims survived
Peter's death.7 But they asserted that Yoon's position undermined
the Doelgers' arguments in their merits brief on appeal that the
district court erred in determining that the Doelgers' tort claims
were duplicative of their contract claims. Thus, Defendants argued
that this court should affirm the district court's conclusion on
that point.
II. Discussion
We will start by addressing the motion to amend, move to
the motion for summary judgment, and then close with the motions
to strike and Yoon's motion for substitution.
A. Motion to Amend
Regarding their motion to amend the complaint, the
Doelgers principally argue that the district court committed a
reversible legal error in its text order adopting the magistrate
judge's R&R and, separately, that the district court "should have
allowed the amendments" because they were sought as promptly as
7 Defendants initially filed a motion requesting that this
court hold Yoon's motion for substitution in abeyance pending the
resolution of the appeal or, alternatively, extend their time to
respond. We denied their request to hold the motion in abeyance
but granted their request to extend the deadline to respond to
Yoon's motion.
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possible. We will address each argument in turn but pause to
recite our standards of review.
We review the district court's denial of a motion to
amend for abuse of discretion. U.S. ex rel. D'Agostino v. EV3,
Inc., 802 F.3d 188, 191 (1st Cir. 2015). Under this standard, we
defer to the "trial court's hands-on judgment" and will affirm if
"the record evinces an arguably adequate basis for the court's
decision." Id. at 191-92 (quoting Hatch v. Dep't for Child., Youth
& Their Fams., 274 F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 2001)). But our deference
has some bounds, and we may find that a trial court has abused its
discretion when, "among other things, it adopts and applies the
wrong legal rule." Id. at 192. Even so, we may decline to reverse
if the error of law is harmless. See, e.g., P.R. Hosp. Supply,
Inc. v. Bos. Sci. Corp., 426 F.3d 503, 507 (1st Cir. 2005). Whether
the district court applied the correct legal standard is a question
of law that we review de novo. See United States v. Vavic, 139
F.4th 1, 16 (1st Cir. 2025).
Starting with a legal error argument, the Doelgers
contend that the district court committed reversible error by
improperly applying Rule 16's "good cause" standard rather than
the applicable, so-called "freely given" standard under
Rule 15(a), which provides that courts should "freely give leave
[to amend] when justice so requires." Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).
This error, they assert, is evidenced by the district court's
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citations to cases applying the "good cause" standard and
determination that the Doelgers "lack[ed] good cause for the
amendment."
Defendants do not dispute that the district court
applied Rule 16's "good cause" standard but highlight that the
court adopted the "reasons stated" in the magistrate judge's order,
which applied Rule 15(a)'s "freely given" standard. Additionally,
they raise that, even if the district court applied the incorrect
legal standard, we can affirm on alternate grounds, namely the
grounds provided in the magistrate judge's order.
We agree with the Doelgers that the district court erred
when invoking Rule 16's "good cause" standard in its text order.8
Typically, "Rule 16(b)'s 'good cause' standard, rather than
Rule 15(a)'s 'freely given' standard, governs motions to amend
filed after" the scheduling order deadline for amending pleadings.
Trans-Spec Truck Serv., Inc. v. Caterpillar Inc., 524 F.3d 315,
327 (1st Cir. 2008) (citation modified). But here, the Doelgers
could not have triggered Rule 16(b)'s "good cause" standard
because the district court's scheduling order did not set a
deadline for amending pleadings. Thus, as the magistrate judge
8 The district court noted that the "freely given" standard
"elevate[s]" to a "good cause" standard when a motion to amend is
filed late in a case and then determined that the Doelgers
"lack[ed] good cause for the amendment" because their proposed
amendments included information they "previously knew or should
have known."
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correctly identified, Rule 15(a)'s "freely given" standard applied
to the Doelgers' motion to amend. Accordingly, the district court
referenced the incorrect amendment standard.
That said, we decline to hold that the district court's
invocation of Rule 16 was an abuse of discretion requiring
reversal, considering the procedural posture the district court
operated under when issuing its order. Under its standard of
review, the district court could "modify or set aside any part of
the [magistrate judge's] order" on a nondispositive motion only if
the district court determined the magistrate judge's order was
"clearly erroneous" or "contrary to law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a);
ML-CFC 2007-6 P.R. Props., LLC v. BPP Retail Props., LLC, 951 F.3d
41, 46 (1st Cir. 2020); see also Pagano v. Frank, 983 F.2d 343,
346 (1st Cir. 1993) (noting that a motion for leave to amend is
typically a nondispositive motion subject to Rule 72(a)).
But, recall, in its text order, the district court
adopted the magistrate judge's order applying Rule 15(a), making
no finding that it was "contrary to law." Indeed, the text order
began by stating that "the [c]ourt finds the [magistrate judge's]
Order to be consistent with the First Circuit jurisprudence and
accordingly ADOPTS" that order. The district court's reasoning
set out in its text order substantially tracks the analysis by the
magistrate judge: that the Doelgers delayed in adding JPMS to the
action, especially considering that they explicitly referenced
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JPMS in their original complaint, and that adding JPMS two years
into the litigation and after the close of discovery would
prejudice and burden Defendants. Thus, the district court's text
order agrees with the magistrate judge's undue delay and resulting
prejudice discussion -- both of which were critical to her
analysis under the "freely given" standard -- and adopts the
magistrate judge's order on those grounds. We find, then, that
any error in citing the good cause standard was harmless. Cf.
Santiago v. Municipality of Utuado, 114 F.4th 25, 34 (1st Cir.
2024) ("We must conclude an abuse of discretion occurred when a
district court bases its ruling on an erroneous view of the
law . . . ." (citation modified)). Accordingly, the district
court's error does not amount to an abuse of discretion that would
warrant reversal.9
We now turn to the Doelgers' contention that their motion
to amend should have been granted because they sought amendment as
promptly as possible. They assign fault for the delay in procuring
the information necessary to amend their complaint to Defendants,
asserting that Defendants "stalled the case for nearly a year"
This is not to say that a district court's adoption of an
9
order applying the correct standard will always be sufficient to
absolve it from an abuse of discretion finding. But we think,
under these circumstances, the district court's decision was not
wholly "base[d]" on the "good cause" standard, Santiago, 114 F.4th
at 34, as it fully reviewed and considered the magistrate judge's
analysis made under the correct "freely given" standard.
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when challenging the Doelgers' lead counsel's pro hac vice motion
and delayed providing them with information "crucial" for amending
their complaint during discovery. Defendants argue the opposite,
positing that the reasons for the Doelgers' delay in amending their
complaint lie at their feet because they had the knowledge
necessary to plead their proposed claims prior to discovery.
Moreover, Defendants assert that the district court was "entitled
to believe" the Doelgers' amendments would disrupt the case
schedule, require additional discovery and research, and thus,
unduly prejudice Defendants. Serrano Medina v. United States, 709
F.2d 104, 106 (1st Cir. 1983).
We resolve these arguments in Defendants' favor and hold
that "the record evinces an arguably adequate basis for the court's
decision" -- namely the undue prejudice the amendments posed to
Defendants. U.S. ex rel. D'Agostino, 802 F.3d at 191-92 (quoting
Hatch, 274 F.3d at 19). In Acosta-Mestre v. Hilton International
of Puerto Rico, Inc., we determined that prejudice to a defendant
"resulting from a re-opening of discovery with additional costs,
a significant postponement of trial, and a likely major alteration
in trial strategy and tactics due to the presence" of a newly added
party, "fully support[ed]" the district court's ruling denying the
plaintiff's motion to amend under Rule 15(a). 156 F.3d 49, 52
(1st Cir. 1998).
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Here, the magistrate judge's order adopted by the
district court recognized that similar forms of prejudice to
Defendants would result if the court granted the Doelgers' motion.
Specifically, the magistrate judge determined that the additional
claims and allegations against Defendants and JPMS would require
reopening discovery and credited Defendants' assertions that they
may need new experts and would require new expert reports. The
new discovery, the magistrate judge found, "would come at an
additional burden and cost to Defendants, and exponentially add to
the time needed to bring this case to a conclusion." We thus agree
with Defendants that "[t]he district court was entitled to believe
that allowance of the eleventh-hour amendment would result in undue
prejudice to the defendants, as it added [a] new part[y] . . .
and[,] by raising new and separate claims[,] would require
additional research and discovery." Serrano Medina, 709 F.2d
at 106. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in the denial
of the Doelgers' motion to amend and therefore affirm the district
court's disposition of that motion.10 See id.
10 The Doelgers raise additional arguments urging us to
reverse based on judicial estoppel or JPMC's and JPMS's fraud on
the court. They reason reversal is warranted because JPMC's
representation before the district court about the
non-arbitrability of the Doelgers' claims against JPMS, in JPMC's
motion to enjoin the Doelgers' arbitration against JPMS, was at
odds with their earlier representation to the magistrate judge
about the arbitrability of those claims. But the Doelgers failed
to raise these fraud-on-the-court and judicial estoppel arguments
below, despite having a chance to do so when, in their opposition
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B. Motion for Summary Judgment
We now turn to the appeal of the district court's order
granting Defendants' motion for summary judgment. A district
court's grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo, and we may
affirm on any ground revealed by the record. See Alicea v.
Cincinnati Inc., 166 F.4th 245, 253 (1st Cir. 2026).
Summary judgment is appropriate if the record, viewed in
the light most favorable to the non-moving party -- here, the
Doelgers -- "discloses 'no genuine issue of material fact' and
demonstrates that 'the moving party is entitled to a judgment as
a matter of law.'" Iverson v. City of Boston, 452 F.3d 94, 98
(1st Cir. 2006) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). "Where a mov[ing
party] asserts that there is an absence of evidence to support
claims on which the non-mov[ing party] bears the burden of proof,
the non-mov[ing party] 'may defeat a summary judgment motion by
demonstrating, through submissions of evidentiary quality, that a
trial worthy issue persists.'" Alicea, 166 F.4th at 253 (quoting
Calvi v. Knox County, 470 F.3d 422, 426 (1st Cir. 2006)). "[A]
conglomeration of 'conclusory allegations, improbable inferences,
and unsupported speculation' is insufficient to discharge the
non[-moving party's] burden." DePoutot v. Raffaelly, 424 F.3d
to the motion to enjoin, they stated that Defendants were taking
inconsistent positions with respect to whether the claims against
JPMS were arbitrable. Accordingly, we deem these arguments waived.
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112, 117 (1st Cir. 2005) (quoting Medina-Munoz v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir. 1990)).
1. Causation
Our review of the district court's grant of summary
judgment centers on causation. In their opposition, Defendants
argue that the Doelgers failed to address causation in their
summary judgment response brief below, merely dismissed
Defendants' causation arguments as "ridiculous" in their surreply,
and then, in their objection to the R&R, offered only "conclusory,
unsupported statements" to support their causation argument.
Accordingly, Defendants contend, the Doelgers waived the causation
issue. We agree.
For context, in their summary judgment briefs,
Defendants argued that dismissal was warranted because the
Doelgers did not have evidence of causation for their breach of
contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, gross negligence, negligent
misrepresentation, Chapter 93A, and FAPSA claims.11 The main
11Defendants' argument that the Doelgers failed to establish
causation for their FAPSA claim appears for the first time in their
reply to the Doelgers' opposition to summary judgment below. But
we are not so concerned that Defendants waived this causation
argument by "failing to raise it in the summary judgment
motion['s]" opening brief. Gerald v. Univ. of P.R., 707 F.3d 7,
27 (1st Cir. 2013). That is because appellees are "typically free
to defend a judgment below on any ground made manifest by the
record, and we are similarly free to affirm a grant of summary
judgment for any reason apparent in the record," including the
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premise of Defendants' causation argument was that the Doelgers
could not meet their burden of proving causation because there was
no evidence that, had Defendants acted differently, Peter would
have divested from MLPs. Seeing no direct response to their
causation arguments in the Doelgers' opposition brief, Defendants,
on reply, argued that the Doelgers' failure to address causation
constituted waiver of that argument and merited dismissal of the
claims requiring causation.
In their summary judgment surreply, the Doelgers
retorted that they did address Defendants' causation arguments in
their opposition brief, citing the page within that brief that,
they contend, contains such a response. But we glean no direct
response to Defendants' causation arguments on the cited page.
Rather, on that page in the opposition, the Doelgers appear to
address damages, not causation, asserting that
"Defendants . . . argue that despite their dishonest conduct and
mismanagement costing Plaintiffs over 90% of Peter's liquid assets
in less than 5 years, Plaintiffs have somehow not suffered any
damages. Such arguments are entirely factual, and accordingly
inappropriate for summary judgment." While a discussion of damages
can be said to imply that something caused the damages, it offers
Doelgers' failure to set forth facts establishing causation for
their FAPSA claim. Id. (citation modified).
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no explanation for what that cause was, much less that it was the
specific cause the Doelgers were required to show.
The Doelgers, in their surreply, seemed to make a belated
attempt at arguing that certain record facts created a genuine
dispute of material fact as to causation. But generally, an
argument raised belatedly in the district court is not preserved
for later appellate review unless the district court, "without
reservation, elects to decide it on the merits." Holsum de P.R.,
Inc. v. ITW Food Equip. Grp. LLC, 116 F.4th 59, 66 (1st Cir. 2024)
(quoting Negrón-Almeda v. Santiago, 528 F.3d 15, 26 (1st Cir.
2008)). Thus, we have rejected waiver arguments when a party
failed to raise an argument until their surreply, but the district
court nevertheless decided the issue on the merits. See id.
(determining that theory defendants raised for the first time in
their surreply was preserved for appellate review because the
district court addressed the theory and based its ultimate decision
on that theory); Negrón-Almeda, 528 F.3d at 26 (proceeding on the
merits of an argument raised for the first time in defendants'
surreply before the district court because "the district court
opted to address the argument head-on").
Here, even the Doelgers acknowledged in their objection
to the R&R that the magistrate judge did not address or without
reservation elect to decide causation on the merits. To the
contrary, in a footnote to her analysis of the Doelgers' breach of
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contract claim, the magistrate judge remarked that "[t]he Doelgers
must also prove causation. Their opposition memorandum failed to
address Defendants' arguments that the Doelgers lack evidence of
causation. In their sur-reply, the Doelgers admit that they did
not respond to this argument because it was 'ridiculous.'" The
magistrate judge thus evinced that she regarded the Doelgers'
proffer as to causation as untimely and rejected their only excuse
for the untimeliness.
Moreover, the district court, for its part, addressed
the Doelgers' objection to the magistrate judge's discussion of
causation but did not decide causation on the merits. Rather, the
district court noted that the Doelgers' challenges to Defendants'
causation argument "mischaracterize[d] Defendants' arguments" and
that their remaining causation arguments "consist[ed] of
conclusory, unsupported statements," effectively finding that the
Doelgers did not preserve their causation arguments.
Additionally, in their opening brief on appeal, the
Doelgers failed to address the preservation concerns in the
proceedings below, further compounding, rather than eliminating,
the issue of waiver. And their attempt on appeal to point us to
causation evidence, without having timely raised it below, comes
too late. Because the Doelgers' belated causation arguments do
not arise under circumstances that invoke our waiver exception, we
deem the Doelgers' causation arguments waived. See 3137, LLC v.
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Town of Harwich, 126 F.4th 1, 15 (1st Cir. 2025) ("Arguments not
spelled out squarely and distinctly in the district court are
waived." (citation modified)).
Having concluded that the Doelgers waived the causation
element, we hold that the district court did not err in granting
summary judgment to Defendants.12 As the moving party, Defendants
asserted "an absence of evidence" on causation, arguing that the
Doelgers cannot show, among other things, that Peter would have
taken a different approach with respect to his MLP investments if
not for Defendants' actions. Alicea, 166 F.4th at 253. To
withstand summary judgment then, the Doelgers could not simply
dismiss Defendants' causation argument as "ridiculous"; rather,
they had to "present 'definite, competent evidence' to rebut the
motion on all issues as to which they bore 'the ultimate burden of
proof,'" including causation. Cruz-Cedeño v. Vega-Moral, 150
12 "Causation in fact -- i.e., proof that the defendant's
conduct did in fact cause the plaintiff's injury -- is a standard
requirement of any tort claim." Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v.
Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 346 (2013). And under New York law, which
the parties do not dispute applies to the Doelgers' contract
claims, causation is an element of breach of contract and breach
of good faith and fair dealing claims. See 34-06 73, LLC v. Seneca
Ins. Co., 198 N.E.3d 1282, 1287 (N.Y. 2022) ("[T]o plead a cause
of action for breach of contract, a plaintiff usually must allege
that: (1) a contract exists; (2) plaintiff performed in accordance
with the contract; (3) defendant breached its contractual
obligations; and (4) defendant's breach resulted in damages."
(citation modified)); M/A-COM Sec. Corp. v. Galesi, 904 F.2d 134,
136-37 (2d Cir. 1990) (discussing party's failure to establish
causation for their breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing claim under New York law).
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F.4th 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2025) (quoting Pina v. Children's Place, 740
F.3d 785, 795-96 (1st Cir. 2014)). But the Doelgers ignored the
causation argument, failing to put forth any evidence -- let alone
"definite, competent evidence" -- on an essential element on which
they bore the burden of proof. Pina, 740 F.3d at 796 (quoting
Mesnick v. Gen. Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816, 822 (1st Cir. 1991)).
Without such evidence, the Doelgers' claims that require causation
could not have survived summary judgment as they necessarily fail
as a matter of law. Defendants were thus entitled to summary
judgment on this basis. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 323 (1986) (mandating summary judgment where "the nonmoving
party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential
element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of
proof").
Accordingly, based on the Doelgers' waiver of their
causation arguments, we affirm the district court's order granting
summary judgment13 on the Doelgers' breach of contract, breach of
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, breach of fiduciary
13 Because we affirm the district court's grant of summary
judgment, we need not address the Doelgers' arguments that the
district court erred when striking expert Phillip Gillespie's
testimony on JPMC's suitability obligations and not considering
expert David Tilkin's "opinions concerning industry standards."
Such evidence is geared to establishing Defendants' standard of
care for the Doelgers' fiduciary duty and negligence claims, which
fail due to the Doelgers' waiver of their causation arguments.
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duty, negligence, gross negligence, negligent misrepresentation,
Chapter 93A, and FAPSA claims. See Gerald, 707 F.3d at 27.
2. Declaratory Judgment and Rescission Claims
Turning to the claims without a causation elem