Full Opinion

USCA11 Case: 25-12412 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 11/12/2026 Page: 1 of 7 NOT FOR PUBLICATION In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 25-12412 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________ WESTON PHILLIPS, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus HAGERTY INSURANCE AGENCY, LLC, ESSENTIA INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendants-Appellees. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia D.C. Docket No. 1:24-cv-00527-JPB ____________________ Before LUCK, LAGOA, and TJOFLAT, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Weston Phillips owned a 1933 Buick Series 60 Model 67 (the “Buick”). Essentia Insurance Company (“Essentia”) insured the USCA11 Case: 25-12412 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 11/12/2026 Page: 2 of 7 2 Opinion of the Court 25-12412 Buick under a Classic Automobile Policy (the “Policy”). 1 The Policy guaranteed that the Buick had a value of $130,000. The Policy de- noted Hagerty Insurance Agency (“Hagerty”) as the insurance agent to which a claim under the policy should be reported. The Buick was involved in an automobile accident on April 22, 2023. 2 Phillips submitted a claim under the Policy for $130,000. Essentia sent Phillips a check for $47,703.13, an estimate of the cost of repairing the Buick. Phillips rejected the check and brought this lawsuit against Hagerty and Essentia, as joint insurers of the Buick, seeking the vehicle’s guaranteed value, $130,000, his litigation ex- penses, and attorney’s fees. 3 Hagerty and Essentia, answering Phillips’ complaint, denied that Hagerty was the insurer of the Buick, that Essentia was in- stead, and that the $47,703.13 Essentia tendered to Phillips was suf- ficient to restore the Buick to its pre-accident condition. Hagerty 1 The Policy was in effect from February 3, 2023, through February 3, 2024. 2 The driver of the other vehicle was uninsured, a fact that is irrelevant here. 3 Phillips brought the suit in the Superior County of Gwinnett County, Geor- gia. Hagerty and Essential removed it to the District Court for the Northern District of Georgia under 28 U.S.C. § 1441, alleging correctly that jurisdiction existed under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 since the parties were of diverse citizenship and the amount in controversy exceeded $75,000. Phillips’ complaint presented three causes of action: Count I, “Breach of Con- tract,” Count II, “Bad Faith Denial of Coverage,” Count III, “Expenses of Liti- gation.” In essence, the complaint alleges that Essential breached its coverages obligation under the Policy. USCA11 Case: 25-12412 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 11/12/2026 Page: 3 of 7 25-12412 Opinion of the Court 3 and Essentia moved for summary judgment. The District Court granted their motion based on the facts disclosed in the parties’ re- spective statements of material facts. Phillips appeals the District Court’s judgment, arguing there are four genuine disputes of material fact: (1) whether Hagerty is an insurer under the policy, (2) whether Essentia’s tender of the re- pair costs satisfied the Policy’s coverage, (3) whether Hagerty and Essentia acted in bad faith in responding to Phillips’ claim for $130,000, and (4) whether Phillips is entitled to recover his litigation expenses. 4 We consider these grounds sequentially and conclude that none merits vacating the Court’s judgment and remanding the case for trial. I. Hagerty is not a party to the insurance contract or even an insurance company. That becomes apparent on a reading of the Policy. Moreover, nothing in Phillips’ statement of material facts is to the contrary. Only Essentia signed the Policy. Essentia is listed on the Policy’s insurance information card as the insurance com- pany. Hagerty is listed as the agent. David Deneau, Hagerty’s Spe- cialty Claims Manager, attested that Hagerty is not an insurance company. 4 In his opening brief, Phillips states: “Plaintiff-Appellant agrees that the mate- rial facts are largely not in dispute.” USCA11 Case: 25-12412 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 11/12/2026 Page: 4 of 7 4 Opinion of the Court 25-12412 Phillips’ evidence does not create an issue of fact on that point. The information on Hagerty’s website that Phillips submit- ted to the Court is consistent with Hagerty being an insurance agent that merely sells insurance for classic automobiles and ad- ministers claims submitted under the Policy. Based on Phillips’ fac- tual submission, a jury could not find that Hagerty is an insurance company, or that it insured the Buick. Granting summary judg- ment on this Hagerty-insurer claim was appropriate. II. The salient facts establish that Essentia’s tender of the costs to repair the Buick satisfied Essentia’s obligation under the Policy. Phillips’ Count I breach of contract claim consequently fails. A. The Buick At the time of the accident, the Buick was not in its 1933 condition, when it was brand new. Its running gear, front suspen- sion, interior, tires and wheels, and paint were not original to the vehicle. Following the accident, Carolina Coach Crafters (“CCC”) provided a detailed itemized estimate indicating that it would cost $ 47,259.95 to restore the Buick to its pre-accident condition. Phil- lips rejected Essentia’s check for $47,703.13 and demanded, instead, $130,000, the value of the Buick as stated in the Policy’s “Guaran- teed Value Endorsement.” Phillips alleged in his complaint that the Guaranteed Value was “the value of the Covered Auto, . . . $130,000.00 in the event of a total loss or ‘constructive total loss’ of the Covered Auto. USCA11 Case: 25-12412 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 11/12/2026 Page: 5 of 7 25-12412 Opinion of the Court 5 B. The Policy The Policy stated, in pertinent part, the following: LIMIT OF LIABILITY A. We will pay the limit shown under PART D in the Declarations or Schedule for the applicable vehicle, which is agreed to be the Guaranteed Value® of “your covered auto”, inclusive of any applicable taxes and fees, in case of a total loss or “constructive total loss”. B. For all other loss or damage to “your covered auto”, we will pay the amount necessary to repair or replace the property, whichever is less, provided you actually repair or replace the property, with similar kind and quality, without regard to depreciation or betterment, but we will not pay more than the Guar- anteed Value® per vehicle shown under PART D in the Declarations or Schedule. The guaranteed value of the Buick is $130,000.00. The Pol- icy further states that Essentia “may pay for loss in money or repair or replace the damaged or stolen property.” The Policy states that Essentia will pay the agreed value of the Buick only in the event of a “total loss” or “constructive total loss.” To survive summary judgment on his Count I breach of contract claim, Phillips had to establish that the Buick was a “total loss” or “constructive total loss.” The Policy does not define “total loss.” Georgia’s statutes do not define this term in the context of damage to a motor vehicle. USCA11 Case: 25-12412 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 11/12/2026 Page: 6 of 7 6 Opinion of the Court 25-12412 But Georgia case authority defines “total loss” as complete destruc- tion of an insured vehicle or damage that is not repairable. See Boral Bricks v. Old S. Transp. Management, 198 Ga. App. 678, 679 (1991). The Policy defines “constructive total loss” as “a loss where the cost to repair damage to ‘your covered auto’ will exceed the agreed value of the vehicle when fully repaired.” The District Court granted summary judgment because all that Phillips presented was an argument that repairing the Buick with fabricated parts as CCC proposed would render the car a “constructive total loss.” He failed to present any evidence to show that his loss exceeds the amount CCC estimated and Essentia tendered by as payment. We agree with the District Court that summary judgment was appropriate. III. Phillips claims in Count II that Essentia’s tender of the repair costs instead of $130,000 constituted bad faith denial of coverage. To prevail, Phillips had to prove two conditions: (1) that a demand for payment was made against the insurer at least 60 days prior to filing suit and (2) that the insurer’s failure to pay was motivated by bad faith. Primerica Life Ins. Co. v. Humfleet, 217 Ga. App. 770, 771 (1995); O.C.G.A. § 33-4-6. Phillips satisfied the first condition, but not the second. The District Court explained why. Essentia issued a check . . . for the cost of estimated repairs to the Buick. Essentia based the amount of the payment on an itemized estimate from Carolina Coach Crafters. “Penalties for bad faith are not au- thorized where the insurance company has any rea- sonable ground to contest the claim . . . .” S. Fire & USCA11 Case: 25-12412 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 11/12/2026 Page: 7 of 7 25-12412 Opinion of the Court 7 Cas. Ins. Co. v. Nw. Ga. Bank, 434 S.E.2d 729, 730 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004) (quoting Fortson v. Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co., 308 S.E.2d 382, 385 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983)). [Phil- lips] points to no evidence to indicate that Essentia lacked any “reasonable grounds” in denying his claim. Further, where an insurer bases its denial of coverage on an expert’s report, the insured must show that ei- ther the report is “patently wrong” or a pretext for denying the claim. Montgomery v. Travelers Home and Mar. Ins. Co., 859 S.E.2d 130, 135 (Ga. Ct. App. 2021). Phillips made neither showing. So, Essentia was entitled to summary judgment on the bad faith claim. IV. Phillips claims in Count III that he is entitled to recover his litigation expenses. Hagerty and Essentia, responding, asserted, and the District Court properly agreed, that “Georgia law, O.C.G.A. § 33-4-6 provides the exclusive remedy for recovery of ex- tracontractual damages against an insurer” and that Phillips had not shown that he was entitled to the remedy. The District Court treated Phillips’ claim for litigation expenses as abandoned. We do likewise. V. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED.