Full Opinion

Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed November 17, 2026. In The Fourteenth Court of Appeals NO. 14-25-01055-CV AERO-REY DELAWARE, LLC, Appellant/Cross-Appellee V. U.S. SPECIALTY INSURANCE CO., Appellee/Cross-Appellant On Appeal from the 125th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 2021-02967 MEMORANDUM OPINION Aero-Rey Delaware, LLC contracted to sell an aircraft to a buyer in Mexico. The aircraft, insured by U.S. Specialty Insurance Co. (“Specialty”), was stolen from a hangar in Mexico during the inspection process and subsequently crashed in Guatemala while allegedly being used to traffic narcotics. Aero-Rey and Specialty sued each other; the insured claimed breach of contract, while the insurer sought a declaration of no coverage under the insurance policy’s conversion exclusion. The trial court found that Specialty breached the policy but awarded no damages to Aero-Rey, because the court concluded that Aero-Rey had received the full purchase price from the buyer and therefore suffered no actual loss. Both sides appeal. Concluding that the insurance policy covers the loss but that Aero-Rey did not suffer any pecuniary damage, we affirm the judgment. Background The material facts are largely undisputed. Specialty issued Aero-Rey an aircraft insurance policy (the “Policy”), which provided aircraft physical damage coverage for a 1977 Beech 200 airplane. If the aircraft was destroyed, Specialty was obligated to pay Aero-Rey the aircraft’s agreed value of $1 million. Aero-Rey offered the aircraft for sale, and a buyer in Mexico, Air Global, agreed to purchase it for $593,000. Air Global paid Aero-Rey $110,000 in non- refundable earnest money. Upon Air Global’s request and with Specialty’s approval, Aero-Rey flew the aircraft from Houston, Texas to a hangar in Toluca, Mexico for a pre-purchase inspection. While the sale was pending, the aircraft was stolen from the hangar and destroyed in a crash in Guatemala. The most likely theory is that the aircraft was used for narcotics smuggling. Specialty stipulated that it “has never known the identity of any individuals who removed the aircraft” from the hangar. Aero-Rey, working in tandem with the United States government and at the government’s request, was able to obtain an additional $538,360 from Air Global under the purchase agreement. The government immediately seized the money but later notified Aero-Rey that it could submit a claim for the money. Aero-Rey “proposed that Specialty make a claim” to the seized money, but Specialty declined. The government then released the seized money to Aero-Rey. Including 2 the $110,000 earnest money, Aero-Rey received a total of $648,360 in purchase money for the aircraft. Aero-Rey filed a claim with Specialty under the Policy’s aircraft physical damage coverage, but Specialty denied the claim based on the Policy’s conversion exclusion. Specialty filed a declaratory judgment action, asking the trial court to declare that it did not owe any payment under the Policy. Aero-Rey filed a counterclaim for breach of contract, unfair insurance practices, and prompt pay violations. The parties tried the case to the bench. In written findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial court found that the aircraft was stolen and that the theft constituted a “covered loss” under the Policy, but that Aero-Rey was “made whole” because it received more than the expected purchase price from Air Global. The trial court also found the conversion exclusion did not apply, denied Specialty’s claim for declaratory relief, and awarded Aero-Rey attorney’s fees and costs but no damages. Both parties appeal. Aero-Rey’s Issues Presented 1. Did the trial court err by holding that Specialty be excused from paying Aero-Rey the amount required by the insurance policy, despite finding that Aero-Rey satisfied all prerequisites to coverage; that a covered loss occurred; and that the single exclusion relied upon by Specialty was inapplicable? 2. What is the amount that should have been awarded to Aero-Rey in the Judgment? Specialty’s Cross-Appeal Issues Presented 1. The trial court erred in declaring that Aero-Rey’s claim was covered by the Policy because Specialty met its burden to establish that the Policy’s conversion exclusion applied to preclude coverage. Specialty does not disagree with the trial court’s finding/conclusion that Aero-Rey suffered no compensable loss and was made whole by the payments from the purchaser of the Aircraft, Air Global Jets, LLC. 3 Alternatively, Specialty met its burden to establish another reason why the claim was not covered—the physical damage to the Aircraft occurred when it crashed in Guatemala, outside the coverage territory. The Policy covers Aero-Rey only while the Aircraft is within the coverage territory. For either reason, this Court should reverse the trial court’s finding/conclusion that the Policy covered Aero-Rey’s claim and declare that the Policy either excluded or did not cover Aero-Rey’s claim. 2. If the Court reverses the trial court’s denial of declaratory relief to Specialty, the Court also should reverse the award to Aero-Rey for its attorneys’ fees and costs under the Declaratory Judgment Act because the award may no longer be equitable and just. The Court should remand the fees/costs issue to the trial court for reconsideration in light of this Court’s decision. Analysis A. Does the Policy cover the loss? Specialty raises two challenges to coverage—first, that Aero-Rey’s claim falls outside the scope of the Policy’s coverage grant and, second, assuming the claim falls within the coverage grant it is nonetheless removed from coverage by an applicable exclusion. We begin with Specialty’s first argument. 1. Does the loss fall within the scope of the coverage grant? In an insurance contract dispute, the initial burden falls upon the insured to establish coverage under the terms of the policy. Comsys Info. Tech. Servs., Inc. v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 130 S.W.3d 181, 188 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied). We interpret insurance policies using the rules of contract construction. RSUI Indem. Co. v. Lynd Co., 466 S.W.3d 113, 118 (Tex. 2015). Under these familiar rules, we begin our analysis with the language of the contract because it is the best representation of what the parties mutually intended. Gilbert Tex. Constr., L.P. v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s London, 327 S.W.3d 118, 126 (Tex. 2010). Unless the policy dictates otherwise, we give words and phrases their 4 ordinary and generally accepted meaning, reading them in context and in light of the rules of grammar and common usage. See id. We strive to give effect to all of the words and provisions so that none is rendered meaningless. See id. The contract’s plain language controls, not what one side or the other alleges they intended to say but did not. Id. at 127. Specialty argues, for the first time on appeal, that denying coverage did not breach the Policy because the loss occurred outside the applicable covered territory. According to Specialty, whether the loss occurred within the Policy’s covered territory is an initial question of coverage, which is Aero-Rey’s burden to prove regardless whether Specialty pleaded it below.1 Aero-Rey disagrees and argues that the Policy’s covered territory provision acts as a limitation or exclusion to coverage, which is Specialty’s burden to prove, and Specialty cannot rely on a policy limitation or exclusion on appeal that it did not invoke in the trial court.2 1 See, e.g., Nat’l Liab. & Fire Ins. Co. v. Los Chavez Autobuses Inc., No. 4:20-CV-01302, 2021 WL 920138, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 10, 2021) (question whether accident occurred within the policy’s coverage territory goes to a fundamental issue of coverage); McCalla v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 704 S.W.2d 518, 520 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (“When Michael McCalla had his accident in Jamaica, he was outside the territorial limits of his policy, therefore, he was outside the basic coverage of his policy.”); see also Royal Indem. Co. v. Marshall, 388 S.W.2d 176, 181 (Tex. 1965) (because issue was whether the loss occurred within the scope of coverage, defendant insurer could resist plaintiff’s cause of action without specifically pleading the coverage provisions of the policy); Love of God Holiness Temple Church v. Union Standard Ins. Co., 860 S.W.2d 179, 181 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1993, writ denied) (“The lack of coverage is not an affirmative defense. It is a defense that the insurer may raise, but the existence of coverage is an essential element of the plaintiff’s case, and he has the burden of pleading and proving coverage.”). 2 See SMI Realty Mgmt. Corp. v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 179 S.W.3d 619, 624 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. denied) (“The insurer has the burden of proving that a policy limitation or exclusion constitutes an avoidance or an affirmative defense.”); Kahla v. Travelers Ins. Co., 482 S.W.2d 928, 933 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1972, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (“A plaintiff claiming rights under a policy of insurance is fully entitled to definite pleadings and specific information upon which the insurance company relies to defeat the liability under its policy.”). 5 Regardless whether Specialty was obligated to raise the coverage territory argument in the trial court, we conclude that Aero-Rey met its burden to establish that the theft occurred within the covered territory. We reach this conclusion based on the Policy’s plain language. We excerpt the following relevant provisions: PART ONE GENERAL PROVISIONS AND CONDITIONS 1. Words and Phrases The following words and phrases have special meaning throughout the policy. ... l. Accident means a sudden event during the policy period, neither expected nor intended by you, that involves your aircraft and causes physical damage to or loss of the aircraft during the policy period. ... 5. When and Where You are Covered . . . [y]ou are covered during the policy period shown in Item 3 of the Coverage Identification Page while the aircraft is within the United States (excluding Hawaii), Canada, Mexico, the Islands of the West Indies (excluding Cuba and Haiti), or while enroute between these points excluding U.S. Sanction Countries.[3] PART TWO AIRCRAFT PHYSICAL DAMAGE 1. What We Cover a. Coverage F covers direct physical loss of or damage to your aircraft caused by an accident while the aircraft is not in motion. b. Coverage G covers direct physical loss of or damage to your aircraft caused by an accident while the aircraft is in motion. 3 The applicable covered territory provision is contained in an “Expansion of Coverage” endorsement, form AIP 1543 (08/12). 6 Thus, under the Policy, Aero-Rey was insured during the policy period while the aircraft was within the covered territory for any physical loss or damage to the aircraft caused by an accident. Specialty concedes that “accident” includes theft but argues that the “only evidence of physical damage” to the aircraft was the crash in Guatemala, and thus the loss should be considered to have occurred in Guatemala. The Policy, however, insures against not only damage to the aircraft but also “physical loss.” Aero-Rey physically lost its aircraft when someone stole it from the hangar in Mexico. It is undisputed that Mexico is included within the covered territory. It is immaterial that the aircraft was ultimately found crashed in Guatemala. The loss occurred within the covered territory and therefore is not removed from the coverage grant for the reason Specialty contends. 2. Is the loss excluded from coverage by the conversion exclusion? To avoid liability if the loss falls within the scope of coverage, the insurer has the burden to plead and prove that the loss comes within an exclusion to the policy’s coverage. See JAW The Pointe, L.L.C. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 460 S.W.3d 597, 603 (Tex. 2015); Tex. R. Civ. P. 94 (“Where the suit is on an insurance contract which insures against certain general hazards, but contains other provisions limiting such general liability, the party suing on such contract shall never be required to allege that the loss was not due to a risk or cause coming within any of the exceptions specified in the contract, nor shall the insurer be allowed to raise such issue unless it shall specifically allege that the loss was due to a risk or cause coming within a particular exception to the general liability[.]”). Specialty relied on the conversion exclusion in the trial court as a basis to deny coverage. Specialty contends that, assuming coverage is initially invoked, 7 the loss is removed from coverage by operation of the Policy’s conversion exclusion. That exclusion provides in relevant part: We will not pay for physical loss of or damage to your aircraft . . . h. Embezzlement, Conversion or Secretion If anyone to whom you relinquish possession of the aircraft embezzles, converts or secretes the aircraft. According to Specialty, Aero-Rey “relinquished” possession of the aircraft by leaving it in a Mexico hangar, where an unknown person stole and crashed it. Aero-Rey disputes that it legally relinquished the aircraft, since it retained possession of title and expressly instructed hangar personnel that the aircraft was not to be flown or moved. We need not decide what constitutes relinquishment under this Policy provision because, even assuming Aero-Rey relinquished possession, Specialty did not prove that the exclusion applied. Given Specialty’s admission that it never identified the person who stole the aircraft, there is no evidence that anyone to whom Aero-Rey relinquished possession was the person who then “converted” the aircraft. Specialty argues that it does not have to identify a specific person who committed the conversion. Because, according to Specialty, the theft of the aircraft necessarily had to have been committed by someone at the hangar who had control of the ignition keys, that factual basis is sufficient to prove the exclusion.4 Specialty’s argument is flawed. The grammatical syntax of the exclusion requires the “anyone” who converted the aircraft to be the same “anyone” to whom Aero-Rey relinquished possession; the singular subject remains the same. The failure of Specialty to prove that the relinquishment and conversion involved the 4 Specialty asserts, “Although both parties admitted they did not know for sure who removed the Aircraft from [the hangar], the evidence established that the converter(s) could have been only those who had the keys to the Aircraft.” 8 same person or organization means that Specialty did not meet its burden to establish that the exclusion applies. Even if Specialty proved that Aero-Rey relinquished the aircraft to a person or persons at the hangar, there remains no evidence that the person or persons to whom it relinquished possession converted the aircraft. Contrary to Specialty’s contention, it is not the case that there could be only one perpetrator, i.e., someone employed by the hangar. Specialty’s argument ignores the alternative explanation that someone unaffiliated with the hangar stole the ignition keys from the hangar and then stole the aircraft. In sum, we hold that the theft of Aero-Rey’s aircraft came within the Policy’s coverage grant and was not excluded from coverage by the conversion exclusion. We overrule Specialty’s first cross-issue, and we need not reach its second. B. Is Aero-Rey entitled to damages under the Policy? Having determined that the theft was a covered accident, we turn to the question whether Specialty was obligated to pay any benefits under the Policy. See USAA Tex. Lloyds Co. v. Menchaca, 545 S.W.3d 479, 494 (Tex. 2018) (“[I]f the policy does cover the loss, the insurer necessarily breaches the policy if it fails to pay benefits for the loss because the insured is entitled to those benefits.”). Our circumstances are unusual because Aero-Rey ultimately received an amount in exchange for the aircraft exceeding the agreed upon purchase price. For this reason, the trial court declined to award Aero-Rey any additional damages under the Policy. Aero-Rey argues that the trial court erred in concluding that it was made whole by the sale. Aero-Rey says it is entitled to the aircraft’s $1,000,000 “Agreed Value” under the Policy terms, regardless of the amount 9 Aero-Rey received from Air Global, plus statutory penalties and interest.5 Specialty agrees with the trial court’s conclusion that Aero-Rey suffered no compensable loss. Although neither party cited it, we find instructive the Supreme Court of Texas’s opinion in Paramount Fire Insurance Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 353 S.W.2d 841 (Tex. 1962). In Paramount, the seller and buyer of a house entered into a sales contract. Id. at 842. Before closing, both the seller and the buyer bought fire insurance on the property. The seller was insured by Paramount Insurance; the buyer, by Aetna. Id. at 842-43. A fire destroyed the home. The buyer still paid the seller the full contract price. Id. at 843. The seller assigned his rights under the Paramount policy to the buyer. Id. Aetna and Paramount settled with their insureds, each reserving its rights against the other, and later filed suit to determine liability as against each other. Id. The court held that Paramount was not liable for policy damages to the seller. The court relied on the “generally accepted principle” that an “insured is entitled to receive the sum necessary to indemnify him, or to be put, as far as practicable, in the same condition pecuniarily in which he would have been had there been no fire.” Id. at 844 (quotation marks omitted). An insured “may recover to the extent of his loss occasioned by the fire, but no more, and he cannot recover if he sustained no loss.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). The Texas Supreme Court acknowledged Paramount’s liability to the seller when the fire occurred, but relied on the reasoning of other state courts that “look[] to the substance of the whole transaction rather than to seek a metaphysical hypothesis upon which to justify a loss that is no loss.” Id. (internal quotation omitted, 5 Part Two, section 3 of the Policy provides, “If your aircraft is destroyed, we will pay the agreed value of the aircraft less the applicable deductible.” 10 emphasis added). The court distinguished the case from one “where a stranger to the transaction, out of charity, or for other reasons, might make good the loss.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). Rather, the buyer paid the seller the full amount in “a related transaction.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).6 Therefore, we must consider the entire transaction, including the events after the plane crash, rather than the relative position of the parties at the time of the loss. See Ind. Lumbermens Mut. Ins. Co. v. Metro Material Mktg., Inc., 646 S.W.2d 547, 549 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1982, no writ).7 On June 11, 2020, Aero-Rey entered into a purchase agreement with Air Global, in which Air Global agreed to purchase the aircraft for $575,000. Aero- Rey and Air Global agreed to increase the purchase price to $587,000 on August 1, 2020 and again agreed to increase the purchase price to $593,000 on August 3, 2020. Prior to August 18, 2020, Air Global paid Aero-Rey $110,000 in non- refundable earnest money. The aircraft was stolen when it was removed from the hangar in Toluca, Mexico on August 18, 2020; the aircraft later crashed and was 6 At least one federal district court has read Paramount to mean that “recovery under insurance contracts [must be limited] when insureds ultimately suffer[] no pecuniary loss,” and that courts must “focus on the transaction as a whole” in “a case by case analysis of the existence of a loss.” Chambless v. Travelers Lloyds of Tex. Ins. Co., 123 F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1032 (N.D. Tex. 2000) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Brazos Area Props., LLC v. Capitol Specialty Ins. Corp., No. 4:21-CV-00087-O, 2021 WL 12318611, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 22, 2021) (“Generally, a seller who collects the full purchase price for property sold has suffered no pecuniary loss even if the property had been damaged during the sale.”); Emps. Fire Ins. Co. v. Shivam Irrevocable Tr., No. 3:09-CV-1179-P, 2010 WL 11618885, at *2 (N.D. Tex. July 20, 2010) (“The general rule [in Texas] is that an insured is not entitled to recovery under an insurance contract if the insured suffered no pecuniary loss.”). 7 Paramount expressly left open the question for cases in which the buyer has no insurance. See Paramount, 353 S.W.2d at 845. Indiana Lumbermens answered that question. When only the seller carries insurance on the property, a buyer who “held equitable title under its executory contract of sale” may still recover from an assignment of the seller’s insurance proceeds. Ind. Lumbermens, 646 S.W.2d at 549-50. Air Global, the buyer, is not party to this lawsuit, and we need not consider its rights, if any, to insurance proceeds for the destroyed aircraft. 11 destroyed. After August 18, 2020, the United States Department of Commerce requested that Aero-Rey assist it with an investigation, which Aero-Rey agreed to do. Between September 9, 2020 and November 17, 2020, Air Global paid Aero- Rey $55,000. Between November 3, 2020 and November 13, 2020, Air Global delivered $483,360 to an escrow agent, which was then seized by the United States Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”). CBP released the seized funds to Aero- Rey in July 2021. Thus, Aero-Rey received a total of $648,360 as payment in exchange for the aircraft. Because Aero-Rey collected in excess of the bargained-for purchase price, it “has suffered no legal loss.” Paramount, 353 S.W.2d at 256; see also Brazos Area Props., 2021 WL 12318611, at *2 (“Generally, a seller who collects the full purchase price for property sold has suffered no pecuniary loss even if the property had been damaged during the sale.”). The trial court did not err in concluding that Aero-Rey “was made whole” and in declining to award damages under the Policy. We overrule Aero-Rey’s two issues. Conclusion We affirm the trial court’s judgment. /s/ Kevin Jewell Justice Panel consists of Justices Wise, Jewell, and Wilson. 12