Mecca & Sons Trucking Corp. v. J.B. Hunt Transport Services

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0731-25 MECCA & SONS TRUCKING CORP., Plaintiff-Respondent, v. J.B. HUNT TRANSPORT SERVICES, Defendant-Appellant. ___________________________ Submitted September 30, 2026 – Decided November 4, 2026 Before Judges Mayer and Vinci. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Hudson County, Docket No. L-4303-17. Kenneth A. Olsen and Barry N. Gutterman (Barry N. Gutterman & Associates, PC), of the New York and Illinois bars, admitted pro hac vice, attorneys for appellant (Kenneth A. Olsen and Barry N. Gutterman, on the briefs). Wedinger & Guidice, attorneys for respondent (Richard W. Wedinger, on the brief). PER CURIAM This matter returns to us after we remanded solely for retrial of plaintiff Mecca & Sons Trucking Corp.'s (Mecca) negligence claim against defendant J.B. Hunt Transport Services (J.B. Hunt) arising out of J.B. Hunt's transport of goods from New Jersey to Illinois pursuant to a contract with Mecca. J.B. Hunt appeals from an October 3, 2025 judgment following a bench trial in favor of Mecca in the amount of $63,425. We affirm. The facts are set forth in our prior opinion, and we need not repeat them in detail here. Mecca & Sons Trucking Corp. v. J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc., No. A-0422-22 (App. Div. May 30, 2024). In 2016, Mecca entered into a written contract with non-party ADM Logistics (ADM) to transport a container of Fibersol, soluble dietary fiber, from New Jersey to Decatur, Illinois, where it was to be delivered to Parke Toll Packaging (Parke Toll). Mecca subsequently retained J.B. Hunt to transport the container. When J.B. Hunt took possession of the container on August 23, 2016, it was sealed with an exterior lock. J.B. Hunt received a bill of lading that referenced "[s]eal #02036686" in the section for "special instructions," and acknowledged the container was received "in good order." J.B. Hunt transported the container by train from New Jersey to Illinois, where it arrived on August 30 with the seal intact. The container remained in A-0731-25 J.B. Hunt's possession for several days before F&S Logistics attempted to deliver it to Parke Toll in Decatur. When the container arrived in Decatur, Parke Toll rejected delivery because the seal was broken. According to Parke Toll, as an entity that "deal[s] with food products," its policy was to reject shipments that arrived with a broken seal. The container was resealed and returned to J.B. Hunt's possession. The Fibersol was deemed unusable because the seal had been broken before delivery and eventually destroyed. Mecca filed a claim with J.B. Hunt contending the broken seal resulted in a complete loss of the Fibersol. J.B. Hunt denied the claim. ADM then filed suit against Mecca in Illinois for breach of contract. The parties settled with ADM granting Mecca a release in exchange for payment of $63,425 without an assignment of ADM's interest. Mecca filed suit in the Law Division against J.B. Hunt asserting a common-law claim of negligence (count one) and a claim based on violation of the Carmack Amendment, 49 U.S.C. § 14706 (count two). 1 J.B. Hunt removed the case to federal court. The district court determined Mecca lacked standing to bring a claim under the Carmack Amendment because it had "acted as a broker" in this transaction and the statute does not grant brokers the right to sue. 1 The Carmack Amendment imposes strict liability on motor carriers for goods lost or damaged in interstate commerce. A-0731-25 The district court also determined that because Mecca's settlement agreement with ADM did not "contain an assignment of ADM's interest," Mecca did not "stand in ADM's shoes . . . for purposes of [asserting a] Carmack Amendment claim." The district court also determined "[e]ven if [Mecca] had standing," the record did not support a finding of actual damage of the Fibersol as required by the Carmack Amendment. That court noted "[n]o one examined the" Fibersol or performed any tests "to determine if the [Fibersol] had been adulterated" and the "absence of the seal alone [did] not render the shipment damaged" for purposes of a Carmack Amendment claim. The district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff's negligence claim and remanded the case to state court. The district court expressly did "not address whether that claim [was] preempted by the Carmack Amendment." J.B. Hunt subsequently moved for summary judgment in the state court contending, in part, Mecca's negligence claim was preempted by the Carmack Amendment. J.B. Hunt also argued the district court held Mecca lacked standing to assert its negligence claim because it could not prove actual damage to the Fibersol. On October 22, 2020, the pretrial judge entered an order denying the motion, supported by a written decision. A-0731-25  The judge concluded Mecca's negligence claim was not preempted. The judge rejected J.B. Hunt's claim that the district court found Mecca lacked standing to assert a negligence claim. She determined the district court's holdings regarding damage to the Fibersol were analyzed in terms of Mecca's Carmack Amendment claim and not its negligence claim. The judge also found Mecca's negligence claim was not "premised on damage to the Fibersol, but rather on J.B. Hunt's failure to deliver the Fibersol with an intact seal." J.B. Hunt moved for reconsideration, which the judge denied in a December 29, 2020 order. Both parties consented to a bench trial on a stipulated record, including deposition testimony, without live witness testimony. The case was assigned to a second judge for trial. Prior to trial, J.B. Hunt filed an in limine motion again seeking dismissal of the negligence claim based on preemption. On July 22, 2022, the trial judge entered an order denying that motion because the pretrial judge's ruling that Mecca's negligence claim was not preempted was the law of the case. The trial judge granted J.B. Hunt's in limine motion to preclude Mecca's employee, Andre Zielinski, from offering expert testimony that J.B. Hunt had a duty, based on "common practice in the industry," to transport the container with an intact seal because Zielinski was not named as an expert in discovery. The A-0731-25 judge ruled Zielinski could testify as a fact witness based on his personal observations relating to the seal. As part of the stipulated record, a Parke Toll employee testified that "if the security seal [was] broken or the security seal numbers [did] not match the inbound documents, [the] customer [was] notified and the load [was] rejected" because a lack of an intact seal indicates the possibility that the food product within a container may have been "tamper[ed]" with. Mecca offered Zielinski's testimony on the requisite standard of care. He testified that: [t]hrough [his] years of experience and the business industry, . . . a seal is a lock. [The seal] is a specific lock that you put on a load from stopping from entering an unauthorized personnel into the load. Seal i[s] common in the industry, it is not to be broken under [any] circumstances. [It is] [o]nly to be broken by the receiver [at] the time it[ is] delivered. That means if the seal is broken, the load was tampered with. . . . And at that time, the receiver is able or authorized or whatever [it] chooses to accept the load or refuse the load because the load is not [] intact. Zielinski's opinion was premised on his extensive experience in the shipping industry in which he "had been employed by a few companies, mostly major freight forwarding companies," working as a traffic manager, or variation s of that title, on "transportation operation[s]." On the issue of damages, Mecca proffered the testimony of Peggy Mecca, president and owner of Mecca. She testified that Mecca's claim was based on A-0731-25 the value of the entire shipment of Fibersol because "a broken seal on a food product compromises the integrity of the product." On August 24, 2022, the trial judge entered judgment in favor of J.B. Hunt on Mecca's negligence claim, supported by a written decision. The judge found that the seal on the container was intact when it arrived in Illinois and the seal was "broken []in the J.B. Hunt yard in [Illinois] by a J.B. Hunt driver" before it was delivered to Decatur. The judge concluded expert testimony was required to establish "J.B. Hunt breached the standard [of care] in the industry by breaking the seal" and, because Zielinski was not permitted to testify as an expert, Mecca "failed to establish the standard of care . . . and breach of the standard through expert testimony." The judge also ruled Mecca was required to establish, through expert testimony, "that a broken seal on a food product compromises the integrity of the product . . . and caused damages." She found Peggy Mecca's testimony on that issue was "not admissible" because she was not "designated, proffered[,] or qualified as an expert sufficient to testify that broken seals compromise integrity of food products." Mecca appealed from the August 24, 2022 judgment. J.B. Hunt did not cross-appeal from the October 22, 2020 order denying its motion for summary judgment based on preemption, the December 29, 2020 order denying A-0731-25 reconsideration of that motion, or the July 22, 2022 order denying its in limine motion on the same issue (preemption orders). On May 30, 2024, we reversed, concluding the trial judge erred by excluding Zielinski's testimony on the applicable standard of care. We found "Zielinski was qualified to opine on the requisite standard of care on [the] negligence claim" and should have been permitted to testify regarding the applicable standard of care "[b]y virtue of his extensive professional experience and personal knowledge about the facts of this case." Because Zielinski's testimony was based on his "personal knowledge of the matter," it was admissible as lay opinion pursuant to N.J.R.E. 701 and he "was not required to be designated as an expert witness or prepare a report in order to testify." We also determined the judge "erred in concluding [Mecca] could not establish damages without expert testimony." We noted Mecca's negligence claim is "based on the broken seal and the deviation from the shipping procedure rather than . . . adulteration of the Fibersol" and the calculation of damages in this case is not so esoteric that it requires expert testimony. We found "[t]he rejection of the shipment based on the broken seal resulted in damages to Mecca" and it was "entitled to recover its actual damages" resulting from the rejection of the shipment. Specifically, the $63,425 it "paid ADM . . . for the lost A-0731-25 Fibersol." We remanded the matter "for reconsideration of the trial evidence consistent with the standards set forth in [the] opinion." On remand, the case was assigned to a third judge. On October 3, 2025, that judge entered judgment in favor of Mecca on its negligence claim in the amount of $63,425, supported by an oral decision. The judge found "through the testimony of Zielinski . . . Mecca adequately establishe[d] the requisite standard of care in the industry" and J.B. Hunt breached that standard of care by breaking the seal on the container before it was delivered to Parke Toll. The judge also found Mecca "established the existence and the quantum of damages . . . through the testimony of . . . Peggy Mecca" who testified the "monetary value of the entire Fibersol shipment" was "$63,425 which had previously been paid to ADM." He found that "testimony sufficiently establishe[d] both proximate cause" and that Mecca's damages "constituted . . . the full value of the shipment." This second appeal followed. On appeal, J.B. Hunt argues Mecca failed to prove negligence or damages. It contends "without proof of adulteration to the Fibersol, there could be no proven damage[s] to the Fibersol, such that the absence of a seal could not possibly result in a finding of negligence." It also argues the remand judge's decision "is unreasonable" because Mecca "failed to establish any contractual or other standard of care owed by [J.B. Hunt] and failed to establish any breach of A-0731-25 a standard though evidentiary or expert testimony as required under New Jersey law." It contends "there was no bill of lading requirement or other agreement . . . to deliver the shipment with an intact seal." J.B. Hunt argues the testimony of Mecca's witnesses "was not reliably independent or dispositive of industry standards[] but was subjective and tainted." J.B. Hunt reprises its argument that "[a]n expert was required to ascertain the standard of care owed . . . and if there was a breach of any such standard" and Zielinski was neither qualified to offer that opinion, nor was he "designated as an expert in accordance with the discovery schedule." J.B. Hunt also contends Mecca "had no standing" to assert a negligence claim because the Carmack Amendment "clearly states that only carriers are liable to the person entitled to recover under the bill of lading" and Mecca was "not listed as the shipper on the bill of lading and acted only as the broker." It claims Mecca's payment to ADM was a "voluntary payment" that "did not comply with the requirements of law for [Mecca] to obtain an assignment from . . . ADM . . . to have standing." J.B. Hunt renews its argument that Mecca's negligence claim was preempted by the Carmack Amendment. It further claims "[t]here is no standing to maintain a Carmack Amendment cause of action without an assignment of interest" and Mecca "was not the real party in interest to maintain this suit at A-0731-25 trial." It contends "[c]learly, if there is no standing to sue on a Carmack cause of action, there is no basis to have standing to sue on a negligence cause of action in the same [c]omplaint." It also claims the district court "ruled that without damages to the cargo there could be no negligence" and the remand judge "should not have allowed or accepted any evidence or testimony of possible damage to the subject cargo as being a basis for [Mecca's] unilateral voluntary payment of monies to its customer ADM." Having reviewed the record and the remand judge's decision in light of our prior opinion, we are convinced J.B. Hunt's arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant extended discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). We add the following brief comments. Our review of a final determination made following a bench trial is "subject to a limited and well-established scope of review." Seidman v. Clifton Sav. Bank, S.L.A., 205 N.J. 150, 169 (2011). We do not disturb a trial court's findings of fact unless "convinced that those findings and conclusions [a]re 'so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevan t and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice.'" Griepenburg v. Twp. of Ocean, 220 N.J. 239, 254 (2015) (quoting Rova Farms Resort v. Invs. Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)). A-0731-25  Here, the remand judge properly considered the stipulated record in accordance with our prior opinion. His factual findings were amply supported by evidence in the record, and he correctly applied those facts to the law. Mecca proved the applicable standard of care, breach of that standard of care, and resulting damages in accordance with our prior opinion. Mecca did not need to establish a separate contractual basis for its claim. J.B. Hunt's argument that expert testimony in addition to Zielinski's testimony was required to establish the applicable standard of care was expressly considered and rejected in our prior opinion, as was its claims that Zielinski was not qualified to offer that opinion or designated as an expert. Likewise, its claim that Mecca was required to prove the Fibersol was actually adulterated was expressly considered and rejected in our prior opinion. Mecca suffered damages because J.B. Hunt broke the seal on the container causing the Fibersol to be deemed unusable and destroyed. J.B. Hunt's argument that the district court ruled Mecca could not prove its negligence claim because the Fibersol was not damaged is incorrect. The district court expressly declined to consider Mecca's negligence claim. There is no support for J.B. Hunt's argument that Mecca could not assert a negligence claim because it did not have an assignment of ADM's right to assert a claim under the Carmack Amendment. Additionally, J.B. Hunt's arguments regarding A-0731-25 standing to assert a claim under the Carmack Amendment are irrelevant. Mecca's Carmack Amendment claim was dismissed by the district court in 2019. J.B. Hunt's argument that Mecca's negligence claim was preempted by the Carmack Amendment was waived. In the prior appeal, J.B. Hunt did not cross- appeal from the preemption orders. As a result, that argument was waived and cannot be raised in a subsequent appeal. R. 2:2-3(a)(1), 2:3-4(a), 2:4-2(a); see Burbridge v. Paschal, 239 N.J. Super. 139, 151-52 (App. Div. 1990) (quoting Franklin Discount Co. v. Ford, 27 N.J. 473, 491 (1958)) ("[Our] Supreme Court rather conclusively stated: 'The plaintiff has not cross-appealed from the judgment below and we have held that a party, in order to attack the actions below which were adverse to him, must pursue a cross-appeal.'"). In addition, the preemption issue could not properly be raised on remand. When a case is remanded on a limited basis, as in this case, the issues presented include only those specifically enumerated in the reviewing court's opinion. Tomaino v. Burman, 364 N.J. Super. 224, 232-33 (App. Div. 2003). Here, the only question the court was instructed to consider on remand was whether Mecca proved its negligence claim based on the stipulated record in accordance with our prior opinion. Nothing in our remand decision directed the remand judge to consider whether Mecca's negligence claim was preempted by the Carmack Amendment. A-0731-25 Affirmed. A-0731-25